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The Décriminalisation of Suicide
Abstract
This thesis examines the passage of the Act which decriminahsed suicide in England 
and Wales in 1961. Although often listed with other reforms of the period under the 
label "permissive", en^irical evidence reveals this to be a serious misreading of what 
the Suicide Act was actually designed to acconq)lish. This thesis argues that, far ftom 
the decriminahsation being a relinquishing of state control over a deviant behaviour, 
the Suicide Act - which was a government, not a Private Member's Bill - stands as an 
unusually exphcit exanq>le of a transfer of responsibihty for control of a deviant 
behaviour ft*om criminal justice to medical jurisdiction in the interests of establishing 
more effective control. Further, the thesis argues that the passage was only possible 
because of a unique and short-lived conjunction of structure and agency. The long 
positivist trend towards re-deftning deviancy as a medical, not a moral, matter was at 
its peak in the late 1950s, at a time when the upheavals of war and unprecedented 
affluence had created a climate conducive to social change. However these conditions, 
while necessary, were not sufficient to effect the passage of the Act. Suicide law 
reform was not a matter of popular concern and the profound moral and rehgious 
inq)hcations of suicide itself made it the kind of sensitive subject governments generally 
leave to private members. Drawing on cabinet and government papers now available, 
and on interviews with key participants in the passage of the Act, this thesis seeks to 
demonstrate that suicide would not have been decriminalised without the actions of 
three very specific human agents, and at the same time to show how these actions were 
shaped by, and their success dependent upon, structural elements that both constrained 
and guided them
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The Décriminalisation of Suicide
Chapter 1: Introduction
Suicide, considered a crime of high seriousness and great wickedness for well over a 
thousand years, was decriminahsed by statute in England and Wales in 1961, The 
Suicide Act, which in contrasting clauses decriminalised suicide but criminalised its 
assistance, passed through Parliament in the spring and summer of 1961 virtually 
unnoticed. It has not been examined in any subsequent pubhshed work.
On the face of it, this lack of attention is extraordinary for a number of reasons: One is 
that cfecriminahsation is a very rare phenomenon. The Suicide Act was the first of 
only a very small handfid of such measures in the 20th or any other century. Another 
reason is that the behaviour the Act formally deemed to be no longer a crime had not 
become morally acceptable; indeed it was roundly condemned in the very debates 
which decriminahsed it. A third reason the absence of notice is curious is that Clause 
n  of the Act dealt with, and formally criminahsed for the first time, one of the most 
controversial issues of modem times: assisted suicide.
At a more technical level, but equally curious to students of law reform, is the fact that 
the Suicide Act was a government measure. Such 'issues of conscience' in Britain 
traditionally make their way into law by means of Private Members' Bills. Even more 
pecuhar is the fact that this radical reform - radical insofar as it was a decriminahsation 
of a sensitive moral matter - was brought forward by a Conservative government, and 
passed by what pohtical analysts reckon to be one of the most conservative (smah 'c') 
Parhaments of the century.
Why and how this came to happen are the questions this thesis wih attençt to answer.
The research draws upon, and seeks to contribute to, two interlinked contençorary 
debates. The first is the question of whether the social reform legislation passed in 
Britain in the late 1950s and '60s really was "permissive" as is generally assumed; and 
second, to the larger debate about how the criminal law is formed and changes.
As regards the first debate, although the Suicide Act has not been subject to any 
academic examination, it is generally mentioned in discussions of the mid-century 
measures which are labelled "permissive". ^  This label, usually taken to mean a 
loosening of state control over certain kinds of behaviour, has been attached to 
changes in the laws on prostitution (1959), censorship (1959 and 1964), betting and 
gaming (1961), capital punishment (1956 and 1965), abortion (1967), homosexuahty 
(1968), and divorce (1969).
Certainly on the face of it, the Suicide Act looks like a loosening of control,^ as Clause 
1 straightforwardly decriminalises suicide, and by implication attenq>ted suicide. 
Moreover, it was passed in 1961, right in the middle of the period in question. Clause 
2, which created a new crime of aiding another's suicide, with a heavy maximum 
penalty (14 years), might have raised doubts about its "permissive" nature, but as 
already mentioned, the Act has never been examined in this way. (The Act is 
produced at appendix A)
People who accept the idea that the period and the legislation enacted during it were 
'permissive' are split between those who beheve it was overall a good thing, and those 
who believe it definitely was not. The first group characterise it using words like 
'tolerant', 'humane', 'civilising', liberating' (Annan 1990, Levin 1979, Marwick 1982, 
Thonq)son 1991.) The second group use words like 'self indulgent', 'demoralising', 
'irresponsible', 'degenerate' (Gummer 1971, Whitehouse 1971, Johnson 1983, 
Himmelfarb 1996). Nevertheless, both groups agree on the basic premise that the 
legislation represented an easing of ofi&cial sanctions on some kinds of social
behaviour. However, a small group of academic writers have emerged who challenge 
this interpretation. They suggest that the true nature of the reforms was not to loosen 
control, but to restructure it in an attempt to make it more effective. Among the most 
influential proponents of this view are Stuart Hall (1980) and Tim Newbum (1992). 
Both Hall and Newbum focus on the legislative changes of the period that involved 
sexual behaviour but imply that their analysis is relevant to other statutes labelled 
'permissive'. In Hall's case he specifically mentions the Suicide Act in a list of what he 
calls the "Butler reforms". Hall asks the question: "Was the legislation, in sum, a sort 
of restmcturing of the moral sphere, which under the veneer of permissiveness and 
hberahsation, actually tightened the control by the state and the law over moral 
conduct - regulating and tuning it more finely? Or was the logic of its tendency a more 
contradictory one?" (Hall 1980: 7)
Hall concludes that, "There was, it seems, an identifiable strategy. Essentially this 
consisted of setting into practice a 'double taxonomy in the field of moral regulation. 
In each domain there is an increased regulation by the state, a greater intervention in 
the field of moral conduct - sometimes making more refined distinctions and often 
taking a more punitive and repressive form than previously existing mechanisms of 
regulation and control. At the same time other areas of conduct are exempted from 
legal regulation - and, so to speak, from the gaze of morahty..." (Hall 1980:17) This 
'double taxonomy as defined by Hall stands as a remarkably apt description of the 
Suicide Act, which exempted suicide from legal regulation, but made "aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring another's suicide" a new and very serious crime.
The source of this strategy, according to Hall, is to be found in the Woftenden Report 
on homosexuality and prostitution which set out a "new principle for articulating the 
field of moral ideology" (Hall 1980:11). This principle. Hall says, was a clear 
separation of pubhc and private spheres of personal behaviour; a sharp distinction 
between morality and illegahty, between what was a 'sin' and what was a 'crime'. It
was the Wolfenden Report that made the much quoted statement that " Unless a 
deUberate atten^t is to be made by society, acting through the agency of the law, 
to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of 
private morality and immorahty which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's 
business." (Cmnd. 247 1956-57: para 61)
Newbum agrees about the in^ortance of what he says has become known as the 
"Wolfenden strategy" (Newbum 1992:56), which he claims resulted in "redrawing the 
boundaries between state control and private morality" (ibid: 179). What happened, 
according to Newbum, is that "the boundaries of what is considered to be private 
behaviour are extended and the areas of pubhc behaviour are more minutely defined 
and subjected to increased surveillance" (ibid: 161) The relevance of this analysis to 
this thesis becomes apparent once one reahses that the practical efifect of the 
decriminahsation was to re-define successfid suicide as "private behaviour", outside the 
state's jurisdiction, but attempted suicide as "pubhc behaviour", and a legitimate object 
of state intervention. This interpretation is examined in chapters 3 and 4.
Hah and Newbum both focus their attention specificaUy on the laws relating to sexual 
behaviour, but the evidence gathered for this thesis shows their interpretation does 
have inq)ortant explanatory potential for aspects of the Suicide Act that are otherwise 
inexphcable. This evidence, in tum, makes a contribution to the debate about the tme 
nature of the so-caUed "permissive" legislation.
The second contenq)orary debate with which this research is engaged is of much 
longer duration and wider range. Contributors to the ancient debate about how 
criminal laws emerge and change come bringing a host of sophisticated theoretical 
perspectives - philosophical, sociological, jurispmdential - which are ill served by the 
sinq)listic reductionism ofl:en imposed upon them. Nevertheless, despite that, some 
organising principle does have to be inq)osed if the theoretical perspectives are to be of
any practical use in understanding real life events. This thesis does this by following a 
path marked out by many more distinguished predecessors and groups the perspectives 
into two carrés, titled respectively "traditional" and "revisionist".
Traditional perspectives are the ones most widely represented in social history of all 
kinds, and in the orthodox approaches to social reform legislation. These perspectives 
use an evolutionary paradigm which sees human af&irs as movmg forward - however 
slowly and haltingly - from barbarism toward civilisation, influenced by immediate 
circumstances and affected from time to time by human agents. In this perspective 
social reform legislation simply reflects this on-going process; the law changes as the 
attitudes and mores of society change. Most of the traditional camp would accept that 
control concerns are among the motives for reform legislation; but then, most 
traditionalists consider social order a basic necessity, and its enhancement a legitimate 
objective.
Revisionists use quite a different paradigm. They view social reform legislation as 
tactical manoeuvring within an overarching strategy aimed at maintaining and 
enhancing social control, which they portray in a sinister light. Revisionists see reform 
legislation as a means of extending repressive power, part of the "technology of 
subjection" inseparable from the modem "disciplinary society".^
If one is dealing only with theory, it may be possible to choose one and remain aloo( 
ignoring conq)eting perspectives. But real life is more conq)licated, and any attempt to 
cram empirical data into the procmstean bed of a single theory usually does damage to 
the facts. In the case of this thesis, neither a traditional nor a revisionist perspective 
alone can adequately explain the empirical evidence about suicide law. The data as it 
emerged in the research, clearly required a more flexible approach, and this is what has 
heen used. A satisfectory understanding of the law forbidding suicide can be gained 
by viewing the data through a traditional lens, but the picture goes conq>letely out of
focus when this by itself is apphed to the decriminahsation. A plausible explanation of 
what really happened to the law on suicide in 1961 is only possible by using both an 
evolutionary paradigm and the concepts supphed by revisionist theory. This 
explanation, and the data that supports it, constitute the body of this thesis. What 
follows here is a brief summary of how the theoretical perspectives informed the 
research and influenced its conclusions.
The traditional, orthodox approach to social history sees the "permissive" reforms of 
the 1950s and '60s as logical outcomes of certain long term trends which destabihsed 
the class structure and undercut traditional moral authority. The resulting volatile mix 
was enriched by the increasing affluence of the 1950s and created a context ripe for 
revolutionary changes in social behaviour and the laws that regulate it. This context 
and the effect it had on the passage of the Suicide Act are examined in chapter 3.
The credibihty of traditional perspectives in general and in particular their appHcabihty 
to suicide law is enhanced by their links with classic sociological and jurisprudential 
thought. With Max Weber, for exançle, who said changes in law reflect its increasing 
rationahty as, freed from the shackles of rehgious superstition, it is shaped into an 
instrument for reahsing human objects. At one level this interpretation works very 
well as an explanation of the law against suicide (see chapter 2), which began as a 
rehgious prohibition and ended in "rational" discussions about its ineffectiveness and 
unfairly random apphcation (see chapters 3 and 7).
The en^irical history of the law against suicide also has clear links with Emile 
Durkheim, who saw criminal law as the tangible manifestation of the "coUective 
conscience", the presence of which marked the bounds of acceptable behaviour. 
Overstepping these boundaries, Durkheim said, evokes a savage and punitive 
response, but as the coUective conscience changes, the boundaries, and thus the law, 
changes too. This seems to have been what happened, quite visibly, with suicide, as
for centuries the corpses of self-killers were savagely mutilated and ritually degraded, 
but the practice gradually faded as attitudes towards suicide changed, until only the 
restrictions on religious burial remained. Interestingly, Durkheim, who used suicide as 
the platform on which to build his "rules of sociological method", was himself quite 
clear about its out-of-bounds status. In Book 3, Chapter 2 of Suicide (1897) he 
argues that "society is injured" by suicide so "it must be forbidden" and "we cannot 
tolerate it under any circumstances" (Durkheim 1979:337)
The links with J.S. Mill are of particular inq)ortance to discussions of 1950s and '60s 
legislative changes. Not only does his "greatest good" utilitarianism offer a theoretical 
structure in which they could be interpreted, he also provided the principle that gave 
many advocates of the reforms a philosophical grounding. The Mill doctrine, familiar 
from countless repetitions, is that the only justification for state interference in personal 
hberty is to prevent harm to others.\ The use of this doctrine and its relationship to 
suicide has been exhaustively examined by Joel Feinberg in Harm to Self (1986), vol. 3 
in his series on The Moral Limits o f the Criminal Law.^
Traditional perspectives on social reform legislation also have aflSnities with classic 
jurisprudential formulations about common law. This is inq)ortant to this thesis 
because when suicide was a crime, it was a crime at common law. These formulations 
(Blackstone 1765-9, Savigny 1831, Maine 1866, Dicey 1905) see law developing 
organically out of the customs and traditions of a particular society and changing as the 
society changes. Maine also pointed out (1866: chapter 2) that such law, once in 
place, inevitably lagged behind changes in the culture. His theory of how this lag was 
addressed ahgns particularly well with the history of suicide law. In progressive 
societies, Maine said, three mechanisms are used: first, "legal fictions" are invented. 
These are ideas deliberately assumed to be true, regardless of their vahdity, in order to 
by-pass awkward and/or anachronistic laws. The letter of the law remains, but the way 
it fimctions changes. This describes the situation in regard to suicide, where from the
15th century people who killed themselves were usually deemed to have been insane, 
and so their corpse and family escaped the criminal penalties inflicted on self- 
murderers, (see chapter 2) Next, Maine says, comes "equity", which allows flexibihty 
in the law in the interests of larger concepts of fairness and justice. This could be a 
description of the situation in the 20th century when the poHce were given wide 
ranging discretion over whether or not to prosecute attempted suicides, and courts 
increasingly softened the sanctions imposed on people convicted of this offence (see 
chapter 3). As for successfid suicides, in 1928 coroners' courts were instructed to use 
the 6ce-saving formula "while the balance of mind was disturbed" when bringing in a 
verdict of suicide, usually without any evidence on which to base such an assunq)tion. 
(Atkinson 1978) Finally, Maine said, changes are formally enacted in legislation; 
which, of course, could be taken to refer to the Suicide Act of 1961.
A much more contemporary contribution to the jurisprudential debate about how law 
changes - and one which is immediately relevant to this thesis, has been made by 
Ronald Dworkin, formerly Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and Professor of Law 
at New York University. "Law is an interpretive concept" Dworkin says (1993:410), 
and has apphed this idea in a series of books dealing with "life" issues - abortion, 
euthanasia and assisted suicide {Law's Empire 1991, Life’s Dominion 1993, Freedom’s 
Law 1996). His detailed examination of the furious conflicts about these "sanctity of 
life" issues in recent decades contrasts dramatically with the total absence of 
controversy - and indeed interest - that accompanied the Suicide Act. It was an early 
indication that there was something unusual about the passage of this Act.
Traditional evolutionary perspectives are what are used by most existing histories of 
particular pieces of 1950s and '60s legislation. Actually, there are relatively few of 
these, which is surprising in view of the joumahstic and pohtical attention they 
continue to receive (see Newbum, chapter 1). The ones there are - Hindeh and Simms 
on abortion (1971), Dixon on betting and gaming (1991), Christoph on capital
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punishment (1962), Stone on divorce (1990), Weeks on homosexuality (1981) - all 
record the same kind of pattern: an evolutionary process of persistent lobbying by 
advocates of change, the formation of pressure groups, discussions among the 
intelligentsia, more lobbying, government examination via committees of enquiry and 
Royal Commissions, more lobbying, and finally, the emergence of legislation, most 
ofl;en by means of a Private Members' Bill. None of this happened in regard to the 
Suicide Act, and the conq)lete absence of the usual pattern was another indication that 
a traditional perspective was unlikely to fit the facts of this particular social reform.
There is, of course, a problem faced by all histories which use a traditional perspective 
and an evolutionary paradigm. Their Achilles' heel - as is endlessly pointed out by their 
critics - is the assumption that there is at any given time a consensus in society about 
what is acceptable social behaviour. Such an assumption, the critics say, cannot 
survive even a single clear-eyed look at the real world. They might cite the bitter 
controversy over "permissiveness" mentioned above as an appropriate exanq)le.
The absence of consensus, however, while it renders traditional explanations of the 
reform inadequate, does not make them useless. They continue to have important 
explanatory power in respect of many aspects of the law on suicide, as is indicated 
above and discussed more fully in chapters 2 and 3. The inadequacies of this approach 
become apparent, however, when an attempt is made to apply a traditional, 
evolutionary perspective to the actual decriminahsation. There are simply too many 
questions it cannot answer. Chief among these is why the decriminahsation happened 
at all, since there was no visible pubhc feeling - or even interest - in the issue, no 
reform lobby promoting change, and no discernible pohtical reason for initiating a 
potentiaUy controversial "moral" reform Traditional approaches can also not explain 
why the J.S. MiU style rhetoric about individual fi'eedom, which was such a prominent 
feature of the high profile hbertarian debates of the period^ was completely missing 
fi"om discussion of the Suicide Act. Neither can a traditional approach adequately
e?q)laiii why, although the focus of the legislation was the criminal status of suicide, the 
actual Parliamentary debate on the Bill was almost entirely about attempted suicide.
All these matters, and a number of others to do with the decriminahsation, are 
inexphcable when viewed through any of the traditionahst paradigms about social 
reform legislation. But quite plausible explanations emerge when a revisionist 
perspective is apphed.
Revisionists take as their starting point the absence of consensus, considering it to be a 
self-evident fact of human existence. In its absence, anarchy and social breakdown are 
ever present possibihties, so social order, created and maintained by ah means possible, 
is the sine qua non for society's survival. The roots of this position, of course, go back 
at least as far as Hobbes, who was in no doubt that absolute sovereign power was the 
only way to forestah chaos. Law, in the revisionist view, does not reflect a 
"cohective conscience" (since there isn't one), nor does it evolve in response to 
society's changing needs. It is sinq)ly one of a number of mechanisms by which the 
state maintains order and controls deviant behaviour.^
In Visions o f Social Control (1985), Stan Cohen describes the revisionist conception 
as involving "master patterns" laid down in the 19th century in which social control is a 
"spreading web of power" grounded in the knowledge and expertise of professionals in 
the social services. This perspective, apphed to the "permissive" reforms of the 1950s 
and '60s, claims that "the oiigmal line of professional knowledge and power has never 
been broken" and moves such as "delegahsation" are "understandable merely as further 
twists in the long spiral which has symbioticahy linked the control system with the 
behavioural sciences." (Cohen 1985:101)
The revisionist perspective, of course, has been much influenced by Foucault, whose 
examination - "archaeology" - of deviance control systems identified "medicahsation"
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and especially psychiatry, as central to the social order project. In Madness and 
Civilisation (1961, English translation 1967) Foucault made the (then) radical proposal 
that the story of Pmel's great "hberation" of the insane in 19th century France could he 
read another way. In 1963 his Birth o f the Clinic queried traditional views of medical 
humanism. And in 1975 in Discipline and Punish, Foucault explicitly set out the 
revisionist stance: "The reform of the criminal law," he said, "must now be read as a 
strategy for the rearrangement of the power to punish, according to modahties that 
render it more regular, more effective, more constant and more detailed in its effects." 
(Foucault 1977:80)
Many writers in the 1970s and '80s used and developed the idea that all the actions and 
institutions of the state are social control mechanisms (see Cohen & Scull, Social 
Control and the State 1983). In line with Foucault's images of ubiquitous, faceless 
power (and indeed with Hobbes' image of Leviathan), most of them invested the 
concept with an aura of sinister oppression.
An inq)ortant subset of this social control hterature is concerned with the concept of 
the "medicahsation of deviance". What it refers to, as Garland (1985) pointed out, was 
a logical outcome of 19th and 20th century determinism, since it is based on the idea 
that deviant behaviour is a pathology "caused" by factors that can be "treated" by 
professional intervention. "Use of the medical metaphor grew apace," Scull said, "for 
it legitimised both heightened ofhcial discretion and the emphasis on individual 
variabihty." (Scuh 1983:149) Revisionist social control writers challenged the widely 
held assunq)tion that putting deviance into the hands of the medical estabhshment was 
a humane and progressive move; something to be approved and encouraged. They 
argued that the "care" was only a disguise for control, and the conq>assionate rhetoric 
a cloak for coercion. Transferring deviants from courts to clinics, revisionists claimed, 
and re-defining "bad" as "mad", was actually done in order to enhance control, as it 
removed the irritating mq)ediment of due process and authorised extensive intervention
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in the name of treatment.^ Thomas Szaz supphed a specific example of how this 
model views the suicide issue. In a much quoted essay he said, "I consider the 
psychiatric stigmatisation of people as 'suicide risks' and their incarceration in 
psychiatric institutions a form of punishment, and a severe one at that... The physician 
uses the rhetoric of illness and treatment to justify his forcible intervention in the life of 
a feUow human being." (Szaz 1981:189)
There is by now a substantial body of theoretical work on these themes - i.e. how the 
modem state controls deviant behaviour and also on wdiat is deemed the "medical 
model".^ There is, however, not very much empirical research into any actual 
legislation that formally inplements the strategies described. It is in this area, then, 
that this thesis seeks to make a contribution, and engages directly with the ancient 
debate about the emergence and change of the criminal law. It is only right to admit, 
however, that the outcome which constitutes this contribution was unexpected. The 
original plan of the project, the hypothesis it set out to prove, was in fact disproved by 
the empirical evidence. The plan, which drew on standard histories of social reform 
and used an evolutionary paradigm, had been to show that the hitherto unexamined 
Suicide Act, seemingly so radical in its bald decriminahsation of behaviour long 
considered immoral and wicked, indicated a significant shift in the relationship between 
law and morahty in the direction of individual freedom and personal sovereignty. To 
the initial disappointment of the researcher, the evidence would not support such an 
hypothesis.
While there was atople evidence (see chapters 2 and 3) that there had indeed been 
important changes in attitudes about morals and the law,^  ^ their relationship to the 
decriminahsation of suicide was tangential. The evidence directly concerning the 
passage of the Suicide Act suggested that it was not a decrirninahsation at ah, but 
instead an unexpected empirical exarq)le of revisionist theory. That is to say, it was 
not a relinquishing of state control over deviant behaviour - which is what
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"décriminalisation" appears to mean. It was a straight transfer of responsibility for a 
deviant behaviour (in this case atten^ted suicide) from criminal justice to medical 
jurisdiction in the interests of more effective control, (see chapters 4 and 7).
It is the case that revisionist perspectives place far more emphasis on structure than 
they do on agency. Individuals are seen as acting out structurally defined roles with 
the outcomes not dependent on particular personalities. But the evidence about the 
reform of the suicide law shows that a very small handful of people - in fact just three - 
played a crucial role as individuals in the passage of the Suicide Act (see chapter 6). 
Structure may have informed and constrained their actions, but they chose to act, and 
it was the strategies and tactics they deployed which shaped the outcome.
All three individuals, in the way they advocated the décriminalisation of suicide, were 
reflecting but also employing the determinist paradigm which was intellectually 
fashionable in mid-century Britain (see chapter 3). It allowed them, when dealing with 
the suicide issue, to by-pass difficult questions about "right" and "wrong" actions, and 
also issues about the symbohc power of law to influence behaviour. They were not 
concerned with the "symbohc" meaning of the change in the law, and indeed went out 
of their way to emphasise that no chaUenge to the existing interpretation of suicide as 
morally wrong was intended. This interpretation was, to them, of no consequence 
compared to the practical issue of how the state could deal more effectively with the 
problem of attenq)ted suicide. It is true they were concerned to re-define the problem 
- from "crime" to "mental illness", but the purpose of the redefinition was pragmatic, 
not symbohc: it was the mechanism by which the transfer could be effected.
The ultimate success of this approach, of course, was dependent on the skih and style 
of the protagonists. They may have felt conventional ideas of "right" and "wrong" 
behaviour were irrelevant to the issue, but many people did not, and were prepared to 
say so (see chapters 3, 5 and 7). However the strategy used to pass the Suicide Act
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managed to avoid any direct challenge to this school of thought, while still effecting a 
major change in the way the state dealt with attempted suicide. The magnitude of this 
achievement would not be underestimated by others who have tried to change laws 
with a moral dimension. The facts of the case suggest it is most unlikely to have 
happened if a particular personahty had not at a particular time had a unique hold on 
the levers of power.
The history of the Suicide Act, then, argues for a revaluation of the role of human 
agency in human affairs. In doing this it joins what Quentin Skinner describes as a "cry 
from many different directions for the development of a hermeneutic approach" 
(1997:6). While it does not suggest that agents should be reinstated to the pre-eminent 
position they held in old style social histories, the story of the passage of the Suicide 
Act shows that individuals do make choices, even if in circumstances not of their own 
choosing, and those choices have real effects.
Methodolosv
The methodology used for this research has followed standard historical research 
practice in drawing on both primary and secondary sources.
Primary sources included records in the Pubhc Record Office at Kew, the Butler 
papers at Trinity College Cambridge, Church of England archives m Bermondsey, the 
British Medical Association archives in Tavistock Square in London, Magistrate 
Association records at Fitzroy Square, London, Metropohtan Pohce records held at 
Buckingham Gate, and the contemporaneous media stored at Colindale. 
Parliamentary Official Records (Hansards), Government papers and Judicial Statistics 
used are in the British Library of Pohtical and Economic Science at the LSE.
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But however full the records and detailed the documents, it is hard to gain from these 
alone an accurate picture of a complex happening. Moreover, one of the prescriptions 
of modem social research is that any adequate account of social behaviour should 
include the subjective interpretations of the actors involved. So among the most 
important primary sources for this research have been the interviews conducted with 
people who were involved in some way, either directly in the Act itself or in the 
surrounding context which influenced its passage. (A full hst of these people appears 
at Appendix I)
On the actual passage of the Bill through Parliament (chapter 7), the personal 
experiences drawn on include those of the Minister who actually put it through the 
Commons, the two top civil servants in the Home Office at the time, the Departmental 
Minister of State, and two former heads of the Home Office Research Unit. They also 
include the recollections of Roy (now Lord) Jenkins, the opposition M.P. and 
subsequent Home Secretary who was deeply involved in much of the reform legislation 
of the period. To these are added the quite different perspectives of Leo Abse, the 
backbench Labour M.P. who nearly destroyed the Bill, and four of the five surviving 
members of the Commons Committee.
The climate of opinion outside Parhament at the time was explored in an interview 
with Lord (Noel) Annan, who as Provost of Kings College Cambridge at the time and 
then Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, was a leading member of the 
intellectual establishment for over thirty years. His books about the period. The 
Intellectual Aristocracy (1956) and Our Age: Portrait o f a Generation (1990), vividly 
convey the temper of the "thinking classes", which was an unsteady mix of positivism, 
romantic libertarianism and enthusiasm for change (see chapter 3). Attitudes 
specifically towards suicide in the 1950s and '60s were discussed with the Rev. Chad 
Varah, who founded the suicide-prevention charity The Samaritans in London in 
1953. The curious question of why the Church did not object to the decriminahsation
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(see chapter 5) was examined in an interview with the Rev. Professor G.R Dimstan, 
who as secretary to the Church of England Board for Social Responsibihty convened 
the committee that produced the highly influential booklet Ought Suicide to be a 
Crime? in 1959.
The three main protagonists of the decriminahsation of suicide - Rab Butler, Kenneth 
Robinson and Doris Odium - are now ah dead. But their importance to the Act was 
such (see chapter 6) that it was worth going to some lengths to gather personal 
memories of people who knew them. Butler was by far the most famous of the three, 
and various perspectives on his enigmatic personahty were supphed by his widow, his 
official biographer, his Permanent Secretary and his junior Ministers at the Home 
Office at the time, his Parhamentary Private Secretary, and a number of present and 
former M P.s and members of the estabhshment who knew him during his more than 
fifly years of pubhc life. Butler also wrote his memoirs (The Art o f the Possible 1971) 
and left copious papers and letters to Trinity Cohege, Cambridge.
Kenneth Robinson and Doris Odium, both crucial as the spurs to Butler's actions on 
suicide law, have left far more modest traces. Many of the M.P.s and former M.P.s 
spoken to in connection with this research remember Robinson well, as did Butler's 
biographer Anthony Howard. They ah spoke about his keen interest in medical 
matters and his genuine reforming zeal. Leo Abse and Lord Jenkins clearly recahed 
Robinson's advocacy of suicide law reform and suggested possible motives for it. The 
writer and social reform campaigner Rose Hacker was a volunteer worker in 
Robinson's north London constituency and was a source of useful information about 
him and also about Doris Odium.
The scant written records there are on the suicide law reform suggest that Dr. Odium 
was the prime mover of the decriminahsation (see chapters 4 and 6), an idea that 
received endorsement flrom Chad Varah. However, as she was not a pubhc figure in
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the same way as Butler and Robinson, it was more difficult to uncover personal 
recollections of her. In pursuit of these, an advertisement was placed in The 
Magistrate magazine. The responses received confirmed the itopression produced by 
the records of a doughty canq)aigner totally devoted to the "médicalisation of 
deviance". Although labelling theory had not at the time been academically articulated. 
Dr. Odium was in no doubt about the stigmatising effects of involvement with criminal 
justice agencies. She was determined that attencpted suicides should be removed fi^ om 
their remit and placed wholly in the hands of the medical establishment. And this is, in 
effect, what the passage of the Suicide Act achieved.
Besides the Bill's actual passage, the extra-Parliamentary context, and the personalities 
of the active agents, it was also considered inportant to gain a personal perspective on 
the way the law against suicide was inplemented in the years leading up to 1961, as 
this clearly was another factor inportant to the decriminahsation. It would be the key 
factor in a symbohc mteractionist interpretation, as this perspective says "Deviation is 
defined by its situation, by its perpetrators and by its audience," and emphasises the 
role of "bailiffs, pohce, psychiatrists, magistrates and doctors in the negotiation of 
deviance." (Downes and Rock 1988; 176-79) So this aspect of the issue was 
discussed in interviews with five criminal justice professionals who were practising 
before 1961. Lord (Peter) Imbert, who went on to become Commissioner of the 
Metropohtan Pohce and Roy Thomas, who became a Chief Inspector and head of the 
Vice Squad in Lambeth, both began their careers as constables on the beat in London 
in the 1950s. Colette Maitland Wame and Doreen Yardley were Probation Officers 
serving the London courts at the same time; Jeanette Stocked was a casualty nurse at 
Charing Cross Hospital in the 1950s, and went on to become a Magistrate. Ah five 
had personal experience of prosecutions against people who had tried, unsuccessfiihy, 
to kih themselves.
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In addition to the individual memories cited above, in regard to the general working of 
Parliament and the criminal justice system, the author of this thesis was able to draw 
upon over twenty years of personal experience working in both.
Plan of the thesis
This thesis sets out to examine the passage of the Suicide Act 1961, using the 
methodology and the theoretical tools described in this chapter. Chapter 2 examines 
how suicide came to be criminahsed in the first place, and tracks the route of the 
ultimate decriminahsation, which winds back through centuries of change in the law to 
a 10th century canon passed by King Edgar. Chapter 3 looks at the 20th century 
structural fiictors which were necessary for the change to happen. Chapter 4 explains 
why the 1959 Mental Health Act was so vital a factor in the reform, and how it 
provided the mechanisms to effect a transfer of control Chapter 5 is about the dog 
that did not bark - i.e. why the Church, originator and continued guardian of the 
concept of "sanctity of life" did not object to the decrirninahsation. Chapter 6 argues 
for the importance of agency to this particular piece of social reform legislation and 
describes the actions of the three people who were crucial to its success. Chapter 7 
sets out the actual passage and charts the extremely unusual route the Bill took to 
arrive on the Government's legislative agenda. Copies of the most significant 
documents fi*om the Pubhc Record Office are appended. The chapter suggests reasons 
why, once into the Lords and Commons, the BiU managed to elude the opposition 
such a measure would have been expected to encounter. FinaUy, Chapter 8 seeks to 
draw the threads together and directly address the question the thesis has examined: 
Why was suicide decriminahsed in England and Wales in 1961? The answer to this, 
based on the evidence, shows why the Suicide Act, though unremarked and formerly 
unexamined, casts a long shadow forward.
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Notes to Chapter 1
^Weeks (1981) says that "From a political and juridical perspective the term [permissive'] has been 
used to describe a particular legislative moment, producing a complex body of legislation passed in 
the decade after 1958, including reforms of the laws governing gambling, suicide, obscenity and 
censorship, Sunday entertainment, the abolition of capital punishment for murder, as well as 
liberalisation of various statutes governing sexual behaviour." (p.249). Hall (1980) has a similar list, 
divided into "two reforming periods". "The first period - the 'Butler reforms' - included the 
limitation of the death penalty (the Homicide Act 1957), the Street Offences Act 1959, the Suicide Act 
1961, and legislation affecting licensing, betting and gambling... The second - largely coincident 
with the tenure of Roy Jenkins - included the Murder (Abolition) Act 1965, the second Obscene 
Publications Act in 1964, the Sexual Offences Act 1967 (dealing with homosexuality), the Family 
Planning Act 1967, the Abortion Act 1967, legislation on divorce (1969), theatre censorship (1968) 
and the law governing Sunday entertainments." (p. 1) Newbum (1992) devotes the whole of Chapter 1 
of Permission and Regulation to a discussion of this term and its various meanings in contemporary 
debates.
^H. AL. Hart in the preface to Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) referred to the Suicide Act and said, 
"It is the first Act of Parliament for a least a century to remove altogether the penalties of the criminal 
law from a practice both clearly condemned by conventional Christian morality and punishable by 
law." Nigel Walker in an article for The Howard Journal titled "Morality and the Criminal Law" 
(1964) said, "More encouraging still, for the first time in at least a century, a crime - attempted 
suicide - has been removed from the statute book, although only after many years of ecclesiastical and 
Parliamentary resistance."
^hese phrases are from the introduction to Cohen & Scull Social Control and the State (1983), and 
represent concepts much used in revisionist writing; see for example Foucault 1967. 1969; Rothman 
1971; Szaz 1974 & 1980; Castel 1982
^Mill's actual statement from On Liberty (1859) is as follows. It is quoted in full as it would appear to 
have immediate relevance to suicide so it is of interest that it was never used in discussions of 
décriminalisation, although much cited in cormection with other reformist legislation. "The principle 
is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufBcient warrant. He cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make 
him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good 
reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but 
not for compelling him, or visiting him with an evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the 
conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The 
only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. 
In the part which merely concerns himself his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." pp. 11-12 Maurice Cranston, writing on Mill's 
essay in 1957 said it was "one of the most rational expositions of a liberal case that has ever been 
written" and that "Mill is coming to be better appreciated than he was a few years ago... There is more 
interest in him... " (Listener 10 January 1957 p.58) Noel Annan, writing about On Liberty in 1960 
said, "A century old last year and I would say that no work of such importance in political thought has 
been published by an En^ishman since." (Listener 28 January 1960 p. 171)
^Feinberg carefully teases out and examines the implications of the "Mill doctrine" as it might be 
applied to suicide. For example, in discussing the "freedom maximisation" argument attributed to 
Mill he says, "A person's freedom is extinguished by his death, so all suicide and euthanasia would 
have to be banned for the sake of maintaining the future freedom of those who would prefer to die." 
(Feinberg 1986 p. 77) He also takes apart the ideas (conflated in Mill) of de jure autonomy and de 
facto freedom and concludes "that there is a rationale for protective interference that gives decisive 
significance, after all, to respect for de jure autonomy." (p. 99) Among other things the elaborate and
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elegant arguments presented by Feinberg, stretching over four volumes, demonstrate there was much 
that could usefully have been said in the suicide debate which wasn't.
^Noel Annan in Our Age (1991) extensively details the intellectual debates of the 1950s that stressed 
individual liberty and minimal state interference in matters of morality. Journals at the time such as 
Encounter, The Listener, and The Spectator regularly carried articles with this theme. The famous 
Hart/Devlin debate on the enforcement of morals was actually coterminous with the passage of the 
Suicide Act.
^Contemporary revisionist historians sometimes write as if this was a modem insight; but it appears 
vividly in Mül's On Liberty: "Society can and does execute its own mandates: ... it practises a social 
tyraimy more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by 
such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details 
of life, and enslaving the soul itself..." (p. 5)
^Publications on this theme include: I.K. Zola Medicine as an Instrument o f Social Control (1975); 
Ivan lUich Limits to Medicine - Medical Nemesis (1977); D. Rothman Conscience and Convenience 
(1980); A. Scull Museums o f Madness (1979); and the Foucault works cited above.
^Examples include: C. Rosenberg & J. Golden Framing Disease (1992); E. Freidson Profession o f 
Medicine (1970); D. QdaldXid Punishment and Welfare (1985); R. Castel, R. Castel & A. Lovell The 
Psychiatric Society (1982); D. In^eby Mental Health and the Social Order (1983); R. Smith Trial by 
Medicine (1981)
^®Paul Rock, in his introduction to Paulus' The Search for Pure Food (1974) said, "There are 
numerous analytic traditions which touch upon legislation, but the detailed workings of the world of 
law have rarely received close scrutiny"; Tomasic in 1985 commented that "the sociology of 
legislation is still very much a neglected part of the sociology of law, despite its theoretical 
significance" and Lawrence Stone in Road to Divorce (1990) said that for his work to achieve its 
object, "it must add another component, namely the law, the neglect of which has been one of the 
worse deficiencies in historiography in all fields of enquiry over the last forty years." (p. 10)
One of the relatively few sociological studies of British legislation that does exist is David Dixon's 
From Prohibition to Regulation (1991). Dixon also comments on the scarcity of this kind of stu<fy 
and suggests it could be because sociological interest in law making (as opposed to law breaking) 
waited upon labelling and new deviancy theorists re-discovering Sutherland's insight that crime is the 
creation of the law.
^^Nigel Walker, writing in 1964, said, "I would be surprised if any country in any single decade has 
seen so much public discussion of the relationship between law and morality as England has in the 
last ten years ... in contemporary England every lay member of the legislature, and most intelligent 
men and women in the street, now have their view on this subject..." Howard Journal Vol. XI no. 3 
1964
i^The difficulty of transferring a deviant behaviour from criminal justice to medical jurisdiction is 
demonstrated by the situation in regard to drugs. Despite medical evidence about the nature of 
addiction, courts continue to regularly send addicts to prison for simple possession of proscribed 
drugs even in the absence of evidence of any other criminal behaviour. Evidence on this is set out in 
the Runciman Report on "Drugs and the Law", sponsored by the Police Foundation, 2000
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Chapter 2; History of the law against self-murder
This thesis concerns the 1961 statute that changed the legal status of suicide in 
England and Wales, making it no longer a crime. But to understand how and why 
this happened it is necessary first to consider how suicide came to be deemed a crime 
in Western culture, since it is not, and never has been, an act universally condemned 
across cultures and over time.
The origin of the law against suicide in Europe can be quite specifically identified: it 
was St. Augustine's edict damning self-killing, promulgated in the 5th century AD. in 
circumstances (outlined below) which gave it a poUtical as well as rehgious flavour. 
Between then and 1961 the law in England passed through five distinct phases: 1) in 
the 7th century Augustine's damnation of self-killing was incorporated into canon law; 
2) in the 10th century the secular state became involved by instituting forfeiture of a 
suicide's goods; 3) in the 17th/18th centuries Enhghtenment rationahsm proposed that 
suicide was neither a sin nor a crime; 4) in the 19th century attempted suicide became 
a crime, against a background of widespread change in the control of deviancy; and 
finally, 5) in the 19th and 20th centuries, enthusiasm for positivist/determinist 
explanations drained morahty fi*om discussions of deviance and created a context in 
which the médicalisation of suicide could take place. The effects - ofl;en contradictory 
and unexpected - of each of these phases are examined in this chapter.
It is iooportant to stress at the outset the contingency of all the stages, including, and 
perhaps most especially, the original prohibition. They are contingent because suicide, 
seen for so long by so many as quintessentially wicked, is in fact a usefiil exanq)le of 
the problematic nature of deviance and of the relativity of norms. ^  At different times in 
different places suicide has been admired and tolerated as ofi:en as condemned. To 
give just some exanq)les:
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In Japan, self-killing ('junshi') has long been held to be an admirable demonstration of 
love and loyalty to a master. (Encyclopaedia o f Religion and Ethics VoL 12) It was in 
this century (1912) that General Nogi and his wife disembowelled themselves on the 
death of the En^eror Meiji, and "for this act they have been held up to the youth of 
Japan as shining examples. "(Dublin & Bunzel 1933:168) Japanese kamikaze 'suicide' 
pilots in World War U were national heroes.^
In China suicide has traditionally been the only honourable course for generals 
following defeat (Encyclopaedia o f Religion and Ethics Vol. 12). In India widows 
who did not voluntarily join their husbands on the funeral pyre were subject to verbal 
and occasionally physical abuse (Venkoba Rao 1975). The Hindu dharmasutras do not 
condemn suicide; indeed, Brahmins traditionally end their lives by deliberately 
destructive ascetic rituals (Dublin & Bunzel 1933). Modem day self-immolation by 
Buddhist monks in aid of various causes has attracted world wide attention, but rarely 
condemnation for the act itself.
In many cultures (Eskimo, Arab, American Indian, among others) the aged commit 
altruistic self-destmction ("senicide") to avoid burdening the community (de Beauvoir 
1996 ).
In Norse mythology Odin (in Germany, Woden), was the father of the gods but also 
'Lord of the Hanged'. He built Valhalla for those killed by violence, whether iofhcted 
by themselves or others: warriors and suicides were welcomed, those who died a 
natural death were not(Alvarez 1990: 72-73).
Anthropologists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, researching among the 
world's remaining primitive tribes, found "Not only is there a striking difference 
regarding the frequency of suicide or its total absence among primitive peoples, but in
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addition attitudes and moral judgements vary greatly in different places. Sometimes it 
is taken as a matter of course and neither praise nor blame is attached to it. Elsewhere, 
it is highly censured; sometimes it is regarded as an honourable and courageous act."^
In western Europe attitudes to suicide have similarly varied over time. A vivid 
illustration of this is that although the Christian Church was the sole authority for the 
ban on self-murder for so long, there is no prohibition of it m the Bible, in either the 
old or new testaments. The reference to acts a modem mind would deem suicide (Le. 
Saul, Samson, Judas) are presented in the scriptures with no condemnation of self 
killing or discussion of its ethical imphcations.'*
The heritage from Greek and Roman culture in regard to suicide is ambiguous at best: 
Westermarck points out, "The Greek tragedians frequently give expression to the 
notion that suicide in certain cases is becoming to a noble mind" and also comments, 
"It seems that the Roman people, before the influence of Christianity made itself felt, 
regarded suicide with considerable moral indifference... Throughout the vdiole history 
of pagan Rome there was no statute declaring it to be a crime for an ordinary citizen to 
take his own life, though it was prohibited in the case of soldiers." (Westermarck 
1926:255)
Greek Stoicism - extremely popular in Rome during the Enq)ire and revived with 
enthusiasm in the 17th and 18th centuries - viewed an honourable death, even if self- 
inflicted, to be in all ways preferable to continuing a shamed life. Stoics beheved 
suicide could be courageous - as was Cato's, who chose to die rather than submit to 
the tyranny of Caesar; or altruistic, as Themistocles', who swallowed poison to save 
his countrymen; or it could be a rational response to intolerable circumstances or 
unbearable pain (Rist 1969). Seneca's thoughts on this have echoed down the 
centuries: "... the journey on which we have aU set out is one which does not have to
be travelled to the very end.... life is never inconq)lete if it is an honourable one. At
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whatever point you leave life, if you leave it in the right way, it is a whole. And there 
are many occasions on which a man should leave life not only bravely but for reasons 
which are not as pressing as they might be - the reasons which restrain us being not so 
pressing either" {Seneca: Letters from a Stoic 1969:12).
Alternatively, Pythagoras in the 6th century BC taught that to kill one's self is 
tantamount to a soldier deserting his post before receiving the commander's (God's) 
order to quit (Westermarck 1939:252). Plato expanded on this through Socrates in 
Phaedo: "I beheve this much is true: that we men are in the care of the gods, one of 
their possessions... so if you look at it this way I suppose it is not unreasonable to say 
that we must not put an end to ourselves until God sends some necessary 
circumstances like the one we are facing now" (i.e. the Athenian Council's decree that 
Socrates must die) (Plato: Phaedo 1993:114). Cicero (106-43 BC) repeated this 
theme in On Old Age, commenting that "Pythagoras forbids us to desert life's sentry- 
post till God, our commander, has given the word" (Cicero 1971:242).
Aristotle voiced the idea, often repeated since, that suicide is the act of a coward: 
"...to kill oneself to escape from poverty or love or anything else that is distressing is 
not courageous but rather the mark of a coward" (Aristotle 1953:130). Aristotle is 
also generally credited as the source of the idea that suicide harms the state: A man 
who kills himself Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, injures the state because 
"he is acting unjustly" and "It is for this reason that the state imposes a penalty, and a 
kind of dishonour is attached to a man who has taken his own life, on the ground that 
he is guilty of an offence against the state" (ibid.:200-201).
Early Christianity, before Augustine, did not condemn suicide, and indeed the promise 
of eternal happiness in heaven for true behevers seemed to invite it. Certainly the 
passion for martyrdom that marked the first centuries of Christianity was encouraged 
by the logic of the faith and seemed to be endorsed by the Fathers of the Church:^ St. 
Cyprian, (200-258), who himself was martyred by Valerian, was eloquent about the
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glories of martyrdom and its eternal reward. Tertullian (160-200) famously proclaimed 
that "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church." Jerome (342-420), sometime 
secretary to the Pope and first translator of the bible into Latin, exphcitly approved 
virgins' suicide to avoid rape and also endorsed religious penance harsh enough to lead 
to death.
Orisin of the law asainst suicide
So Augustine's edict damning suicide, when it came in the 5th century, was contrary to 
the contenq)orary currents of his faith. Moreover, the circumstances in which he did it 
might plausibly be used by modem conflict theorists to support their thesis. It 
happened as follows:^ Augustine (354-430) had been created Bishop of Hippo in 396, 
and in common with other Bishops of the time was part of the civil authority, acting as 
a Magistrate in a busy court of summary justice. At the time, imperial Rome had 
made peace with orthodox Christianity, which is to say Augustine's brand of 
Catholicism, but was suppressing heretics very harshly. It was also only a single 
generation since the great persecution under Diocletian, when any kind of Christianity 
had been a capital crime, punishable by death. The vigorous enforcement of that law 
under Diocletian had had the effect of inflaming further the martyr-cult that was such a 
prominent part of the early Christian church.
In 5th century North Africa, Augustine and all the other representatives of authority 
were faced with civil disorder on a grand scale, exacerbated by heretic Christian sects 
such as the one called the Donatists. A terrorist wing of the Donatists, known as 
Circumcelhons, was waging guerrilla war against the official Catholic church, seeing it 
as a tool of the hated Roman enpire. The Circumcelhons' creed called them to actively 
seek death through suicide or martyrdom. The line between these two was ill-defined, 
and Circumcelhons were reported to regularly stop traveUers on the highway, hand 
them a knife and say, "Kih me or I wih kiU you." Gibbon in The Decline and Fall o f 
the Roman Empire says, apropos Augustine's area: "the distracted country was fihed
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with tumult and bloodshed; the aimed troops of Circumcelhons alternately pointed 
their rage against themselves or against their adversaries; and the calendar of martyrs 
received on both sides a considerable augmentation". Gibbon adds in a footnote: "The 
Donatists boasted of thousands of these voluntary martyrs" (Gibbon 1969 Vol. 3 
p.332).
The Encyclopaedia Britannica describes the situation in pohtical terms, saying that 
inq)erial Rome's attempts at repression "gained Donatism the support of strong 
elements in the native population whose grievances were social and economic rather 
than ecclesiastical."
It was in this context that Augustiue of Kppo brought forth his exphcit statement that 
suicide was a mortal sin. Glanville WiUiams says, "There seems to be little need to 
doubt that it was by way of reaction from these rehgious excesses that Augustine was 
led to condemn suicide in forthright terms and so to become the chief architect of the 
later Christian view" (Williams 1958:229). Augustine developed the concept of suicide 
as a crime in many of his infruential letters as weh as in his major work De Civitate 
Dei, {The City o f God, 1984:26-39). In doing this he rehed upon the 6th 
Commandment - "Thou shalt not kih" - and argued that this apphed to oneself as weh 
as others, and therefore the suicide was a murderer. This is the biblical authority on 
which the ecclesiastical canon law of the Church has rested ever since, but the 
apphcation of it to suicide was a whohy Augustinian creation. Battin in Ethical Issues 
in Suicide says, "Although there is httle reason to think that Augustine's position is 
authenticahy Christian, and although it clearly was a response to pressing practical 
circumstances, it nevertheless rapidly took hold and within an extremely short time had 
become universally accepted as frmdamental Christian law" (Battin 1995:64).
It is almost inq)ossible to overstate Augustine's influence on the theology of Western 
Christianity. Unlike the Eastern Church, where numerous different intellectual strands
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were woven into doctrine, in the West Augustine's ideas totally dominated the early 
years of doctrinal development. His pronouncements became central tenets of the 
faith: original sin, salvation by God's grace alone, the delineation of the trinity - all 
were Augustinian concepts. It is not surprising, therefore, that his damnation of 
suicide carried such weight and was absorbed into the standard orthodoxy of the 
Church.
Shortly after Augustine's death, the Council of Arles in 452, using Augustine's words 
and ideas, condemned suicide as an act "inspired by diabohcal possession", and in 563 
the Council of Braga decreed that suicides had died in mortal sin and were thus denied 
rehgious burial rites. This was incorporated into Enghsh canon law at the Council of 
Hereford in 673 (St. John Stevas 1961). In line with Augustine's edict, suicides were 
officially damned and therefore would go straight to hell
It was fear of this - the terrifying hell Christianity portrayed - which, according to some 
sources, inspired the intense horror with which suicide was viewed throughout Europe 
during the middle ages. In Dante's Inferno suicides were condemned to a lower circle 
of hell than murderers and rapists, their souls turned to poisonous thorns picked at 
through eternity by hideous harpies (Dante 1945 Canto X m  & XIV: 53-62). Romilly 
Fedden (1938), one of the most quoted writers on the history of suicide, says that the 
Christian damnation of self-murder re-awakened primitive fears about 'sleepless souls' 
and vengefiil ghosts, so that superstitious terror fuelled the savage response to suicide 
corpses. For centuries the bodies of people who had killed themselves were subjected 
to macabre rituals of mutilation and degradation, then buried profanely, usually at a 
cross roads in the dead of night with a stake through the heart to pin the evil spirit 
down.^
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Imposition o f forfeiture and its effect
Suicide law in England entered a new stage in the early middle ages, when the civil 
sanction of forfeiture was added to the ecclesiastical sanction of denial of rehgious 
rites. The precise starting date for this practice is unknown, but a canon under King 
Edgar in 967 is recorded as ordering:
"Let him who hath murdered himselÇ be fined in all his goods to his lord: let 
him find a place of burial neither in the church nor church yard; unless ill health 
and madness drove him to the perpetration" (O'Dea, quoted in Dublin & 
Bunzel 1938:245).
Henry de Bracton in his famous 13th century work on Enghsh law set out "the ancient 
judgements of the just because his ignorant and uneducated contenq)oraries were 
misrepresenting the law" (PoUock & Maitland 1898 Vol 1:183). This work - De 
Legibus et Consuetudinibns Angliae (126?) - confirmed that suicide was a crime at 
common law - a felo  de se, so forfeiture rules apphed:
"Just as a man may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by 
slaying himself the felony is said to be done to himself, as where one has been 
accused of some crime and been arrested [or outlawed] [as] for homicide or 
with the proceeds ofthefi, or apprehended in the course of some evil deed and 
crime, and kiUs himself in fear of the crime that hangs over him; he wih have 
no heir, because the felony previously committed, the thefl; or homicide or the 
like, is thus convicted. But the goods of those who destroy themselves when 
they are not accused of a crime or taken in the course of a crirmnal act are not 
appropriated by the fisc, ...But if a man slays himself in weariness of life or 
because he is unwilling to endure further bodily pain [as when he drowns 
himself or throws himself from a height, or kills himself in some other way] he 
may have a successor, but his moveable goods are confiscated...if one lays
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violent hands upon himself without justification, through anger and ill-will, as 
where wishing to injure another but unable to acconq)lish his intention he kills 
himself he is to be punished and shall have no successor, because the felony he 
intended to commit against the other is proved and punished, for one who does 
not spare himself would hardly have spared others, had he the power" (Bracton 
1968 Vol. 2:423).
Since forfeiture was traditionally a sanction used to punish felons, it has been 
suggested that the imposition of forfeiture led to suicide being considered a felony 
rather than the other way around. "The point, as it were, was argued backwards," 
according to St. John Stevas (1961:234). It is interesting to note in regard to this, 
that if forfeiture was inq)ortant to the criminahsation of suicide, it was also important, 
in the very long term to its (décriminalisation. This is because attenq)ts to avoid 
forfeiture led to suicides being regularly declared insane (see below).
At about the same time suicide was being confirmed as a felony at common law, the 
rehgious prohibition against it was being given a powerful new inq)etus by Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-74) in Summa Theologica, his great (unfinished) attempt to reconcile 
Augustinian-inspired Christian doctrine with Aristotehan philosophy. On suicide, 
Aquinas endorsed Augustine's interpretation of the sixth commandment, and expanded 
the fiat divine fiat by reasoning that "natural law" demands self-preservation and 
therefore forbids self-killing. He also repeated Aristotle's view that suicides breached 
their obhgation to the community, and the neo-Platonist argument that life is a gift 
from God that men have no right to destroy.^ Aquinas' pronouncements - the 
'Thomist' arguments - re-interpreted the rehgious prohibition in a way that stih stands 
as the orthodox Christian position on suicide. These arguments were actuaUy cited in 
the Parhamentary debate on the Suicide BiU (see chapter 7). Certainly at the time they 
were propounded and until at least the 16th century it was universally beheved that 
divine law prohibited self-killing (MacDonald 1992:88). It was this clear theological
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foundation on which the posthumous prosecutions against suicides were based; 
prosecutions which actually increased in number after the Reformation. "The absolute 
unlawfiilness of suicide was stressed in sermons, devotional works, treatises and 
didactic hterature by writers of every hue in the Protestant theological spectrum" 
(MacDonald and Murphy 1990:43). Martin Luther (1483-1546) considered suicide 
to be the "work of the devil".^ ® Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556), in his Catechismns, 
which were required to be read in all Anglican churches, firmly decreed that the self- 
murderer was cursed of God and damned for ever.^i The popular Mirror for 
Magistrates, first pubhshed in 1559 and reprinted in 1574, '75, '78, '87 and 1609, 
condemned suicide as the unforgivable sin (Sprott 1961:14). When the famous 
Judge, Sir James Hales, drowned himself in 1554, the suggestion it was suicide caused 
a major scandal At the subsequent enquiry as to whether his goods were forfeit. 
Judge Brown reiterated the Thomist arguments as to why suicide was a mortal sin and 
earthly crime (St. John Stevas 1961:235).
MacDonald and Murphy (1990), researching suicides in early modem England, found 
that prosecutions for felo de se soared in the 16th century. They link this to the Tudor 
policy of giving coroners who brought in verdicts of felo de se a share of the forfeited 
goods. MacDonald and Murphy also note the obvious incentive the system offered, 
especially to the famihes of prosperous suicides, to have the deceased declared not 
sane, as such a verdict nullified the forfeiture provisions. They speculate, admittedly 
on limited evidence, on the possibihty that such families offered coroners a share of the 
Mwforfeited goods if they brought in a verdict of non compos mentis . Certainly 
coroners' juries after 1660 began to bring in more and more lunacy verdicts. Before 
this date barely 2% of inquests on suicides had this result, but in the 1660s the figure 
was 8.4%, in the early 1700s it was 42.5%; by the 1750s it was almost 80%, and by 
1800 over 97% (MacDonald 1992:90). It is not unreasonable to suppose that 
resistance to forfeiture played a part in this change. The practical legal question of 
whether the insane verdicts were justified cannot be resolved, as the mental state of
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the deceased was seldom investigated at the inquest. If medical evidence was called it 
was primarily to estabhsh the actual cause of death (drowning, poison, etc.). (ibid.:95- 
96) What does emerge clearly from these statistics however, is that the pattern of 
ofl&cially deeming people who killed themselves to be insane became very well 
estabhshed over a very long time.
Suicide besins to be debated
The next important phase in the history of the suicide law was the intense debate about 
self killing which took place in the 17th and 18th centuries. The intellectual ferment 
of these years left few received ideas unscathed, and it had a profound effect on 
attitudes toward suicide. Before the 17th century the orthodox rehgious view, as 
articulated by Aquinas, dominated all thinking about self-murder. By the beginning of 
the 19th century this rehgious view was stih extant, but its total dominance was over 
and it was conq>eting with a multiphcity of new views about the status - moral, legal 
and/or medical - about self-killing.
The verdicts from the coroners' courts cited above offer some empirical evidence of 
this change, since in the mid-1600s over 90% brought in the criminal verdict offelo de 
se on suicides, but by 1800 it was less than 3%. Another indication of the change was 
the steadily decreasing number of times suicide corpses were subjected to superstitious 
savagery. The last to be so treated was a man caUed Griffiths in 1823 whose body was 
dumped naked into a pit at the intersection of Grosvenor Place and the Kings Road in 
Chelsea. Immediately after this incident Parhament passed a statute forbidding the 
practice.
The most persuasive evidence of the widespread and wide ranging nature of the 
debate, however, is the popularity of material - written, dramatised, sermonised - 
relating to it. In the 17th and 18th centuries three themes were of major intellectual 
significance, and all three had important effects on attitudes to suicide. The first was
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the enthusiastic re-discovery of classical thinking, in particular Stoicism. Second was 
Enlightenment rationalism which claimed human reason to be a better guide to action 
than rehgious authoritarianism Third was the Romantic wave that swept across 
Europe from the mid-1700s, and which made "sentimental suicides" (such as Goethe's 
Young Werther and Thomas Chatterton) objects of frshionable admiration.
The revival of interest in Stoicism became apparent as early as the 14th century when 
Chaucer, in the Parson's Tale ranked Seneca with St. Paul, Solomon and St. 
Augustine (Carrçbell 1969:236). The great Dutch humanist Erasmus (who lectured at 
Cambridge from 1511 to 1514) featured many of Seneca's proverbs and sayings in 
Adagia (1500) (ibid.:236). The French essayist Montaigne, extensively translated 
into Enghsh from 1603, wrote adnhringly about classical suicides, notably in his essay 
A custom o f the Isle o f Cea, in which he claimed that "In our own city of MarseiUes in 
former times" would-be suicides could argue their case before the Senate, and if 
successfijl would be granted hemlock from the civic stores (Montaigne 1991:392-407). 
One of Montaigne's most famous epigrams remains, "Life is slavery if freedom to die is 
wanting" (ibid. :393).
T.S. Ehott described the increasing popularity of Stoic ideas at this time in his two 
famous essays on the subject: "Seneca in Elizabethan Translation" and "Shakespeare 
and the Stoicism of Seneca" (both 1927). It is noteworthy that despite the then 
reigning rehgious condemnation of self murder, the suicides in Shakespeare's plays - 
Romeo, Juhet, Otheho, Anthony, Cleopatra, Cassius, Brutus, Goneril - are none of 
them presented as iniquitous in themselves, but as plausible responses to circumstance. 
Only in Opheha's suicide does madness play a part. Hamlet's lengthy disquisition on 
self murder (written sometime around 1600) is a reasoned balancing of pros and cons, 
and is a remarkable pre-figuring of the debates throughout the next 200 years.
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The first straightforward challenge to the orthodox view of suicide as a mortal sin was 
written by John Donne in 1608, long before he became the celebrated Dean of St. 
Paul's. While still languishing in what he called the "swançs of south London" 
(Mitcham), Donne wrote Bianthanatos, recorded in texts as the first formal defence 
of suicide in English In it Donne posed the then-shocking question of whether "self­
homicide is not so naturally sin that it may never be otherwise.
In a passage of what was tremendous daring for the time Donne echoed Socrates and 
Seneca, saying: "whensoever any affliction assails me, mee thinks I have the keyes of 
my prison in mine owne hand, and no remedy presents it selfe so soon to my heart, as 
mine own sword" (quoted in Sprott 1961:25). The voicing of such thoughts in the 
early 1600s could have fearfid consequences, and Donne (whose brother had died in 
prison for a religious crime) suppressed the essay, requesting a fiiend to \\&om he sent 
it to "publish it not, but yet bum it not" (quoted in Alvarez 1990:177). His son finally 
published it in 1646, fifl;een years afi;er Donne's death.
Despite the suppression of Biathanatos, threats to the orthodoxy of suicide as mortal 
sin were palpable enough in the early 17th century to pronqpt the first explicit rebuttals 
to such heresy: Life's Preservatives Against Self-Killing was published in 1637 by the 
Anghcan clergyman John Sym,^  ^ and in 1653 Sir William Denny published a 12 canto 
poem giving "Christian advice against self-murder" (Sprott 1961:41-44). In 1700 
John Adams, Provost of Kings College Cambridge, published an essay specifically to 
refute Biathanatos and added a political twist to the rehgious arguments:
"to allow self-murder would utterly destroy the force of human laws, because 
the greatest punishment that human laws can threaten is death. If men are 
taught to despise death they will not be obhged to do any Duty by the fear of 
this, much less by the fear of anything else, but would Rob, Ravish and 
Murder...
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Moreover, giving people the right to commit suicide would subvert all civil 
authority... the private judgement of the individual would therefore take 
precedence over the interests of the State..." (Adams 1700:26)
Nevertheless, despite tirades against it, interest in Stoic thought on suicide continued 
to grow in the 18th century. A second edition of Biathanatos came out in 1700. 
L'Estrage's digest of Seneca's letters, pubhshed in 1678, went to 10 editions by 1711 
(Drabble 1985:885). Jeremy Colhefs translation of Marcus Aurehus' Meditations, 
published m 1701, was re-printed 58 times before 1800 (ibid.:618). Joseph Addison's 
celebrated play Cato, produced in 1713, portrayed the Roman repubhcan as a pohtical 
hero, and his suicide as a courageous blow struck for freedom against tyranny. From 
that point the debate on suicide escalated, to become, in S.E. Sprott's words "one of 
the storm centres of the inteUectual climate" in the 18th century (Sprott 1961:94).
Certainly a remarkable number of famous Enhghtenment names contributed to the 
attack on the orthodox view. Many echoed Stoic philosophies, others added the 
distinctive rationahst arguments of the time. Montesquieu, in Persian Letters (1721) 
renewed Seneca's defence of suicide: "Society is based on mutual advantage, but when 
I find it onerous what is to prevent me renouncing it? Life was given to me as a 
favour, so I may abandon it when it is one no longer; when the cause disappears, the 
effect should disappear also" (Montesquieu 1993:153). The Persian Letters ran to 
ten editions within a year of pubhcation (Betts 1993:19).
In their 1976 introduction to Adam Smith's The Theory o f Moral Sentiments (first 
pubhshed in 1759), Raphael and Macfie say, "Stoic philosophy is the primary 
influence on Smith's ethical thought... In his survey of the history of moral philosophy 
Stoicism is given far more space than any other 'system', ancient or modem" (Raphael 
and Macfie 1976:5). Smith's book has a lengthy discussion of suicide, in which he 
describes the Stoic view with certainly the appearance of approval:
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"If your situation is upon the whole disagreeable...walk forth by all means. But 
walk forth without repining; without murmuring or conq)laining. Walk forth 
calm, contented, rejoicing, returning thanks to the Gods, who from their infinite 
bounty, have opened the safe and quiet harbour of death, at all times ready to 
receive us from the stormy ocean of human life; who have prepared this sacred, 
this inviolable, this great asylum, always open, always accessible; altogether 
beyond the reach of human rage and injustice; and large enough to contain 
both aU who wish, and all those who do not wish to retire to it: an asylum 
which takes away from every man every pretence of conçlaining, or even of 
fancying that there can be any evil in human life, except such as he may suffer 
from his own folly and weakness" (Smith 1976:280).
Later Smith comments: "The propriety, upon some occasions, of voluntary death, 
though it was, perhaps, more insisted upon by the Stoics, than by any other sect of 
ancient philosophies, was, however, a doctrine common to them all, even to the 
peaceable and indolent Epicureans" (ibid.:281).
Probably the most famous 18th century revival of Stoic views on suicide is David 
Hume's essay On Suicide, which is grounded in the Enhghtenment argument that 
individuals should be guided by their own reason, not by rehgious dictates:
"Suppose," Hume says, "that it is no longer in my power to promote the 
interests of society; suppose that I am a burthen to it; suppose that my life 
hinders some person from being much more usefiil to society. In such cases my 
resignation of life must not only be innocent but laudable... If it be no crime, 
both prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at once of 
existence when it becomes a burden. Tis the only way that we can then be 
usefiil to society, by setting an example, which, if imitated would preserve to
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everyone his chance for happiness in life and would effectually free him from all 
danger or misery" (Hume 1998:323).
Hume wrote On Suicide in the mid-1750s, and despite major shifts in public opinion in 
the years since John Donne, such thoughts were still dangerous, and initial public 
outrage caused either Hume or his pubhsher to take fright and withdraw the essay. It 
was not formally published untü 1776, the year of Hume's death, and even then was 
brought out anonymously (Popkin 1980).
Other significant Enlightenment figures also began to focus attention on secular 
aspects of the suicide issue. Cesare Beccaria, in Essay on Crimes and Punishments 
(1764) said: "He who kills himself does a less injury to society, than he \\fro quits his 
country for ever; for the other leaves his property behind him, but this carries with him 
at least a part of his substance" (Beccaria 1992:78). Beccaria also pointed out that 
punishing a suicide corpse was about as much use as "flogging a statue" (ibid.:77). 
Jeremy Bentham criticised the seizing of a suicide's goods , and  Voltaire cançaigned 
for an end to the brutal treatment of suicide corpses. However, at the same time 
protagonists on the other side of the debate were fiercely defending the orthodox view 
that suicide was a sin and a crime. John Locke (1632-1704), despite being a 
celebrated champion of human rights, nevertheless said, "man...has not the liberty to 
destroy himself... for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely 
wise Maker, they are His property [and] are made to last during His, not one another's 
pleasure" (Locke 1936: 119-20). Sir William Blackstone, Professor of Common Law 
at Oxford set out the formal 18th century legal position in his celebrated 
Commentaries on the Laws o f England (1765-69):
"..the suicide is guilty of a double offence, one spiritual, in invading the 
prerogative of the Almighty and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled 
for; the other tençoral, gainst the King, who hath an interest in the
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preservation of all his subjects; the law has therefore ranked his among the 
highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony committed on one's self." 
(Blackstone Vol. 4:289)
The idea that there might be damaging tenq)oral consequences of suicide which 
justified its secular criminalisation had been lent support by an incident in London that 
became a cause célèbre all over Europe. In 1732 a young married couple named 
Smith shot their toddler and hung themselves, leaving a philosophically argued note 
explaining that as they could not pay their debts and could see nothing ahead but 
misery for themselves and their child, their actions were entirely rational (Radzinowicz 
1948). In tone it echoed a controversial pamphlet published shortly before in London 
by the Italian Count Alberto Radicati in which he argued that suicide is "at all Times a 
laudable Action, and at no Time blameable; natural and not contrary to Nature" 
(Quoted in Sprott 1961:106). Taken together with the "Cato cult" inspired by 
Addison's play, the effect of the Smiths' deaths "was to create an almost hysterical fear 
among conservatives that Radicati's ideas were infecting the lower orders of society, 
with murderous effects. As long as philosophical suicide was confined to the free 
thinking club (Alexander Pope inq>hed) it was a matter for sarcasm; when it spread to 
artisans, it was a social emergency" (MacDonald and Murphy 1990:158).
Another incident, in 1755, illustrated the passion the subject aroused: a man called 
Barlow killed himself in prison after murdering his child. The prison authorities buried 
him quietly, but a mob dug up the body and reburied it at a crossroad, irnpaled with the 
superstitious stake. (Radzinowicz 1948:196)
Throughout the whole of the 18th century defenders of the orthodox view of suicide 
presented the arguments, theological and secular, why it was rightly deemed a mortal 
sin and legal crime. Among the churchmen who, in Sprott's words, "fired fiisdlades of 
sermons", was John Wesley, who wrote to the Prime Minister William Pitt in 1784 to
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urge him to hang suicide corpses publicly in chains as a deterrent (Radzinowicz 
1948:196). At the end of the century, in 1790, The Rev. Charles Moore published A 
Full Enquiry into the Subject o f Suicide - 600 pages of rebuttal to the idea that 
suicide should not he a crime. "The conclusions were like a grand barrage of the 
artdleiy that had been fired against the rationahsts for seventy years past" (Sprott 
1961:152). Moore did beheve that forfeiture should end, but was unequivocal about 
the utter wrongfiilness of suicide itselÇ which, he said, offended both divine law and 
natural law.
Moore's treatise was influential at the time and for some decades into the 19th century, 
but far more inq)ortant in the long term was the contribution made by Immanuel Kant 
to the question of suicide as sin and crime. According to his modem editor (1996), 
"Even today [Kant's] remains the premier moral theory" (Sullivan 1996:vii). Kant 
discussed the issue of self-killing both in the Groundwork o f the Metaphysics o f 
Morals (1785) and in the more conq>lex The Metaphysics o f Morals pubhshed in 1797. 
The First Article of the First Chapter in "The Doctrine of Virtue" is "On Killing 
Oneself, and Kant concludes,
"Kilhng oneself is a crime (murder). It can also be regarded as a violation of 
one's duty to other people (the duty of spouses to each other, of parents to 
their children, of a subject to his superior or to his feUow citizens, and finaUy 
even as a violation of duty to God, as one's abandoning the post assigned him 
in the world without having been cahed away fi*om it)" (Kant 1996:176).
In other works Kant uses suicide to exenq)lify his principle of categorical moral 
inq)eratives; to ihustrate the need to always treat human beings as ends, not means, 
and at one point adds a pohtical dimension, saying: "Nothing more terrible [than
suicide] can be imagined... For he who does not respect his life even in principle cannot 
be restrained firom the most dreadfiil vices; he recks neither king nor torments" (Kant
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Lectures on Ethics, quoted in Battin 1995:90). Kant's huge influence over all 
subsequent thought on ethics and morality is not disputed, and his densely phrased 
arguments, which link Enhghtenment reason to both classical philosophy and theology, 
continued to play an mq)ortant part in debates on suicide at the end of the 20th 
century.
The third major theme of this period \\&ich significantly affected attitudes to suicide 
was the Romantic Movement which some historians (see Isaiah Berlin 1999) 
characterise as a violent reaction to the Enhghtenment, as it gave priority to feeling 
over reason, spirituahty over rationality, and mystery over scientific explanation. 
Romanticism added a new dimension to the suicide debate with its fashionable 
admiration of a certain kind of sentimental self-killing. The prototype was in Goethe's 
novel Young Werther (1774), in which Werther is a sensitive artist who kills himself for 
love. The "scandalous suicide" was said to be an inq)ortant reason for the book's huge 
popular success, which was so great that Werther merchandise - tea-sets, perfiimes 
and yehow breeches - was profitably marketed throughout Europe.
In England the prime example of Romantic suicide was the real, not fictional, Thomas 
Chatterton (1752-1770), who poisoned himself with arsenic at the age of 17, in 
despair at the lack of recognition of his literary talent. Wordsworth wrote a poem 
about Chatterton ( "the marvellous Boy,/ the sleepless Soul that perished in his pride"), 
and Keats dedicated Endymion to him In 1856 Henry Walhs painted "The Death of 
Chatterton", wfdch today hangs in the Tate Gallery.^i
Changes in the law: Attemvted suicide becomes a crime
By the beginning of the 19th century, these different strands had all contributed to a 
major change in society's view of self-killing. The rehgious approach remained 
inçortant, defended by the church and nominally subscribed to by church members, 
but it was no longer the sole force shaping responses to suicide. By the early 1800s
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responses were as likely to be informed by classical Stoicism, Enlightenment 
rationalism and Romanticism as by theological doctrine.
The legal position, however, remained formally as it had been for centuries, and as 
Blackstone had set it out in the 1760s. The first change in the actual law concerning 
suicide came in 1823 when Parhament formally ended the practice of superstitious 
burial for the bodies of suicides, (see above) From this point coroners were 
forbidden by law to issue warrants for burial in the pubhc highway; the bodies of 
suicides were to be interred in private ground or a church yard, but it had to be at 
night between 9 p.m and midnight, with no Christian rites. In 1880 the Burial Law 
Amendment Act eased the restrictions on rehgious rites at burial services, and the night 
requirement was removed by the Interments (Felo de Se) Act 1882.
It was not these Acts, however, that constituted the next significant development of 
suicide law. This arrived with a change in the way the law was applied, rather than 
changes to the law itself. What happened was the law began to be used to arrest and 
prosecute attempted suicides. The long term relevance of this change to the 
decriminahsation hes in the fact that it had tangible, visible effects in the real world. 
With the abolition of ritual degradation of the body, and the formal ending of the 
forfeiture provisions for all crimes in 1870 (actual forfeiture for suicide had virtually 
ceased some time before),^^ the common law against suicide itself had no practical 
effects. In these circumstances the law might have remained in existence, but with no 
subject against which to bring a prosecution it is reasonable to suppose it would have 
sunk into disuse, remaining only in the legal limbo where other relics of ancient 
common law linger. The reason this did not happen - and the reason why 
decriminahsation became a matter of practical importance - was because of the change 
whereby attenq)ted suicides began to be arrested, prosecuted and punished under the 
common law offelo de se. [Assisting someone else's suicide under Victorian law was 
charged as abetting m urd er. 3^]
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Most histories that mention suicide law ascribe the criminahsation of attempted suicide 
to the case of Regina v. Doody in 1854 (Coxs Criminal Law Cases Vol. VI 1852-55 
p.463). But this case, involving a man who tried to hang himself in the water closet of 
the George Inn in Wolverhampton, singly conhrmed existing practice. Judicial 
statistics show that arrests for the offence of "attempted suicide" in the metropohtan 
pohce district began well before that date. In the 1840s a Middlesex Magistrate, Sir 
Peter Laurie, gained notoriety by waging a determined and punitive campaign against 
them "^  ^ The TIMES of 23 October 1841 reported him as saying, when passing 
sentence on an attenpted suicide: "Suicide and attenpts, or apparent attempts, to
commit suicide very much increase, I regret to say. I know that a morbid humanity 
exists, and does much mischief as regards the practice. I shall not encourage attempts 
of the kind, but shall punish them; and I sentence you to the treadmill for a month, as a 
rogue and vagabond. I shall look very narrowly at the cases of persons brought before 
me on such charges" (Quoted in Gates 1988:51).
The institution of prosecutions against attenpted suicides is probably best understood 
in the context of the general project of maintaining social order in the rapidly changing 
circumstances of 19th century England. The creation of the modem police themselves 
is considered a part of this project (Radzinowicz 1956 and 1968, Reiner 1992). Olive 
Anderson contends that it was "the advent of the new pohce" in 1829 that "made it 
practicable routinely to treat suicide as an offence" (Anderson 1987:282) and goes on 
to suggest that the pohce did this simply as part of their remit to maintain pubhc order: 
"the new severity towards suicidal behaviour was part of the effort to enforce 
seemliness, law and order in a teeming city" (ibid.:285). Revisionist historians would 
place it in the theoretical context of the "master patterns" of 19th century social 
control - surveiUance, categorisation, regulation, discipline (Cohen and Scuh 1983).
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In the 1830s the metropohtan pohce arrested on average about 50 people a year for 
attempted suicide. As the model of the metropohtan pohce spread to the provinces so 
the numbers charged with this offence rose there as well, and by the 1870s an average 
of over 800 people a year in England and Wales were being arrested for attenq)ted 
suicide. In the 1890s it was weh over a thousand a year and by 1910-1913 over 
2000.25
The offence was initiaUy triable on indictment only. Chhdren who attempted suicide 
became triable summarily in 1879 and juveniles in 1899, but this change was not 
implemented for adults unth 1925.2  ^ However, the judicial statistics indicate 
magistrates were reluctant to send people up to Quarter Sessions and Assizes on this 
charge. Although 587 men and women were arrested by the Metropohtan Pohce for 
attempted suicide in the 1830s, none of them was committed to the higher court for 
that offence (Anderson 1987:291). The magistrates usuaUy dealt with them under 
other, summary-only charges, such as drunk and disorderly or the vagrancy laws, or 
they discharged them for want of evidence.22 This continued to he the case 
throughout the 19th century, during which only a small percentage of the thousands 
arrested for attenpted suicide were actually committed for trial. However, what was 
important about these arrests, in terms of the ultimate decriminahsation of suicide, was 
the practice begun in these years of magistrates remanding in custody anyone charged 
with attempted suicide for at least a week and sometimes two, usually with a request 
for a report by the prison chaplain and sometimes by the prison s u r g e o n . 2 8  The 
debates which immediately preceded the decriminahsation of suicide a century later 
clearly suggest that it was the custody on remand, as so many more were affected by 
this than by imprisonment on conviction, that evoked compassionate concern and 
provided an incentive to change the law.
However, not ah attempted suicides received lenient treatment.. E.H. Carr in The 
Romantic Exiles quotes a Russian exile on a news item from the TIMES of 1860:
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"A man was hanged who had cut his throat, but who had been brought back to 
hfe. They hanged him for suicide. The doctor had warned them that it was 
impossible to hang him as the throat would burst open and he would breathe 
through the aperture. They did not listen to his advice and hanged their man. 
The wound in the neck immediately opened and the man came back to life 
again although he was hanged. It took time to convoke the aldermen to decide 
the question of Wiat was to be done. At length aldermen assembled and bound 
up the neck below the wound until he died' (Carr, 1998:296).
Although capital punishment was extremely rare for attempted suicides, imprisonment 
on conviction was not. The small but judicially distinguished Royal Commission of 
1878, charged with drafting a Criminal Code, proposed that the crime of attenpted 
suicide should be made punishable by two years imprisonment with hard labour 
(Radzinowicz and Hood 1990:738). This Code was never enacted, but the 
recommendation gives an indication of the views of estabhshed authority at the time.
One of the four members of the Royal Commission was Sir James Fitgames Stephen, 
who Radzinowicz credits with the actual drafting of the Codification Bhl. In his later, 
massive History o f the Criminal Law o f England (1883) Stephen set out his view of 
the law on suicide:
" It would, I think, be a pity if Parhament were to enact any measure tending to 
alter the feeling with which [suicide] is and ought to be regarded. As an 
instance of popular feeling on the subject, I may mention a case I once tried at 
Norwich, in vdiich a man - 1 think drunk at the time - tried to poison himself in 
a pubhc house. When cahed on for his defence, he burst out with ah the 
appearance of indignant innocence: T try to kih myselfl I cannot answer for 
what I might do when drunk, but I was ah through Central India with Sir Hugh
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Rose in 1857,1 was in so many general actions, and so many times under fire, 
and can anyone believe that if I knew what I was about I could go and do a 
dirty, cowardly act like that?' he was acquitted" (Stephen 1996:107).
Through the operation of the law then, rather than by any formal change, the 19th 
century saw attempted suicide become firmly embedded in the criminal law. However 
during this period, another change was occurring, one which was ultimately to prove 
to be the decisive factor in removing both suicide and attempted suicide firom the 
crimmal law.
The vositivist/determinist paradism
Nineteenth century positivism mq)acted on the suicide law in both its sociological and 
medical forms. Each school of thought saw self killing not as a voluntary act of will 
to be admired, pitied or condemned, but as something caused. To the sociologists, or 
"moral statisticians" as they were then called, the cause lay outside the individual, in 
society at large. To the medical men it lay in a malfimction or disease of the body. In 
either case, the person could not be held responsible. This meant that the morality - or 
not - of the act, which had been the central issue m regard to suicide for over two 
thousand years, was by-passed and held to be no longer relevant.
To come upon this 19th century interpretation after reading the 18th century debate, 
filled as it was with the passionate rhetoric of free will, human dignity and the rights of 
man, is to be vividly reminded of the enormity of the change in attitude. It is not 
surprising that such a seisrpic shift took a very long time to reach a point where it was 
sufficiently powerful to influence a change in the law. It is the contention of this thesis 
that it had reached such a point by the mid-20th century, and that this provides the 
structural explanation of why the law changed then. It is not suggested that the 
positivist/determinist paradigm had come to enjoy total hegemony; on the contrary, 
the existence of opposition to it was probably what motivated Butler to maintain such
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a low profile for the Suicide Bill (see chapter 7). However, the paradigm was 
extremely influential, and was decisively so in regard to the décriminalisation of 
suicide. Interestingly, many of the 19th century roots of the positivist paradigm itself 
lay in studies of self-killing.
It was the remarkable regularity of the numbers and kinds of suicides, year on year, 
that supplied the early "moral statisticians" with the en^irical evidence they wanted to 
demonstrate their contention that human behaviour was determined by external laws in 
the same way as was the physical world. The Belgian mathematician and social 
statistician Adolphe Quetelet is usually credited as the first person to draw these 
conclusions fi'om statistical data. His Sur VHomme (1835) was published in English in 
1842 as A Treatise on Man and the Development o f His Faculties. It put forward the 
radical proposal that human acts such as crime (and suicide), long presumed voluntary, 
were in fact determined (Hacking 1998:105-114). According to Giddens, Quetelet 
believed that "Suicide, in common with other moral phenomena, which would at first 
sight appear to be purely 'individual', is in fact governed by the laws of the social 
system" (Giddens 1970:xxxii).
This proposal gained some enthusiastic adherents in England. In 1857 Henry Buckle 
put it forward in the first volume of his History o f Civilisation in England', a book 
which made him, according to Ian Hacking, "the hon of the London season" 
(Hacking 1998:123). In the introduction Buckle said,
"...in the ordinary march of society, an increasing perception of the regularity of 
nature destroys the doctrine of Chance and replaces it by that of Necessary 
Connection ... all the evidence we possess respecting it points to one great 
conclusion, and can leave no doubt on our minds that suicide is merely the 
product of the general condition of society, and that the individual felon only 
carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding circumstances.
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In a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end to their 
own life" (Buckle 1857 Vol. I: 9 & 26).
Enrico Morselli, an Italian working with Enghsh suicide statistics in the 1870s, came 
to the same conclusion: "By the statistical returns of suicide is disclosed then,...such a 
regularity as to surpass... the statistical laws of births, deaths, and marriages. This fact 
has helped to change radically the metaphysical idea of the human will, and in the 
hands of Quetelet, Wagner and Drobisch, has served as a formidable weapon to deny 
the reality of independent human actions, and to declare that the same laws exist in the 
moral as in the physical world" (MorselU 1882, quoted in Papemo 1997:23).
So by the time Durkheim wrote his 6mous Suicide in 1897, it was not the beginning, 
but in feet the culmination of nearly a century of European work with the official 
statistics on suicide. It was with this background that Durkheim "sought to explain 
differential suicide rates in terms of 'social causes', 'real, living, active forces', 
'suicidogenic currents'" (Lukes 1973:190-191). For Durkheim, as for other late 19th 
century writers, an increase in suicide was syrcptom of sickness in the social body, 
considered to be "a reflection of the pathological state of societies which had lost their 
grounding in a firm moral order" (Giddens 1971 p.xxxi). Jack Douglas said, "There 
was general agreement among the moral statisticians that the moral state of society (or 
the moral organisation of society) was the primary cause of suicide rates" (Douglas 
1967:16).
These were not ideas that remained quarantined m academic ivory towers. MorselH 
had contended that the morals of a society were the most important cause of suicide 
rates. This assertion, together with what was viewed as an alarming rise m numbers of 
self killings in the last quarter of the 19th century, fuelled a heated controversy which 
was reflected in the pages of popular periodicals: "Suicide" in Blackwood's June 1880; 
"Suicidal Mania" in Contemporary Review 1881; "Is Life Worth Livmg?" Nineteenth
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Century September 1877, all drew attention to the phenomenon. In 1900 the 
Reverend Gumhill wrote a book, The Morals o f Suicide in which he echoed the 
Durkheimian view that the suicide rate was a pathological synq)tom of serious social 
ills. Gumhill said, "[T]he causes which lead to suicide are many of them of a social 
character, that is, they take their rise in the unsatisfactory condition of those social 
problems, whether industrial, civil, or domestic, on the well-ordering of which the 
contentment, welfare, and happiness of the people so greatly depend" (Gumhill 1900 
quoted in Gates 1988:155).
Moral statisticians and early sociologists considered suicide a synq)tom of pathology in 
the body of society as a whole. A number of medical people believed it was a 
synq)tom of pathology or disease in the body of the individual suicide. In terms of the 
positivist/determinist paradigm itself this diSerence did not matter; both believed 
suicide was caused by factors outside the individual's control so issues of personal 
responsibility and morality were irrelevant. But if there are any "moral entrepreneurs" 
in the story of the change in the law on suicide, the title belongs not to sociologists, 
but to doctors, who first staked a claim to madness itself and then campaigned to have 
suicide defined as a symptom of it.
The association of self killing and insanity of course goes back a very long way. The 
10th century canon under King Edgar, cited above, orders forfeiture of aU a suicide's 
goods, "unless ill health and madness drove him to the perpetration."
Henry de Bract on's 13th century record of the law (see above), afl;er confirming 
suicide as a felony goes on to say:
"But what shall we say of a madman bereft of reason? And of the deranged, 
the delirious and the mentally retarded? or if one labouring under a high fever 
drowns himself or kills himself? Quaere whether such a one commit felony de
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se. It is submitted that he does not... since they are without sense and reason 
and can no more commit an injuria for a felony than a brute animal..." (Bracton 
1968 Vol 2:423)
Coroners' juries had been making the connection between madness and suicide for 
centuries when they brought in verdicts of non compos mentis. Indeed, so common 
was this verdict that it moved Blackstone to complain that jurors behaved as if 'the 
very act of suicide is an evidence of insanity; as if every man who acts contrary to 
reason, had no reason at all" (Blackstone Vol 4:189) Often, as MacDonald and 
Murphy contend, the finding was for the purpose of forfeiture-evasion, but there were 
bound to be some suicides for whom it was a matter of sinq)le fact. Robert Burton in 
The Anatomy o f Melancholy (1661), at a time when hostility to suicide was still very 
marked, said "In some cases those hard censures of such as offer violence to their own 
persons...are to be mitigated, as in such as are mad, beside themselves for the time, or 
found to have been long melancholy, and that in extremity" (Burton, 1927 Vol 3:439).
In 1788 the English doctor WilHam Rowley in A Treatise on...Diseases...with 
Thoughts on Madness, Suicide etc. said flatly, "Everyone who commits suicide is 
indubitably non compos mentis and therefore suicide should ever be considered an act 
of insanity.
But it was in the 19th century that a truly determined move was made by medical men 
to bring suicide and atten^ted suicide within their jurisdiction. The beginning can be 
located in the French cançaign to "médicalisé madness" dramatically described by 
Michael Foucault in Madness and Civilisation'. Birth o f the Asylum. One of the 
leading figures in the movement was Jean Esquirol, a pupil of Phillip Pinel Ian 
Hacking says Esquirol had "lived during one of the great periods of inçerial expansion 
of his profession. He was inq>lying that doctors have the right to guard, treat, control 
and judge suicides. They are no longer in the domain of moralists and priests, of
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Augustine and Aquinas. Self-murder has become, [Esquirol] writes, 'one of the most 
inq)ortant subjects of clinical medicine'." (Hacking 1998:65) Esquirol's major work. 
Des maladies mentales advocating this view, was published in Paris in 1838.
Shortly afterward in London in 1840, Forbes Winslow, a fellow of the Royal College 
of Surgeons, pubhshed The Anatomy o f Suicide, which served as a major text of the 
subject throughout the century.^  ^ Winslow also beheved madness and suicide were 
medical matters and could be traced to physical causes. He pressed the point not only 
in his book, but in the Journal o f Psychological Medicine which he edited fi'om 1848 
to 1863. Together with two well known coroners, Thomas Wakley and Edwin 
Lankester, Winslow advocated post mortems on the bodies of suicides in order to 
identify the organic cause that had made them kill themselves. Wakley announced in 
The Lancet iu 1855 that he would "regularly publish tabulated information gleaned 
from his suicide inquests, so that the community could discover 'what are the physical 
conditions which lead to this catastrophe"' (quoted in Anderson 1987:121). Lankester, 
who wrote and lectured widely in addition to his duties as Westminster medical officer 
of health and coroner for Central Middlesex, promoted the idea that "suicidal 
tendencies were usually a manifestation of brain disease. Another coroner, William 
Wynn Westcott, wrote the second major 19th century Enghsh text on suicide in 1885, 
in which he called for an end to its criminahsation and emphasised the need for medical 
involvement in its prevention.
As the Victorian project of institutionahsing deviants grew in the second half of the 
19th century (Scull 1996), the concept of suicide as a manifestation of madness meant 
that attempted suicides were routinely certificated under the lunacy laws and placed in 
asylums. By the 1880s some 4000 people with suicidal propensities were being 
certified by doctors every year as in need of confinement. (Lunacy Commissioners' 
44th Annual Report p.59, quoted in Anderson 1987:402) A General Practitioner 
named Adams, writing in the early part of the 20th century, said, "A recognised
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suicidal tendency is often the principal reason, in the eyes of the pubHc at least, for 
sending a patient to an asylum" (quoted in Anderson 1987:388),
A few voices were raised against the determinist tide: in 1885 T.O. Bonser published a 
panophlet The Right to Die (London Free Thought) in which he argued for a 
legalisation of suicide in extreme cases (Gates 1988:132). The traditional religious 
arguments about suicide involving morahty and choice were re-presented in 1907 in an 
influential book The Theory o f Good and Evil edited by Hastings Rashdell. And in the 
legal world free will continued to be presumed as the necessary prerequisite for 
prosecution and punishment.
But determinist thinking was gaining ground, particularly in penal matters; David 
Garland has detailed its swelling influence at length (1985). hi respect of suicide it 
was having an effect even on people with overtly rehgious motivations: the Salvation 
Army opened an Anti-Suicide Bureau in 1906 and reported that in a "typical case" the 
suicidal man "was first sent to a doctor" (Dublin and Bunzel 1933:323). Moreover, 
General Booth announced a plan to use the Bureau for sociological research: 
"Records will be kept of all cases that come to our notice", he wrote, "and they will be 
studied from a scientific point of view. We wUl try to find out to what this suicide 
mania is due, and we hope later to be able to deal with the cause in its inc^ient state. 
The sociology of the future will deal with causes, and not effects, and our study will 
help in this direction" (DAILY TELEGRAPH 5 January 1907).
Following Durkheim, there was a small but regularly appearing progression of 
sociological studies of suicide, which contributed to the growing consensus that it was 
"caused", not chosen. But it was the medical world that waged a steady campaign to 
re-define self killing as an exclusively medical matter. Evidence for this can be found 
in the number of articles in medical journals, growing as the century went on, which 
pressed the link between suicide and mental illness.
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lu addition, still within a medical context, the contribution of Freudian ideas to the 
determinist paradigm should not be ignored. His famous concept of a 'death wish' - a 
naturally occurring destructive instinct directed towards the sel^ first proposed in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922) - became absorbed into popular consciousness 
and inevitably aflfected ideas about self killing.^ "^  The inçortance of this and other 
aspects of Freudian determinism to mid-20th century thought was made visible in the 
huge, almost reverential celebration of his centenary in 1956 (see chapter 3).
So steady was the promotion of the idea that suicide was caused, and so unwavering 
its advocates, that by the 1950s, the conception of self killing as a synçtom of a 
pathology - either of the individual or society - had assumed virtually the status of a 
cliché, and the scene was set for it to be formally removed fi^ om criminal justice 
jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The variety of attitudes to suicide across cultures and over time demonstrates that its 
status as a crime has always been problematic. Its criminal status in Western culture 
was originally defined by an Augustinian edict which seems to have been inspired as 
much by public order as by moral considerations. Nevertheless,. the religious 
prohibition, bolstered by superstitious fears and the needs of the Royal treasury, meant 
that suicide came to be viewed with intense horror and revulsion throughout Europe 
for many centuries. However, fi*om a vantage point beyond the 1961 
decriminahsation, hindsight can discern during these centuries elements at work that 
prepared the ground for it. Four were of special significance: (1) The rule allowing a 
suicide's property to escape forfeiture if the self-killer was deemed non compos mentis ', 
(2) The resurgence of classical ideas in the 17th and 18th centuries, which joined with 
rationahst Enlightenment thinking to make possible divergent views on the moral 
status of suicide; (3) The 19th century initiation of prosecution and punishment of
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attempted suicide; and (4) The growing influence of the positivist paradigm as an 
explanation of human behaviour, with its implicit programme of the médicalisation of 
deviance. As the 19th century ended, these elements had created a context in which 
the décriminalisation of suicide was potentially possible, though not inevitable. The 
next chapter looks at structural changes engendered by the upheavals of the 20th 
century which further enhanced the prospects for change in the law on suicide.
Notes to Chapter 2
^Jack Douglas in The Social Meanings o f Suicide (1967) criticises the idea that suicide is, or has ever 
been, a unidimensional and unvarying form of behaviour. He points out that the definitions and 
meanings of suicide vary within a single society as well as between different cultures.
^This phenomenon and other aspects of Japanese attitudes to suicide are covered in 'Suicide Attempts 
of Japanese Youth and Durkheim's concept of Anomie' in Giddens, A. (ed.) Sociology o f Suicide 1971 
^This quotation is from Steinmetz, S.R. "Suicide among Primitive Peoples" in American 
Anthropologist 7, 1894. It is quoted in several sources; this one was taken from Dublin & Bunzel t 
p. 139. Westermarck in The Origin and Development o f the Moral Ideas 1926 pp.229-237, lists 
dozens of contrasting attitudes to suicide in various cultures around the world.
"*The absence of biblical prohibition of suicide is referred to continuously in the literature, beginning 
with John Donne's Biathanatos in 1608 (first published 1648). St. John Stevas in Life, Death and the 
Law (1961), says (p.248): "In all, eight cases of suicide are mentioned [in the bible]: Judges, ix,54 
(Abimelech): To save disgrace of being killed by woman at a siege. Judges, xvi 30 (Samson): 
Destroyed the Philistines with him. Double effect? I Sam, xxxi 4 (Saul): Fell on his sword. 2 Sam, 
xvii, 23 (Ahithophel): Hanged himself because his counsel was rejected. Kings, xvi, 18 (Zimri):
Burnt himself in his house. 2 Mac., xiv, 41 (Razis): Chose suicide rather than fall into enemy hands. 
Matt, xxvii, 5 (Judas): Hanged himself with a halter from despair. Acts, xvi, 27: Jailer of Paul 
attempted suicide fearing prisoners had escaped."
^Attitudes of the early Christian church to suicide, particularly in relation to martyrdom are discussed 
in Davies, J.G. The Early Christian Church 1965 and Chadwick, H. The Early Church 1967. 
^Information about Augustine's position and the context in which he damned suicide are taken from 
Chadwick, H. Augustine^ 1986; Chadwick, H. The Early Church, 1967; West, R. StAugustine, 1933; 
O'Meara, J., Introduction to The City o f God, 1984, and Gibbon, E., The Decline and Fall o f the 
Roman Empire Vol. 3 & 4, 1969
^This kind of reading of the situation would appear to offer support to the interpretation described by 
Steven Box in Power, Crime and Mystification, where he says that "Numerous researchers 
(Chambliss 1964; Duster 1970; Graham 1976; Gunningham 1974; Hall 1952; Haskins 1960; Hay 
1975; Hopkins 1978; McCaghy and Denisoff 1973; Platt 1969; and Thompson 1975) have produced 
evidence consistent with the view that criminal law categories are ideological reflections of the 
interests of particular powerful groups. As such criminal law categories are resources, tools, 
instruments, designed and then used to criminalise, demoralise, incapacitate, fracture and sometimes 
eliminate those problem populations perceived by the powerful to be potentially or actually 
threatening the existing distribution of power, wealth, and privilege. They constitute one, and only 
one way by which social control over subordinate, but 'resisting' populations is exercised. For once 
behaviour more typically engaged in by subordinate populations has been incorporated into criminal 
law, then legally sanctioned punishments can be 'justifiably" imposed." p.7
^MacDonald, M. & Murphy, T., Sleepless Souls: Suicide in Early Modem England, 1990, describes 
these rituals in detail. Westermarck (op. cit. p.255) says the cross roads burial and stake through the
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body were to prevent the suicide's spirit from causing mischief. Durkheim runs through the savage 
burial rituals of Europe in Chapter 2, "The Legal Prohibition of Suicide" in the famous Suicide 
^St Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law, Question 94: Of the Natural Law, Second Article; from 
Summa Theologica Vol. 2 tns. by Father Laurence Shapcote, 1955
^^Quoted in Battin, M.P., Ethical Issues in Suicide 1995, p.74, sourced as Martin Luther, The Table 
Talk or Familiar Discourse o f Martin Luther, trs. by William Hazlitt 1848, p.254: "The saying 
attributed to Luther is 'It is very certain that, as to all persons who have hanged themselves, or killed 
themselves in any other way, 'tis the devil who has put the cord round their necks, or the knife to their 
throats."
^^Clebsch, W.A. England's Earliest Protestants 1964 and MacCulloch, D. Thomas Cranmer 1996 
^^This debate is the entire subject of Sprott, 1961., and is also set out in Minois, G., tns. by Cochrane, 
L., History o f Suicide: Voluntary Death in Western Culture, 1999, Part III; H.R. Fedden (1938) deals 
with it at length in chapters V-VII.
^^Many texts refer to this incident; the earliest source given is Ashton, J., The Dawn o f the 
Nineteenth Century in England 1866, Vol. II p.283
1 ^ 4  Geo 4,1823 made it illegal for coroners to issue a warrant for burial of a felo de se in a public 
highway
^^This was the sub-title Donne gave to Biathanatos. A modem edition was published in 1981, edited 
by Rudick, M. & Battin, M.P.
^^Sym's work is discussed at length in Sprott (1961); MacDonald edited a modem edition of Sym's 
Life's Preservatives Against Self-Killing for Routledge in 1988
^^Bentham, J., The Principles o f Morals and Legislation 1948 p. 191. Bentham also commented on 
the "peijuiy" of coroners' juries in bringing in verdicts of insanity on suicides, saying it was "the 
penance which prevented an outrage on humanity": Principle o f Penal Law, p.479 
l^George Minois in History o f Suicide: Voluntary Death in Western Culture 1999, discusses 
Voltaire's contribution. Glanville Williams (1958) said "It was chiefly under the influence of 
Montesquieu, Diderot and Voltaire that France took the lead in legalising suicide by a statute of 
1790." p.239
^^See esp. Battin 1995; Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 1995 and Law's Empire 1991; Feinberg, J., 
Harm to Self 1986
2(>The "Werther phenomenon" and its effects on suicide is discussed in Anderson., Suicide in 
Victorian and Edwardian England, 1987; Papemo, Suicide as a Cultural Institution in Dostoevsky's 
Russia, 1997, and Alvarez, The Savage God 1971
^^For a full account of the Chatterton phenomenon see Ackroyd, P., Chatterton, 1993 
^^Forfeiture was ended by the Felony Act 1870; the gradual ending of its practical force on suicides is 
discussed in Gates, B. Victorian Suicide 1988
^^Stephen, Sir James, A History o f the Criminal Law o f England 1883, p. 107. Stephen also reports 
(p. 107) that the Royal Commission of 1878, charged with drafting a criminal code of law, wanted to 
make abetment of suicide a special offence, subject to penal servitude for life as the maximum 
punishment.
^%oth Gates (1988) and Anderson (1987) discuss Sir Peter Laurie, and say his campaign against 
attempted suicides made him the model for Charles Dickens' character Alderman Cute in The Chimes, 
1854
2^he figures are taken from Anderson 1987 who presents tables at pages 286 and 288, of average 
annual attempts suicide arrest rates in the 19th and early 20th centuries, drawn from the 
Metropolitan Police Retums; Miscellaneous Statistics of the U.K. 1861-79; and the Judicial Statistics, 
Part I
^^Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879; Summary Jurisdiction Act 1899, Criminal Justice Act 1925 
Anderson and Gates both draw this conclusion. Although the Judicial Statistics confirm that only a 
small number of attempted suicide charges were sent to the higher courts, it is not possible to tell 
which of the "drunk and disorderly" or "breach of the peace" convictions originally came in as 
attempted suicides. Ignatieff, in A Just Measure o f Pain 1978 also comments on the "new severity 
towards petty crime" and says "Eighty-five percent of [the new police] arrests in the 1830s were for 
vagrancy, prostitution, drunkenness, disorderly behaviour and common assault..." p. 185. The same 
point is made by Storch in The Policeman as Domestic Missionary 1976. McConville in A History o f 
English Prison Administration (1981) also examines who was sent to prison in the 19th century.
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28Anderson 1987 p.295. That remands for medical reports was a long established practice is further 
supported Ity the wording of the formal advice given to magistrates in the next century about the 
necessity to do so. See chapter 3.
^^owley. Dr. William, A Treatise on Female, Nervous, Hypochrondriacal, Bilious, Convulsive 
Diseases...with Thoughts on Madness, Suicide, etc. 1788, quoted in MacDonald 1990 p.95 
^^Forbes Winslow's book, and its importance to 19th century attitudes to suicide is discussed in all the 
texts on this issue; see esp. Hacking, Anderson, Gates and Papemo. The actual book is Winslow, 
Forbes, The Anatomy o f Suicide, Henry Renshaw, London 1840 
Anderson 1987 p. 122. The coroners Thomas Wakley and Edwin Lankester are also discussed in 
MacDonald's work on The Médicalisation o f Suicide in England, in Rosenberg and Golden Framing 
Disease 1992 p.88
32westcott, Suicide: Its History, Literature, Jurisprudence, Causation and Prevention 1885 
^^Farberow and Shneidman in Cry for Help 1961, present an international bibliography on suicide 
from 1897 to 1957. It is sixty-one pages long, printed in 8 pt. type. They divide it into four 
categories: Psychology and General, Sociological, Medical-Legal and Philosophy-Religion, but say 
(p.327) "Medical and surgical procedures in the handling and treatment of suicidal cases continue to 
receive a major share of the space devoted to suicide, particularly in foreign medical journals." A 
sample of some of the titles gives the flavour: "Collective Suicide", British Medical Journal (BMJ) 
1898; "Suicide and Sanity", Lancet 1907; "On Attempted Suicide", Journal o f Mental Science 1913; 
"The Prevention of Suicide", BMJ 1918; "Certain Personality Problems in Relation to Mental Illness 
with Special Reference to Suicide and Homicide", British Journal o f Medical Psychology 1929; 
"Suicide from the Medico-Legal Aspect", BMJ 1931; "The Psychology of Suicide", BMJ 1931; 
"Attempted Suicide: An Investigation", Journal o f Mental Science 1937
"^^ In addition to Freud's introduction of the "death wish" concept, he provides another illuminating 
insight into the law against suicide in Totem and Taboo (1950, p.69), when he says, "For, after all, 
there is no need to prohibit something no one desires to do, and a thing that is forbidden with the 
greatest emphasis must be a thing that is desired."
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Chapter 3 : Moving towards décriminalisation
By the 20th century, as chapter two makes clear, the law against suicide had already 
become fraught with ambiguity, and subject to the matrix of forces Weber said 
underhes all social change. In the years up to the 1961 reform these forces intensified, 
and to understand what happened it is necessary to consider what they were and how 
they affected the social context in which the change occurred. Hegel's claim that 
reform must spring from historically prepared soil is particularly apposite in respect of 
what happened to the suicide law.
The last chapter dealt with, among other things, the intellectual debates on suicide in 
the 18th century. These could be said to have "historically prepared the soil' in much of 
Europe, as suicide laws were reformed in many continental countries in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries.^ But weU over a century elapsed before change occurred in 
England. So the question must arise - why did it happen when it did? Why after so 
long a period, throughout which the law continued to be used, and in the absence of 
any intellectual debate remotely resembling that of the 18th century, did Parhament 
abruptly deem it not a crime?
This chapter begins the task of answering this question by examining the factors in the 
"matrix of forces" - the elements in the contemporaneous "social soil" - that impacted 
on the passage of the Suicide Act. In the interests of clarity, although it is artificially 
arbitrary, it will do this under three headings: 1) The nature of the time (what Hegel, 
Dicey and others have called the "spirit of the age"); 2) The operation of the law; and 
3) The practical reahties.
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Nature o f the time
In mid 20th century Britain for various reasons - the most obvious being relief at the 
lifting of wartime restrictions - people were synq)athetic to the idea of loosening 
control This climate of opinion had the effect of stifling potential, and muffling actual, 
resistence to the general idea of decriminahsation, which seemed somehow to chime 
with the tender of the times. Whether the specific decriminahsation of suicide would 
have been widely endorsed is not possible to know, as it never became the subject of 
pubhc debate, nor was any opinion poU taken on the issue (Tyler 1990) .^ However, 
because of the general feeling that less control was probably a good thing, it can be 
argued that the climate of opinion was favourable to the change. In addition to this, 
there were at least two elements in the mid-century matrix that played a more active, 
possibly even an instigating, role: These were first, the determinist paradigms that
dominated the intehectual landscape, and second, the continuing efforts of parts of 
the medical estabhshment to consohdate their jurisdiction over suicide (see chapter 2).
hi considering the general climate of opinion and why it was favourable to change, the 
most significant explanatory factors are increased affluence and changed attitudes 
towards morality. As regards the increased affluence, it has become a chché to talk 
about the material well-being of the 1950s, but the bare facts continue to be 
conçelling: firom 1951 to 1964 there was uninterrupted fiiH employment, a 110% rise 
in average earnings, 30% rise in the average standard of living, and a 100% rise in the 
proportion of the population in owner-occupied housing (Pinto-Duschinsky 1970:55). 
The lives of ordinary people were changing in very tangible ways. According to David 
Thompson "The people as a whole enjoyed a higher standard of living, better housing, 
longer hohdays and shorter working hours, more foreign travel, wider facilities for 
leisure and recreation, than the British people had ever enjoyed before" (Thompson 
1981:281). Even writers on the left, like Richard Hoggart who in 1957 regretted what
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he saw as the destructive intact of affluence on working class communities, conceded 
that the material comfort of their lives had greatly increased. Anthony Crosland, 
later a Labour cabinet minister, wrote in Encounter in 1961 that "now England was 
rich" it would have to turn to solving the world's inequahties (March 1961:56). 
A.J.P. Taylor in a 1960 Ne^v Statesman article titled "Look Back at the Fifties" said, 
"if the next ten years do anything like as well as the last they will do very well indeed." 
(2 January 1960:5). Eric Hobsbawn called them the "Golden Years", saying "In the 
course of the 1950s many people, especially in the increasingly prosperous developed' 
countries, became aware that times were indeed strikingly improved, expecially if their 
memories reached back to the years before the Second World War" (Hobsbawn 
1995:257).
The relevance of this to the Suicide Act is that life in England in the 1950s was 
changing fast, and it was changing for the better. The age old human suspicion of 
change was being seduced by washing machines, cars, televisions, refiigerators. Social 
critics like Bogdanor and Skidelsky (1970), Galbraith (1958) and Titmuss (1960) 
deplored what they called the "conq)lacency", "inertia" and "irresponsibihty" of the 
times, but modem political analysts would call it the "feel good factor", and it 
translated into the unusual situation of rapid social change without social disorder. 
The ever-present human fear that change will disintegrate into chaos was lulled by a 
wash of material prosperity, and in 1959 when the sitting government carrq)aigned with 
the slogan "Life is Better Under the Conservatives" they increased their majority from 
61 to 100 seats (Butler & Sloman 1980:209).
In circumstances such as these it was possible for the ruling classes to contemplate 
social change with exceptional equanimity. Moreover, they did not just contemplate it, 
they urged it forward. Noel Arman says that after the war, "Blueprints for a better 
world were all the rage" (Arman 1991:282). Christopher Booker wrote a book about 
the fifties called The Neophihacs - "addicts of the new" - claiming that the fashionable
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intellectual elite of the time were "explicitly eager for a revolution" (Booker 1969:98). 
In the years around 1961 "change" began to be advocated with increasing urgency: 
Booker quotes an Anthony Crosland "broadside" in Encounter in 1960 about 
"complacent, sluggish, stagnant Britain" (ibid.: 149). Penguin brought out a "Special" 
titled "The Stagnant Society" (Shanks 1961). Britain was said to be suffocated by 
ancient traditions and archaic institutions; the word "stagflation" was coined to 
describe what was said to be "the English disease" (Home 1989). Macmillan's famous 
1960 "Winds of Change" speech, though delivered in reference to enq)ire, was felt by 
many to have domestic relevance. Criticism of clinging to tradition came even fi'om 
such an unlikely source as the monarchy: Prince Philip in Febmary 1960 said "If 
anyone has a new idea in this country, there are twice as many people who advocate 
putting a man with a red flag in fi'ont of it" (Sampson 1962:37).
All this worked to create a climate wiiere new ideas did not encounter the sustained 
resistence they might have faced at other times. Potential opposition certainly did 
exist, made up in part of the concern for social order which is the root of much 
resistence to change. Exanq)les of latent opposition are set out below, and its presence 
was probably one of the reasons Butler adopted the strategy he did in order to pass the 
Suicide Act (see chapters 6 and 7). However, as the 1960s began, Enhghtenment 
optimism was in vogue and intellectual fashion held that the world could be made 
better if only human reason was properly apphed.
The second significant element in the climate of the period which made it conducive to 
change was the erosion of traditional moral authority and shifls in attitudes to morahty 
itself. Traditional moral authority, in the shape of the estabhshed Church, had been in 
decline since the 19th century. This, too, had become something of a chche, and 
intellectual periodicals of the 1950s such as Encounter, Spectator, New Statesman, 
Listener, ran many articles on the subject, often with titles like "Is Christianity Still 
Relevant?" {Listener 18 April 1957)
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Writing in the Listener in June 1959, Alisdair Macintyre said, "The Church of England 
does not express the rehgion of England any more, simqply because England no longer 
has a rehgion. I do not just mean by that that most people in this country no longer 
beheve in the supernatural in any very exphcit feshion. I mean that we lack any shared 
symbols through which our common fears and hopes could be expressed; and that we 
lack any shared moral convictions to which such symbols, if we had them, could give 
living expression"(26 June 1959:1054). This idea was expressed more briefly and 
bleakly in John Osborne's acclaimed 1957 play "The Entertainer", when Jean Rice says, 
"There is no God; we've only got ourselves. Somehow we've just got to make a go at 
it. We've only ourselves" (Osborne 1957:85). Some forty years on, in 1994, the 
academic sociologist Grace Davie, studying rehgion in post-war Britain, concluded 
that "a majority in the nation remained very largely indifferent to rehgious organisation 
of whatever kind" (Davie 1994:167).
As no census after 1851 queried rehgious afiSliation, it is difficult to document these 
views definitively, but an indication is given in the felling church rohs. Membership of 
the Church of England dropped from 145 per 1000 population in 1931 to 89 in 1960, 
and declining numbers were recorded by ah the other protestant denominations too, 
save only the Methodists, who showed a shght increase. The numbers of Roman 
Cathohcs rose shghtly in the 1950s, but were stih down from the figures in 1920. The 
Jewish community increased in size during this period, but was estimated to number 
only about 450,000 (Butler & Sloman 1980:467-473).
N
The Church of England retained a facade of social significance and moral authority, in 
part because of its estabhshed presence in the House of Lords. This helps explain why 
the booklet from the Church of England Board for Social Responsibihty featured 
prominently in the Parliamentary debates on the Suicide Bih (see chapter 5). It had the
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eflfect of defiisiiig potential religious opposition by persuading legislators that the 
Church supported decriminahsation.
But in feet, the Church's role as authoritative arbiter on moral issues was by this time 
much diminished. This was clearly demonstrated in the 1956 Report of the Royal 
Commission on Marriage and Divorce (Cmnd 9676 1955-56), where the members q)ht 
bitterly on the question of the law's reform, but were unanimous that it was entirely a 
secular matter. Rehgious views on marriage and divorce, which for so long had been a 
central Church concern, were not deemed relevant to government pohcy making. 
Further illustration of the Church's marginahsation on matters with a moral dimension 
came in the 1957 Wolfenden Report's exphcit and much quoted distinction between sin 
(a matter for the church) and crime (a matter for the state). This is the doctrine that 
Hall (1980) and Newbum (1992) cite as the "Wolfenden strategy" which, they say, 
formed the basis for much of the reforming legislation of the time (see chapter 1)
Many social critics commenting on post-war Britain have reflected on the weakened 
authority of rehgion,^ which lessened the force of its moral taboos. Significant among 
these, of course, was the one against suicide. Running paraUel to the decline in 
traditional moral authority, was a changed attitude to morality itself There were 
several diflerent strands to this, some of them conflicting, but the overall effect was to 
mute and deflect opposition to the decriminahsation One inq)ortant strand was an 
increased tolerance of human fi*ailty and diversity, a product perhaps of the depression 
and war, which no adult over 30 in Britain had escaped. Peter Wildeblood, writing on 
"English Criminals" in 1957 said the general view of the time towards them was 
" There but for the grace of God', 'Nous Sommes Tous des Assassins' and 'Knock on 
any door'" {Encounter 24 July 1957:27). Increased tolerance, mixed with conq)assion, 
can be discerned, for example, in the Legitimacy Act of 1959 seeking an end to the 
stigma of bastardy, in the First Offenders Act 1958, which restricted imprisonment of 
adults by summary courts, and in the moves in the '50s and '60s towards conq>ensation
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for victims of crime (Rock 1990). Coicpassion was certainly an element in the 
arguments made in support of Kenneth Robinson's 1961 private member's bill to 
legahse abortion (see especially Ahce Jenkins Law for the Rich 1960).
It is relevant that Graham Greene's novels were so popular in the 1950s, as 
compassion was one of their central themes. A matter of special interest to this 
research is the way suicide is handled in Greene's Heart o f the Matter, published in 
1948: it is presented as something to be understood, not condemned. This is also the 
approach taken towards the suicide in Virginia Woolfs Mrs. Dalloway, pubhshed in 
1925 and a classic by the 1950s, and in Arthur Miller's Death o f a Salesman, written 
in 1949, and playing to critical acclaim in London in the 1950s. Terrence Rattigan's 
(1952) play The Deep Blue Sea dealt synq)thetically with the stigma surrounding 
suicide and the suffering it so often entailed. . Compassion, not moral censure, was 
also the motivation for the Samaritans, according to their founder, Chad Varah, wfto 
began organising volunteers in London in 1953 to offer help to people in despair who 
were contemplating suicide (Varah 1973).
A particularly apposite example of conq)assion rather than censure toward suicide 
arose in October 1959, when the sitting M.P. for Harrow West, Sir Albert Newby 
Braithwaite, killed himself with an overdone of barbiturates in his flat in Westminster. 
According to the Telegraph (20 Oct. 1959) "a note left by Sir Albert clearly showed 
his intention of ending his own life," but to the headline "M.P. Took His Own Life" 
was added the excusing line: "Suffered Years of Ill-Health".
Although tolerance of deviance and diversity was hardly a universal characteristic of 
the 1950s - exanq)les of its opposite appear below - it was given a significant stamp of 
approval when one of its most important advocates, Isaiah Berlin, was knighted in 
1957. In his inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Pohtical Theory at 
Oxford {Two Concepts o f Liberty 1958), Berlin described the nature of the plurahsm
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he felt freedom required: "One belief more than any other, is responsible for the 
slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals... this is the behef that 
somewhere... there is a final solution ... Indeed, the very desire for guarantees that our 
values are eternal and secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the 
certainties of childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past... To demand 
[these things] is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to 
guide one's practice is a sycoptom of an equally deep, and far more dangerous, moral 
and pohtical immaturity" (Berlin 1969:167 & 172).
Reviewing this and other lectures by Berlin in February 1959, Noel Annan said, 
"Plurahsm.. strikes at the heart of many rehgious, moral and aesthetic doctrines 
common today. We cannot measure people, or moral systems, or hterature against a 
single standard, however subtly organised that standard may be. This I beheve to be 
the true hberal's faith, and its concomitant virtue, tolerance, is bom of compassion for 
the infinite variety of human character and the social situations or predicaments in 
which human beings find themselves" {Listener 19 Feb. 1959:324).
These attitudes, promoted by such powerful figures (Annan, for example, was Provost 
of Kings CoUege London in 1959), contributed to an intehectual climate which 
subsequently found an unexpected spokesperson in the Bishop of Woolwich, whose 
best-selling book Honest to God (1963) announced that "Nothing of itself can always 
be labeUed as 'wrong' "(Levin 1979:109).
Traditional moral attitudes came under attack from other quarters, including one from 
the logical positivists, who enjoyed a brief intehectual celebrity in the 1950s. Logical 
positivism was the school of moral phhosophy which rejected all metaphysics, and thus 
defined morahty and rehgion as meaningless. Their pronouncements, especiahy those 
of the Oxford phhospher A.J. Ayer, who appeared regularly on radio and television, 
provoked a lively exchange of views in the correspondence columns of the Listener on
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the theme "Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt Youth?" (Anscombe 14 February
1957)
Another, and ultimately more long-lasting assault on metaphysics came from the 
nascent discipline of sociology, just beginning to gain academic credibihty in the 
1950s/ Its commitment to fact-based, value-free en^iricism deemed questions about 
"right" and "wrong" to be irrelevant in dealing with behaviour problems, which were 
more appropriately conceptuahsed using terms like "normative" and "anti-social". C 
Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination, published in 1959, made the claim that 
"The sociological imagination is becoming, I beheve, the major cultural denominator of 
our cultural life and its signal feature" (Mills 1959:13).
Yet another attack on traditional morahty in the fifties came from the resurgence of 
19th century Romanticism, which re-invigorated the idea of the single individual as an 
autonomous moral agent; a larger-than-life figure living on the edge, with a total 
disregard for the norms of society. This was the quintessential D.H. Lawrence hero, 
and it is relevant that Lawrence's books were very popular in the fifties, even before 
the Lady Chatterley trial. Stuart Hampshire, reviewing a re-pubhshed edition of 
Lawrence's letters in 1956 said, "Lawrence's heroes and heroines, although living in 
contençorary England, reahse in their moments of freedom that they feel no natural 
ahegiance to any form of life that is conceivable in a competitive, rational society. 
When they free themselves from pretence, they find that their nature is in revolt, not 
only against the ideals of bourgeois society, but against modem society as such, 
whatever form it may take. They do not want to be social men at all" {Encounter 
December 1956:84).
Colin Wilson's best selling book The Outsider (1956) presented a pantheon of romantic 
rebels through the centuries, both fact and fiction. It was admiringly reviewed, notably 
in Encounter, wfrich said it was "the most remarkable book upon which this reviewer
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has ever had to pass judgement"(unsigiied review, 7 June 1956:24). The 1950s literary 
phenomenon labelled "Angry Young Men", which included writers like Kingsley 
Amis, John Osborne and Alan Sillitoe, was based on rejection of and conten^t for 
established norms of conventional society. Such rejection had the endorsement of 
some very influential figures, including Bertrand Russell, whose book The Conquest o f  
Happiness was first published in 1930 and proved so popular that it was reprinted 
eleven times, and re-published in paperback in 1961. In it Russell says, "Ask yourself 
seriously wJiether the world is the better for the moral teaching traditionally given to 
the young. Consider how much of unadulterated superstition goes into the make-up of 
the conventionally virtuous man... Why is his subconcious morality thus divorced 
from reason? Because the ethic believed in by those who had charge of his infrncy was 
silly;... and because it contained within itself elements of morbidness derived from the 
spiritual sickness that troubled the dying Roman Enq)ire. Our nominal morality has 
been formulated by priests and mentally enslaved women. It is time that men who have 
to take a normal part in the normal life of the world learned to rebel against this sickly 
nonsense" (Russell 1961:80-81).
It was in the 1950s that romantic/existentiahst work of Albert Camus began to be 
widely read and intellectually acclaimed: Camus was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Hterature in 1957. The Outsider was pubhshed in Britain in 1946, The Rebel in 1953, 
and The Fall in 1957. Significant to this thesis is his short work The Myth o f Sisyphus, 
published in Britain in 1955, which begins, "There is but one truly serious philosophical 
problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to 
answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest... comes afterwards." 
(Camus 1975:11) The Myth o f Sisyphus was one of the extremely rare works 
published in the 20th century which carried on the philosophical debates of the 18th 
century on suicide. Virtually all other writing on the subject was either sociological 
or medical, and of a firmly positivist nature. In his preface to the book Camus said, 
"For me The Myth o f Sisyphus marks the beginning of an idea which I was to pursue in
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The Rebel It attenq)ts to resolve the problem of suicide, as The Rebel attempts to 
resolve that of murder, in both cases without the aid of eternal values which, 
temporarily perhaps, are absent or distorted in contemporary Europe"(Camusl955:7). 
Camus then sets out the - to him unanswerable - case for the total absurdity of life 
and thus the total logicahty of suicide, but concludes that one should carry on hving 
anyway, thereby demonstrating courage and reasoning. "It is essential to die 
unreconciled," he says, "and not of one's own free will. Suicide is a repudiation" 
(ibid.:55).
Challenges to traditional authority in the 1950s also began to come from people long 
considered to be its most soHd supporters. Frank Parkin charts in Middle Class 
Radicalism (1968) the rise of the Carrpaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which began in 
1955, and at its peak saw an estimated 100,000 mainly middle class people in Trafalger 
Square openly defying estabhshed authority. Parkin says, "the radicahsm of the middle 
class is directed mainly to social reforms which are basicaUy moral in content"(Parkin 
1986:2).
So at the time of the Suicide Bih many different forces were at work which separately, 
and in different ways, had the effect of unsettling - destabilising - traditional attitudes 
toward morahty. Tim Newbum in his analysis of law and morals in post-war Britain 
(1992) says, "The opening up of opportunities for debate on morals and 
values...problematised the supposed existence of a uniform morahty... the very idea of 
a consensus of moral values was losing credence" (Newbum 1992:159).
Ah these forces could be said to have assisted the passage of the Suicide Act insofar as 
they created a climate in which the status quo could be chaUenged with more than 
usual hope of success. They worked to deflect and muffle opposing forces which in 
other circumstances - and without the strategy adopted by Butler (see chapters 6 and 
7) - could have been expected to resist its passage. These opposing forces are set out
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below in the section on "practical realities", but before that, consideration needs to be 
given to what was perhaps the most significant component of the intellectual climate of 
the time, the determinist paradigms.
Sîsnîfîcance o f positivism
It is being argued here that the material prosperity of the 1950s, together with the 
changing attitudes to morahty created a climate which allowed the decriminahsation of 
suicide to take place. In addition to this there were the aspects of the period that can 
be said to have actively encouraged it. One of these was the intehectual dominance of 
positivism, with its determinist paradigms as explanations for human behaviour. These 
placed responsibihty for deviance not on the individuals concerned, but on forces 
beyond their control - medical, psychological and/or social Advocates of these 
models confidently predicted that professional skih and knowledge, of a sort never 
before avahable, would be able to re-shape deviance into conformity without the 
tiresome and controversial procedures of criminal justice (Garland 1985, Cohen 1985, 
Smart, 1992).
Deternhnist paradigms were the children of what Bryan Appleyard (1993) calls the 
"love af&ir with science" which had begun as far back as Francis Bacon and grown 
steadhy through the centuries as its material and medical fiuits became ever more 
apparent and obtainable. The 1956 Reith lectures were devoted entirely to this subject, 
and in them Sir Edward ^p le ton  summed up a paeon of praise by saying, "The spirit 
of science is indeed the spirit of hope" {ListenerlS September 1956).
Sigmund Freud, so significant an influence on the 1950s, was an arch determinist. His 
translater, James Strachey said, "Behind aH of Freud's work ... we should posit his 
behef in the universal vahdity of the law of determinism ... [he] extended the behef 
unconq)romisingly to the field of mental phenomena" (Strachey 1990:17). In one of 
his early lectures (1909) at Clark University hi Massachusetts Freud cited as one of
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two obstacles to the acceptance of psychoanalysis the feet that "people are 
unaccustomed to reckoning with a strict and universal apphcation of determinism to 
mental life" (Freud 1962:63). However, by 1956, the celebrations of Freud's 
centenary offered ample illustration of how accustomed people had become to 
determinist interpretations. Freud's biographer, Ernest Jones, said, "It is hard to 
imagine a world without Freud, for he and his followers have shaped the thought and 
language of twentieth century man" {ListenerlO May 1956). Brian Farrell said, "We 
were much more ready fifty years ago to talk morahstically [about behaviour]... now 
we are inclined to talk diagnosticaUy or clinically. It would be generally agreed that 
this change is due, in part, to the work of Sigmund Freud" {Listener 21 June 1956).
The power of the determinist paradigms stemmed fi’om the idea that the methods of 
science, so successful in the physical world, could be equally successfid in solving 
human problems. Durkheim is particularly in^ortant in the context of this research, 
and his insistence that suicide was a social phenomenon inspired a continuing tradition 
of research into the precise social factors that might be at work. One such study was 
referred to several times in debates surrounding the Suicide Bill. This was Peter 
Sainsburys Suicide in London: An Ecological Study (1955). Sainsbury, who at the 
time was with the Institute of Psychiatry of the Maudsley Hospital, believed firmly 
that the apphcation of enq)irical scientific methods would result in practical solutions 
to this human problem "This approach to suicide," he said, "affords an objective body 
of feet regarding the social conditions that engender suicide or suicidal inclinations in a 
group, and thereby provide data on which a practical programme of mental hygiene 
might be based" (Sainsbury 1955:11).
It should be noted that not once in the Sainsbury study is the law on suicide mentioned, 
nor its effect on the individuals prosecuted for attenq)ted suicide. But his reference to a 
"programme of mental hygiene" based on an "objective body of fact" demonstrates 
how neatly sociological emqpiricism could be meshed with medical methods in a project
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to "normalise" deviance. The assumption, which was widely shared, was that morally 
neutral science could actually solve ancient human problems, and prejudicial moral 
judgements would be superseded by beneficial medical prescriptions. It is not often 
recalled now that one of the chief arguments in the 1950s for the décriminalisation of 
homosexuality was that it "was a disease that needed medical treatment rather than 
prison" (Annan 1991:172). Among the Wolfenden recommendations which have been 
largely forgotten were ones to lift the ban on oestrogen treatment for homosexuals in 
prison and "that research be instituted into the aetiology of homosexuality and the 
effects of various forms of treatment" (Cmnd 247 1956-57: Recommendations 17 & 
18).
David Garland, among others, has charted the impact of this kind of determinist 
thinking on penal policy in the 20th century, and he describes how it successfidly 
"deployed a new language of reform, correction and normalisation... In [this] language, 
the deviant was no longer represened as wicked or worthless - punishable because of 
the moral choices for which he was responsible. Instead, the deviant appears as 
deficient - mentally, morally or physically... The fimction of penality is to restore him 
to an elusive normality by means of training and treatment" (Garland 1985:248).
The lead article in the Spectator of 23 June 1961 (at just the time the Suicide Bill was 
entering the House of Commons) enthusiasticaly endorsed this determinist approach to 
penal affairs: "The time has come," it said, "when we must begin to think more 
carefiiUy about whether the traditional concept of "criminal responsiblity" has any 
validity in the light of recent advances of knowledge about criminal minds and 
motives... The very notion of'guftty or not guilty* and the notion of'guilty but insane' 
depend on the assumption that criminal responsibility exists. But does it? The Courts 
could perfectly well continue to do what they now do: ascertain whether an offence 
against the law has been committed. The only change would be that instead of 
awarding special punishment a court would turn over offenders to specialist boards set
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up to decide what should be done with them., the length of his detachment from 
society depends on his progress, rather than on some arbitrary court sentence" 
{Spectator 23 June 1961:903-4).
Stan Cohen has pointed out that this "benign terminology...of helping, nurturing, 
healing" was just about to come under fierce attack in the 1960s as a "fraud" (Cohen 
1985:121), but in the 1950s and into the early 1960s its influence was immense, and 
especially among people whose views were important to the passage of the Suicide 
Act. Barbara Wootton is an exanq)le: a noted sociologist and magistrate, she was 
made a Baroness by the Labour party in the first cohort of life peers appointed to the 
Lords in 1958. In September 1959 Baroness Wootton spoke on BBC radio about the 
future of the criminal justice system, and advocated replacing it all with panels of 
medical and psychiatric e?q)erts. "Everything except treatment," she said, "Guilt, 
responsibihty and ah the rest of it - would become irrelevant... such a system would be 
both humane and effective, which is more than can be said for what we have now" 
Listener 24 September 1959:481). Wootton expressed these views at length in her 
book Social Science and Social Pathology pubhshed in May of 1959. Her pubhshers, 
George Ahen & Unwin, sent a copy to the Home Secretary, Rab Butler, which was 
duly, if cooly, acknowledged by his private secretary, Mrs. M. Jefferies (Butler papers 
E l l ,  file A, 11 May, 1959). Wootton was one of the speakers in the Lords' debate on 
the Suicide Bih, in which she echoed Durkheim, saying "Suicide is in some measure 
sociahy caused" (Hansard: Lords: 2 March 1961), but then went weh beyond him in 
firmly advocating its decriminahsation. In her memoirs. Crime & Penal Policy: 
Reflections on Fifty Years Experience (1978), Wootton talks with satisfection about 
how during this half century she witnessed the gradual shifi in attitudes towards 
offenders, away from punishment toward treatment. She cites as an important 
milestone the concept of diminished responsibihty, which had been incorporated in the 
1957 Homicide Act, although only after much bitter debate.
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Kenneth Robinson M.P. whose questions to Butler as Home Secretary were the 
immediate precipitating trigger for the change in the suicide law (see chapters 6 and 7), 
also favoured treatment not punishment, certainly for offenders who might be mentally 
disordered. He was a strong supporter of the Mental Health Act 1959, which proved 
to be so significant to the passage of the Suicide Act (see chapter 4). On the 
introduction of the Mental Health Bill to Parliament, Robinson wrote an article for the 
New Statesman in which he welcomed it as "a tribute both to the Royal Commission 
and to growing public enlightenment." He noted with approval the provision in the 
Mental Health Bill about mentally disturbed offenders: "The Courts are permitted,"
he said, "afl;er hearing medical evidence, to order conq)ulsory care and treatment 
without first convicting the offender" (10 January 1959:34).
Of special significance for the purposes of this thesis is the clear support given to the 
determinist "treatment" side of the penal argument by Rab Butler. Within two months 
of becoming Home Secretary, in March 1957, Butler took the occasion of an 
opposition supply day debate to outline plans for an inq)ortant programme of penal 
reform. (Hansard: Commons: 13 March 1957) According to his biographer, Anthony 
Howard, this speech, "with its ertq)hasis on the need for more research into the causes 
of crime, the provision of after-care services and the essential requirement for an entire 
new prison-building programme through which offenders could be treated according to 
their needs rather than their deserts - made a considerable impression" (Howard 
1987:255). In the Butler papers at Trinity College Cambridge is a carefully saved 
letter fi-om the former head of the Prison Commission, Lionel Fox, congratulating him 
on this speech (Butler papers G31 78(1)). Leon Radzinowicz's description of the 
speech's reception: "There seemed to be no end to congratulations so efiusive as to 
become politically embarrassing" (Radzinowicz 1999:170) - shows that Butler's brand 
of penal determinism pleased at least some sections of the political elite.
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Two years later Butler brought out a White Paper on penal reform (Cmnd 645 1959), 
which he himself viewed with considerable satisfaction. "I had managed," he says in 
his memoirs, "by the beginning of 1959 to publish a White Paper of corcçrehensive 
scope. Penal Practice in a Changing Society, on which all subsequent inq)rovements 
have been based" (Butler 1971:200). Butler referred to the rationale of the paper in a 
speech to the National Association of Mental Health. He spoke about how he had 
seen the modem tendency to "explore farther into the dark recesses of the mind" in the 
work he was trying to do in penal reform "I feel certain," he said, "that if we were able 
to apply the findings of modem research and science in deciding how to deal with 
offenders, and in the treatment of those placed under supervision or in detention, the 
world would be a very much happier place" (GUARDIAN 7 March 1958). Butler's 
enthusiasm for research had several tangible, and still extant outcomes: he created the 
Home Office Research Unit (HORU), and was a key figure in the founding of the 
Institute of Criminology at Cambridge. Both organisations were dedicated to finding 
the causes of crime and ways to cure it (Radzinowicz 1999 pp. 172-191). John Croft, 
a former Head of HORU, confirmed in interview that it was bom and spent its 
formative years in a climate where positivist determinism was the dominant mood, and 
where there was a widespread assunq)tion that "the social sciences were going to make 
us happy" (Croft interview 11 July 1996).
Throughout the Parliamentary debates on the Suicide Bill, the treatment paradigm was 
universally endorsed (see chapters 4 and 7), at least for this particular kind of 
deviance. From the Minister's comment that "We are changing the method of 
treatment for these unfortunate people", (Hansard: Commons: 28 July 1961) to Leo 
Abse's diatribe about the need for more public spending on mental health to cope with 
attenq)ted suicides (Hansard: Commons 19 July 1961), to Viscount Kilmuir's statement 
that the objective of state intervention in attempted suicide was "primarily medical or 
therapeutic" (Hansard: Lords: 2 March 1961), to David Weitzman's assertion that 
"Obviously, the person who commits or attenq)ts suicide...requires treatment of some
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kind" (Hansard: Commons: 19 July 1961), not a single speaker dissented from the idea 
that the appropriate response to atteir^ted suicide was treatment. The only slight 
conflict arose over the question as to whether the treatment should be compulsory (see 
chapter 4).
There are two ways in which these determinist paradigms in the 1950s are important to 
an understanding of the passage of the Suicide Act. One is the way in which this 
approach to human behaviour removes responsibility from the actual perpetrator of an 
offence. Since the concept of criminahty is contingent on the existence of moral 
choice, eliminating personal culpability annuls the rationale for ciminalising anything. 
The other is the way in which these attitudes re-confirmed state responsibihty for the 
control of deviance, but in the guise of "treatment" rather than penal sanctions. 
Together these help to explain why the décriminalisation was so readily accepted — 
suicide and attenq>ted suicide were defined as manifestations of mental illness, so 
criminahty could no longer be ascribed, and the décriminalisation was firmly coupled 
with provisions for the treatment of attenq)ted suicides so state control was re­
affirmed.
Beyond the favourable climate of opinion, and the influence of the determinist 
paradigms, the most overtly active element in the social context surrounding suicide 
law reform was the section of the medical estabhshment which had been trying since 
the 19th century to bring this form of deviance totally within their jurisdiction. 
Despite Durkheim's and other sociologists' espousal of 'social causes' for suicide, in 
the end it was the medical model of'mental illness' that prevailed. This is perhaps not 
surprising since for several centuries coroners had been officially labelling most 
suicides insane (see chapter 2).
According to Stan Cohen, "The professionalization of deviancy control...is a story of 
continual expansion and diversification," (Cohen 1985:161) with the inq)licit or even
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explicit aim to "increase their monopolistic reach" (ibid: 164). While there was never 
a co-ordinated canq>aign among doctors (or indeed any other group) to change the law 
on suicide, individual doctors since at least 1788 (see chapter 2) had been writing and 
speaking on the theme that suicide and attempted suicide were prima facia evidence of 
mental illness and should be put wholly in the hands of the medical estabhshment. 
Whether this constituted a form of dehberate entire building along the lines described 
by Cohen, or moral entrepreneurship as formulated by Becker (1963) and Gusfield 
(1963) and specifically related to doctors by Scull ("Medical Men as Moral 
Entrepreneurs" 1975), is a matter for debate. What is true is that a certain section of 
the medical estabhshment, in the 20th century primarily psychiatrists, pressed the 
theme continuously, with determination and professional conviction.^ Moreover, it 
was in a medical forum that the first exphcit step was taken that can be said to have led 
directly to the reform of the law. It is academicaUy serendipitous that this forum was 
one where the principal contestants for jurisdiction over suicide and attenq)ted suicide 
actuaUy met face to face.
The step came as a proposal in 1947, in the third report of the British Medical 
Association/Magistrates Joint Committee which advocated amending the law "so that 
attempted suicide ... would not be dealt with as an illegal offence", but would instead 
be subject to court orders for medical treatment (see chapter 4).
In the years between this 1947 Report and the passing of the Act in 1961, medical and 
psychiatric periodicals regularly carried articles on suicide and atten^ted suicide.^ 
These articles were m the main not exphcitly directed at changing the law, but made 
the point - indeed assumed it to be self-evident - that attençts at self-killing were a 
medical matter. No other discipline took a comparable interest in the subject. The 
disciplines which had participated in the 18th century debate - pohtics, theology, ethics 
- were not concerned m the actual change when it finally came. One exception was the 
series of lectures by the Cambridge Professor Glanvdle Wilhams, delivered in the
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United States in 1956 and later published as The Sanctity o f Life and the Criminal Law 
(1958). In these Williams considered suicide along with contraception, artificial 
insemination, abortion, and euthanasia. His approach was a scholarly review of the 
long history of Western attitudes to suicide, and when at the end he offered his own 
view, he did not advocate a complete end to criminal justice involvement: 
"Theoretically," Williams said, "the law should allow some right of interposition to 
prevent a suicide..." (Williams 1958:261). He goes on to suggest a magistrate's order 
for a short detention period for anyone attempting suicide, with the hearing to be in 
private.
As for sociology, where the tradition of studying suicide as a social phenomenon had 
begun in the 19th century (see chapter 2), according to Giddens "very few significant 
sociological studies of suicide have appeared in Britain since the turn of the century ... 
In Britain, most work on suicide has come from medical or psychiatric researchers" 
(Giddens 1971:xiv). Some of what research there was, however, was actually referred 
to in the Parliamentary debates on the Suicide BiH,^  and it undoubtedly contributed to 
a general climate receptive to reform.
One particularly prominent psychiatrist, Professor Eric Stengel, publicly urged 
décriminalisation as a way of achieving more effective medical treatment. Stengel was 
President of the Psychiatric Section of the Royal Society of Medicine, and had been 
conducting research into atten^ted suicide since the early 1950s. In an address to the 
Howard League in 1956 he said: "The fear that a suicide attempt may lead to 
prosecution tends to make some people lie to the doctor about it and maintain that it 
was an accident, thus making psychiatric treatment impossible and a repetition more 
likely..."(Howard Journal 31 May 1956) At the invitation of Dr. Doris Odium, 
Professor Stengel came and spoke to the BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee in 
January 1958 (see chapter 4). The Committee records report: "He told of cases in
England where persons who had attenc^ted suicide were brought to hospital and police
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officers waited to take a statement 6om them even though the case was not 
subsequently brought to court. This was very unsatisfactory from the point of view of 
treatment of the patient and also unsatisfactory in that it only happened where cases 
were known to the pohce" (Minutes of Joint BMA/Magistrates Committee 22 Jan.
1958).
Professor Stengel and his work were raised by Kenneth Robinson M.P. in the 
Committee stage of the Suicide Bdl. "The man who has done the most research in this 
country," Robinson said, " is Professor Stengel of Sheffield University, who for a long 
time has canq)aigned for the reform embodied in the Bdl. Professor Stengel has 
produced the most satisfying definition of attempted suicide: I read it in one of his 
books. He describes the suicide as an act of violence against society and at the same 
time an appeal to society for help. That is precisely what it is, and it is a tragedy that in 
the past society in this country has tended to react to the violence and largely to ignore 
the plea for help" (Official Report Standing Committee E 25 July 1961).
Viscount Kilmuir referred obliquely to Stengel's work in the actual introduction of the 
Bill into the House of Lords, saying, "it is even more true that most cases of attempted 
suicide flow from some sort of mental stress or imbalance. Recent research suggests, 
for exanq)le, that those who attenq)t suicide are often making an appeal for help" 
(Hansard: Lords: 2 March 1961). Professor Stengel was also cited in the brief 
correspondence in the Times following Kenneth Robinson's first raising of possible 
reform of the suicide law in February 1958. Glanville Wilhams wrote: "Dr. Stengel has 
shown how pohce intervention in cases of attempted suicide hinder the efforts of 
medical men to treat their patient" (TIMES 11 February 1958).
Another doctor, Phylhs Epps, during this period did one of the extremely rare studies 
of people in prison charged with attenq)ted suicide. Between 1954 and 1956 Dr. Epps 
interviewed a consecutive series of 100 women admitted to Hohoway Prison Hospital
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on charges of attenq)ted suicide. After an exhaustive analysis of their characteristics, 
Dr. Epps' diagnosis was that "Of the 100 women, 49 were classed as neurotic, 19 as 
psychotic, 16 as psychopathic, 11 as epileptic and 5 as borderline or mental defectives" 
{Proceedings o f the Royal Society o f Medicine, 14 January 1958:298). Her overall 
conclusion, was "The growth of psychiatric services in this country over recent years 
defeats the argument that prison should be used as a place of safety for the potential 
suicide. Though suicide may generally be regarded as an undesirable or even as an 
anti-social act, we in this country are in the minority in regarding it as a criminal act. 
Moreover, we are illogical in that those who fail in the atten^t are treated as criminal, 
while those who succeed are usually found at the coroner's inquest to have been 
unbalanced in mind" (ibid.:300). Dr. Hermann Mannheim of the LSE gave Dr. Epps' 
study wider pubhcity by mentioning it in a letter to the TIMES and on the basis of her 
data asked "If criminal proceedings are not needed on medical grounds, what else can 
be said in their favour?" (TIMES 25 Feb. 1958)
The psychiatrist Doris Odium is the doctor who probably deserves the most credit for 
moving attempted suicides conq)letely out of criminal and into medical jurisdiction. 
Her campaign to change the law lasted some seven years and was waged in a number 
of different forums (see chapter 6). Not all doctors, by any means, agreed that 
attempted suicide should not be a crime, and the views of those opposed are 
considered below in the discussion of the potential resistance to the decriminahsation.
The above factors taken together - increased affluence, changed attitudes towards 
morality, and the determinist paradigms (particularly medical) of the 1950s, created an 
environment that was favourable to a change in the suicide law. There were other 
structural factors that contributed to a propitious climate, in particular the way the law 
had been inq)lemented by practitioners, and the practical realities mq)inging on 
pohticians of the day. These factors are considered next.
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Opération o f the Law
The issue of whether and how Judges make law has been debated for years. Equally 
interesting, although less examined, is the interactionist phenomenon whereby lower 
profile practitioners in the criminal justice process - police, magistrates, coroners - can, 
by their practice, re-shape attitudes to law and so in the long run influence the shape of 
the law itself According to Downes and Rock "Deviance is identified, answered and 
formed by those who deal with rule-breakers" (1988:178). The police, who are the 
gate-keepers to the criminal justice process, have substantial discretion as to what laws 
to enforce and against whom (Reiner 1997). Up to the first examination of police 
practice by the Royal Commission in 1960, this discretion was exercised with virtually 
total autonomy, certainly in respect of low level public order offences. "This was 
particularly true", Reiner says, "of decisions not to invoke the law" (ibid.: 1009). 
Magistrates are another influential group of lower level criminal justice practitioners. 
They comment inçlicitly by their sentences - as Judges do - on the importance of 
breaches of the law and thus on the significance and status of the law itself. Other 
participants in the criminal justice process, such as doctors, coroners, and probation 
officers, also influence by their practice how a law is regarded. Changes in 
administrative arrangements surrounding a particular law - such as the Criminal Justice 
Act 1925 which allowed attempted suicides to be tried summarily - can also impact on 
attitudes. It is argued here that the overall effect of these factors on the suicide law 
was to slowly erode the behef that self-killing was a crime of the sort appropriate for 
police and court attention, and endorse by practice the idea that attempted suicides 
were "sick" and in need of "treatment".
Police
From the time of their inception in 1830, the Metropohtan police had been prosecuting 
attempted suicides as part of their remit to enforce order in the streets (see chapter 2), 
but used the broad discretion inherent in police powers to choose the targets of 
enforcement. In the 20th century the use of this discretion is clearly visible m the large
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discrepancy between attempted suicides "known to the police" and those "proceeded 
against". (Until the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1986, of course, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute an offence such as attenq)ted suicide lay entirely 
with the pohce.) The discrepancy between "known" and "proceeded against" ran at a 
roughly steady rate of nine or ten to one from the beginning of the century right up to 
the decriminahsation in 1961, although the numbers "known" increased from an annual 
average of about 2000 in the early years with just over 200 proceeded against, to 4980 
in 1959, with 511 prosecuted (Judicial Statistics England and Wales 1900-1961).
Guidance as to how the pohce were to use their discretion in respect of attenq)ted 
suicides was issued first to the Metropohtan Pohce in 1916, in a revision to General 
Orders which stands as an interesting, quite exphcit exanq)le both of Black's 
"differential mobihsation of the law" (Black 1976:38) and of "institutionahsed 
discrimination" as described by Reiner: "wJiere the consequences of unrversalisticaUy 
framed enforcement pohcies or procedures work out in practice as discriminatory 
because of the structural bias of an unequal society" (Reiner 1992:158). The revision 
to General Orders said:
"A person brought to the Station as having attempted suicide and fit to be 
detained thereat, is not to be charged forthwith, but immediate enquiries are to 
be made to ascertain what was the motive for the attenq)t and whether there 
are fiiends or relations wUling and able to take charge of) and be responsible 
for, the offender. If such persons are available, and there are no special 
circumstances such as the commission of another crime, a previous attempt to 
commit suicide, definite indications of insanity, threats to renew the act, 
habitual excessive drinking, etc., the offence is not be be charged but handed 
over to the care of the fiiends or relations, a report being then submitted for 
Commissioner's consideration as to apphcation for process." (Crime, G O 28 
August 1916: 286)
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A similar instruction was circulated by the Home Office to provincial police forces in 
1921 (St. John-Stevas 1961:241) Since data at that time was recorded only on the 
numbers, not the nature, of atterrçted suicides, it is not possible to empirically 
demonstrate the consequences of this General Order. However, as the clear 
instruction was to proceed only against those with no family or Mends willing to take 
responsibihty, the outcome would inevitably be "differential mobihsation" of this law. 
It is rare to have an overt official instruction that ihustrates theory, but this would 
appear to be a clear example of Black's description of how the law behaves: "A crime 
by an unemployed man is more serious than a crime by an employed man. It is stih 
more serious if an unemployed offender has no family, and yet more so if he is a 
transient, unknown in the community. It is even less serious, however, if an employed 
offender has a good work record, a large family, and is known for his service to the 
community. In every way, a marginal man is more vulnerable to law; by comparison, 
an integrated man has an hnmunity" (Black 1976:51).
Lord (Peter) Imbert, former Comunissioner of the Metropohtan Pohce, and Roy 
Thomas, retired Chief Inpector with the Met, started their careers on the beat in 
London in the 1950s, when suicide and attempted suicide were stih criminal offences. 
They both confirmed in interview that the presumption was against prosecution of 
attempted suicides. It had to be reported - "unless it was possible for the beat 
pohceman to turn a blind eye - which he did if he could" (Thomas interview 5 April 
1997) but the decision whether or not to prosecute was taken at Inpector level and in 
the "vast majority of cases it was decided a prosecution was not warranted" (Imbert 
interview 14 February 1997).
Chad Varah, founder of the Samaritans, says in his autobiography that "in the 
metropohtan area the pohce took a very humane view of suicidal acts which did not 
prove fatal, and hardly ever engaged in a prosecution which led the person to
79
in^risonment, except in a few cases where they thought it necessary for the protection 
of the person concerned and the avoidance of a public nuisance - as for instance in the 
case of a man who regularly swallowed an unbehevable assortment of cutlery and took 
up a lot of hospital and operating-theatre time. The normal pohce procedure...if they 
thought the person was still a danger to himself or herself was to urge the person to 
see their doctor with a view to psychiatric treatment, or, latterly, to come to The 
Samaritans. Only when the person proved recalcitrant would they prosecute, not in 
order to get the person sent to prison, but so that they might be inclined to accept as 
an alternative being put on probation with a condition that they received psychiatric 
help" (Varah 1992:191).9
Pohce practice towards attençted suicides was exphcitly caUed in support of the 
Suicide BiU by the Lord ChanceUor in the Lords debate: "For many years now," he
said, the practice of the pohce has been to institute criminal proceedings only where 
there are no relatives or fiiends willing to give help and accept responsibihty, or where 
the person making the attempt has refused to accept help fi*om those around him" 
(Hansard: Lords: 2 March 1961) This is despite the fact that the Metropohtan Pohce 
Guide continued throughout ah these year to state unequivocaUy that "Suicide is a 
felony at common law" and "an attenq)t to commit suicide is an attempt to commit a 
felony , and therefore punishable with hard labour under the Hard Labour Act 1822" 
(Baker: Metropohtan Pohce Guide, successive editions:501)^®
This dehberate non-enforcement of the law in so many cases over so many years 
reflected, and was also likely to have influenced, pubhc opinion about the criminahty 
of attenq)ted suicide. It would have contributed to the view of many who, in the 
words of the Lord ChanceUor, beheved "it has none of the characteristics of criminal 
conduct. On the contrary, it is ohen a sign that medical and social help is wanted" 
(Hansard: Lords: 2 March 1961)
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According to some sources, doctors colluded in the non-enforcement of the law 
against attenq)ted suicide. Glanville Williams said, "One reason why so many suicidal 
attenq)ts 6il to reach the ears of the Enghsh pohce is that it is against medical ethics 
for a physician to report them" (Williams 1958:244). However, Mrs. Jeanette 
Stockell, who was a casualty nurse at Charing Cross Hospital in London in the 1950s, 
says they were legally obhged to inform the pohce vdienever an attençted suicide was 
brought in, and the doctors did so on a regular basis. Mrs. Stockeh also said she and 
most of her feUow nurses "worried about this... it did not seem appropriate for the 
pohce to be involved" (Stockeh interview 15 May 1999).
Courts
The response of the Courts to attenq)ted suicide also contributed to erosion of the 
concept of it as a criminal act. Before 1925 atten^ted suicide was prosecuted at 
Assize and Quarter Sessions, at a rate of two to three hundred a year between 1900 
and 1914, falling to an annual average of under one hundred between 1915 and 1924 
(Judicial Statistics England and Wales, 1900-1925). The 1925 Criminal Justice Act 
brought adult attempted suicide within summary jurisdiction, which was in^hcitly a 
"down-grading" in the sense it was no longer considered so serious as to be indictable 
only. Interestingly, the immediate effect was to increase the number of prosecutions. 
Whereas the annual average had been below 100 prosecutions at Assize and Quarter 
Sessions in the years 1915 to 1924, in 1926, 376 people were prosecuted for 
attençted suicide in Magistrates' Courts. In 1927 it was 646; 1928, 660; 1929, 717, 
and continued to run at roughly these kind of numbers up until the passage of the 
Suicide Act in 1961. Initiahy a residue of some twenty to thirty a year continued to 
be prosecuted at Assize and Quarter Sessions, but this tapered down to an average of 
under ten by the end. VirtuaUy everyone prosecuted was convicted (ah figures firom 
Judicial Statistics England and Wales 1926-1961).
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The increased prosecutions after 1925 might be explained as a reflection of police 
views that attempted suicide was a minor public order offence, committed usually in 
circumstances not warranting the panoply of a trial before a Circuit Judge, but 
appropriate for the limited sanctions and more immediate attention of the Magistrates' 
Courts. It could also have reflected an increasing tendency to view attenq)ted suicides 
as in need of "treatment", and a prosecution at summary level the quickest way to 
achieve it. Magistrates' were virtually obliged to take a "medical" view of attempted 
suicides, at least in the flrst instance, as was made clear in an instruction about how to 
handle this matter in The Magistrate of Sept.-October 1946:
On attempted suicide:
"There should always be a remand in custody for a report by the prison doctor 
as to the prisoner's mental health and the clerk or the probation officer should 
communicate to the prison doctor any known or observed facts which are likely 
to assist him in making his report.
If on the adjourned heaing the prison doctor reports that the prisoner is of 
unsound mind, the pohce wih usuaUy offer no evidence and ask that the 
prisoner be discharged so that they can take him away to be dealt with under 
the Lunacy Acts.
If the doctor reports that he is mentaUy sound, and there appears to be no 
reason to anticipate a renewal of the attempt, the Justices may weU take the 
view that they may deal with the case summarily if the accused consents... The 
observations of the pohce should be invited before this decision is taken. If 
there have been previous attempts, the Justices should in no circumstances deal 
with the case themselves... Although there is power to inq)ose a penalty of 
inq)risonment up to six months and/or a fine of not exceeding £100 punishment 
is seldom imposed, for what punishment is appropriate? The usual course is to 
ask the probation officer to make the fifllest enquiries, to get in touch with 
relatives and fiiends if none are already forthcoming and endeavour to make
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the best possible arrangements for the prisoner to be looked after and cared for. 
A supervision order is sometimes called for, but in any case recourse is usually 
had to one of the courses open to the court under the Probation of Offenders 
Act.
As aheady intimated, if there is any reason to fear a renewed attempt, or if they 
are not satisfied that there is no reason to fear it, the Justices should not take 
the responsibihty of dealing with the case themselves. The defendant should in 
that case be committed for trial" (unsigned instruction in The Magistrate 
September-October 1946:214)
The continuing trend away from 'punishment' towards 'treatment' of offenders had been 
given significant inq>etus by the Criminal Justice Act 1948. The "Explanatory 
Handbook" about this Act, written "for Magistrates, Practitioners and Probation 
Officers by two impressively titled authors made the treatment bias of the Act clear and 
endorsed it with enthusiasm:
"The Criminal Justice Act 1948 is a measure of outstanding importance. Bold 
m conception, elaborate and logical in design, and comprehensive in its scope, 
it marks the beginning of a new and more enhghtened epoch m the approach to 
the problem of crime and, what perhaps is still more important, the treatment of 
offenders... Through the ages, society's demand in regard to the wrongdoer 
has been "Punish him." With what severity this demand was satisfied is on 
record. Today the direction is "Reform him" And that is the underlying, 
goveimng principle of this Act... Magistrates will need to make themselves 
intimately acquainted with the intention of the legislature in providing a variety 
of forms of treatment, with the precise nature of them, and with all those facts 
about the offender necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion with regard to 
him" (by His Honour Judge Tudor Rees D.L., J.P. (Chairman of the Surrey
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Quarter Sessions, Chairman of the Epsom Petty Sessons) and E. Graham M.A. 
(Oxon.) of the Inner Tenq)le, Barrister-at-Law, Deputy Clerk of the Peace for 
the County of Surrey)
One of the measures of this 1948 Act was to formally allow a convicted offender to be 
placed under the supervision of a probation officer. Previously the rather anomalous 
wording of the 1907 Probation of Offenders Act had allowed Magistrates to do this 
"without proceeding to conviction" (Bochel 1976, Newbum 1995, Mair 1997), which 
renders the statistics on disposals of atten^ted suicides pre-1950 at times difficult to 
interpret. However, after the 1948 Act, probation rapidly became the most used 
disposal for this offence. In the years 1952 to 1956 inclusive 63% of the people 
convicted of attempted suicide (1,842) were given a probation order. 6.7% (194) 
were given sentences of imprisonment. The second most favoured disposal was 
conditional or absolute discharge, or bind-over - 28% (819) (Hansard: Commons: 13 
Feb. 1958). Two retired Probation Officers interviewed for this paper both recalled 
that in the 1950s, whatever the final outcome, attempted suicides were virtually always 
remanded in custody for medical and psychiatric reports. One was critical of the 
practice: "The prison medical reports were fairly useless," she said, "basically they 
said 'not mad - punish any way you think*. 1 think the remands themselves were 
punitive - a taste of prison* even if custody was not the sentence** (Yardley interview 3 
April 1997).
Despite the enthusiasm for *treatment* at all levels of criminal justice, punitive 
approaches had not been entirely discarded. An illustration was the case in 1955 when 
one Edward French pleaded guilty to attenpted suicide and was sentenced to two 
years inprisonment by the Recorder, E. Ryder Richardson QC. In passing sentence, 
Richardson said, **May 1 be allowed to put the problem as it presents itself to me? 
Self-murder is one of the most serious crimes on our calender. An attempt thereat, 
therefore, is a very serious crime indeed. 1 was minded to regard this as a fiivolous
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attempt and I should have treated it as such notwithstanding, but by your evidence you 
have proved to my satisfaction it was a serious, sane attençt on the part of this man to 
take his life. How can I take that lightly?" (quoted in Appeal Court judgement. 
Criminal Appeal Reports 1955 Vol. 39 (1956)
But when the case went to appeal Lord Chief Justice Goddard delivered an opinion 
that indicated that he believed the Recorder was seriously out of step with 
contemporary judicial opinion;
"I am not surprised [the appellent] desires to appeal against that sentence, 
because I have never heard of a sentence of two years inq)risonment for 
attenq)ted suicide.
The circumstances of the case are that the appellent, who is obviously a man of 
somewhat unstable disposition, stole a spare wheel and tyre from a van, and he 
was trundling it away when a constable, who had seen him do it, arrested him. 
That night he smashed his cell window and cut his neck on both sides with the 
glass and then called the gaoler. There seems to have been some doubt 
whether it really was a serious attempt or not, but the doctor thought it might 
be a genuine attempt at suicide and not a mere piece of exhibitionism. 
However that may be, as the appellent was a man of 36 years with 41 
convictions for different offences, the majority of them various forms of 
drunkeness, the magistrates very properly committed him for sentence to the 
Recorder...
It would not be right for this court to say that a court should treat attenq)ted 
suicide as a trivial thing. One knows quite well that unbalanced people do 
attempt suicide, but this is the first time I have ever heard suicide described as 
one of the most serious crimes known to the law and therefore attempted 
suicide as a very serious offence... No doubt attempted suicide has always been 
regarded as an offence, but to say that it is to be regarded as a very serious
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crime indeed shows an entire lack of proportion. It is not a very serions crime 
in point of law. Whether it is regarded as a sin or not is not a matter for the 
court. In such cases a short sentence is often given to protect the man against 
himself A very great change has come about in this matter since I was first 
called to the Bar. I remember that, when I was a young man going the Western 
Circuit, prosecutions for attempted suicide were very common at quarter 
sessions. Now they are rare, and magistrates generally deal with the matter. 
At any rate, it is absurd to say that a sentence of two years inq)risonment ought 
to be passed.
We cannot possibly allow that to stand... we substitute a sentence of one month 
to be served concurrently with the other sentence, Wiich means that the total 
sentence feUs fi*om four years to two years" (ibid.).
Coroners
Coroners were another professional group who by their practice influenced thinking 
about the criminality of suicide. Macdonald and Murphy, examining what they say 
was a profound change in attitudes towards self-killing in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
claim that the focal point of the change was the coroner's jury. "Coroners' juries," they 
say, "palhated the law of suicide in two ways - by colluding with farmlies to fiustrate 
the rights of the crown and lesser lords, and by excusing increasing numbers of suicides 
as persons non compos mentis - a demonstration of a change of belief to the idea that 
self-destruction was in itself an act of insanity, an end more to be pitied than scorned" 
(Macdonald & Murphy 1990; 114). This may indeed have been the case, but if so, it 
was insufficient to effect a change m the law, which remained in place for several more 
centuries. What it did do was to establish an assumed, albeit unexamined, coimection 
between suicide and mental illness that remained in place, so that when 
decriminahsation was finally mooted, its acceptance was assisted by linking it clearly to 
mental health measures, and presenting it as an obvious and logical move.
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In respect of coroners' practice, an administrative step was taken in 1936 that both 
reflected and contributed to the draining away of criminahty fi'om the act of suicide. 
In considering verdicts available to coroners' courts, a government committee 
recommended that the verdict "felo de se" (felony against oneselQ no longer be 
available in cases of self-killing, but should be replaced by a non-committal statement 
that the deceased died by his own hand (Cmd 5070 paras 82-83). Although 
recommended in 1936, this change did not formally appear in the official coroners rules 
until 1953, which held that the standard form of the verdict should be that the deceased 
"kihed himself, but permitted the (optional) addition of the words "whilst the balance 
of mind was disturbed" (Coroners Rules 1953, Third Schedule, Form 18, Note 5).
Atkinson, in his study of the often arbitrary way in which coroners impute suicide, 
commented on "the familiar rider often added to suicide verdicts by coroners" about 
"death viftile the balance of the mind was disturbed" and claims "it adds nothing, as far 
as the law is concerned to the verdict" (Atkinson 1978:91). "The attraction of the 
phraseology for coroners," Atkinson suggests, "seems to be that it is distinct flrom a 
direct legal pronouncement of insanity or ascription of mental illness. Thus it may be 
used to lessen any possible inq)utation of responsibihty for what happened on the part 
of signiflcant others of the deceased, without simultaneously branding the deceased as 
mad (to which the significant others might object with equal force). Coroners appear 
to vary in their use of it... One coroner, who was exclusively trained m law, told me 
that he never used it precisely because it is legally unnecessary" (ibid.:205).
The Hon. Secretary of the Coroners' Society of England and Wales, Robert Milne, 
who was a practicing Coroner in London, contributed an opmion to the 1959 Church 
of England parqphlet on suicide (see chapter 5). In his view, "The rider 'whilst the 
balance of his mind was disturbed' has, clearly, no significance at criminal law." He 
was in fevour of discarding it altogether since "While the impact of a suicide verdict is
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softened to some relations and fiiends of the deceased by the inclusion of the rider, 
very nearly as many are affronted by the suggestion of insanity in their family or circle 
of fiiends." Mr. Milne advocated inclusion of "surrounding causes" in cases of self­
killing, such as "while suffering firom a depressive state" which would serve "a useful 
purpose in elucidating or clarifying the actions of these unfortunate and unhappy 
people who take their own lives" {Ought Suicide to be a Crime 1959:39).
In the case of the M.P. who killed himself in October of 1959, the coroner was 
reported to have recorded that Sir Albert Newby-Braithwaite "died fi'om barbitaric 
poisoning self-administered" but further that "the drug was taken while Sir Albert was 
suffering fi'om a very serious kidney infection which must have had a very serious 
effect on the state of his emotions" (TELEGRAPH 24 October 1959) However, not 
everyone was gently dealt with by coroners' courts. A few days after the Newby- 
Braithwaite report the TIMES carried a story headlined: "Attençt to Cover Up Wife's 
Suicide: Minister 'couldn't beaf publicity" The article read: "A Presbyterian minister 
did not tell a Coroner's officer that he had put his wife's body into bed after finding her 
in the gas-fiUed kitchen of their home because "I couldn't bear the public to know that 
she had gone this way" he said at an inquest at Southwark, SE yesterday. A verdict 
was recorded that Mrs. Winifred Alice Thorbum, aged 65, wife of the Rev. Ernest 
Thorbum, killed herself The SE Coroner, Dr. A. Gordon Davies, commented, "An 
attempt was made to cover up the suicide. I can synq>athize with Mr. Thorbum in his 
position and his desire to shield his wife from this stigma, but what in fact he served to 
do was to bring a deal more pubhcity on the incident than had the case been properly 
reported and the fiill story told" (TIMES 27 Oct. 1959).
These two verdicts can be seen as hlustrating the "pity not scorn" approach towards 
suicides that Macdonald and Murphy first identified some 400 years earher. While this 
attitude certainly contributed to a climate conducive to decriminahsation, it did not 
have sufficient motive force by itself to change the law. A conjunction of several other
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factors was necessary to achieve this, and among these were the practical realities 
ircçinging on the political scene in the late 1950s.
Practical Realities
Two practical realities inçinged upon the passage of the Suicide Act, which at first 
sight appear to pull in opposite directions - one encouraging the reform, the other 
resisting it. The first was the rising rate of crime, which was causing difficulties for 
the Home Office both in terms of politically uncomfortable statistics and pressure on 
an ageing prison estabhshment. The second was the large conservative (small "c") 
constituency, well represented in Parhament, which viewed all proposals to loosen 
social control as dangerous threats to social order.
The first reahty - rising crime and crowded prisons - encouraged a pragmatic view of 
decriminahsation as a quick, painless, costless way to lower recorded crime rates and 
at least shghtly ease the prison problem, especiaUy in the hard pressed remand sector. 
Indeed, Leo Abse pubhcaUy accused the Government of having such a motive. "So we 
find on this occasion," he said in the Second Reading debate on the Suicide Bill, "the 
Government are conquering crime by causing self-murder to be no longer included in 
criminal statistics" (Hansard: Commons: 19 July 1961).
The second reahty - continued concern about social order - could certainly have 
inspired resistance on social control grounds to a straightforward decriminahsation. 
This thesis is arguing that the reasons it did not were first, that Butler's low-profile 
strategy kept most of the conservative constituency fi'om even noticing it was 
happening, and second, those who did notice were mollified by the prospect of tighter 
control over attempted suicides being available through the provisions of the Mental 
Health Act.
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Both the realities - pragmatic pressures and social order anxieties - were clearly 
displayed in the 1960 Interim Report of the Royal Commission on Pohce;
"The background to this decision [to issue an interim report] was a climate of 
pubhc opinion which for some years has been disturbed by the recognition of 
mounting crime in an increasingly prosperous society. The facts speak for 
themselves. During the decade 1949-59, the national wealth has risen by over 
a quarter and average earnings have gone up in real value by 35 percent. In the 
same period crimes reported to the pohce have increased by 45 percent and 
there are two and a half times as many reported crimes of violence as there 
were ten years ago. This is a distressing accompaniment to the benefits of the 
welfare state, the virtual elimination from our society of poverty and 
widespread unemployment, the increased leisure now enjoyed by ah classes and 
the educational opportunities open to ah. Research into the causes of crime is a 
fundamental issue of our time; and hand in hand with research goes an 
unprecendented programme of penal reform and experiment presented to 
Parhament by Your Majesty's Secretary of State for the Home Department in 
February 1959.
But the fruits of research and the harvest of penal reform necessarily he some 
way ahead; and the demand is for action now to check the grave increase in 
crime...
The maintenance of law and order ranks with national defence as a primary task 
of government. It is an essential condition of a nation's survival and happiness. 
We do not think that anyone acquainted with the facts can be satisfied with the 
state of law and order in Great Britain m 1960, The criminal statistics give a 
broad indication of social malaise, of feilure by society to curb irresponsibihty 
and deal effectively with growing lawlessness" (Cmnd 1222 1960-61 Chapter 
n:4)
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The Metropolitan Police Commissioner's Report for 1960 also focused on rising crime 
and disorder in the streets:
"For the first time on record the total number of indictable and non-indictable 
criminal offences exceeded 200,000 or an average of 550 crimes a day... the 
highest number of offences ever recorded - 97.7% higher than in 1938. 
Offences against the person increased from 4,100 in 1959 to nearly 4,700 in 
1960."
"Although fewer incidents of hooliganism were reported during the year, this 
continues to be a problem. Deficiency in patrol strength allows groups of 
mischief makers to congregate in a manner which would not have been 
tolerated before the war and which causes much resentment on the part of law 
abiding citizens... in several incidents more than the ordinary amount of 
violence was displayed" (Cmnd 1440 1960: 9-10)
The 1960 Report of the Commissioner of Prisons set out the stark consequences for 
the prison service of the rise in crime, and made a particular point of the remand 
population:
"During 1960 the total population of prisons and borstals, which had shown a 
marked decline during the first quarter of 1959, began to increase once again; 
this increase continued throughout the year and during the first half of 1961, by 
which time it had reached a new peak of over 28,500.... Throughout the year 
the number of untried prisoners remained very high, the general daily level 
being about 1,400...
Between mid-1956 and mid-1961, the total population of prisons and borstals 
has risen fi'om about 20,500 to over 28,500. The unrelenting pressure on a 
system which was already overloaded has made great demands on prison staffs.
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particularly in the local prisons which bear the brunt of increased receptions 
and overcrowding” (Cmnd 1467 1960:1 & 4)
Ministers were certainly aware of the urgent political problem these figures presented. 
In an interesting juxtaposition on the same the day that Kenneth Robinson put his first 
Parliamentary Question about suicide law reform, Butler also had to answer a question 
about concern over the increase in crimes of violence. He said that "research was 
being undertaken" (Hansard: Commons: 6 February 1958). Also on that day David 
Renton M.P., at that time junior Minister at the Home Office replied to a question 
about overcrowding in prisons. He told the House that the "Prison Commissioners are 
inspecting a number of defence and other Government establishments likely to become 
redundant in the hope of finding premises suitable for conversion into open prisons" 
(ibid.).
The 1959 White Paper "Penal Practice in a Changing Society" (Cmnd 645 1959), 
which Butler personally oversaw, and of which he was extremely proud, was candid in 
acknowledging the problems and indicated the ways answers were being sought. It 
began by saying, "It is a disquieting feature of our society that crime has increased and 
is still increasing," and later, "The increase in crime during the last two or three years 
has led to severe overcrowding in prisons and has strained the resources of other 
agencies ... The growth of crime has added greatly to the work of the criminal courts... 
the number of cases for trial doubled between 1938 and 1956. This increase has 
brought problems of jurisdiction and organisation which need to be examined. It has 
also brought a corresponding increase in the number of persons who remain in custody 
for a considerable period before being brought to trial." And after announcing the 
creation of the Home Office Research Unit, and fimding for the Institute of 
Criminology at Cambridge, the paper continued: "It is hoped and believed that
knowledge of crime and criminals will increase to the point at which measures can be
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taken to bring about a real reduction in the amount of crime and still more elective 
treatment can be given to each offender" (Cmnd. 645 1959: Introduction).
One of the most significant points in the White Paper, as regards reform of the suicide 
law, was Butler's commitment to "deal with that part of the prison population which 
could be and should he avoided by adequate alternatives" (Radzinowicz 1999:170) 
Attempted suicides in the remand population - brought to his attention by Kenneth 
Robinson's Parhamentary Questions - clearly could be counted in this group.
Sir Charles Cunningham, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office from 1957 to 1966, 
confirmed in interview the deep concern of Ministers and Home Office officials at this 
time ahout rising crime and the inadequate prison establishment. He pointed out that 
no new prisons had been built since the 19th century, and virtually no money had been 
spent on existing ones. There was pressure for immediate answers to the problem of 
prison places (Cunningham interview 30 September 1996) However, as suceeding 
decades have amply demonstrated, pragmatic moves by the Home Office to try to 
keep offenders out of prison (diversion, community service orders, early release) have 
at every point run into opposition from people who see such pohcies as soft on 
crime. These people beheve that if someone is convicted of a crime sanctions should 
be swift and robust. Despite a tendency among some historians to see in the late 1950s 
and early '60s early signs of "permissiveness", the truth is that the conservative 
constituency at that time, particularly in respect of crime and social order, was large 
and vocal. Some illustrations chosen from a very big selection appear below. It is a 
matter of special interest to this thesis to note that the opposition to decriminahsation 
that could plausibly have been expected from this constituency did not materiahse in 
any tangible form. In what his widow says was one of Rab Butler's favourite phrases, 
they were "the dogs that did not bark."(Molhe Butler interview 24 October 1996). It 
is one of the contentions of this thesis that Butler quite dehberately took steps to 
achieve this (see chapters 6 and 7).
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In looking for exarq)les of potential opposition to décriminalisation - the dogs that did 
not bark - one could start with Butler's own Minister of State, David Renton M.P., 
now Lord Renton, who said that he opposed decriminahsation of suicide at the time, 
and (in 1996) still did. Indeed, in his view the penalties for attempted suicide should 
have been made harsher. He based this view, he said, on his Other's experience as a 
doctor. "They [atterr^ted suicides] were a terrible nuisance to him," Renton said, "they 
needed to be deterred" (Renton interview 8 May 1996). He did not, however, say so 
pubhcly when the Act was being passed.
It is clear that at least some other doctors shared this view. In a letter to the Times 
following the report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in October 1960 (see 
chapter 6), Dr. Seymour Spencer of Exeter wrote.
"...you question the soundness of the major premise underlying the report of 
the Criminal Law Revision Committee. Dealing from day to day with 
attenq)ted suicides, I think you are right.
Cases of attenq)ted suicide fell into two broad groups of the mentally ill and the 
irresponsibly unstable. The first four cases referred to me at a general hospital 
were in the latter group: irresponsible young women overdosing themselves 
because life chanced not to be going their way; not even deeply concerned to 
harm themselves but so standardless regarding their responsible self- 
preservation that they casually gestured self-destruction. Two others 
blackmailed with suicide threats for the abortion of unwanted pregnancies. 
Medical confidence precluded reports to the pohce which might have led those 
patients to receive the probationry guidance and elementary moral instruction 
they lacked; but one could at least warn them that their behaviour being 
contrary to the canons of society its repetition might place them in legal 
jeopardy.
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What sanction can we assert before these people, adult in years, children in 
behaviour, if society formally underwrites their standardless irresponsibility? Is 
there no public concern for the difficulty under which doctors like myself will 
work once, in the midst of the present post-Christian indifference towards the 
stewardship of our lives, and those of our unborn children, this last legal 
sanction is removed from us?" (TIMES 28 October 1960)
So the medical estabhshment was not unanimous in supporting decriminahsation of 
suicide, and it is interesting that the Church of England booklet on the legal status of 
suicide (see chapter 5) quoted Peter Green (author of The Problem o f Right Conduct) 
as saying "I ought to add that though I have discussed the question with many 
physicians and surgeons, I have not yet found one who would approve the suggested 
permission. The usual answer I have received has been that the medical profession 
would oppose any change in existiug law and custom in this matter, and that the 
doctor's business is to prolong life to the uttermost." {Ought Suicide to be a Crime? 
1959:49)
The robust nature of the social order constituency was very much on display in the 
debates on capital punishment which took place regularly throughout the 1950s in 
Parhament and especiaUy at Conservative party conferences. Advocates of harsh 
sanctions to control deviance were highly visible in these and the equally regular 
debates on corporal punishment. At exactly the time that Kenneth Robinson M.P. 
first suggested removing all criminal sanctions from suicide and attempted suicide, in 
the winter of 1958, a number of Members of Parhament signed an Early Day Motion 
seeking to enable courts to inflict corporal punishment for crimes of violence 
(GUARDIAN 28 February 1958). Butler as Home Secretary repeatedly had to fend 
off what came to be known as the "hanging and flogging" section of the Conservative 
party, and suffered vociferous attacks at party conferences on the issue of criminal 
sanctions (Butler 1971, Radzinowicz 1999). His Criminal Justice Bill, which went 
through Parhament coterminously with the Suicide BiU was nearly scuppered in the
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Lords by peers who wished to add an amendment re-introducing flogging as a criminal 
sanction (Howard 1987:283). Butler's refusal to give in to them them is cited by his 
supporters as a crucial reason for his failure to become Prime Minister. His PPS 
during these years (1960-62), Paul Channon M.P. (now Lord Channon) confirmed this 
in interview and said that at that time, "The overwhelming bulk of the party was 
against all reform" (Channon interview 14 Novembr 1996).
The need for strict sanctions to deter deviance had many highly placed advocates 
outside Parhament as well. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker, advised the 
Magistrates Association in October 1959, "Do not be afraid to give severe deterrant 
sentences", and when he then said "I am in favour of a short sentence of corporal 
punishment; I am a behever in corporal punishment", the GUARDIAN reported that it 
was "greeted with applause" (23 October 1959). Lord Parker, according to Anthony 
Sampson in the first Anatomy o f Britain "strongly advocated flogging", and moreover, 
"He passed the record sentence of 42 years on George Blake for spying. And when 
the flood of appeals came up to him, he and his colleagues later began actually 
increasing ihQ sentences" (Sampson 1962:154-55 ).
In October 1960 Cardinal Wilham Godfrey, Roman Cathohc Archbishop of 
Westminster told the annual meeting of The Pubhc Morahty Council:
"We read of drug addictions, sexual delinquency, drunkenness, violent assaults, 
even by young people, and thefts on a large scale. These are widespread, and 
the causes must be of a general kind... Older people would have been long 
aware of the progressive slackening of restraints, the setting aside of precious 
conventions as outdated, the watering down or negation of rehgious behefs that 
had kept society stable through the ages" (GUARDIAN 27 October).
96
The TIMES quoted another section o f this speech:
"The method of these propagandists of evil follows a familiar pattern. First 
eliminate the idea of sin and make a person his own law maker in moral issues. 
Convince him of this and you eliminate any idea of guilt. This also destroys the 
idea of responsibility for crime. Then the word 'treatment' takes the place of 
'punishment' and the criminal glories in the possession of some so-called mental 
abberation which destroys in him all sense of responsibility.. Punishment is not 
merely a deterrent: it is meant to redress an order of broken relations between 
a man and his god" (TIMES 27 October 1960).
The Cardinal's Church of England counterpart, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who 
was repeatedly (and erroneously, see chapter 5) cited as the initiator of the committee 
which recommended décriminalisation of suicide, called in November 1959 for the 
recriminalisation of adultry (Mercer 1995:835).
Parliamentary debates on a number of other measures during this period clearly reveal 
the presence of a conservative constituency much concerned with social control and 
public order. As suicide had been linked with social breakdown since the mid-19th 
century, explicitly by such influential figures as Durkheim, Morselli and Mazarek, this 
constituency might have been expected to oppose décriminalisation. Exanq)les of 
concurrent issues where social control concerns were ascendent include the 1959 
Street Offences Bill, which is often cited as a piece of permissive legislation, but which 
in fact was entirely aimed at clearing prostitution off the streets. It was based on the 
other half of the Woffenden Report, and the actual title reads: "An Act to make, as 
respects England and Wales, fiuther provision against loitering or soliciting in public 
places for the purpose of prostitution and for the punishment of those guilty of certain 
offences in connection with refreshment houses and those who live on the earnings of 
or control prostitutes" (Halsburÿs Statures of England and Wales 1994). Butler 
himself said the measure was motivated by social order concerns: "The Act
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substantially increased the penalties for soliciting, with inq)risonment as a possible 
penalty for repeated offences, and increased the maximum prison sentence for those 
convicted of living on the immoral earnings of prostitution. I was moved to take such 
action by the condition of the streets around Mayfair and Piccadilly which were 
literally crowded out with girls touting for clients" (Butler 1971:203-4).
The Obscene Pubhcations Act 1959 is another example. This too is often cited as 
permissive legislation, but was not viewed as such by the people who proposed it. The 
Select Committee on the issue, whose membership included Roy Jenkins, the 
subsequent sponsor of the Private Member's Bill, said in their 1958 Report:
"While appreciating the desirabihty of removing uncertainty in the law we are 
also concerned that any amendment of the law relating to obscene publications 
is liable to be controversial To attenq)t to do too much might well give rise to 
fears that the law would be unduly relaxed in ways that were unintended and 
unforeseen; these fears might well jeoparadise the enactment of even a modest 
measure of necessary inq)rovement if it were associated with other more radical 
provisions. We have therefore tried to draw up our recommendations to 
remove any such apprehensions... In the course of our enquiries, we have been 
inq)ressed with the existence of a considerable and lucrative trade in 
pornography, its supression has proved a constant problem under existing 
statutory powers... The suppression of this trade would, in onr opinion, be 
facihtated, and the task of the police made easier, if the law were amended so 
as to give additional power to the courts and wider powers of investigation to 
the pohce" (Cmd 599 1957-58:iv).
Concern about pubhc morahty and social control was visible in the often acrimonious 
debates over reform of the hcensing and betting and gaming laws (Dixon 1991). It 
was certainly visible in the bitter resistence to the idea of legahsing abortion and 
homosexuahty. Leo Abse, the Labour M.P. who attempted to introduce a Private
98
Member's Bill to legalise homosexuality in 1960, said, "The 1959-64 Parhament was 
overwhelmingly opposed to the recommendations of the Wolfenden Report urging that 
homosexual acts in private between adults should no longer be criminal offences" 
(Abse 1973 p. 145). The Bill was defeated by a majority of 114 in a vote of 213 to 99 
(Howard 1987 p.280). Kenneth Robinson M.P. brought forward a private members 
bill on abortion in February 1961, at about the same time as the Suicide Bill was 
introduced to Parhament. The TIMES, interestingly, saw a connection and reported 
the two BiUs in the same article. (3 February 1961) Robinson's 'Termination of 
Pregnancy BiU was not even aUowed to reach a vote, but was talked out by a group of 
Roman Cathohc M P.s (HindeU & Simms 1971).
The suggestion that tolerance of the sort advocated by Isaiah Berlin and Noel Annan in 
the 1950s was widespread is countered by historians of homosexual law reform who 
claim that the campaign against homosexuahty was intensified in the 1950s, under the 
specific direction of David MaxweU-Fyfe when he was Home Secretary (1951-54) and 
Theobald Mathew, the long serving Director of Pubhc Prosecutions. (Annan 1991, 
Driberg 1977, Weeks 1989). Cohn Spencer claimed that "between 1945 and 1955 the 
number of annual prosecutions for homosexual behaviour rose from under 800 to just 
over 2,500, of whom 1000 were given custodial sentences" (Spencer 1955:360). 
Maxweh-Ffyfe became Lord ChanceUor in 1954 and as Viscount Kilmuir was the 
person who actually introduced the Suicide BiU to Parhament. Mathew remained DPP 
throughout the period and was a member of the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
Butler appointed to consider change in the law on suicide.
Patrick Devlin's famous speech on "Morals and the Criminal Law" to the British 
Academy in March 1959 forcefidly articulated the principle that the state does have a 
responsibihty to enforce moral behaviour, in the same way as it has a responsibihty to 
safeguard anything else that is essential to its existence (Devlin 1965). This position 
attracted pubhc support as weU as criticism during the ensuing famous "Hart-Devlin
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debate", and was judicially confirmed shortly afterwards in the case of Shaw v. DPP. 
This case concerned the appeal against conviction of the man who published the 
Ladies Directory of prostitutes to assist punters who were having difficulty finding 
them after the Street Offences Act. Viscount Simonds delivered the verdict, which 
turned on the issue of whether there was an offence known to the common law of 
'conspiracy to corrupt public morals', on 4 May, 1961. At that point the Suicide Bill 
was actually in Parliament, in transit from the House of Lords to the House of 
Commons. Simonds said: "I entertain no doubt that there remains in the courts of
law a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to 
conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State, and that 
it is their duty to guard it against attacks which may be the more insidious because they 
are novel and unprepared for" (Shaw v. DPP [1961] 2 WLR 897, quoted in Griffith 
1997: 260-61).
Professor Hart, who is characterised as the spokesman for the "permissive" side of the 
law and morality debate at the time, commented critically in his book Law, Liberty and 
Morality (1963) about what he saw as a "revival of what might be termed legal 
moralism... provoked ...perhaps [by] the idea that a general stiffening of the sanctions 
attached to any form of immorality may be one way to meet the general increase in 
crime by which we are all vastly disturbed. But whatever its cause, this movement of 
judicial opinion has gone far" (Hart 1963:6-7). It should be noted that Hart 
specifically attached his arguments about individual liberty in this debate to matters of 
sexual morality; on the issue of preventing an individual harming himself Hart 
supported legal intervention.^^
There are in fret a plethora of exanq)les of attitudes and positions at the time that 
could have developed into opposition to décriminalisation of suicide. The noted 
Oxford Professor AL. Goodhart, for instance, writing in English Law and the Moral 
Law (1955), said: "...there is not a single branch of English law which does not, to a
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considerable degree, find both its origin and its strength in the moral convictions of the 
English people. Law which is divorced fi*om those convictions tends to wither and 
become ineffective, for it will have lost one of the primary grounds on which the 
recognition of its obhgation is based" (Goodhart 1955:ix). The influential novelist 
Angus Wilson, writing in Encounter 1956 considered the matter of suicide as a 
criminal offence and concluded "It is fortunate that this theological veto [on suicide] 
should be so firmly entrenched in our criminal law because in a world where despair 
hes so close to the crust, [suicide] is an act that comes too near to home" {Encounter 
December 1956:82). Wittgenstein, who was something of an intellectual cult in the 
1950s, was quoted as saying: "If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed. If 
anything is not allowed then suicide is not allowed... for suicide is, so to speak, the 
elementary sin" (Shields 1993:66) .
These exançles of potential resistence - on a variety of grounds - to the idea of 
decriminalising suicide could be multiphed. If the issue had been opened up to pubhc 
discussion it is certainly possible that this potential resistence would have become 
actual. Moreover, the measure might have triggered the same kind of response fi’om 
the general pubhc as did the proposal to decriminahse blashphemy when it was raised 
in 1981. That proposal "produced about 1000 letters and petitions with some 20,000 
signatures iu favour of retaining the offence. This was numericaUy, a vastly greater 
response than that in favour of abolition" (Zander 1994:416). Evidence gathered for 
this thesis indicates that Butler was weU aware of the possibihty of resistence to the 
decriminahsation of suicide, and that this is why he kept its profile low to the point of 
invisibihty (see chapter 7). However, a low profile alone would not have been 
sufficient to pass the Bill, given the attitudes clearly on display in the Parhamentary 
debates about it. It is the contention of this thesis that something else was needed, and 
that something was supphed by the Mental Health Act, which is the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Conclusion
In the 20th century the pre-existing structural trends tending toward change in the law 
on suicide accelerated and were joined by others. Affluence and educational 
opportunity broadened horizons and encouraged enthusiasm for change; 
secularisation, class mobihty and the upheavals of war weakened traditional moral 
authority. Positivists became more insistent in their claim that morahty was anyway 
irrelevant to the issue of attempted suicide, which required treatment, not punishment, 
and the agencies of criminal justice, by their operational practice, came more and more 
to intphcitly endorse this positivist position. These factors, which gave some people a 
taste for change, made others fearfid about social breakdown. These fears were 
exacerbated by rising rates of crime in the 1950s and by increasingly visible disorder in 
the streets. The fear was manifest in vociferous opposition to most of the social 
reforms proposed at the time, so its absence from the debates on the decriminahsation 
of suicide is extremely odd. Why the change was not opposed is best explained by the 
arguments set out in the next three chapters.
Notes to Chapter 3
^According to Williams (1958 p.239) "It was chiefly under the influence of Montesquieu, Diderot and 
Voltaire that France took the lead in legalising suicide by a stuatute of 1790" and most other 
European countries followed in the 19th century
^Opinion polls have been regularly taken on the question of euthanasia and mercy killings, but not on 
the criminal status of suicide itself or attempted suicide. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society claims that 
"The number of people supporting voluntary euthanasia has risen dramatically over the years" (The 
Last Right p. 6) They say that a poll by Mass Observation in Britain in 1969 showed 51% of the 
population in favour of active voluntary euthanasia, and the most recent survey in 1993 showed 79% 
in favour, with 42% agreeing "strongly". (Your Ultimate Choice p. 103-4. Souvenir Press for the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society 1992)
^The weakening of traditional religion's moral authority is a constant theme in writings about post­
war Britain. See especially: MacIntyre, A. Secularisation and Moral Change 1967; Mitchell, B. Law, 
Morality & Religion in a Secular Society, Gilbert, A.D. The Making o f Post-Christian Britain 1980; 
Habgood, J. Church and Nation in a Secular Age 1983
Annan said of the 1950s, "Not that anyone would have dreamed of pursuing sociology at Oxford or 
Cambridge" (1991 p. 346), but described the change as coming shortly when: "Ministers discovered 
that these outsiders...could help them" (p.347). C. Wright Mills in The Sociological Imagination 
(1959) said, "In England, sociology as an academic discipline is still somewhat marginal" (p. 19).
 ^A particularly forthright plea to change the law in the Lancet was quoted by Kermeth Robinson in 
the Committee Stage of the Suicide Bill: "It seems clear that this outdated law is as inconsistent and 
inequitable in its application as it is damaging in its effect. Its virtues are hard to discover. Its vices
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are blatant. The sooner it is done away with the better." Hansard, Standing Committee E, 25 July 
1961, col. 2)
^Examples include British Journal o f Medical Psychology 1947; British Medical Journal 1952,
\956, Lancet 1951, 1952, 1955, 1961; Journal o f Forensic Medicine 1954; Medical Practitioner 
1955; Bulletin ofthe British Psychiatric Society 1951 \ Psychiatry 1957; Neuropsychiatry 1951; 
Psychiaric Quarterly 1950, 1951, 1953, 1956.
^The work of Professor E. Stengel was both implicitly and explicitly referred to in the Parliamentary 
debates on the Suicide Bill. Implicitly when Viscount Kilmuir said "Recent research suggests...that 
those who attempt suicide are often making an appeal for help" (Hansard - Lords 2 March 1961 col. 
247, and explicitly w4ien Kenneth Robinson in Committee said "The man who has done most research 
in this country is Professor Stengel of Sheffield University, who for a long time has campaigned for 
the reform embodied in the Bill. (House of Commons Official Report, Standing Committee E, 25 
July 1961, col. 5. Leo Abse referred to Durkheim (Hansard 19 July 1961 col. 1410 and to various 
social surveys on suicides in Wales (col. 1413-14). Baroness Wootton referred to the Sainsbury 
study, saying that London boroughs with high suicide rates were ones of social disorganisation and 
lack of cohesion and to a study that showed "rates [of suicide] at Oxford and Cambridge were 
enormously higher among undergraduates than it is for the same age group" (Lords 2 March 1961) 
^File MEPO 10121 at the Police Record Office, Wellington House, Buckingham Gate has an exchange 
of letters about the Samaritans in the spring of 1962. It begins with the Commissioner of the Met,
A. Townsend, writing to J. Goyder, Assistant Commissioner at the City of London Police to ask if he 
knows anything about the Samaritans. Goyder replies that he is fact does, having called for a report 
about them in the spring of 1960 after having seen a television show about them. The reply from 
Goyder to Townsend is dated 2 May 1962 and says as far as he knows the Samaritans are all right.
On 10 May 1962 Townsend wrote to Chad Varah saying, "Although it is no longer a crime to attempt 
to commit suicide, you will appreciate that the police of the Force are still frequently called upon in 
these cases, and it is part of their duty to do all they can to ensure that the person who has made the 
attempt is placed in the care of someone who will look after him (or her) and give help and advice." 
Chad V ar^ replied (letter dated only "May, 1962): "I was very pleased to receive your enquiry as we 
are most anxious that the Met Police should act in the same way as the City of London Police by 
referring to the Samaritans any potential or attempted suicide who can be persuaded to agree ... We 
are currently dealing with 3000 new cases a year of which at least 40% are suicide risks."
^Andrew Brown, Deputy Records' Officer at Wellington House said (24 March 1997) that the General 
Orders are now defunct; they were not revised very often, and when changes in the law took place a 
Police Order went out and local forces were expected to cross out and write in the changes in their 
printed copies. In File MEPO 10121 there were examples of this in regard to the Street Offences Act 
1956 and the Suicide Act 1961.
^®The number of people tried at the higher courts had risen from 8,384 in 1930 to 30,591 in 1960, 
and in the magistrates courts from 43,464 in 1930 to 84,523 in 1960 (Butler & Sloman 1980 pp. 289- 
90)
Government policies, both Conservative and Labour, from the 1970s on have been aimed at trying 
to change the perception of community sentences. The White and Green papers (Cm 965 and CM 
966 1990) were explicit on the subject. The current Home Secretary, Jack Straw, has made numerous 
speeches urging more rigour on the Probation Service. See Mair 1997, Newbum 1995 
 ^^ Butler himself gives this as a reason in The Art o f the Possible, and it was cited repeatedly in 
interview by his widow, Molly Butler. It was also cited by Howard in the official biography (1987), 
and in interview by a subsequent Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker.
^ I^n the course of the Hart-Devlin debate Hart said that many of the examples Devlin cited were not 
interference in private behaviour but justifiable paternalism, so state action was appropriate. Simon 
Lee explores this aspect of Hart's thinking in Law and Morals 1986.
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Chapter 4: The Significance of the Mental Health Act
The Mental Health Act 1959 was an important and far reaching piece of legislation. 
Its significance goes well beyond what will be covered here and has been considered in 
a number of works, in particular a two volume study by Larry Gostin of MIND 
published in 1975 and 1976. In respect of the Suicide Act, this thesis argues that 
the Mental Health Act was crucial to its passage: that if this 1959 reform of the law on 
mental dlness had not taken place the décriminalisation of suicide would not have been 
proposed - certainly not by a Conservative government - and would not have been 
passed by the "deeply reactionary" 1959-64 Parliament.
This argument rests on two key aspects of the Mental Health Act: first, that the Royal 
Commission^ which preceded it, and the lengthy debate that accon^anied it, managed 
to achieve working agreement across political parties that, whatever the circumstances, 
the appropriate response to mental disorder should be medical treatment, not criminal 
sanction. Thus the key point was enshrined in statute: if a criininal offence could be 
ascribed to mental illness it should not attract punishment, and the offender should be 
removed from judicial to medical jurisdiction. Following this, it only remained for 
suicide and attempted suicide to be defined as in themselves piima facie evidence of 
mental illness and they would automatically be removed from criminal justice 
jurisdiction. After this, the statutory decriminahsation could be presented as simply 
eliminating a redundant involvement of the criminal courts.
The second aspect of the Mental Health Act that was of critical importance to the 
Suicide Act were the provisions giving power to the pohce to remove someone 
suspected of mental disorder to 'a place of safety* (section 136), and power to doctors 
to detain that person (sections 25-29). The clear statement of these powers (see
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below) in the statute provided the necessary assurance that decriminahsation of suicide 
would not result in a loss of official control over attenq)ts at this kind of deviance. 
Indeed one of the points made by its advocates in favour of the Suicide Bill was that 
attempted suicides who currently slipped through holes in the criminal justice net 
would be more likely to be caught if the behaviour was brought wholly within the 
medical remit.
Evidence to support the argument that these aspects of the Mental Health Act were 
crucial to the passage of the Suicide Act comes in the number of times, and th e way in 
which, they were mentioned in the debate about décriminalisation, both inside and 
outside Parhament. This evidence is presented in this chapter. In all the comments the 
assun^tion is made that attenq)ted suicides were ill and in need of treatment, and this 
assunq)tion was not challenged. The only point of contention came from people who 
wanted the treatment to be made compulsory, and their concerns were met by 
reference to pohce and medical powers over the mentahy disordered that had been 
estabhshed in statute by the Act.
The Mental Health Act became law on 29 July 1959, "An Act to repeal the Lunacy 
and Mental Treatment Acts 1890 to 1930 and the Mental Deficiency Acts 1913 to 
1938, and to make fresh provision with respect to the treatment and care of mentahy 
disordered persons and with respect to their property and affairs; and for purposes 
connected with the matters aforesaid." (Law Reports: Statutes 1959) It was very 
specific about who was ultimately responsible for these matters: Section 147 (1) on 
definitions says firmly, " 'Minister' means the Minister of Health." The role of the 
pohce and courts was limited to identifying (under the guidance of doctors) mental 
illness when it appeared within their remit, and then handing the sufferer over to the 
medical authorities. "The Minister," says section 97(1), shah provide such institutions 
as appear to him to be necessary for persons subject to detention under this Act, being 
persons who in the opinion of the Minister require treatment under conditions of
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special security on account of their dangerous, violent or criminal propensities." The 
Health Minister, Derek Walker Smith M.P., in presenting the Bill to Parliament pointed 
out that "Security precautions will continue ... But the fact that the Minister of Health 
is responsible underlines the fact that these places are primarily hospitals where we 
shall continue to treat the patients..." (Hansard: Commons: 26 January 1959)
There was the difficulty of someone who might not wish to be treated - a problem that 
exercised Magistrates and Parliamentarians (see below), and the police. In the file 
labelled MEPO 2 10121 at the Metropohtan Police record office on Buckingham Gate 
there is a note, hand-written on an actual copy of the House of Lords Hansard for 9 
March 1961 (the date of the Committee Stage of the Suicide Bill, see chapter 7). The 
note is fi*om "A.C.A." (identified by Andrew Brown, Deputy Records Officer as 
"Assistant Commissioner A Dept), and says, "How are we to deal with cases if the 
attenq)ter refuses help? 1 mentioned this to Sir Charles Cunningham as being the only 
point in which we were interested." There is no record of an answer to AC.A , but 
this kind of query in other places was regularly met by reference to the Mental Health 
Act, in particular section 136:
"Mentally disordered persons found in public places:
(1) If a constable finds in a place to which the pubhc have access a person who 
appears to him to be suffering fi*om mental disorder and to be in immediate 
need of care or control, the constable may, if he thinks it necessary to do so in 
the interests of that person or for the protection of other persons, remove that 
person to a place of safety within the meaning of the last foregoing section ...
(2) A person removed to a place of safety under this section may be detained 
there for the purpose of enabling him to be examined by a medical practitioner 
and to be interviewed by a mental welfare officer and of making any necessary 
arrangements for his treatment or care."
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If these professionals decided there was evidence of mental disorder^ the Act gave 
them powers of compulsory detention: "Section 25(2) An application for admission 
for observation may be made in respect of a patient on the grounds - (a) that he is 
suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants the detention of 
the patient in a hospital (with or without medical treatment) for at least a limited 
period; and (b) that he ought to be so detained in the interests of his own health or 
safety or with a view to the protection of other persons." The original detention was 
to be for "observation" and was limited to 28 days, but the person could thereafter be 
further detained - indefinitely - for treatment if the doctors deemed it necessary.^
Insight into what the treatment might involve was supplied by Dr. Edith Summersldll 
M.P., who rephed to the Second Reading of the Mental Health Bill on behalf of the 
Labour opposition. She gave an enthusiastic welcome to the Bill, and listed some of 
the new treatments - "group and individual psycho-therapy, electro-therapy, modified 
insulin, occupational traimng and so on...[which] have made a valuable contribution to 
the cure and rehabilitation of those suffering from mental illness" (Hansard: Commons 
26 January 1959). Dr. Doris Odium, who played such an important role in the passage 
ofthe Suicide Act (see chapter 6), was said in her TIMES obituary (18 October 1985) 
to have been "one of the pioneers in the use of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)."
Of particular in^ortance in respect of atten^ted suicide, were sections 60, 65 and 67 
ofthe Mental Health Act. Section 60(1) allowed Magistrates, following a conviction, 
and if two doctors certified mental disorder, to pass a hospital order and have the 
offender put immediately into corcpulsory care. Perhaps more significantly. Section 
60(2) allowed them to do so without a conviction, if "the court is satisfied that the 
accused did the act.'"  ^ These powers were also available to the Assize and Quarter 
Session courts with the added power to pass a compulsory hospital order that 
restricted discharge, either "without limit of time or during such period as may be 
specified in the order."
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The debates on the Mental Health Bill in Parliament were sufiRised with the optimism 
that Enlightenment positivism inspires. This is the belief that with rational, scientific 
effort, things will improve. It was on display right at the start of the 2nd Reading of 
the Bill on 26 January 1959 when Derek Walker Smith said, "It is really the advance in 
methods of research and treatment that divides us so decisively jfrom the past... 
scientific research and medical treatment are, by and large, a modem plant of an 
intensely vigorous and rapid growth..." (Hansard; Commons: 26 January 1959). He 
then went on to give the clearest possible demonstration of feith in this vision: large 
amounts of money devoted to it.
"In recent years," Walker Smith said, "the mental health services of the local 
authorities have been steadily expanding, as is evidenced by the progressive 
increase in their new expenditures on them In 1954-55 the net expenditure 
was £2,292,000. In 1955-56 it was £2,627,000, an increase of £335,000. In 
1956-57 it was £3,127,000, an increase of £500,000. In '57-'58 it was 
£3,647,000, a further increase of £520,000, and this year, '58-'59 it is estimated 
that the figure will be £4,100,000., a further increase of £453,000. ... The 
estimated expenditure on the service exceeds the estimated expenditure of the 
current year by over £900,000 for next year, '59-'60, and by over £1 3/4 million 
the year afl;er that. These figures allow for an annual rate of development in 
each of the next two years at roughly two-and-a-half times the rate of real 
increase which has obtained in recent years" (Hansard: Commons: 26 January 
1959).
This detailed illustration of how much the medical empire was expanding was greeted 
warmly by participants in the Parhamentary debate. The problematic effects of it on 
civil hberties did not concern them, and did not impede passage of the Bfll. The high 
profile hbertaiian debate taking place at exactly the same time remained focused on 
issues of sexuahty and censorship. However the effect on civil hberty did begin to
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cause concern in the years that followed, especially the effects of the conq)ulsory 
detention and treatment provisions. Gostin (1985) defined it as the "welfarism vs. 
legalism" debate, and Jill Peay explained that "the danger is that once deference to 
psychiatric notions is permitted, welfarism need no longer be tendered by legahsm and 
outcomes which challenge notions of justice can arise. Hence psychiatry's role in 
managing and controlling offenders efficiently may even legitimise forms or length of 
confinement which could not be justified in purely legal-punitive terms" ( Peay 
1997:680).
Concern about the conq)ulsory detention provisions ofthe Mental Health Act did grow 
in the 1960s and '70s, inspired in part by a canq)aign waged by MIND (the name 
adopted by the former National Association for Mental Health). By 1976 the well 
known psychiatrist Anthony Clare publicly stated, "There is no denying that the 
conçulsory admission provisions of the 1959 Mental Health Act are abused" (Clare 
1976:364). But at the time of its passage no one objected to allowing the pohce to 
remove mentally disordered people fi*om pubhc places and very few were concerned 
about giving doctors virtuaUy unfettered power to conq)ulsorily detam them There 
was widespread agreement that professional discretion, in Larry Gostin's words, should 
be "unencumbered by a panoply of bureaucracy and procedures" (Gostin 1985 :v). In 
this the debate was foUowing lines laid down by the Royal Commission (also known as 
the Percy Commission) which had been unequivocal in advocating that mental disorder 
should be removed firom criminal justice jurisdiction and put whoUy in the control of 
the medical estabhshment.
Dr. AD  D. Brougton M.P. was one of the very few people in Parhament who queried 
the sweeping powers granted to doctors by the Mental Health Act. Speaking at 2nd 
Reading as "the only practising psychiatrist in the House," he said, "I should like the 
justices of the people to be included for the reason that a medical man is only qualified
109
to give a medical certificate when a patient is compulsorily detained, that person is 
losing inq)ortant civil rights. I do not think a medical man is qualified to rob a person 
of his or her civil rights. I therefore think that responsibility would be better lefl: with 
justices ofthe peace" (Hansard; Commons: 26 January 1959).
Dr. Broughton's point was not accepted, and not only were justices of the peace 
removed from any involvement in conq)ulsory detention ofthe mentally disordered, the 
Mental Health Act relieved them of their long held responsibility to certify the 
institutions where the detention took place. Kenneth Robinson M.P., an important 
figure in the reform ofthe mental health law as well as the suicide law, was particularly 
pleased at the exclusion of J.P.s. Writing in the TVew Statesman hi January 1959 about 
the Mental Health Bill, he said approvmgly, "The decision to detain an unwilling 
patient will be a purely medical decision... The efforts of a small medical rearguard to 
retain the magistrate in the picture have been scotched."
Although only minimal concern was expressed at the time about possible threats to 
civil liberties inherent in the Mental Health Bill, a great deal of concern was expressed 
about the threats it posed to social order; in particular the provisions for care in the 
community.(Part U "Local Authority Services") A representative exanq)le comes fiom 
the National Council of Women (NCW), who passed a resolution at their 1957 Annual 
Conference saying the NCW "deprecates the proposal that certain cases who may be 
anti-social in behaviour or who may unexpectedly become aggressive, should be cared 
for in the community instead of in institutions or colonies" (NCW 1958 Annual 
Report:?). At the 1957 Conference ofthe National Association for Mental Health, the 
representative from the NCW, Mrs. Frankenburg J.P. "spoke on the danger to the 
pubhc of mental defectives being at large on discharge from hospital". The NCW 
record of this says, "Her remarks were very well received and were reported m the 
Press" (ibid.:34).
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Mrs. Frankettburg's remarks, and their reception, demonstrate why both aspects of the 
Mental Health Act cited above were so important to the Suicide Act. When 
atten^ted suicides were successfully defined as mentally ill, which the advocates of 
décriminalisation worked so hard to do, they inevitably became subject to the kind of 
fears expressed by the NCW, so the removal of the mentally ill firom judicial to 
medical jurisdiction had to be coupled with measures offering reassurance that such a 
move would not jeopardise public order and social control. These measures duly 
appeared in the clauses referred to above. They played a central role m the subsequent 
passage of the Suicide Act, as the extracts firom the debate set out below demonstrate.
Just as civil liberty concerns did not obstruct passage of the Mental Health Act, 
neither did they hinder the Suicide Act. The relatively brief Parliamentary debate on 
decriminalising suicide never considered the possibility that attempted suicides were 
not mentally ill Schopenhaur's point was never raised that "it is quite obvious that 
there is nothing in the world to which every man has a more unassailable title than to 
his own life and person." (Schopenhauer, "On Suicide", quoted in Battin 1995:181) 
Nor was Thomas Szaz's notion that "the medical profession's stance toward suicide is 
like the Communists' toward emigration" - i.e. intolerable efforts to curtail human 
fireedom (Szaz 1980:196) Nor did anyone in the Suicide Bill debate query the 
assunq)tion established in the Mental Health Act that if someone was mentally ill (or 
appeared to be) that it automatically licensed professional intervention and coercion. It 
was not until much later that Thomas Szaz, himself a psychiatrist, wrote his attacking 
essay "The Ethics of Suicide" in which he said "the physician uses the rhetoric of illness 
and treatment to justify his forcible intervention in the life of a fellow human being" 
(Szaz 1980:189).
What debate there was about the decriminahsation of suicide - which was not very 
much - clearly shows that it was on precisely this basis - ie. people who try to loll 
themselves are ipso facto mentahy ih and need treatment - that the proposal was
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made, and only on this basis that it was accepted. The arguments and statements of 
the participants in the debate can support no other interpretation. It is why this thesis 
argues that the Suicide Act, which on the face of it was a straightforward 
decriminahsation, was in 6ct a transfer of control from criminal justice to medical 
jurisdiction. Although the Suicide Act itself (see Appendix A) made no reference to 
medical involvement, the debates that surrounded it certainly did, and in particular to 
provisions of the recently enacted Mental Health Act. Its supporters clearly saw it not 
as abandoning control of a deviant behaviour, but as transferring it away from the 
"punitive" practices of criminal justice to the "humane treatment" practices of the 
medical establishment. The idea that the state might withdraw attempts at control 
altogether simply did not arise. Extracts from the debate that preceded and 
surrounded the decriminahsation of suicide are presented below in support of this 
argument. The nature of the people involved in the debate as weU as what was said 
is, of course, inextricably linked to the outcome, and this factor - the importance of 
"agency" is considered in chapter 6.
As mentioned in chapter 3, it is fortuitous that the genesis of the actual law that 
decriminahsed suicide was in a smaU committee where representatives of the judicial 
and medical estabhshments came face to face, and where the minutes, preserved in the 
BMA archives, record not only the attitudes which informed the transfer, but also 
reflect a territorial struggle between judicial and medical estabhshments for control of 
the 'body* of the offender.
The BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee debate on this issue is also discussed in 
chapter 6 and set out frdly in Appendix B. Extracts from this record are presented 
here to show that members of this committee beheved suicide and attempted suicide 
were serious social problems, properly the object of state intervention and control, but 
were persuaded that the state's powers should be exercised through the medical 
estabhshment (which had been nationahsed in 1948), and not through criminal justice
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agencies. This assimçtion was shared by nearly everyone whose words are recorded 
in the debate on décriminalisation. The only resistance came from those who like Dr. 
Broughton (see above) and Seymour Collins (see below) wanted to share the control 
between criminal justice and medical agencies. As regards the government's view of 
the matter, it is revealing that when members of the Joint BMA/Magistrates Committee 
were summoned to the Home Office in March 1959 to discuss suicide law with the 
Deputy Permanent Secretary Francis Graham-Harrison, the only other people present 
were two officials from the Department of Health.
The joint BMA/Magistrates committee was set up after the second world war to 
"consider matters of common interest." Their third report, in 1947, was titled 
"Attenq)ted Suicide and the Law," and stated: "There is a strong case for amendment 
of the law so that attempted suicide (excluding suicide pacts or incitement of another 
person to commit suicide) would not be dealt with as an illegal offence." Interestingly, 
in the perspective of a conflict over jurisdiction, this report made clear that this
statement reflected the views of the medical members only, and explained that the
Magistrate members "had participated fidly in the discussion, but, though they were 
not in disagreement with the conclusion reached, it was agreed that the report should 
be concerned only with the problem from the medical aspect." (All information 
concerned with the Joint Committee comes from the BMA archives, file B/27/3/2. The 
items do not have individual archival numbers)
The Report went on to make clear clear that the purpose of any change should be to 
improve/increase treatment possibilities:
"... adults 'in need of care and protection' would be brought before the 
magistrates courts to whom the necessary psychiatric advice should be 
available, so that consideration could be given to the best treatment for their 
rehabilitation. A further suggestion was made that powers be granted to
magistrates to extend the present 28 day limit under an observation order."
(quoted on agenda for Joint Committee meeting of 30 September 1955)
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Not a great deal happened in regard to suicide law following the 1947 report until 
1955, when Dr. Doris Odium, as the then Chair of the BMA/Magistrates committee, 
resurrected the issue and asked the then current committee to endorse its predecessors' 
report. However, even this seemingly unexceptional proposal encountered resistance. 
The minutes of the first discussion record: "Some were of the opinion that it was 
advantageous for attempted suicide to be regarded as an offence because cases were 
brought to the notice of the authorities who could decide on appropriate action..."
This view of the situation was shared by quite a few people at the beginning of Dr. 
Odium's effort to change the law, most inq)ortantly by the Magistrates Association (see 
below). It was the position Rev. Chad Varah of the Samaritans said he held until 
"Doris Odium convinced me it was wrong." (Varah interview 7 April 1999) The wish 
to retain some criminal justice involvement with attenq)ted suicides was very hard to 
dislodge. In September 1960 The Economist ran an article speculating on a possible 
change in the law on suicide and said, "One can grant that the criminal law is a present 
means of obtaining treatment, but it is hardly a necessary one. Those suffering from 
mental illness can be given treatment voluntarily, or if necessary conq)ulsorily, without 
recourse to the courts ... The only gap left by the abohtion of the criminal offence 
would be a tiny suicidal minority, uncertifiable but unwilling to accept treatment. They 
could be dealt with by giving the courts power to make temporary orders, similar to 
the care and protection orders made by juvenile courts, so that rehabihtory treatment 
could begin." (Economist 3 September 1960:871)
In any case, enough members of the Joint Committee initially wanted to retain criminal 
justice involvement to prevent their accepting Dr. Odium's proposal to endorse the 
1947 recommendation. As they could not agree among themselves on the issue, they 
decided to canvass opinion in their respective Associations. It turned out that the 
Magistrates' Association was firmly against any change in the law on suicide. Their
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representative on the Joint Committee, Mrs. MacAdam J.P., reported in November 
1956:
"the Legal Committee of the Magistrates* Association had considered the 
present position regarding cases of attempted suicide and had reported to the 
Council of the Magistrates Association that, in their view, there was no 
necessity for a change in the law. They beheved that cases were being dealt 
with satisfactorily, and had asked to be informed of any evidence showing that 
the discretion whether or not to bring a person before the courts was not being 
used wisely."
This view had been clearly stated in the Annual Report of the Magistrates Association 
in October 1956:
"The [Legal] Committee has considered whether there is need for some 
alteration in the law relating to atten^ted suicide, and in particular whether it 
should remain a criminal offence.
In view of the general practice of only bringing a case of atten^ted suicide in 
exceptional circumstances, the Committee is not in favour of the law being 
amended, but considers that attenq)ted suicide should continue to be a criminal 
offence so that where necessary the person concerned can be safeguarded and 
helped." (Magistrates' Association 36th Annual Report, October 1956:23)
Some two and a half years later the BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee did agree to 
recommend a change in the law in order to facihtate treatment of attençted suicides, 
but the proposal to remove this behaviour completely from the criminal courts had 
been strongly resisted. A magistrate member of the Committee, Seymour Collins 
J.P., fought especially hard to maintain at least partial judicial jurisdiction. Throughout 
the four years the committee debated the issue Collins was distinctly unenthusiastic 
about proposals to decriminahse, insisting on the need to retain pohce and court 
powers of intervention. In the face of the medical members' opposition to this.
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Collins took the unusual step, in April 1957, of circulating a personal statement to all 
members of the committee:
"With regard to the proposed Statement on Attempted Suicide I am rather 
reserved and very sceptical about the wisdom of all the recommendations.
The pohce officer's powers of arrest where there had merely been a breach of 
the peace merely continues if some action on his part becomes necessary to 
prevent in the immediate fixture a fixrther breach of the peace. I am very 
doubtfixl whether, apart fi'om his power of arrest for the common law offence 
of atten^ted sixicide a pohceman coixld intervene even if he saw a man in the 
street eating large quantities of aspirin and obviously trying to do away with 
himself and a fortiori he woxxld have no powers whatsoever if this or any of the 
other recognised methods of terminating life were being exercised on himself 
by a man in a private dwelling. In any event I doubt whether attenq)ted suicide 
is at the present time any breach of the peace.
I am in fixU agreement with the view that attempted suicide cases usually 
reqxxire some treatment or supervision and I am never very happy about the 
idea of patients being regarded as voluntary patients in a mental hospital when 
they have been sent there xmder Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 as a 
condition of residence for a period not exceeding 12 months which can only be 
enforced as a breach of a probation
order. It seems to me that these provisions and their enforcement are so 
roxmdabout that they exceed the British genius for con^romise.
All I hope is that the Joint Committee will not tie themselves down to 
recommendations which will leave the pohce powerless and I venture to 
suggest that in the comparatively rare cases which come before the Coixrts the 
present system works pretty well. There still is Httle to choose between the
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stigma of having been before the Court and having been in a mental hospital in 
the eyes of most famibes and where the only chance of psychiatric treatment is 
through the medium of a Court I feel the present system has much to 
recommend it."
But some members of the Joint Committee were firm in their behef that attenq)ted 
suicide should be removed entirely firom criminal justice jurisdiction. At the meeting 
when the Collins' statement was discussed they managed to defer fiirther discussion, 
and for a particular purpose. The v^ril 1957 minutes record agreement on the 
following:
"That consideration of the drafl; statement on attempted suicide be deferred 
until the Committee has had an opportunity of studying the Report ofthe Royal 
Commission on Mental Dlness and Mental Deficiency, expected to be published 
in May."
It should be noted that the Joint Committee would have had privileged access to what 
the Report was likely to say as Lady Hester Adrian J.P. was a member both of it and of 
the Royal Commission.^
A seven page summary of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Law 
Relating to Mental Dlness and Mental Deficiency was duly circulated to members of 
the Committee. At the next meeting in July 1957 a resolution was passed 
recommending the police should continue to be involved, not to prosecute, but to 
conq)el treatment:
"In view of the fact that suicide is at present a felony, the pohce have power to 
intervene where a person is found attempting suicide, and it is desirable for 
power of this kind to be retained in certain circumstances. It is suggested that 
suitable alternative legislation could provide for pohce intervention in cases of
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attempted suicide and give power for such cases to be brought to a hospital for 
observation and treatment if necessary."
Dr. Odium then invited Professor E. Stengel, President of the Psychiatric Section of 
the Royal Society of Medicine, who had been involved in research on suicide and 
atten^ted suicide, to address the Joint Committee's next meeting. Professor Stengel 
had long advocated a change m the law on suicide, and the minutes of this meeting (22 
January 1958) record that he "reminded the Committee that the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Mental Health expressed the view that the less the judiciary had to do 
with the treatment of patients the better and he thought that this principle should be 
apphed in relation to attempted suicide."
The minutes ofthe meeting with Professor Stengel include this note:
"Mr. Seymour Collins felt there was a necessity for some power to be given to 
the pohce to intervene where a person was found attenq)ting suicide. If the 
present law was amended so that attempted suicide was not regarded as an 
offence the pohce would have no power to intervene and to take a person to 
hospital and would be hable to action for unlawful arrest if they so acted."
The committee's response to Collins' concern was minuted as:
"It was thought there would be no difidculty in making suitable arrangements to 
cover that point; it was essential that the pohce or any other person discovering 
an attempted suicide should take action to save the person and take him to 
hospital or a medical practitioner."
The minutes continue:
"It was the general feeling of the Committee that the present law was obsolete 
and should therefore be amended to ensure that ah persons attenq)ting suicide 
received appropriate care. It was suggested that as a first step towards 
obtaining amendment of the law the matter should be raised in connection with
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new legislation arising out of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Law 
Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency.
The Committee then Resolved:
"That the Committee on the Report of the Royal Commission on the Law 
Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency be informed of this 
Committee's views on the subject of atten^ted suicide, and be asked to support 
them and to propose the inclusion of a special clause relating to attenq)ted 
suicide in any new legislation concerning mental health."
The significance of the Royal Commission and of the Mental Health Act to the Suicide 
Bill is apparent not only from the number of times they were referred to in the various 
debates, but also in the manner of the references. In the BMA/Magistrates Joint 
Committee it was only the existence of the Act that finally overcame the determination 
to preserve at least some criminal justice powers over attenq)ted suicide. This 
happened in March 1959, at the point when representatives of the Committee had 
been invited to the Home Ofi&ce to discuss the suicide law (see chapter 7). In advance 
of going to the Home Office, the representatives held a preliminary meeting on 12 
March in order to finalise their submission. Some months previously, at a meeting 
when Seymour Collins was not present, it had been agreed to recommend that courts 
be removed completely from any involvement with atten^ted suicides. At the 
preliminary meeting in March Seymour Collins atten^ted to reverse this by adding a 
recommendation to give courts power to impose care and protection provisions on 
attempted suicides. This was resisted, and the minutes record:
"There was some objection to the proposal on the grounds that it would mean 
that the person had to be brought before a court. It was also felt that, whilst 
such a procedure might be useful in a few cases, the proposals in the present 
Mental Health Bill were such that if accepted, they would provide for action, 
where necessary, in many cases of attempted suicide and it would be
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unnecessary to bring in additional legislation to cover a very small number of 
instances of atterc^ted suicide."
The meeting then did agree a series of proposals to be presented to Home Ofi&ce 
ofificials as the formal view of the British Medical Association/Magistrates Association 
Joint Committee. These proposals were the product of a remarkably small number of 
people: there were only five present at the meeting, including Lady Adrian and Dr. 
Odium. The recommendations are worth recording in fidl because they reveal so 
clearly the intention to transfer, not remove, control over atteicpted suicide, and the 
importance of the Mental Health Act to this objective:
"a) Attempted suicide per se should not be a criminal offence
b) Clause 133 of Mental Health Act could be applied if atten^ted suicide is in a 
public place, to enable the person to be removed to a place of safety.^
c) If the attempted suicide is not in a public place, the police should have power 
to take that person to a place of safety on the presumption they are in need of 
treatment.
d) The small proportion of atten^ted suicides who create a public disturbance 
could be charged with breach of the peace. ^
e) Following discharge from hospital, it is suggested that after care and follow 
up be undertaken by a social worker, not a probation officer.
f) It is not possible to protect people against themselves completely, but if they 
are kept in a place of safety and have the opportunity of care and treatment, 
they are less likely to make a second attempt at suicide than if they have been 
imprisoned.
g) A change in the law would not make it more difficult for a person to receive 
treatment.
h) The recommendations do not refer to suicide pacts." ^
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The minutes of the meeting that took place at the Home Office on 13 March 1959 
provide explicit evidence of how inç)ortant the Mental Health Act was to the change 
in the law on suicide:
"It was pointed out that when the Joint Committee of the B.M.A. and the 
Magistrates' Association had recommended provision for bringing in a charge 
of breach of the peace it was intended to cover those cases where the 
attençted suicide had caused a disturbance to the public. It was now realised 
that if the Mental Health Bill at present before Parliament was passed, the 
provisions contained therein would cover most of the cases of attempted 
suicide in which it was considered necessary to remove the victim."
The provisions of the Mental Health Act had an important influence on the debate in 
the Church of England committee which considered suicide law (see chapter 5), just as 
it had had on the Joint BMA/Magistrates Committee. In the "legal" section of the 
booklet this Church of England committee produced, titled Ought Suicide to be a 
Crime?, it says: "The case for abolishing the crime of atten^ted suicide will be greatly 
strengthened if the Mental Health Bill becomes law." The writer points out that under 
the proposed Mental Health Act "courts can make a 'hospital' or guardianship' order 
if satisfied the defendant is mentally ill" and that this order "may be made without 
recording a conviction". The writer then canvasses the problem of people whose 
suicide attempts cause danger to others - such as by throwing themselves under a bus - 
and suggests a possible extension of public nuisance laws to cover this. However he 
notes that this may not be necessary as under "Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 
police can remove to a place of safety someone in a place to which public have access 
if it seems he is suffering from mental disorder and needs care and control."
The applicability to suicide law of new provisions in mental health law was also raised 
in the brief exchange of letters in the TIMES that accompanied Kenneth Robinson's 
first raising of the suicide law issue in Parliament in February 1958. Herman
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Mannheim of the LSE, who had been a member of the Joint BMA/Magistrates 
Committee, wrote supporting an end to criminal sanctions on atten^ted suicides and 
suggested that "some other machinery might possibly he worked out in consultation 
with the NHS, other social services and the pohce, and some of the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency might also be 
relevant" (TIMES 25 February 1958). Professor Mannheim also referred to the issue 
in a pubhc lecture given at the LSE in the spring of 1958: "Would pubhc opinion have 
been offended," he asked, referring to people prosecuted for attempted suicide, "if 
these people had been looked after by specially trained social workers and mental 
hospitals without the stigma and expense of prosecution and court procedure?" 
(Mannheim 1959:279)
On one of the three occasions when the TIMES commented about decriminahsing 
suicide,  ^it too remarked on the helpfidness of the Mental Health Act. An editorial in 
October 1960 commented:
"Medical treatment is obviously more appropriate than punishment and the 
Mental Health Act went some way towards supplying the main need by 
providing that a constable can remove to hospital any person suffering firom 
mental disorder and in immediate need of care or control "if he thinks it 
necessary to do so in the interests of that person or for the protection of other 
persons" (TIMES 21 October 1960).
In Parliament, links between the Suicide Act and mental health law reform are 
discernable even before Kenneth Robinson put his first question about amending the 
suicide law. The Percy Commission which preceded and informed the Mental Health 
Act reported in May 1957. In July Parliament debated the Report, for the most part 
with lavish expressions of welcome and admiration. In this debate, most unusually as 
he was Home Secretary and it was a Health matter, Butler gave the closing speech. 
The Health Secretary, Dennis Vosper M.P., was ill at the time, and Butler explained
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(Hansard: Commons: 8 July 1957), "I am rising solely because the Government 
thought this a matter of sufficient importance for a member of the Cabinet to 
intervene..." He went on to point out that, "It so happens that I am, and have been for 
some years, the President of the National Association for Mental Health. It is 
therefore not altogether unsuitable that I should take part in the debate." The 
significant point in this speech in terms of the as-yet-to-be-raised suicide reform came 
toward the end when Butler said, "I simply undertake, from the point of view of 
administration at the Home Office, to do what I can to carry out the spirit of the 
Commission's Report." Since one of the key points in the Report was the removal of 
all judicial involvement with mental illness, Butler's commitment to it was clearly 
relevant to the subsequent suicide issue.
Kenneth Robinson, who was the first to raise the issue of the suicide law in Parliament, 
was an enthusiastic supporter of mental health law reform and spoke many times in 
debates on the Royal Commission Report and on the MHA, regularly advocating that 
mentally disordered offenders be removed from criminal jurisdiction and put in the 
hands of doctors.
A month after Robinson's first question about suicide law reform see chapter 7), 
Butler announced to the House of Commons that the Government would be bringing 
forward legislation to reform the law on mental illness in line with recommendations of 
the Percy Commission. In the two years that followed, Kenneth Robinson's 
Parhamentary Questions to Butler about the suicide law, and Butler's responses, show 
that assured provision for treatment of attempted suicides was the crux of the matter as 
far as Butler was concerned. This was made exphcit in the following exchange at 
Question Time in May 1958 (Hansard: Commons: 23 May 1958): Robinson asked
what fiuther consideration the Home Secretary had given to the legal aspect of suicide 
and attempted suicide? Butler rephed: I am pursuing my study of this problem, which
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has practical aspects of no less inq)ortance than its legal aspects. I am not yet ready to 
reach a conclusion upon it ."
Robinson followed up with a further question: "Is the Rt. Hon. Gentleman aware that, 
since the last Question I put to him on this subject, a joint committee, set up by the 
BMA and the Magistrates Association to examine this subject, has reported in fevour 
of a change in the law in the direction which I am suggesting and that this report is 
unanimously accepted by the Council of the Magistrates Association? In view of this 
weighty opinion, will not the Home Secretary make an early decision in this matter?"
Butler responded that he was aware of the report, but "I am also aware of various 
other considerations. I think this is a very difficult subject." He then pointed out how 
few prosecutions there were for attenq)ted suicide, and that most of them resulted in 
probation. "I have also considered," he said, "that in a minority of cases without the 
power we have now we might not be able to achieve the desired results, so that, on the 
facts, it is a very difficult question to decide."
Robinson pursued the point of ensuring control: "Other provisions of the law," he 
said, "in regard to breach of the peace and mental health are quite sufficient to deal 
with the cases he has in mind." Butler then ended the exchange with a clear indication 
of the connection between change m the suicide law and mental health law reform: 
"The Government's approach to mental health is at present actual [sic], and does bring 
all this subject to the fore. It is against that background that I am examining it."
Parhamentary Questions from Robinson in the months that followed ehcited fiirther 
confirmation of the linkage: July 1958: Robinson - "Has the Home Secretary reached 
a conclusion on the desirabihty of amending the law relating to suicide and attenq)ted 
suicide?" Butler: "No Sir. My study of this question suggests that in its practical 
aspects the problem is largely one of ensuring that those who need care or treatment to
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prevent them from endangering themselves or others in fact receive it. In general 
where this can be done without the intervention of the courts proceedings are not 
taken, but there is a residue of cases in which the person concerned cannot be given, or 
will not accept, care or treatment without the intervention of the courts. I shall 
continue to study this aspect of the matter and I am in consultation with my Rt. Hon. 
Friend the Minister of Health about it" (Hansard: Commons: 24 July 1958).
February 1959: Robinson: "What further progress in discussion with regard to the 
law relating to suicide?" Butler: "I am pursuing, in consultation with my Rt. Hon.
Friend, the Minister of Health, my study of the question how, if attempted suicide 
ceased to be a criminal offence, we could ensure that people who attempted to kill 
themselves and were in need of mental treatment would in fact receive it... A meeting 
will take place shortly between ofi&cers of my Department and representatives of the 
Joint Committee of BMA and the Magistrates Association which has considered the 
subject" (Hansard: Commons: 26 February 1959).
The existence of the Mental Health Act was, perhaps crucially, invoked in a memo 
from the Cabinet Secretary to the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan on 24 October 
1960, briefing him on the sudden appearance of the Suicide Bill on the Cabinet agenda 
(see chapter 7). The fidl text of this memo appears at Appendix D, but it is relevant to 
note here the comment in paragraph 2: "The Mental Health Act of last session makes it 
possible to detain for 28 days' observation a person who appears to be suffering from 
mental disorder and ought to be detained for his own health or safety" (PRO: CAB 
21/4471).
The full significance of the Mental Health Act, and in particular the clauses licensing 
coercion, became apparent when the Suicide Bill actually entered Parliament. It was 
presented as the actual, tangible device which would ensure that the proposed transfer 
would not mean a loss of control. At the introduction of the Bill in the Lords, in
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March 1961, Viscount Kilmuir, announcing the Home Secretary's intention that 
"attempts to commit suicide should cease to be an offence against the criminal law", 
said:
"The only problem has been the practical one of whether alternative and more 
appropriate methods are available for providing help where it is needed or has 
been rejected. I think I can assure your Lordships that this will be the case. 
Arrangements have been made by my Rt. Hon. Friend the Minister of Health to 
ensure that persons who are brought to hospital having attenq)ted suicide are 
examined by a psychiatrist who can consider whether treatment or supervision 
is needed. Under the provisions of Part IV of the Mental Health Act 1959, it is 
possible to detain for 28 days observation a person who appears to be suffering 
from mental disorder and who ought to be detained for his own health or 
safety. This short period of compulsory detention can be initiated either by the 
apphcation of the nearest relative or by that of a mental welfare of&cer. In 
these circumstances it has been thought possible and right to introduce this 
reform of the law, which is effected by Clause I of the [Suicide] Bill" 
(HansardiLords: 2 March 1961).
Lord Denning in the same debate said:
"I have had cases of atteni^ted suicide before me, and what one always did was 
to bind them over and arrange for medical treatment. But now, since the 
Mental Health Act 1959, it is unnecessary for any action to be taken in the 
courts" (ibid.).
In the Commons, the Government Minister introducing the Bill (Charles Fletcher- 
Cooke M.P.) gave the same assurances as had been made in the Lords:
"Arrangements are being made by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health 
to ensure that persons who are brought to hospital having attençted suicide are
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examined so that need for treatment or supervision can be assessed. Under the 
provisions of Part IV of the Mental Health Act, 1959, it is possible, subject to 
appropriate safeguards, to detain for 28 days observation a person who appears 
to be suffering from mental disorder and who ought to be detained for his own 
health or safety or for the protection of others" (Hansard: Commons: 14 July 
1961).
Despite these assurances, there still remained anxiety that some attempted suicides
might shp through the social control net. Eric Fletcher M.P. said:
"[T]he machinery of the criminal law...has in recent years been used not to 
secure a prison sentence but to ensure that the unfortunate sufferer obtains the 
treatment required. There is a fear in some quarters that if we remove the 
existing responsibihties and duties of the pohce in this regard some of those 
who in the past have attempted suicide and who because of pohce intervention 
have had the appropriate treatment, wih not get it... The Minister referred to 
the Mental Health Act and indicated the provisions which there exist for 
persons to be detained for a period of twenty-eight days. I appreciate that that 
wih cover those cases of attenq)ted suicide where people find themselves in 
hospital But what about those who do not? What about those who at present 
go to a doctor after they have taken an overdose of barbiturates, or whatever it 
may be, which is not sufficient to kih them, and they are cured? What is the 
machinery to ensure that those people get appropriate treatment in the friture?" 
(ibid.)
This concern was directly addressed by Kenneth Robinson in the Standing Committee
debate on the Bill, and again rehed on the Mental Health Act provisions:
"This is not nearly as serious a problem as my hon. Friend and others have 
suggested. I think that we all agree that psychiatric treatment is what most of 
these unfortunate people need. I am assured that it has a far better chance of
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success in these circumstances if it is voluntarily accepted. I am also assured 
that, as long as these cases of attempted suicide are brought to the notice of the 
psychiatrist, there is seldom much difficulty about persuading them to accept 
psychiatric treatment.
Of course there will be some who will resist, but most of those will be suffering 
from some kind of mental disorder and in many cases it will be a mental 
disorder of a type or degree which would justify conq)ulsory treatment under 
Section 26, or compulsory observation in a mental hospital under Section 25, 
of the Mental Health Act, 1959" (Official Report Standing Committee E, 
Suicide Bill, 25 July 1961).
The anxiety about untreated cases of attempted suicide and the possibility of amending 
the Bill to include provisions for their compulsory treatment was raised in both Lords' 
and Commons' debates. Leo Abse M.P. said:
"Concern has aheady been expressed in another place that although the 
workings of the Mental Health Act will ensure that an attempted suicide who is 
certifiable will enter a mental hospital, although one m respect of whom a 
relative may take action will enter for treatment, there exists a gap - in my view 
a wide gap - left by the abohtion of the criminal offence. This will be the 
suicidal minority who are not certifiable but who are unwilling to accept 
treatment; a not unusual state among potential suicides. The point has not 
been met despite what has been said elsewhere. I would urge that powers be 
given to the courts to make temporary guardianship orders so that 
rehabihtation treatment could be given." If the Government were not 
agreeable to this, Abse went on, then other laws, such as the National 
Assistance Act or the Pubhc Health Act, could be used, both of which allowed 
people to "be brought before the court and a suitable order made", and this 
would "deal with this residue who otherwise would not be dealt with at all" 
(Hansard: Commons: 19 July 1961).
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B.T, Parkin M.P. agreed:
"I hope that [the Home Secretary's] influence will be exercised in the direction 
of widening the positive welfare activities of the Home Office along the lines 
suggested by my hon Friend the Member for Pontypool [Leo Abse]... The 
Home Secretary...is still the senior Minister responsible for the welfare of Her 
Majesty's subjects, not just for locking them up and punishing them I hope to 
see the Home Office developing more in that direction. I hope to see it using 
the police more as agents of the Welfare State. They should be primus inter 
pares among the agents of the Welfare State and should have access to the 
agents of other Departments" (ibid.).
But the government managed to resist pressure to add compulsory treatment 
provisions to the Suicide Bill, mainly by continuing to cite powers available in the 
Mental Health Act which could be used to deal coercively with attempted suicides. In 
the final Third Reading in the Commons, afl;er the Bill emerged unamended fi*om its 
Committee Stage, the Minister, Fletcher-Cooke, announced his belief that it was 
"universally welcomed" and in case there was any doubt, went on to unambiguously 
re-state the true nature of the Bill:
"Because we have taken the view, as Parhament and the Government have 
taken, that the treatment of people who attenq)t suicide should no longer be 
through the criminal courts, it in no way lessens, nor should it lessen, the 
respect for the sanctity of human life which we all have. It must not be thought 
that because we are changing the method o f treatment fo r those unfortunate 
people we seek to depreciate the gravity of the action of anyone who tries to 
commit suicide" [enq)hasis added] (Hansard: Commons: 28 July 1961)
This statement, and indeed the entire debate on the change in the suicide law, both 
inside and outside Parhament, makes clear that no one involved had any wish or 
intention that the state should relinquish control of this deviant behaviour. They
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wanted the control - the "treatment" - to be exercised in a different way by a different 
group of people. As final confirmation of this, the Suicide Bill passed its Third 
Reading on 28 July 1961 and received the Royal Assent on 3 August. On 1 August, 
1961 Eric Fletcher M.P. put down a Question to the Minister of Health, Enoch Powell: 
"Mr. Fletcher asked the Minister of Health what steps he proposed to take to ensure 
that all cases of attenq>ted suicide coming to the notice of any hospital or general 
practitioner obtained psychiatric or other suitable treatment."
Mr. Powell rephed: "I shah shortly be asking hospitals, local health authorities, and 
general practitioners to do ah they can to ensure that everyone coming to their notice 
as having attenqpted suicide receives appropriate care and treatment" (Hansard: 
Commons 1 August 1961). Kenneth Robinson than asked Mr. PoweU: "Wih the 
Minister take special care about hospitals in view of the fact that in the past at least 
one famous London teaching hospital was in the habit of treating the physical 
synq)toms of an attempted suicide and discharging the patient without referring him to 
the psychiatric department of the hospital?" Mr. Poweh: "That is a point on which I 
am placing particular emphasis in the circular which I intend to issue" (ibid.).
As is clear firom the above extracts, a sizeable number of people wanted attempted 
suicides to be subject to compulsory treatment as a matter of law. The Suicide Act did 
not, in fact, do this, but an interesting footnote to the debate is that some people 
professionally involved in mental health thought that it did. Philip Bean, Senior 
Lecturer in Social Administration at the University of Nottingham, wrote in 1985 that 
"persons who have attempted suicide... under the provisions of the Suicide Act 1961 
are no longer regarded as criminal but are instead close to being regarded as insane, 
because the Act requires them to see a psychiatrist before they can be discharged fi'om 
hospital" (Bean 1985:299)
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Conclusion
The Mental Health Act 1959 was crucially inçortant to the passage of the Suicide Act. 
Philosophically it codified the concept that if medical disorder was identified as a 6ctor 
in criminal behaviour the offender was automatically transferred from criminal justice 
to medical jurisdiction. Practically, it gave power to pohce to remove and doctors to 
detain anyone who seemed to be suffering mental health problems. This meant that if 
attenq)ted suicide was agreed to be of and by itself evidence of mental disorder then it 
was de facto decriminahsed by the Mental Health Act, and the Suicide Act was only 
removing the redundant involvement of criminal justice. This was a triunq)h for the 
positivist position and a clear gain for advocates of the medicahsation of deviance. 
However, there still remained a formidable traditional defender of the idea that 
individuals do make choices and carry moral responsibdity for the consequences. This 
was the Church, who as prime mover of the criminalisation of suicide, could have 
been expected to object to its (fgcriminahsation. How this logically likely opposition 
was deflected is the subject of the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter 4
^Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, Feb. 1954 - May 
1957, Chaired by Lord Percy of Newcastle, 11 Members, Cmnd 169
^Exactly what constitutes mental disorder was problematic at the time and continues to be forty years 
on. It is interesting that Butler had to deal with the problem many years later as Chair of the 
Committee on Mentally Abnormal QfiScers 1972-73, Cmnd 6244. In 1998 the government appointed 
another Committee to enquire into the matter again.
^The Mental Health Act included provisions for people compulsorily detained to apply to a Tribunal 
for release, but the actual operation of this came under increasing criticism in the years that followed. 
See Gostin 1975 and 1977; Clare 1980
"^ In the personal experience of the writer, this power of magistrates courts to make hospital orders 
without convicting continues to cause difficulty as it is unclear what exactly is needed for the court to 
be "satisfied that the accused did the act".
^Lady Adrian's husband. Lord Adrian, was the Master of Trinity College Cambridge, which was 
Butler's old college. Butler took over the post of Master from Adrian in 1965.
^Although the recommendations said "Mental Healthier" it was in fact at the time - March 1959 - a 
Bill. Some changes were made in the course of its progress through Parliament, and this matter 
became Clause 136 in the Act.
?The idea of maintaining residual criminal justice sanctions over attempted suicides by bringing 
charges of breach of the peace against them had been examined by the Home Office. In the meeting
131
with the Joint Committee on 13 March 1959, the Deputy Permanent Secretary, Francis Graham 
Harrison, was recorded as saying that consideration had been given to the recommendation that those 
cases of attempted suicide which it was necessary to bring before a court could be dealt with as a 
breach of the peace. Enquiries had been made about the position in Scotland where this procedure 
was alreaify followed. It appeared that it was not altogether satisfactory because in some areas a 
charge of breach of the peace was made in nearly every case, with the result that of the cases known to 
the police a higher proportion was brought before the courts than happened at the present time in 
England and Wales. (See .^ipendix B)
^ h is  recommendation referred back to the difficult debates over the Homicide Bill about how to treat 
survivors of a suicide pact. After much controversy this was resolved in S.4 (1) of the Homicide Act 
1957; "It shall be manslaughter and shall not be murder for a person acting in pursuance of a suicide 
pact between him and another to kill the other or to be a party to the other being killed by a third 
party."
^ h e  other two occasions were a brief secondary leader on 26 Feb. 1958 after Kenneth Robinson's first 
PQ (see chapter 5), and another short comment on 3 March 1961, the day after the 2nd Reading in the 
Lords (see chapter 8).
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Chapter 5: Why did the Church not oppose it?
In October 1959 the Church of England Information Office published a booklet 
entitled "Ought Suicide to be a Crime?" recommending that it should not. This 
booklet was extremely inçortant to the subsequent passage of the Suicide Act, as 
evidenced by - among other things - the way it was referred to in the Parhamentary 
debates on the Bill, and the fkct that a copy is appended in the government files on the 
Act in the Pubhc Record Office.
The inq)ortance rested partly on the fact that the Church was responsible for the 
criminahsation of suicide in the first place, and the ancient taboo on self-killing was 
essentiahy a rehgious, or at least a superstitious, prohibition. Therefore the most 
hrportant opposition to ^^criminahsation could have been expected to come firom this 
quarter. The Church's firm opposition at the time to abortion and to loosening of 
controls on obscenity, blasphemy and divorce suggest on the face of it that the Church 
would have been likely to oppose this measure too. The simple fact that it did not 
oppose it was important. The pubhcation of a booklet under its imprint that actuaUy 
recommended it was highly significant.
Although the moral authority of the Church was greatly weakened by the 1950s, it still 
retained a facade of social sigmficance. Moreover, it continued to have 
disproportionate influence in the corridors of power, with its Bishops as permanent 
members of the House of Lords, and a number of vocal supporters in the House of 
Commons, three of whom were members of the Committee on the Suicide Bill. ^
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Rab Butler had experienced Church resistance to reform legislation when, as Education 
Minister, he put through the 1944 Education Act. According to Michael Barber in 
"The Making of the 1944 Education Act" (1994) Butler had to engage in "tortuous 
negotiations" with the churches to achieve passage of the Education Act and "gave 
more time and attention to the Churches than to any other interested parties" (Barber 
1994:54). With this as background, it is interesting to note that the Secretary to the 
Church committee on suicide and the law. Rev. G.R, Dunstan, said in interview that 
he sent advance copies of the suicide booklet both to the Home Office and to the Lord 
Chancellor, because he knew "it was inçortant for legislators to know the Church 
would not oppose legislation" on this subject. (Dunstan interview 11 Nov. 1996) 
Butler acknowledged he had seen it in response to a Parhamentary Question from 
Kenneth Robinson shortly after it was pubhshed (Hansard: Commons: 5 Nov. 1959).
The booklet's major effect was to preençt and forestall what could have been 
damaging opposition, and it succeeded in doing this despite some muttering in the 
ranks. The Bishop of Carlisle, for instance, during the Second Reading debate in the 
Lords said, "I hope it will not be regarded as an inq)ertinence if I say I am not even 
satisfied with this report produced by a Committee of my own Church, because I feel 
that there is not strong enough witness home in it to what I call the sacredness of 
every human life" (Hansard: Lords: 2 March 1961). As the record detailed below 
shows, the Archbishop of Canterbury also had reservations about the booklet's 
recommendations and made clear in the introduction that they were not the views of 
the Church but merely of the four members of the committee.
This chapter details the history of the booklet. It does so because the history offers 
evidence that supports one of the main arguments of this thesis, which is, that suicide 
and its relationship to law and morahty was still a profoundly controversial issue, and if 
this age-old controversy had been allowed to surface in debates on the Suicide Bill it is 
most unlikely it would have been passed. The history is also usefid in illustrating the
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intact of the 1957 Wolfenden Report's clear distinction between sin and crime. This 
concept naturally resonated most with people and institutions who concerned 
themselves with ideas about sin and morahty, and its effect is very apparent in the 
Church of England committee's discussions on suicide.
The Church of England committee was the only (recorded) 20th century place where a 
discussion of decriminalising suicide involved the ancient debate about law and 
morahty; that is, whether what is a sin is necessarily a crime. As in most debates on 
this issue positions on the committee were polarised and held with tenacity.^ No 
agreement was reached, and no agreement seemed possible. The appearance of 
unanimity given by the final booklet, which was widely interpreted as a Church 
endorsement of decriminahsation, was achieved only when the committee shifted focus 
firom suicide itself to the practical problem of the prosecution of attercpted suicides. 
Here, as in ah the other fora where the issue was discussed at ah, the provisions of the 
Mental Health Act were iu^ortant to the achievement of agreement. It is very 
significant that although the title of the booklet was Ought Suicide to be a Crime? the 
first words of the first recommendation were "Attempted suicide should cease to be a 
crime..." [emphasis added] It then went on to recommend in a far less decisive manner 
that "consideration be given to placing the law with regard to the habihty of secondary 
parties to suicide on a more reahstic basis by abohshing the felony of suicide and 
creating a new offence of aiding, abetting or instigating suicide of another." (a fuh list 
of the recommendations appears below)
There is another important point the history of this booklet illustrates, which is that the 
claim of powerful institutional support for decrimmalisation, so crucial to the passage 
of the Suicide Act, often rested on very insecure foundations. The advocates of a 
change in suicide law made confident assertions on a number of occasions that the 
Church, the judiciary, and the medical estabhshment were all solidly in favour of 
reform Evidence in this chapter casts serious doubt on this claim in respect of the
135
Church. (Chapters 3, 5 and 7 look at the case for the other two) To take one exarople: 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, though presented in newspaper reports as the initiator 
and supporter of the project, not only did not initiate it, he took no interest in it until 
its outcome became apparent, whereupon he attenq)ted to stop pubhcation of the 
recommendations. Moreover, the very small committee (four members and the 
secretary) never made any attençt to discover the views of church members other than 
themselves. There are a number of indications that if they had they would have 
uncovered substantial resistance to decriminahsation. Without the pubhcation of their 
authoritative sounding booklet this resistance might have become vocal and opposed 
the Suicide Bill
The account which foUows here of the booklet's history is based on material in the 
Church of England archives in Bermondsey (file labeUed "Ought Suicide to be a 
Crime?"- no archival numbers on documents), the Hansard records of Parhamentary 
debates. Cabinet papers in the Pubhc Record Ofidce, contenq)orary newspaper reports, 
interviews with members of the Commons committee on the Suicide Bill, and on an 
interview with Rev. Prof. Gordon Reginald Dunstan, who was Secretary to the Church 
of England's Council for Moral Welfare at the time, and secretary to the small 
committee which produced the booklet. Rev. Dunstan went on to become (among 
other things) Professor of Moral and Social Theology at Kings CoUege London and 
Chaplain to the Queen. ^  Rev. Dunstan set up the committee that considered suicide 
law, served as its secretary, and was mid-wife to the delayed birth of the booklet itself. 
Fortunately for historical research, much interaction which today would take place on 
the telephone (or e-mail) was at that time still conducted through short letters. Many 
of these are preserved in the file singly titled "Ought Suicide to be a Crime?" in the 
Church of England archives. The ones most relevant to this thesis are set out in this 
chapter.
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History of ”Ought Suicide to be a Crime?”
Here are the details of how the booklet came to be published;
On the 20th of March 1958 Rev. Dunstan wrote to the then Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Geoffrey Fisher as follows:
"At the meeting of the Board for Social Responsibihty last evening, we had a 
short discussion on atteropted suicide. It seemed to us possible that the strong 
interest being shown in the House of Commons, in correspondence in 'The 
Times' and in recent pubhcations, might result in the setting up of a 
Departmental committee... we should be ready with some evidence... and we 
decided to ask a small group to look at the question of should attempted 
suicide remain a crime and prepare a short paper.
It occurs to me first to ask whether your Grace has aheady asked another body 
to do this?"
In the light of later developments three things are irpportant to note about this letter. 
First, despite subsequent pubhc presentation that the working group and report were 
requested by the Archbishop, it is clear that they were in fact initiated by Rev. Dunstan 
on behalf of the Board for Social Responsibihty. In the forward to the final, pubhshed, 
booklet the Archbishop says: "I asked the Church Assembly Board for Social
Responsibihty in March 1958, to examine the question on my behalf', and throughout 
the (admittedly limited) media reporting of the booklet when pubhshed, it was 
presented as "the Archbishop convened a group." This gave the matter a significantly 
higher status than an ordinary Church working group would have had.
The second point to note about the letter is that Rev. Dunstan did not ask the 
Archbishop's permission, or even his blessing for the project. He sinq)ly reported that
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the Board intended to examine the question and queried whether the Archbishop had 
asked anyone else to do so.
The third point is that Rev. Dunstan's letter clearly says the Board for Social 
Responsibihty discussed attempted suicide, not suicide, and decided to "ask a smaU 
group to look at the question of should attempted suicide remain a crime."
In terms of trying to discover the exact springs and sources of action, it is useful to 
consider Rev. Dunstan's comment about "the strong interest being shown in the House 
of Commons, in correspondence in 'The Times' and in recent pubhcations". It was on 
6 February 1958, just eight weeks before Rev. Dunstan's letter to the Archbishop, that 
Kenneth Robinson M.P. had put down his first Parhamentary Question on suicide law. 
Before this there had been no Parhamentary discussion, nor any pubhc debate about 
the subject. FoUowing Robinson's Question there was a total of six letters to the 
TIMES on the matter. Of these, one was about life insurance payments fohowing 
suicide and one was firom a coroner who was against decriminahsation (both on 20 
February 1958). Of the remaining four, one was fi*om Robinson himself (24 February, 
replying to the coroner), two were fi*om the Cambridge Professor GlanvUle Wilhams, 
whose book on The Sanctity o f Life and the Criminal Law was about to be pubhshed 
(February 11 and 26), and one (25 February 1958) was fi*om Professor Herman 
Mannheim of the LSE, who had served on the Joint BMA/Magistrates Committee (see 
chapter 4). In a brief secondary editorial on the subject on 26 February the TIMES 
said "the general pubhc has not thought about this question and probably has no 
opinion." Afl;er his Parhamentary Question, Kenneth Robinson had tabled an Early 
Day Motion about suicide law reform on 27 February (see chapters 6 and 7), and this 
Early Day Motion had been reported in the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN and the 
TIMES. Robinson had also written an article on "Suicide and the Law" in the 
Spectator in March. Among the points made in this article in support of reform 
Robinson said, "Now that it has been raised in the press and in Parhament... The
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Churches have raised no objection. The general feeling seems to be that it is time 
England caught up with the rest of the civihsed world" (14 March 1958:317). Given 
the brief period of time since his original Parhamentary Question, and the limited pubhc 
exposure of the issue, it is at least possible that the absence of Church objection 
stemmed from snrçle lack of awareness that decriminahsation of suicide had appeared 
on the pohtical agenda.
Robinson's Spectator article appeared in the week of the meeting of the Board for 
Social Responsibihty which had "the short discussion on attempted suicide". In 
interview Rev. Dunstan said he could not remember exactly what had triggered this 
discussion. He did confirm that as far as he could teU at the time, there was no pubhc 
debate on the question of attenq)ted suicide as a crime, and he and the Board made no 
atterrçt to ascertain pubhc opinion on the issue. "It never occurred to me to do that", 
he said. "My job was to look around and spot issues coming that the Bishops might 
have to speak about in the House of Lords." When asked what pubhc opinion was at 
the time on the suicide issue Rev. Dunstan rephed, "I don't think I stopped to enquire... 
It was not a subject on which one would want to excite feeling; the less controversy 
the better, we thought." (Dunstan interview 11 Nov. 1996)
On 22 March 1958 the Archbishop rephed as foUows:
"My dear Dunstan,
I have not asked anybody to work on this question of whether attenq)ted 
suicide should remain a crime. As you say, it is almost certain to come up and 
an authoritative report ought to be available. I shah be veiy glad if you wih set 
somebody to work.
I shah be interested to know what the answer is. Looking at it casuahy, now 
that we are getting the distinction between crime and sin on to a reasonable 
basis, I can myself see no grounds on which it is possible to go on treating 
attempted suicide as a crime. It hardly seems justifiable for the protection of
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the community, and seems to be very definitely more a piece of private morality 
than, for exanq)le, adultery, which is not a crime."
Yours sincerely, Geoffrey Cantaur
It is worth noting here the Archbishop's exphcit reference to the Wolfenden 
formulation about sin and crime. The sharp distinction between them would have been 
of particular interest to this Archbishop, Geoffrey Fisher, who concerned himself with 
matters of this sort. According to the Dictionary of National Biography, "One of the 
first tasks to which he set his mind was the revision of the canon law of the Church... 
he once described it as 'the most absorbing and all-embracing' topic of his life'." 
Correspondence in the Church files indicates that it was the canon law aspect of the 
suicide issue - i.e., whether self-killers could be buried in consecrated ground - which 
ultimately concerned the Archbishop far more than the question of its secular 
criminahty. However, neither appeared to concern him overmuch, as the following 
spring, when the Chairman of the committee wrote to him about the ahnost-conçleted 
booklet, he rephed (on 2 March 1959):
"My dear Christie,
I had forgotten all about this matter of attempted suicide and the law, and am 
the more grateful to you and your colleagues for having given your minds to 
this small but not unirrportant problem. I am sure it is right to put out such a 
considered report as this for Church people to have available. And of course I 
fijlly approve so far as I am able to judge it, of the statement of the case by 
lawyer, psychiatrist and theologian... "
The letter goes on at length about the burial issue, and says he wishes to delay any 
further movement on the booklet in order to obtain the opinion of the Archbishop of 
York on the burial question.
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But to return to the outset of the project, in March 1958: Rev. Dunstan began by
attenq)ting to recruit a working party. He first asked Canon T.K Milford, who 
regretted as he was too busy. Then on 15 April 1958 he wrote to Canon V.A. Demant 
of Christ Church College, Oxford , asking if he "would consent to be part of a group 
that might consist of you, and one other theologian, a Q.C. and perhaps someone with 
a knowledge of forensic psychiatry..."
Canon Demant replied on 22 April agreeing in principle to serve on the working group 
and indicating he was strongly against "removing suicide firom the fist of crimes". "I 
presume," he said, "the other members of the Group wiU agree."
Rev. Dunstan sent an immediate, tactfiilly worded but shghtly anxious letter saying the 
"Board had been concerned that the group should approach the question with an open 
mmd..." To which, on 26 April, Canon Demant responded:
"I misunderstood your proposal, and, as you gave no hint to the contrary, I 
assumed that it was to prepare a statement giving reasoned grounds why the 
Church opposes such a change in the law, having examined the strongest case 
in favour of it. ... You are quite right that I had better say 'no'..."
A hiatus followed, during which Rev. Dunstan had some difi&culty finding suitable 
people to serve. In the summer he enlisted Sir (as he was then) John Wolfenden, 
recently appointed as Chairman of the Board for Social Responsibility, to ask John 
Christie, Principle of Jesus College Oxford, to chair the suicide committee.^ Christie 
accepted. Wolfenden at that time was of course prominent - some would say 
notorious - in matters of law and morahty, following the pubhcation of his Report the 
year before.
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On 1 July 1958, Wolfenden wrote to Rev. Dunstan from the University of Reading, 
where he was Vice Chancellor;
"Christie has now said positively that he will do this... I confess that I have very 
few names in my mind - but I expect that you have, and I dare say he will have 
one or two suggestions of his own."
On 15 July Christie himself wrote to Dunstan:
"I had a long talk yesterday with Goodhart, the Master of Univ, and he gave 
me a clear idea of the legal view of the matter.^ In fact he hardly seems to 
recognise an ethical question at all He gave me one or two names and I am 
trying Rupert Cross of Magdalen, an able man who knows much about the 
criminal law... There is much to he said for having a woman on our 
Committee."
The point about a woman on the committee had arisen when Dunstan approached Dr. 
T.C.N. Gibbens at the Maudsley Hospital about possible membership. Dr. Gibbens 
refused, but suggested Dr. Doris Odium, consulting psychiatrist for psychological 
medicine at the Elizabeth Garret Anderson Hospital. Dr. Odium's many activities, and 
in particular her special significance to the Suicide Act, are discussed in chapters 4 and 
6. At this point it should smq)ly be noted that even a cursory investigation would have 
revealed she had settled views on the matter of suicide as a crime, which did not match 
Rev. Dunstan's stated criterion that "the group should approach the question with an 
open mind..." Nevertheless, on 17 July 1958, John Christie wrote to Dunstan:
"About the possible psychiatrist for our committee, I have drawn a blank in 
Oxford so far and it strikes me that the lady you mention. Dr. Odium, might be 
a good person... It is rather a shot in the dark, but I think it would be good to 
have a woman member and I could not fix anything up for a long time if I had 
no answer before I go away..."^
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So on 25 July Dunstan wrote to Dr. Odium inviting her to join the proposed working 
group on suicide and the law:
"It would", he wrote, "produce a memorandum which might or might not be 
pubhshed... the purpose is to have some preparatory thinking done...the wider 
purpose, no doubt, would be to educate the pubhc mind in this inq)ortant field 
of thought."
Dr. Odium accepted by return of post, on 26 July 1958.
Christie's approach to Rupert Cross, FeUow and Tutor in Law of Magdalen Cohege 
Oxford, was successfid, and Canon I T. Ramsey, Professor of the Philosophy of the 
Christian Rehgion at Oxford, also accepted. Ah four members of the committee, 
including Dr. Odium, were Oxford graduates.
The first meeting was held on 2 October 1958, some six and a half months after the 
idea had been mooted. The minutes, taken by Rev. Dunstan, show it was decided that 
three members of the group would each write a section from the standpoint of their 
own discipline: law; theology, and psychiatry. The Chairman would write an 
introduction. There would be a concluding section with recommendations, on which 
they should ah concur. Fohowing the meeting. Dr. Odium circulated to the group an 
article she had written, which made her views on the matter crystal clear. The 
concluding paragraph read:
"It would appear that the only possible reason for continuing to regard either 
suicide or atten^ted suicide as a criminal offence would be the concept that 
suicide is a form of murder and therefore should be punished from a retributive 
point of view or as a possible deterrent. It has aheady been pointed out that 
there is no evidence that it does in fact act as a deterrent. The concept of
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purely retributive punishment is no longer acceptable to the majority of the 
community who take a more humane and constructive attitude" {Proceedings 
o f the Royal Society o f Medicine: 14 Jan. 1958:298).
It seems apparent that Dr. Odium based her assertion that "the majority of the
community" found retributive punishment "no longer acceptable" on the same 
foundation as most people at the time seemed to base assertions about pubhc opinion; 
which is to say on their own opinion and that of like-minded colleagues. Opinion 
polls, as a way to ascertain what the pubhc actuaUy were thinking, were not accorded 
much credence.^ If they had been, then comments about retributive punishment could 
hardly have ignored the consistent large majorities in favour of capital punishment. 
Keimeth Robinson's assertion in his Spectator article (see above) about "The general 
feeling...." in regard to suicide law appears to have been made on the same basis, since 
no opinion poUs at ah had been taken about the criminal status of suicide and
attempted suicide. This fact should also be borne in mind when considering the
confident assertion in the introduction to the Church of England booklet that "Li its 
attitude to this subject [reform of suicide law], as to some others, public opinion has 
outstripped the Law."
The Committee Disasrees
The file in the Church archives shows that the dehberations of the committee did not 
proceed smoothly. The difficulties seem to have been grounded in the classic conflict 
between positivism's exculpatory approach to deviant behaviour and traditional 
concepts of morality and personal responsibility. When the following June, 1959, the 
Chairman, John Christie, sent a final draft to the Archbishop he appended a note:
(18 June 1959)
"I must apologise for the delay which has been largely due to the efforts by the 
Committee to meet the difficulties raised by one member of our group... not
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unlike those put forward by yourself and the Archbishop of York about a 
possible alternative Service for a certain class of suicide. We have spent many 
hours discussing this question..."
A fortnight earher, on 29 May 1959, Christie had written to Dunstan:
"Ramsey and Cross and I met yesterday and I hope that our meeting served to 
narrow the gap between Dr. Odium and the rest of us..."
A week before, on 22 May, in another letter to Dunstan about Dr. Odium, Christie had 
been exphcit about the divide in the Committee:
"I wonder," Christie asked in his letter, "whether the real trouble is that she 
does not emotionaUy beheve in what we should call responsibihty or guilt at 
ah."
The precise stumbling block concerned the concept, which appeared in the "Moral and 
Rehgious Assessment" section of the booklet [not formaUy accredited, but almost 
certainly the work of the theologian on the committee. Canon Ramsey] that suicides 
could be differentiated, and categorised, because, in this view, some were "guilty".
"It would seem" [the theology section of the booklet says] "as if there are not 
many suicides which can nowadays be regarded as whoUy voluntary and 
dehberate. Even so...the number is sufficient not to remove suicide altogether 
from the sphere of morahty... indeed there are distinctly moral issues and 
problems raised in ah cases of suicide...
"It seems difficult, if not inq)ossible, for a Christian to welcome any dichotomy 
between law and morahty, let alone between both and rehgion. The Christian 
must continue to see in law an embodiment of his rehgion and moral insights, 
insights which are there translated into rules for the ordering and weh-being of 
a community... If a law on principle excludes certain behaviour from its
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provisions, such behaviour becomes inevitably in the popular mind 'permissive'. 
It assumes a certain respectabihty"
This section goes on to define four different kinds of suicide, three of them carrying 
"no fault", but the fourth "voluntary and selfish", and therefore culpable. This fourth 
category of suicide was to be subject, not to the criminal law, but to an alternative 
burial service, to mark its moral guilt. It had been suggested, when the group began its 
dehberations, that actual criminahty might be retained for this category of suicide, a 
proposal which had pronq)ted Dr. Odium to write to Dunstan on 9 January 1959:
"I personally should strongly deprecate retaining suicide as a felony and would 
regard it as contrary to the poHcy of the BMA and the Magistrates 
Association."
This tactic of referring to heavyweight professional battahons supposedly standing in 
support was regularly used in advocating decriminahsation by both Dr. Odium and 
Kenneth Robinson. Butler used it as well in proposing the Suicide Bill to the Prime 
Minister and to the Cabinet (see chapter 7). Indeed by that time (October 1960) the 
Church committee's booklet had been published, so Butler cited the Church of 
England as a supporter along with Doctors, Magistrates, and his own exceedingly 
heavyweight Criminal Law Revision Committee (see chapter 7). During the 
Parliamentary debates on the Bill all of these groups were at various times claimed to 
be in favour of decriminahsation.
The records of the Church of England committee show that the divide between 
positivist rejection of guilt and classicist stress on personal responsibihty was never 
bridged. It was by-passed by focusing instead on pragmatic issues connected with the 
criminal prosecution of attempted suicides. A fist of these appears in the "legal" 
section of the booklet:
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punishment of attempted suicide was not likely to deter others:
- punishment will not prevent offender making a j&edi attempt as soon as free 
to do so; - press reports of attenq)ts can only be harmfiil to the accused and 
painful to his relatives;
- the fact a criminal prosecution may ensue will discourage relations from 
getting medical treatment for the atten^ted suicide;
- conviction of attempted suicide might preclude some types of ençloyment for 
the rest of life;
- prosecution may inq)ede recovery from any illness that might have been 
caused;
- although the police proceed in only about 10% of cases known to them, there 
are more cases where inquiries take place, and these may do harm. "
This list of strictly practical, morally neutral, reasons for ending prosecutions of 
attençted suicide appeared in the 'legal' section of the booklet. The writer was most 
certainly Rupert Cross, Fellow and Tutor in Law at Magdalen College, Oxford, and 
he followed the hst by directly addressing the anxiety about social order always 
aroused by proposals to decriminahse. "The case for abohshing the crime of attempted 
suicide," he said, "wiU be greatly strengthened if the Mental Health Bill becomes law." 
He explained this by pointing to the provision in the Bill, (which at the time he wrote, 
in the spring of 1959, was still before Parhament) that "courts can make a 'hospital' or 
'guardianship' order if satisfied the defendant is mentally ill" and can do it "without 
recording a conviction". Moreover, in terms of dealing with attenq)ted suicides who 
create pubhc disorder, the writer goes on to point out that under "Section 136 of the 
Mental Health Act pohce can remove to a place of safety someone in a place to which 
pubhc have access if it seems he is suffering from mental disorder and needs care and 
control."
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The position taken by the booklet in respect of suicide itself as opposed to attenq)ted 
suicide, was more ambivalent. The Introduction started from a positivist stance:
"It does not need much imagination to realise that a high national suicide rate is 
a sure indication that the community is failing to adjust itself to the demands of 
life...
For centuries, at least in Christian countries, the suicide was regarded primarily 
as a criminal; be was a species of murderer... in the present century we have 
come to feel that the would-be suicide stood more in need of medical or 
spiritual help than of conviction in a law court."
But then ended with something of a classicist cri de coeur.
" ... and yet suicide is an act which surely demands some kind of moral 
judgement from us; we cannot treat it merely as a mental aberration... "
This rather ambivalent view was never abandoned by the majority of the committee 
members, and it is found clearly reflected in the third recommendation: "That there 
should be an alternative Burial Service available for certain cases of suicide."^
It was this recommendation, grounded in the idea that some suicides are guilty of a 
moral offence and should be sanctioned, that had been the cause of contention 
between Dr. Odium and the rest of the committee. The fact the others refiised to give 
it up caused Dr. Odium great anguish. On 12 May 1959, following one of the 
obviously fraught discussions, she wrote to Dunstan:
"I was so deeply distressed that I have hardly slept all night."
Meanwhile, the Archbishop, having been reminded of the project by Christie on 2 
March, (see above) seemed to be having second thoughts. The Church archives 
contain a note from Dunstan dated 16 March 1959 saying circulation of the report on 
suicide to members of the Board for Social Responsibility had been delayed because 
"the Archbishop wanted the committee to discuss the recommendations again."
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In the end the Committee did reach an accommodation, and the final drafl: went to the 
Archbishop in mid-June. On 7 July Dunstan wrote to the Archbishop saying 
pubhcation would go ahead "as soon as the printing strike permits", and noting that the 
Board was very keen that responsibility for the recommendations be clearly defined as 
those of the committee members only.
Then on 14 July the Archbishop himself wrote fi*om Lambeth Palace to E.G. Wedell, 
secretary to the Board for Social Responsibility:
(14 July 1959)
Dear Wedell,
First, about the Report on Suicide, I have written to Dunstan, having had a 
word with John Scott [Chief Secretary to the General Synod]. There are 
reasons it would be very unsuitable to publish this Report just at present. I am 
therefore withdrawing it fi’om circulation. I shall get it printed myself and 
produce it for the Bishops' Meeting in October: they can then read it, and after 
that we will decide what should be done with it."
On 7 August Michael Adai, Chaplain to the Archbishop at Lambeth Palace, wrote to 
Dunstan to say the Archbishop "agrees the document should be published as an 
Archbishop's document". There was "no reason why it should be published as a 
Board Document". Adai ended, "I apologise for the long delay which Lambeth has 
caused in the publication of this document."
This letter is the last item in the Church archive file, save a copy of the booklet itself  ^
which was pubhshed in October 1959 under the imprint of The Church Information 
Office. Rev. Dunstan was unable to recall the precise reasons for the delay. He said: 
"Im speculating here, but John Scott might have been worried it would cause 
controversy, possibly embarrass the Church..." (Dunstan interview 11 Nov. 1996) He
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was also unable to recall how the concerns had been overcome, and how the booklet 
came to be openly pubhshed by the Church Information Office. Rev. Dunstan agreed 
that this imprint contributed to an ingression that the report was an official Church of 
England document. This would appear to he the view Rev. Dunstan himself took of 
the document at the time, since he sent it to the Home Secretary and the Lord 
ChanceUor to let them "know the Church would not oppose legislation on the subject."
The Committee Recommendations
The formal recommendations of the working group, as presented in the booklet were 
as follows;
"1. Atten^ted suicide should cease to be a crime and that consideration be 
given to placing the law with regard to the hability of secondary parties to 
suicide on a more realistic basis by abolishing the felony of suicide and creating 
a new offence of aiding, abetting or instigating suicide of another.
2. Coroners verdicts should contain reference to 'other significant conditions' 
contributing to death of a suicide.
3. That there should be an alternative Burial Service in certain cases of suicide.
4. That the needs of those tenqpted to commit suicide and of those who actually 
attempt it be specially commended to the pastoral concern of the clergy and 
that the clergy be offered more help in understanding this part of their pastoral 
duty."
The forward to the booklet was signed by the Archbishop and presented an awesome 
array of credentials for the committee members:
"In view of growing opinion among doctors, magistrates. Members of 
Parliament and others, that criminal proceedings were inappropriate against 
those who attempt unsuccessfully to commit suicide, I asked the Church 
Assembly Board for Social Responsibihty in March 1958 to examine the 
question on my behalf On the Board's invitation, the Principal of Jesus
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College, Oxford, Mr. J.T. Christie, convened and presided over a small 
Committee, consisting of Mr.Rupert Cross, Fellow and Tutor in Law of 
Magdalen College, Oxford; Dr. Doris Odium, psychiatrist and magistrate, and 
the Rev. Canon I T. Ramsey, Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the 
Christian Religion in the University of Oxford, with the Rev. G.R. Dunstan of 
the Moral Wel&re Council, as secretary. Subsequent enquiries reached me 
concerning the dependence on Coroners' verdicts of the use of the Prayer Book 
Service for the burial of suicides, and this matter also I referred to the 
Committee.
The authority attaching to the Recommendations is that of its signatories only, 
but I am sure that the report will be very valuable as a basis for discussion."
In considering how powerful images of consensus are created, it is useful to note the 
first sentence of this forward; asserting as it does, a "growing" body of professional 
opinion in favour of reform. The truth was that Kenneth Robinson was the only M.P. 
to have raised the issue in Parliament. Although he had put down an Early Day 
Motion and gained 150 signatures (out of a House of 630 M P.s), there had been no 
debate on it. Three other MPs (Gordon Walker, Sir F. Medlicott and Charles Royle) 
had each, on different occasions, asked a supplementary question following one of 
Kenneth Robinson's Questions to the Home Secretary, but that was the sum total of 
Parliamentary exposure on the issue. Dr. Odium in the psychiatric section of the 
Church of England booklet inq)lied total professional support for decrhninahsing 
suicide and attempted suicide. However, the minutes of her own BMA committee and 
the Magistrate Association records (see chapter 4) show clearly that such a wholesale 
consensus did not, in fact, exist.
Considering that the booklet was assumed in Parliamentary debates on the Bill (see 
below) to be the official view of the Church, it is important to note that it was not even
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proposed that the Church itself consider the question until the beginning of 1961, when 
the Archbishop put a proposal on the Agenda of the Convocation of Canterbury that a 
committee should be appointed to consider the booklet (TIMES 19 Jan. 1961). The 
Convocation agreed to the proposal, hut no record of this committee's findings was 
ever made pubhc, and in any case consideration was overtaken by the actual statutory 
decriminahsation the foUowing summer. Besides noting the agreement to appoint a 
committee, the TIMES report gave the Archbishop's account of how the issue had 
come to be considered in the first place. It is noteworthy in this account that he no 
longer claimed credit for convening the group.
"[Dr. Fisher said he]... had received a letter fi’om a distinguished coroner who 
wanted to know the attitude of the Church in relation to burial of suicides... 
the coroner became horrified to learn that the clergy often settled how to bury 
a suicide by the 6ct vdiether or not the words 'while of unsound mind* were 
added to the verdicts. The coroner said that was monstrous. "I gather", said 
Dr. Fisher, that there is no legal significance about putting in the words 'when 
of unsound mind' It is merely that the coroner thinks it is a nice thing to do in 
a particular case. That so alarmed me that I got in touch with the Council of 
Moral Welfare and then found that there are other problems connected with 
suicide, particularly on the possibihty before very long as to whether attempted 
suicide should be a crime.
"The Council got together a small group of people in Oxford to give their 
minds to the question and produced this report. I put down the motion [on the 
Convocation agenda] not to provoke debate but to suggest that there should be 
a joint committee to consider this report and then to teU what, if anything. 
Convocation ought to do in this matter" (TIMES 19 January 1961).
This proposal, in January 1961, to set up a Church committee to "consider" the 
report, and "what, if anything. Convocation ought to do..." came some fifteen months
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after the booklet appeared in October 1959, and less than a month before the first 
reading of the Suicide Bill in the Lords on 14 February 1961.
When the booklet actually had been published, on 19 October 1959, it had received 
scant coverage in the media, possibly because the newly elected House of Commons 
convened on 20 October and held a controversial election for Speaker. Nevertheless, 
what coverage there was gave the distinct impression that the Church itself favoured 
decriminahsation. The following examples illustrate the point:
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN (20 October 1959):
CHANGE IN LAW ON SUICIDE URGED 
Attenç)t to take own life "no longer a crime": Church report view
Attenq)ted suicide should cease to be a crime says a Church of England 
committee whose recommendations are pubhshed today. .. The 
recommendations are contained in a 56-page booklet "Ought Suicide to 
be a Crime", the work of a committee of five set up last year at the 
instigation of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Geoffrey Fisher, to 
study the question.
In an editorial the same day headed "The Law on Suicide" the GUARDIAN said,
"...a distittguished committee of churchmen, meeting on behalf of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury has come to the conclusion that the State's view 
should be changed."
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The TIMES (20 October 1959)
CHURCH COMMITTEE URGE CHANGE IN SUICIDE LAW
Atten^ted suicide should cease to be a crime, says a Church of England 
Committee whose recommendations are made in a report published 
yesterday. The committee believes that consideration should be given 
to abolishing the felony of suicide and creating a new offence of'aiding, 
abetting or instigating the suicide of another'.
The TELEGRAPH ( 20 October 1959)
SUICIDE SHOULD NOT BE A CRIME, SAYS CHURCH 
Capt. Oates Cited As case of'Self-Sacrifice'
The SUNDAY TIMES (25 October 1959) in the comment column "A View of the 
Week":
SUICIDE AND THE LAW 
It is a sound principle of jurisprudence that what is contrary to public 
conscience should not claim the sanction of the law. This principle is 
fully served in the recommendation by a Church of England Committee 
that attempted suicide should cease to be a crime, and suicide a felony, 
subject to the creation of a new offence of aiding, abetting or instigating 
it.
Later in the month (31 October) The British Medical Journal said:
The Church has now added its voice to the many others that have 
criticised the law making attempted suicide a criminal offence in 
England and Wales. Last year at the instigation of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, a committee was set up to examine the question... its first 
recommendation is that "attenq)ted suicide should cease to be a crime."
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Some time later, the Howard Journal (Vol. X, No. 3, 26 July 1960:245) mentioned 
the booklet in a composite book review section titled "Social Problem", and 
commented, "It puts the sahent arguments briefly and clearly, and comes down 
wholeheartedly on the side of those who want to see suicide removed fi'om the criminal 
law... Altogether, this is a sane and valuable httle book."
The modest amount of media coverage did for the most part refer to the "committee's" 
recommendations, but still managed to convey the impression that it was an ofiBcial 
Church view. Certainly this was how it was used by Butler in his note to the Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, on 18 October 1960, about the proposed Suicide Bill: 
"It is not likely to be controversial" he wrote, "- the Church Assembly Board for 
Social Responsibihty has published a Report which is broadly in line with what we 
propose, "(see chapter 7)
This was also how it appeared to be perceived by Parhamentarians who referred to it in 
debates on the Bill, starting at the outset with the introduction of the Suicide BUI by 
Viscount Kilmuir in the Lords:
" This view [to decriminahse suicide] is supported by the considered opinion of 
those most closely concerned with this problem, fi*om the aspects of ethics and 
rehgion, medicine and the administration of justice. No doubt many of your 
Lordships have already read the booklet on the subject issued by the Church 
Assembly Board for Social Responsibihty in which the view is put forward that 
suicide and attençted suicide should cease to be crimes." (Hansard: Lords: 2 
March 1961)
Lord Silkin, as the Labour shadow Chancehor, responded by broadly welcoming this 
"most humane measure". He then expanded the supposed endorsement to more than 
the Anghcans:
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" It may be that this change in outlook has been influenced by the very fine 
pamphlet which has been issued by the Churches and which I have had the 
pleasure of reading. [enq)hasis added] (ibid.)
Eric Fletcher, M.P. for Islington, East, in the 2nd Reading Commons debate said:
"I entirely agree that the time has come when the law should be changed, and I 
am very glad to find that the same view is taken in the booklet, which no doubt 
hon. Members have read, recently issued by the Church Assembly Board for 
Social Responsibihty." (Hansard: Connons: 14 July 1961)
The Minister, Charles Fletcher-Cooke M.P., mentioned the booklet during the 
Committee stage of the Bill, in the context of the maximum sentence for aiding and 
abetting. [Although he misquoted their recommendations, saying: "The maximum 
penalty of life inq)nsonment was recommended by the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment in 1953 and by the Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibihty in its 
pamphlet entitled "Ought Suicide to be a Crime?" - which was not, in fact, one of the 
booklet's recommendations. (Official Report Standing Committee E, Suicide BiU: 25 
July 1961)]
One of the members of the Commons committee, interviewed in the course of this 
research, was Wilham van Straubenzee, M.P. for Wokingham (1959-87), and active in 
Church of England affiirs for many years. In interview he indicated he himself had had 
some reservations about the booklet's recommendations at the time, although not 
sufficient to oppose them. Sir Wilham (as he now is) said his reservations were based 
on his behef then, and now, that the law does have a role in areas of personal morahty, 
and that "many people then used to beheve if something was immoral it should be 
iUegal." However, on the suicide matter, he said, "The Church felt it had a 
responsibihty to take a stand... and the greater weight was for decriminahsation. But
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the issue was not about condoning i t S i r  William said the view of the Church 
mattered very much in the 'fifties and 'sixties on issues involving law and morahty, and 
on the suicide matter the booklet would have been taken to be the Church's view. 
(Van Straubenzee interview 31 Oct. 1996)
Eric Fletcher, Labour M.P. for Islington East was another member of the Commons 
Committee who was also a Member of the Church Assembly. His speech in the 2nd 
Reading debate contained several rehgious references, and at least impHcitly iudicated 
that he, too, had some reservations about the Bill:
"In this country, no doubt for reasons based on Christian theology, suicide has 
been regarded as the most heinous of felonies - the felony of self-murder. It 
has been said that no man has a right to destroy his own life, because life is a 
gift firom God, to be preserved with a sense of responsibihty.
"Suicide, like murder, is a violation of the Sixth Commandment, and in some 
ways it is more grievous than murder because it precludes the opportunity for 
repentance. Those are the reasons which have justified the law of the land for 
so many centuries past.
"It is sometimes said, of course, that punishment for attempted suicide is no 
deterrent, but there are cases on record which show that those who have 
determined to take their own life and who have made an unsuccessfid attempt 
have, in fact, been deterred fi*om renewing their attempts, not by the possibihty 
of punishment, but by a reahsation of the gravity of the act which they have 
contenq)lated and the fact that suicide or atten^ted suicide is generally 
condemned by pubhc opinion" (Hansard: Commons: 14 July 1961).
Shortly after this, John Hobson, M.P. for Warwick and Leamington, said.
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"I add my support to the BiU while agreeing with the hon. Member for 
Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) that it should be generaUy and pubUcIy realised 
that suicide nevertheless remains a mortal sin" (ibid.).
These comments spurred the Minister to say in closing the 2nd Reading;
"I think [the BiU] has had a general welcome, subject to the fears of the hon. 
Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) and those of the hon. Member for 
Paddington, North that the BiU itself might somehow give potential suicides the 
inçression that what they were proposing to do was no longer regarded as 
wrong. I should like to state as solemnly as I can that that is certainly not the 
view of the Government, that we wish to give no encouragement w&atever to 
suicide, that a great many people, probably the majority of the people of the 
country, have regarded it, now regard it and wiU continue to regard it has a 
mortal sin, and that, in the words of the hon Member for Paddington, North, 
there is a duty, as there certainly is, to stick it out" (Hansard: Commons: 19 
July 1961).
AU this puts a distinct question mark over whether the influential recommendation for 
decriminahsation in Ought Suicide to be a Crime? did represent the view of a majority 
of members of the Church of England, or even a majority of the Church estabUshment. 
The best that can be said is that no coherent attempt was made to find out whether it 
did. There is certainly evidence of the existence of dissent within the Church
hierarchy. Rev. Demant, for exatcple, in his letter to Dunstan, came down firmly 
against decriminaUsing suicide, and was fuUy prepared to co-operate in producing a 
report setting out why the Church was officiaUy against it. The theological section of 
the booklet itself although it makes reference to the Wolfenden formulation, sounds 
very dubious about applying it to suicide: "To speak of a dichotomy between sin and 
crime." it says, "has become commonplace, and...has been greatly popularised... 
Little by Uttle we have become more merciful - some might say more lax - towards
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grievous and notorious sins... [nevertheless] if the law wishes to embody and preserve 
any basic significance for human life, it must surely take some kind of note of suicide, 
though it might be enough to have second party liability..." Then, after advocating that 
culpabihty and Church sanctions be retained for "selfish and voluntary" suicides, the 
section cites in detail the six traditional reasons why Christians should view any suicide 
as a sin:
"1. Life is a gift from God to be preserved... suicide is a denial of due 'self- 
love' (Mark Xii 31) and self-murder is against the 6th Commandment.
2. Life is a moral probation; sufiFermg is a necessary discipline. A Christian 
should unite his sufferings with those of Christ and prove in them the power of 
God.
3. God alone should prescribe the end of a man’s life.
4. Suicide is to fail in one's duty to society; for it deprives society of one of its 
members.
5. Because death is the wages of sin', it is something we ought not deliberately 
of our own accord to bring about.
6. Suicide is the most grievous of all sins because it precludes repentance."
The introduction to the booklet, written by the Chairman, Christie, set out the 
dilemma the committee faced in dealing with the morahty of suicide and its relation to 
the law:
"Nevertheless, if we wholly exclude suicide from the operation of the Law, are 
we in danger of givmg countenance to the view that self-destruction, atten^ted 
or successful, is not morally wrong at all, but rather a case' for the 
psychologist or the doctor? Such a view would not do justice to the deep 
feeling which a great number of responsible people still have, that there is 
something fundamentally wrong - many would say wicked - in the act of
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suicide. To them it is cowardly and selfish, like running away in battle, an 
action treated with the utmost rigour in time of war. Such condemnation - or 
at least deep disapproval - of suicide still finds expression today."
As further indications of the existence of dissent in the Church one should note the 
resistance of the Board for Social Responsibility to publishiug the recommendations 
under its inq)rimatur, and the clear statement of the Archbishop in the foreword that 
they represented the views of the four signatories only. One might also note the 
Archbishop's retreat firom claiming credit for convening the working group, as 
recorded in the TIMES report in January 1961. There is also the expressed dissent of 
the Bishop of Carhsle in the Lords debate, and the religious concerns voiced in the 
Commons debate.
Taken together, there is sufficient indication of the existence of opposition within the 
Church to decriminalising suicide, to suggest that if the debate had not been 
preempted by the pubhcation of the booklet and the illusion of a carefully considered 
Church position it presented, that the Bill could have run into trouble on rehgious 
grounds.
In analysing how this ihusion was created despite the existence of dissent, there 
certainly are no grounds to aUege a deliberate conspiracy. However, equahy, there 
was no attenq)t made to encourage debate. Quite the opposite: as Rev. Dunstan said, 
"It was not a subject on which one would want to excite feeling..."
In terms of preenq)ting controversy on the suicide issue, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury's name on the foreword to the report, was bound to give its 
recommendation to decriminahse an aura of authority. This aura was fiuther enhanced 
by the academic and professional credentials of the members of the committee. Even 
in the less deferential, more democratic climate of the end of the century such
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credentials carry weight; in mid-century they were virtually unchallengeable. On a 
matter of theology who would wish to take on not only the supreme head of the 
Church of England, but the Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian 
Religion at Oxford? Probably the most in^ortant factor in the creation of the illusion 
that décriminalisation was the oflhcial view of the Church was that none of the public 
references mq)lying that it was were ever challenged, so each repetition of the claim 
was made with increased confidence.
The lack of opposition from the Church of England to the Suicide Bill was matched by 
silence from all other faiths, including the Roman Catholics. This fact (an example of 
"the dogs that did not bark") was certainly important to the passage. Religious 
opposition from a range of faiths was a major factor in the other "sanctity of life" issue 
of the time - abortion law reform, and in virtually all the other issues with a moral 
dimension (homosexuality, censorship, prostitution, divorce). In terms of the general 
membership of the various faiths, the argument here is that because of the very minimal 
exposure, most people were not aware of the proposed decriminahsation. The huge 
and bitterly divisive debates in subsequent years over euthanasia and assisted suicide 
suggest that greater awareness of the Suicide Bill may very well have triggered 
rehgious opposition, probably along the lines of division that spht the Church of 
England committee.
It was perhaps her experience at the first meeting of this committee, and thus 
reahsation of the strength of rehgious feeling on the issue, that led Dr. Odium in 
November 1958 to write to both the Roman Cathohc Church and the Free Church 
Federal Council to try and preenq)t possible opposition to decrhninahsing suicide. 
Dr. Odium's letters used the Wolfenden distmction and also stressed the kind of 
pragmatic arguments about attempted suicide that seem to have persuaded her fehow 
Church of England committee members to recommend decriminahsation (see above).
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The answers show the recipients did not accept these arguments, but they did not 
actively oppose them either, which turned out to be all that was required.
Whether the spur was e?q)erience at the Church of England committee or not. Dr. 
Odium wrote her letters from the more authoritative platform of Chairman of the 
BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee. On 29 November 1958 she wrote to the Roman 
Catholic Lord Archbishop of Westminster (Cardinal Godfrey) and to the General 
Secretary of the Free Church Federal Council, enclosing copies of the statement the 
BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee had finally hammered out the preceding summer 
(see Appendix B)
To Cardinal Godfrey, following an introductory paragraph, she put the following 
question:
"It would be of great help to the Committee, of which I am chairman, and to 
many of our Catholic members, to know whether the proposal would be in 
accord with the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church and whether it would 
be allowable for individual Catholics to support it.
I feel that I should assure Your Grace that there is no suggestion that suicide 
should not continue to be regarded as a sin. Our only object is to remove it 
from the purview of the criminal law. As you will see from the attached report 
the present law creates great hardship for the person who has attempted suicide 
and for his relatives. In some cases it actually impedes measures of treatment 
and rehabilitation for the individual who has shown himself to be in such a 
grave state of mental distress.
It appears that there is a possibility that the Home Secretary may set up a 
committee of enquiry with a view to changing the law so that the matter is of
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some urgency. It would be of the greatest assistance to have Your Grace's 
opinion on this important issue."
On 5 December the Archbishop's Private Secretary rephed. The masterly ambiguity of 
this response should be viewed in the hght of Dr. Odium's subsequent claim that none 
of the Churches objected to a change in the law:
"His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster has asked me thank you for your 
letter of 29 November.
With regard to suicide, the same principles apply as those set out by His Grace 
in the Statement of 2nd December, 1957 on the Wolfenden Report. I beheve 
you have seen a copy.
Briefly, the Church regards a fully responsible person who attenq)ts suicide as 
committing a grievous sin. And whilst the Church recognises the distinction 
between sin and crime, it also recognises the right of the State to make a sinfid 
act a criminal act, if the prevalence of the sinfid act is contrary to the well-being 
of the State. Similarly, if the State considers that by removing the stigma of 
criminal offence from a sinfid act, it is giving the impression that it condones 
the sin, then it has the right to retain the existent legislation.
I hope that this statement of the principles involved wiU be of help to your 
Committee."
Dr. Odium wrote substantially the same letter to the Free Church Federal Council, but 
they were even less ready to commit themselves on the issue and passed responsibility 
for comment to their Women's Section, who in turn rehed on a decision made by yet 
another body:
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From the General Secretary o f the Free Church Federal Council to the Chairman 
(Dr. Odium) 12.12.58
"You will be interested to know that our Executive Committee, at their 
meeting on Thursday 11th December, gave careful consideration to the 
problem of attempted suicide. There was an interesting and syn^athetic 
discussion, but the Executive did not feel that they were in a position to give 
the matter the detailed and expert consideration which would justify them in 
making any definite pronouncement. Our Women's Section, however, has 
been able to give the matter more detailed consideration and gave their support 
to the Resolution* passed by the National Council of Women, on which they 
are represented.
I am sorry not to be able to be more helpfid, but you at least have the 
satisfaction of knowing that the matter has been brought to our sympathetic 
attention.
*this resolution is as follows:
'The National Council of Women in conference assembled is of the 
opinion that suicide and attempted suicide should no longer be 
considered crimes and urges H.M. Government to legislate 
accordingly."
This Resolution, quoted in the Free Church Federal Council letter, was indeed passed 
by the annual conference of the National Council of Women, meeting that year, 1958, 
in Royal Leamington Spa between October 21 and 23 (NCW Annual Report for 1958: 
405). The archives of the National Council of Women are now stored at the Greater 
London Record Office. A careful reading of these has revealed that there was no 
recorded discussion of the law on suicide or attempted suicide at any meeting of the 
Committee of Management, or any meeting of the Sectional Committees in 1957, '58, 
'59, '60 or '61, although most of the major issues of the day were discussed, including.
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most extensively, the Wolfenden Report, the Street Offences Act, and the Royal 
Commission Report on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, all of which were 
subjects of Resolutions at Annual Conferences. There is no indication of where the 
1958 Resolution on the suicide law came from However, the records do show that 
Dr. Doris Odium joined the Headquarters Branch of the National Council of Women in 
March of 1958, was co-opted onto their Sectional Committee on Pubhc Health the 
same month, and gave an Address to this Committee in June.
Not very long after the exchange of letters between Dr. Odium, the Free Church 
Council, and the Archbishop's private secretary, Kenneth Robinson made the 
foUowing sweeping statement in the House of Commons on the subject of suicide law 
reform:
"Is [the Home Secretary] aware that the joint report of the British Medical 
Association and the Magistrates Association has now been considered by the 
Church of England, the Roman Cathohc Church and the Non-conformists, and 
that none of these bodies has raised objections?" (Hansard: Commons: 26 
February 1959)
Conclusion
It is always difficult to prove a negative, and so it is not possible to definitively answer 
the question 'Why did the Church not oppose decriminahsation?' One answer, 
rendered plausible by the very meagre media coverage of it, is that most church people 
did not know it was happening, and would have opposed it if they did.i^ Nevertheless, 
the history of the Church of England booklet shows that among church people who did 
know, both the Wolfenden formula of separating sin and crime, and the practical issues 
surrounding prosecution of attempted suicide were important considerations. It is 
clear that the aura of compassion that attached to the idea of "treatment" rather than 
punishment for attenq)ted suicide appealed to rehgiously oriented speakers in the 
Parhamentary debate. But at the same time they were very concerned to emphasise the
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immorality of the act of suicide. There is sufficient evidence in these debates of 
rehgiously based unease about decriminalising a deeply sinffil act to suggest that 
without the seemingly authoritative support of the Church of England booklet, coupled 
with silence from the other faiths, that the decriminahsation could have run into 
trouble. Much of the credit for avoiding this, and indeed the many obstacles that lay in 
the path of the Suicide Act, belongs to the three human agents whose individual 
contributions are examined in the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter 5
^The three were: Wilham Van Straubenzee, M.P. for Wokingham (Conservative), who was a member 
of the Church Assembly House of Laity for five years, of the General Synod for ten, and from 1962 
lived in a fiat in Lambeth Palace; Peter Kirk, M.P. for Gravesend (Conservative), who was the son of 
the Bishop of Oxford, and Eric Fletcher, M.P. for Islington East, who had been a member of the 
Commission on Church and State (1951), a member of the Church Assembly, and later became 
Chairman of the Advisory Board on redundant churches.
^Charles Berg, a psychiatrist, who wrote an account of the discussions of the Wolfenden Committee 
on homosexuality said in respect of the law and morality issue: "It took a great del of controversial 
discussion regarding the difierentiation between 'private sin' and 'the business of the law* to pass this 
recommendation - and one member of the committee, Mr. Adair, took great pains to disassociate 
himself from it, writing 6 closely printed paged to justify his disagreement." (Berg 1959:12-13)
^In 1996 Rev. Dunstan, at the age of 79, published a book commissioned by the British Council of 
Medicine, titled Euthanasia', a collection of essays by professionals generally arguing against any 
change in the law on this issue.
"^he expectation that the Church might be asked for an opinion was perhaps based on the number of 
times in recent years governments had conducted major enquiries into matters where the Church had 
an interest: betting and gaming (1949-51), capital punishment (1949-53, marriage and divorce 1951- 
55, mental illness 1954-57, homosexuality and prostitution (1954-57)
^Rev. Dunstan said in interview that the members did refer to it as "the suicide committee", which 
caused some merriment among them when outsiders looked startled.
^Professor Goodhart was the author of English Law and the Moral Law 1955, a passage from which 
is quoted in chapter 3 as an example of the continuing influence of conservative ideas about law and 
morality. He was also - in the English tradition of densely interlocking elites - a membr of the Royal 
Commission on the Police 1960-62
^According to the Dictionary of National Biography, John Christie had suffered ill health for many 
years and a note in the Church file says at this time was going into hospital for an operation.
^ h e  British Institute of Public Opinion Surveys, part of the Gallup organisation, was founded in 
1937, but its findings were published only in the NEWS CHRONICLE and in 1960 the CHRONICLE 
folded. National Opinion Polls (NOP) was established in 1957 as an affiliate of Associated 
Newspapers Limited, and its findings were exclusive to the DAILY MAIL (Tyler 1990). According to 
Robert Worcester in Political Opinion Polling in Great Britain (1983), people in the 1950s were still 
very suspicious of polls (p. 64), and that "The Tories' advertising agency, CPV, employed research 
techniques in the 1959 election, but these were largely ignored by Conservative party leaders." (p.68). 
On the Labour side, Worcester says Nye Bevan was "an intractable opponent of opinion polls", (p.69) 
Herman Mannheim, speaking at the LSE in 1958 said, "One of the shortcomings which the Report of 
the Royal Commission on Coital Punishment, though otherwise much more substantial than the 
Wolfenden Report, shares with the latter is the tendency to take refuge behind what it proclaims to be
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public opinion, without making any attempt to find out what the state of public opinion really was on 
the various points at issue." (Mannheim 1959 p.277)
^This remains the case at the end of the millennium. According to English Canon Law 3rd Edition, 
(Briden & Hanson 1992): "In general, the minister of the parish where burial may be claimed is 
bound to conduct the funeral and to conduct it in accordance with the service in the Prayer Book or 
other authorised service, whether or not the deceased was a member of the Church of England. There 
are, however, three exceptions to this rule. The burial service is not to be said over the bodies of those 
who die unbaptized, or who have laid violent hands upon themselves or who die excommunicate. 
(Rubric at the beginning o f the Burial Service; and Canon 338) The expression who have laid 
violent hands upon themselves has in practice been interpreted charitably to refer only to those who 
have deliberately committed suicide in circumstances which amounted to felony-de-se before the 
passing of the Suicide Act, 1961. This Act, whereby it is no longer a crime to commit suicide, is 
silent on the subject of the burial of the bodies of those who have committed suicide, and it is, 
therefore, suggested that the rubric and Canon B38 are ^plicable in these circumstances." (p.82) 
^^Copies of these letters are in the BMA archives on Tavistock Square, in the file with the minutes of 
the Joint Committee of the BMA and Magistrates' Association. They are not individually identified 
with archive numbers.
i^With respect to the matter of whether anyone noticed the Suicide Act, Nigel Walker wrote in 1964: 
"The abolition of the crime of attempted suicide in 1961 gave me an opportunity of applying a test of 
sorts in a small survey which I carried out with the help of undergraduate interviewers in the summer 
of 1962. Four hundred men and women (but not children) in various parts of Britain were asked for 
their views on homosexuality and attempted suicide, and were also asked whether such acts were 
against the law or not. 75% did not know that attempted suicide was no longer against the law, 16% 
did know, and 9% were not sure." ("Morality and the Criminal Law", The Howard Journal Vol. XI 
No. 3,1964)
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Chapter 6: The Importance of Agency
Chapters two and three considered the decrinhnahstion of suicide from the standpoint 
of structure. This chapter considers the role of agency. This is because however 
propitious the intellectual climate and pressing the practicahties, it is most unlikely the 
law would have changed without the actions of three individuals: the Home Secretary 
Rab Butler, the Labour M.P. Kenneth Robinson, and the psychiatrist and magistrate 
Dr. Doris Odium
It is the case that any effort on the part of these three (or anyone else) would have 
been futile - or more likely never made - without the slow accretion of change in 
attitudes to rehgion, morahty, crime, mental hlness and suicide, that are detailed in 
other chapters in this thesis. But these changes merely created a favourable context. 
The statutory reform - the tangible Parhamentary legislation - required human agents 
who were skilfid enough and who occupied positions of sufficient influence to effect an 
actual change in the law.
These three quite different people did not work 'together' in the usual sense of the 
word, but their individual actions were in the end more effective than many other 
more co-ordinated attempts to change laws. Their success was certainly due in part to 
the fact (as their words and writings make plain) that ah three were operating on the 
same basic premise, the one that hindsight shows was crucial to achieving the 
decriminahsation. This was the assunçtion that the proposed change had nothing 
whatever to do with the moral status of suicide and everything to do with the 
corapassionate, effective treatment of attenq>ted suicide. It is a measure of the skih
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and influence of these three that they were able to persuade key professional and 
poHtical constituencies that this assun^tion was valid.
This chapter considers the contributions made by these three people. They can be 
summed up in headline form as follows: Dr. Odium was extraordinarily effective in
convincing significant individuals and professional groups that the law should be 
changed. Kenneth Robinson (very probably as a result of Dr. Odium's activities) put 
the matter on the Parliamentary agenda, and pursued it in a manner that made his 
advocacy politically effective. Rab Butler, fi’om his uniquely commanding position as 
Home Secretary, Leader of the House of Commons, and Chairman of the Conservative 
Party, orchestrated the actual passage of the Bill..
Rab Butler
Butler, though chronologically the last of the three to become involved in changing the 
suicide law, was the most important in terms of the actual legislation. On the evidence 
available, it could be said that once persuaded the suicide law should be changed - and 
Kenneth Robinson and Dr. Odium deserve the credit for this - Butler put the Bill 
through almost single handedly. Chapter 7 gives the details of how this was 
accomplished: how Butler completely by-passed the traditional, long-settled route for 
Government legislation and inserted the Suicide Bill into an already crowded 
Government legislative agenda at the last minute, without discussion or preamble and 
certainly without any of the long gestation (pressure groups, committees of enquiry, 
royal commissions, white papers) that usually precedes social reform legislation. 
Butler never spoke in the actual Parliamentary debates on the Bill, but Public Record 
Office papers show his close involvement in the lead speeches of the Ministers who 
did. And although he is invisible in the written records once the BiU entered 
Parliament, there is the curious fict that when this short and modest measure nearly
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foundered at the final hurdle, some powerfid but unidentified hand reached out and 
saved it.
Butler himself makes no mention of the reform of the suicide law in his memoirs, nor is 
it referred to in Anthony Howard's biography of him, nor is it mentioned in the 
autobiography of Viscount Kilmuir who introduced it to Parhament, ^ nor in any of the 
other memoirs of the period with the single exception of Leo Abse's, where the focus is 
on Abse's own smaU and nearly disastrous contribution. Therefore the reasons for 
Butler's actions in respect of this reform, and in particular why he adopted the secretive 
strategy he did, have to be inferred fi*om what is known about his background, 
personahty, and behaviour on similar issues. A substantial amount is known about 
these matters, and four aspects can be highhghted as of special relevance in 
understanding his actions on the suicide law:
1) Long experience at the highest levels of pohtical power
2) Intimate knowledge of the House of Commons and of the Conservative party.
3) Attitude toward social reform
4) Temperament and personahty, and the probable influence of certain life events.
1) Butler's experience and position
Butler first became a Government minister before the second world war.^ By 1960 he 
had been Minister of Education, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Privy Seal and 
Home Secretary. On several occasions when Eden and Churchill were ill he had been 
acting Head of Government, and on Macmillan's firequent trips abroad he regularly 
became acting Prime Minister (Butler 1971:196). In 1959-61, in a rare concentration 
of pohtical power, he was not only Home Secretary, but Leader of the Common s and 
Chairman of the Conservative Party. Over these many years in ah these various posts, 
Butler had gained a reputation for keen intelhgence and great pohtical astuteness. His 
junior Minister at the time of the Suicide Bill, Charles Fletcher-Cooke M.P., described 
bim as "an immensely skilful pohtician" (Fletcher-Cooke interview 6 March 1996); his
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biographer Anthony Howard said, "No one was better at working the machinery of 
Government" (Howard interview 10 Jan. 1997). His PPS at the time, Paul Channon, 
said he was "thought to be the greatest Leader of the House of his day - or since" 
(Channon interview 14 Nov. 1996); his Permanent Secretary, Sir Charles Cunningham 
said he was "extremely intelhgent and able - the Department was devoted to him" 
(Cunningham interview 30 Sept. 1996), and Roy (now Lord) Jenkins spoke of his 
"great Whitehall prestige" (Jenkins interview 6 Nov. 1996). During these years 
Butler had also acquired a reputation for being inscrutable, devious, conspiratorial and 
a consummate pohtical operator^. 'I never numbered candour among his virtues' said 
Viscount Hailsham (Hadsham 1990:219); Viscount Kilmuk described him as an 
"enigmatic figure... always looking like a 17th century Cardinal who had 
incomprehensibly mislaid his robes (Kilmuir 1964:191) and Enoch Powell, who was 
the Minister of Health in 1960-63, while praising Butler's abihty and intellect said, "No 
one will ever ... fall mto the error of calling him 'immensely loyal' (DAILY 
TELEGRAPH 12 July 1971).
At the time of the Suicide Bill, 1960-61, Butler had been in Parhament for more than 
thirty years (he entered in 1929), and a Minster for nearly a decade and a half Few 
other pohticians had his in-depth knowledge of how Parliament worked, of the routes 
by which legislation emerged and how, if one were sufldciently knowledgeable and well 
placed these routes might be circumvented. The only person with the power to block 
or override Butler was the Prime Minister himselÇ and Macmillan at that time was fiiUy 
focused on foreign affairs. Ahstair Home, Macmillan's official biographer (1989) says, 
"Throughout the copious Macmillan diaries, with all their multifold interests, there is 
so conspicuously httle reference to social reforms - urgently as many were needed - 
that one is entitled to reckon that they assumed a relatively low position in Macmillan's 
list of priorities. He could say, with equanimity, I lefl; that side all to Rah and Henry 
Brooke.'" (Home 1989:81) Butler confirms this in his own book, and offers the 
following incident to make the point:
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"It occurred in the summer of 1959 when a group of leading Ministers and 
party officials were gathered together in the Prime Minister's room at the 
House of Commons to consider a preliminary draft of our election manifesto. 
We had reached the passage which stated, in unexciting but 1 thought 
unexceptionable language, certain of my legislative aims for the next 
Parliament. 'We shall revise some of our social laws, for exan^le those 
relating to betting and gaming and to clubs and licensing,which at present ftill 
of anomahes and lead to abuse and even corruption.' The Prime Minister picked 
up the document, held it out two feet from his face, hooded his eyes and said 
very slowly, 1 don't know about that. We aheady have the Toby Belch vote. 
We must not antagonise the Malvoho vote.' There were dutifid chuckles round 
the table. Then the Chief Whip, Ted Heath, ever businesslike and fbrceftil, 
intervened by pointing out that we had committed ourselves to such reforms. 
'Well,' said Macmillan resignedly, this is your province. Rah. 1 suppose you 
think it's all right.' 1 indicated that 1 did, and without further discussion we 
passed on to less contentious matters." (Butler 1971:197-198)
AU this suggests that Butler was uniquely weU positioned, in terms of his skiUs, his 
pohtical offices, and the laissez-faire approach of the Prime Minister, to be able to 
place a law onto the statute books via an unorthodox route. When this was put in 
interview to Paul Channon, who admired Butler very much, he said, "You are in 
danger of over estimating Rab's tactics. He would have had to go through QL 
[Queen's Legislation Committee] and Future Legislation[Committee] and the Cabinet." 
But the papers in the PubUc Record Office show quite clearly that Butler did not, in 
fact, put the Suicide BiU to either QL or Future Legislation, and the presentation to 
Cabinet when it happened (see chapter 7) serves as an exceUent example of what 
Channon himself, and another admirer, Chris Patten, caU Butler's 'cunning'. (Patten 
1995:105) When the same suggestion was put to others who knew and worked with 
him - that is, that Butler might have used his skills to circumvent usual procedures in
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order to decriminalise suicide - there was widespread agreement that it would have 
been in character. Roy Jenkins said it would be very much his style (Jenkins interview 
6 Nov. 1996); Kenneth Baker said he thought Butler actually preferred to do things by 
stealth. (Baker interview 26 Oct. 1996) In a memoir of her husband published in 1987 
MoUie Butler said, "Rab's pohtical views could be summed up by the words 
'consensus', 'continuity and in a time of crisis 'coahtion', but never 'confrontation' if it 
could be avoided." (MoUie Butler 1987:60)
2) Intimate knowledge of the House and the Conservative Party 
In considering why Butler adopted an unorthodox route for the Suicide BiU - especiaUy 
in the Hght of his long previous adherence to traditional processes and consensus 
pohcies - it is helpful to look at the character of the 1959-64 House of Commons. In 
1959 the Conservatives had been returned to Government with an increased majority: 
they had 365 seats to Labour's 258 and the Liberals' 6. Thus the opposition posed no 
threat to Government plans, but some of their own backbenchers did. The nature of 
the '59-'64 Conservative Parhamentary party, according to Paul Channon and Bernard 
Levin (1979), among others, was "profoundly reactionary". It was particularly 
exercised by issues of crime and social order, a fact vividly demonstrated at the first 
Home Office Question Time of the new Parhament, on 5 November 1959 when Butler 
was "subjected to a sustained assault" from Conservative members on the issue of 
flogging of offenders. (Howard 1987:272) The bitterness of the attack arose partly 
from a long held suspicion in parts of the Conservative party that Butler was "soft on 
crime" - an aUegation raised not only in respect of flogging, but also in regard to 
Butler's cherished proposals for penal reform (see chapter 3). These had been greeted 
with a "chorus of approval by hberals" and much less enthusiasm by his own party. 
(Howard 1987:267) His own Minister of State at the time, David (now Lord) 
Renton, when interviewed, said "Rab was always very wet. Terribly wet." (Renton 
interview 8 May 1996) Butler was aware of these doubts and misgivings in his own 
party, and spoke in his memoirs of having a reputation for "pink socialism". (Butler
173
1971:28-29) In contemplating reform of the suicide law it might have occurred to 
him that a straight proposal to cfccrirninahse something, especially if it came from him, 
might meet immediate, almost automatic, resistance. Sir William van Straubenzee, a 
backbench Conservative M.P. at the time, said in reference to Butler, "We didn't trust 
him an inch." (Van Straubenzee interview 31 Oct. 1996) It can be seen as something 
of a vindication of Butler's strategy that van Straubenzee was a member of the 
Committee that considered - and passed unamended - the Suicide Bill.
Besides being very conservative, with a small as well as capital 'c', the 1959-64 
Parliament was extremely partisan. It should be noted that the word 'Butskelhsm', was 
coined as a term of abuse (Boyd 1995:5) directed at what was seen as Butler's left- 
leaning tendencies. Thus the fact that the original proposal to decriminalise suicide 
had arisai on the Labour side was important. Kenneth Robinson, even though 
personally well-regarded, was a Labour M.P. Moreover he had been joined in 
advocating suicide law reform by a much more controversial Labour M.P., Leo Abse, 
who had entered parhament in the '59 election, and immediately joined Robinson in 
promoting social reform legislation. Although decriminahsing suicide did not appear 
in the 1959 Labour manifesto, it had been mentioned in Roy Jenkins' booklet "The 
Labour Case" pubhshed to coincide with the election. (Jenkins 1959:137) It had also 
been mentioned in passing in a Fabian Society pamphlet "Speed-up Law Reform" 
published in 1958. (Pollard 1958:60) Butler would have known that as far as most 
Conservatives were concerned, this "left" provenance would have condemned out of 
hand a measure which in addition had an air of permissiveness about it. Leo Abse 
claims in his book Private Member (1973) that there was much resistance to 
decriminahsing suicide in the House, and analyses it as: "some people would take the 
view that what in law is permissible is free from objection; and behef in the sanctity of 
life, and the duty of the State to uphold its responsibihty to seek to preserve the life of 
every person, necessitated no weakening in our criminal law." (Abse 1973: 90) 
Butler would have been aware of this body of opinion in the House. Nico Henderson,
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drawing on his experience in Butler's Private Office, wrote that he "had acute political 
antennae" and was "very much alive to anything that might cause difficulties." 
(Henderson 1984:73) Sir Francis Boyd said, "He is a man who knows, almost by 
instinct, exactly what is going on." (Boyd 1995:14) In his own memoirs, Butler said, 
"... I used to go into the Smoking Room practically every evening to smell out 
rats - incipient causes of trouble that might blow up on the floor of the House 
at a few hours' notice and, if badly handled, could affect the standing and 
reputation of the whole government. If any appeared, or even if there were 
the smell of one, however faint, I would ring the Permanent Secretary at once 
and arrange a talk then or next morning. Thus, to use a celebrated Irish mixed 
metaphor, the rats were nipped in the bud, and for five years we successfully 
anticipated or avoided serious trouble." (Butler 1971:199)
In the light of this, there seems little doubt Butler would have been aware of several 
sources of potential resistance to decriminalising suicide. It suggests why throughout 
the entire time the issue was before Parliament he kept its profile as low as possible.
Wary as he was of Conservative hostility toward any measure perceived to be 'liberal', 
Butler would also have been sensible of another aspect of his party that could actually 
work to assist passage of the Suicide Bill. This was its still-deferential attitudes about 
class and towards traditional repositories of authority, such as the Church of England, 
Oxbridge academics, and the senior judiciary. According to Paul Channon, Bernard 
Levin (1979), and Anthony Sampson (1962), among others, the Tory party at 
Westminster '59 to '64 contained a number of old fashioned "knights of the shire", 
who saw a stint in Parhament as a pubhc duty, and loyalty to the party as an article of 
faith. Butler benefited from these attitudes, not only as a very senior Minister of 
unparalleled experience, and as Chairman of the Party, but also as someone who by 
class and wealth automaticaUy commanded the respect of this group.
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On his father's side Butler's ancestors had been distinguished for generations, usually as 
academics, but there was an M.P. in the family as early as 1368. Butler's father was 
offered a Cambridge fellowship but went into the Indian Civil Service instead, where 
his brother-in-law was Private Secretary to the Viceroy. Francis Boyd conq)ared the 
Butlers to the Cecils and the Churchills: "These three families have established quite 
different traditions from each other, but they have made a mark on public afrairs for at 
least two centuries and have left a record distinguished enough to be a spur to 
successive generations" (Boyd 1995:12)
Butler himself gained a first at Cambridge and initially contenq)lated an academic life. 
Throughout his career he was always considered extremely clever; with what people 
called a "Rolls-Royce mind" (Howard 1987:368). By his marriage to Sydney 
Courtauld he not only became immensely rich (she was the only child of Samuel 
Courtauld), but gained pohtical security as well, since the sitting M.P. for Saffron 
Waldon, an area of major Courtauld employment, promptly relinquished his seat so 
Butler could have it. Butler's father-in-law gave him Stansted Hall, a country estate in 
Essex, and also Gatcombe Park in Gloucestershire, "which Butler eventually sold to 
the royal family as a residence for Princess Anne" (Jenkins 1995:29). All this stands in 
contrast to the circumstances of an ordinary M.P. in the 1959-64 Parliament, who 
received only £1000 a year in salary, with an additional £750 for expenses. There was 
no secretarial allowance, no free postage, and Paul Channon, who entered the 
Commons m 1959, remembers queuing in the lobby to use the pubhc telephone as 
Members did not have their own. Anthony Sampson, writing the first Anatomy o f  
Britain at just this time said, "Parhament no longer attracts the very ablest men- with 
the inteUectual cahbre of Butler or Maudling, (both from the diminished private income 
class)" (Sampson 1962:58). In this context it is not surprising that the Conservative 
Parhamentary party, even while suspecting Butler's hberal tendencies, accorded him 
both deference and respect.
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The party viewed distinguished legal figures the same way, especially the sort 
assembled on the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) (see chapter 7) that was 
said to have recommended decriminahsation. In 1959 Butler referred suicide law to 
this prestigious Committee - not to consider whether suicide should be decriminalised, 
but to consider what should be done about aiding and abetting it when it was 
decriminalised. Despite this truncated brie( Butler did not scruple to represent the 
CLRC's subsequent report as endorsing décriminalisation, and this allowed him to 
claim prestigious judicial support. This claim had as Httle empirical grounding as did 
the claim that the churches and the whole medical establishment favoured 
décriminalisation (see chapters 4 and 5). Nevertheless, the claims would have been 
deeply impressive to rank and file Conservatives.
3) Butler*s attitude to social reform
In trying to discover why Butler would have undertaken to decriminahse suicide, 
risking the controversy he was always keen to avoid, at a time when his pohtical life 
and the Government's legislative agenda were both seriously overburdened, and, 
moreover, when there was no ground swell of pubhc opinion at ah urging this reform, 
one should start by looking at his attitude to reform in general. Butler's own memoirs, 
and the recohections of people who knew him, identify social reform as his major 
pohtical interest. The radicaUy reforming Education Act of 1944 was, according to 
Anthony Howard, "the single memorial of which Rab would always remain proudest." 
(Howard 1987:139) Butler himself cahs it his "greatest achievement" and in his 
autobiography refers to it as informing later actions, saying in particular, "I was able 
to bring into the work of the Home Office the same spirit of reform and zeal for 
progress as had caUed into being the Education Act of 1944"(Butler 1971:199). The 
Education Act had given Butler experience in shepherding controversial social reform 
onto the statute books; put through as it was in the teeth of fierce opposition from the 
churches, and disinterest tinged with hostihty from the Prime Minister Winston
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Churchill (Barber 1994). So he knew how difficult it could be to pass such legislation, 
and it would have been in character for him to take steps to bypass trouble on the 
Suicide Bill if at all possible.
After the war while in opposition from 1945 to '51, Butler had been head of the 
Conservative Research Department, and was responsible for the complete intellectual 
reform of the Party; without which, according to Chris Patten, a later Conservative 
party chairman, the modem Tory party would not exist (Patten 1995). In thinking up 
and carrying through his various reforms, Anthony Howard said that Butler "cared 
not at all about pubhc opinion", (Howard interview 10 Jan. 1997) and it is tme that as 
Home Secretary he steadfastly defied a continuing pubhc outcry for the restitution of 
corporal punishment. According to his Permanent Secretary, Sir Charles Cunningham, 
Butler was conscious of pubhc opinion as a possible obstacle to the achievement of his 
goals, but beheved it could be "influenced and educated, and he did this in his 
speeches, which were marvehous" (Cunningham interview 30 September 1996). 
Butler himself confirmed his view of pubhc opinion as an irritant that could be 
overcome in a letter to Sir Eric Edwards MC TD on 10 July 1959:
"I understand that you are having trouble with a Conservative Association at 
Walton on the subject of corporal punishment and the hanging of murderers... 
I reaUy think it would be rather a pity if these people were taken too seriously... 
Perhaps it could ah be explained to them very simply because their emotion 
comes partly from the idea that no other people but themselves have any 
firmness or courage and this just simply is not tme. Pohtics is in fact the art of 
the possible." (File E ll ,  MisceUaneous correspondence, Butler papers)
Another demonstration of Butler's willingness to support reforms he personaUy 
approved regardless of popularity or pohtical pedigree was his support of Roy 
Jenkins' Private Member's BiU to loosen hterary censorship. In an article in Encounter 
(October 1959) recording his stmggles with this Bill, .Tenkins paid tribute to Butler's
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help, and when it finally became law, wrote to Butler personally saying his own efforts 
"would have been unavailing had you not been basically sympathetic." (Howard 
1987:266) Lord Jenkins re-confirmed this in interview, saying that it was Butler who 
arranged for the necessary Parhamentary time, without which the Bhl would have 
Med.
It seems clear that, in Howard's words, Butler "liked to see himself as a reformer" 
(Howard interview 10 January 1997). In his memoirs. The Art o f the Possible, Butler 
comments with some complacency, that "there were periods when I was obhged to 
stand out as a charrçion of progress against substantial sections both in parhament and 
in the country" (1971:28).
At the time of the change in suicide law Butler's reformist tenq)er was focused on penal 
affairs, and in regard to these, Radzinowicz says, "Mr. Butler decided to become a 
truly reforming Home Secretary" (Radzinowicz 1999:169). Howard's comment is that 
when Butler first became Home Secretary in 1957 "he spotted prisons and penal 
reform as places where a new broom was required" (Howard 1987:255). It is in 
looking at how Butler wielded this 'new broom' that an answer begins to emerge as to 
why he would have concerned himself with the small, relatively unimportant, reform of 
the suicide law.
The determinist basis of his penal reforms was clear fi’om the outset (see chapter 3): 
research and scientific knowledge were gomg to identify the causes of crime and 
supply ways to treat them."^  Mary Tuck, a former head of the Home Office Research 
Unit that Butler created to do this, said, "The origm [of the unit] was 'let's find out 
what works'. The idea was to tailor the medical model to make it work better" (Tuck 
interview 24 May 1996). So Butler was entirely sympathetic to the idea of treating, 
not punishing, offenders in general. Given his long involvement with mental health 
issues (see below) he would have been particularly receptive to the idea that mentally
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ill offenders should receive medical treatment, not punishment. This, of course, was 
the thrust of Dr. Odium's and Kenneth Robinson's case on attenq)ted suicides. 
Chapter 4 records Butler's Parliamentary endorsement in 1957 of the Percy 
Commission's recommendation to remove all judicial involvement with mental illness, 
including any related to offending. Butler had a life long commitment to this idea, as 
is evidenced by his chairmanship some years later of the Committee on Mentally 
Abnormal Offenders (1975) which firmly favoured the policy of "placing the patient in 
the hands of the doctors, foregoing [j/c] any question of punishment and relinquishing 
fi"om then onwards its own controls over them". (Cmnd 6244 1975, quoted in Peay 
1997:661)
This, then, is the background, the general framework, within which Butler would 
have considered the question of the law on suicide, when it was raised by Kenneth 
Robinson during Parhamentary Questions to the Home Secretary. There is no 
indication that before that time Butler had ever thought about the matter, and his 
answer on the first occasion was that he was "not satisfied that any change in the law is 
desirable" (see chapter 7). Kenneth Robinson then immediately asked the Home 
Secretary in a written question to give the average sentences of those imprisoned 
during the latest five year period after conviction for attenq)ted suicide. Supplying the 
answer, which was printed on 13 February 1958, had the effect of bringing to Butler's 
attention the - probably unexpected - fact that a substantial number of people were 
being put in prison, either on remand or sentence, as a result of having tried to kill 
themselves.^ The answer also revealed the very large discrepancy between numbers of 
attempted suicides known to the pohce and numbers prosecuted. In the determinist 
paradigm to which Butler subscribed, these unprosecuted were not beneficiaries of 
benign hbertarianism, but unfortunate victims of inadequate treatment programmes.
The subsequent exchanges of Parliamentary questions and answers between Butler 
and Robinson over the ensuing two years show Butler to have focused corcpletely on
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the issue of the prosecution of attempted suicides; the issue of suicide itself does not 
arise. Moreover, the exchange shows clearly that what was at stake in regard to 
attenq)ted suicides was how this deviant behaviour was to be controlled if it was 
decriminahsed. This was made particularly clear in his answer in November 1958, 
quoted in chapter 4: "Before a change in the law is proposed, it is necessary to ensure 
that persons who attempt suicide and need care but cannot be given it, or will not 
accept it, unless they are brought before the courts, can be looked after by other 
means. I am still studying this difficult problem and I am sorry that I cannot at this 
stage give an undertaking as to when it will be possible to introduce legislation" 
(Hansard: Commons: 6 Nov. 1958).
So the idea of reform in general appealed to Butler, and this particular one 
corresponded precisely to his programme of positivist penal reform aimed at treating, 
not punishing offenders. In addition, it would not have escaped a practical and 
effective administrator, which Butler undoubtedly was, that decriminahsing suicide 
would remove many hundreds of people from the hard-pressed remand sector of the 
prison system
4) Temperament, personality, and life events
'Comphcated', 'baffling', 'enigmatic' are words regularly used by people speaking and 
writing about Rab Butler. Despite this there is widespread agreement about the sahent 
characteristics of his pohtical personahty: a patemahst/ehtist approach to government, 
a keen intelhgence coupled with a sharp pohtical 'nose', and a deep aversion to 
controversy. Ah these traits are clearly visible in his handling of the suicide issue. 
From the start his actions indicate awareness of potential controversy insofar as he 
kept the profile of the issue very low. Butler's record shows he preferred the 
traditional method of bringing forward legislation: the plodding route of wide 
consultation, distinguished committees of enquiry. Royal Commissions, ah slowly 
evolving into legislation with as much consensus as possible. But this preference could
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be overridden by his abhorrence of conflict, something his widow Molhe Butler, 
confirmed in interview: "If there was controversy," she said, "he would let a thing 
drop" (MoUie Butler interview 24 Oct. 1996).
As late as the 2nd Reading of the Suicide BiU in the House of Commons, after it had 
saUed smoothly through the House of Lords, Butler indicated to the Minister about to 
move it that if there was trouble he would drop it (Fletcher-Cooke interview 6 March 
1996). But that was not necessary. Butler had taken steps - successfiiUy as it turned 
out - to minimise the possibiUty of conflict. Using his weU-attested inteUect and 
tactical skiUs, he had cocooned the measure in an aura of scientific compassion - "a 
better way to treat these unfortunate people" (see chapter 7) - that nevertheless 
radiated assurance about continued social control He was able to deploy what looked 
like endorsements firom a remarkably wide range of pohtical and professional opinion, 
and was cavaUer in making them appear firmer than they were. But mostly he kept the 
matter very quiet, not subjecting it to the usual Future Legislation committee and to 
Cabinet scrutiny, but shpping it in as a non-controversial footnote to a Cabinet meeting 
distracted by controversy over betting and gaming and NHS charges (see chapter 7). 
He brought it into Parhament via the Lords, whose activities received far less attention 
than the Commons.^ When it did reach the Commons, he never appeared himself in 
connection with it, but put it in the hands of his brand new, very junior Under 
Secretary, with the advice, "let's go on with this in a minor key" (Fletcher-Cooke 
interview 6 March 1996).
The entire episode reflects a certain attitude towards government and law making. 
Richard Crossman argued in an article in the New Statesman (3 April 1954), that 
Butler was "a good Platonist reaUy concerned with an effort to perpetuate a society 
controUed by an ehte and within a firm framework of authority." A 'good Platonist', of 
course, is a thorough-going ehtist, unconcerned with what people want^ but with what 
is good for them. Between his first response to Kenneth Robinson that "there is no
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evidence in my possession that the alteration of the basic concept would be universally 
acceptable to pubhc opinion" and his actual putting forward of the Suicide Bill, there is 
no record that Butler made any atten^t to discover wdiat pubhc opinion was on the 
issue. In any case, it is unlikely he would have cared what it was, except insofar as it 
would have caused controversy, which was distasteful to him, and created difiBculties 
for the BiU. It is interesting that he does seem to have beheved that both controversy 
and difficulty were likely. In the hght of this, even though the reform of suicide law 
would have been attractive to him for reasons set out above, these reasons were not 
con^elhng, and they do not provide a sufficient explanation for the amount of tactical 
skiU and effort he expended on it. His actions suggest a possible deeper, more 
personal concern about people who try to kiU themselves.
It is not possible to be definitive about this, as the "enigmatic" nature so remarked 
upon effectively concealed personal motivation, but it is possible to cite certain events 
in Butler's life that might have contributed to a particular syn^athy for the suicidal and 
despairing. For instance, while he was at Cambridge, he suffered not one, but two 
conçlete nervous breakdowns. "I never got to the bottom of those breakdowns," 
Anthony Howard said, "but they were very serious - he had to be put in the hands of 
speciahsts" (Howard interview 10 January 1997). It is a matter of record that Butler 
took a life long interest in issues of mental health, and served as President of the 
National Association of Mental Health (later MIND) for many years. He had a 
crippled right hand and arm, the result of a childhood accident, and although Molhe 
Butler said she beheved he "never thought of it", (Molhe Butler interview 24 October 
1996) it could not have been an asset in a profession that puts a high premium on hand 
shaking. Butler also had personal experience with suicide and suffering: because his 
parents were in India, he spent hohdays during his school years with an aunt and uncle 
in London's Ovington Square, and became, according to Howard, very fond of them 
In February 1928 the aunt committed suicide by throwing herself under an 
underground train at Victoria station. ^
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In the early 1950s Butler's first wife, Sydney, suffered a long, slow, agonising death 
fi'om cancer of the jaw. Later, in 1959, an American magazine reporter wrote a 
profile of Butler containing the sentence: "There can be httle doubt that it was the 
contentment and security of his marriage which enabled him to develop the 
compassionate outlook which arises fi^ om great personal happiness." She sent it to 
Butler, and he personally amended it to read "...the contentment and security of his 
marriage and the pain involved in its ending which enabled him to develop the 
compassionate outlook which arises j&om great personal experience."^
The effect of these events on Butler's attitude toward suicide law reform can, of 
course, only be guessed. Anthony Howard, who examined the whole of Butler's life in 
order to write the ofhcial biography, said, "Rab was not a conq)assionate man. He 
treated people very badly" (Howard interview 10 Jan. 1997). Ascribing motive is, in 
any case, a risky business. What is known is that Butler had an appetite for reform, 
fuelled by his self-image as a 'champion of progress'. He had complete confidence in 
the correctness of his own decisions and was unperturbed by dissenting views. He was 
embarked on a determinist programme of penal reform into which the change in suicide 
law fitted very neatly. Whether his actions were further inspired by personal 
compassion is probably immaterial; what matters historically is that Butler's actions 
had a direct and powerful effect on the passage of the Suicide Act. However, the 
records strongly indicate he would not have done it without the impetus supplied by 
two other people.
Kenneth Robinson
Kenneth Robinson M.P. put his first Parhamentary Question about suicide law to Rab 
Butler on 6 February 1958. He followed it with nine oral and four written questions 
on the subject over the next two and a half years. This may seem a good many, but 
the number has to be seen in the context of hterally dozens and dozens of questions
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Robinson put to government ministers on health and social affairs during these years. 
His keenness for social reform, especially any with a medical dimension, was the 
defining theme of his pohtical career. Unfortunately Robinson died in 1996, just 
before it was possible to interview him, and so his reasons for this have to be a matter 
for informed conjecture. According to people who knew him, and his obituary in the 
TIMES (20 Feb. 1996) it was because he had wanted to follow his GP father into 
medicine and become a doctor himself But when his father's early death cut short his 
son's education, Robinson became an insurance broker at Lloyd's instead. He entered 
Parhament in a by-election in 1949 as the Labour M.P. for St. Paneras North. From 
the start he took a keen interest in medical matters and in social reform, speaking in 
virtuahy ah the relevant debates and pressing ministers relentlessly with Parhamentary 
Questions. In the marathon debate on the Mental Health BiU Robinson was a 
persistent advocate for the Percy Commission's recommendation that mental illness be 
removed fi*om judicial and criminal jurisdiction. In 1958 he became a Vice President of 
the National Association for Mental Health (Butler was the President).
The author and social activist Rose Hacker worked with Robinson on a National 
Association of Mental Health sub-committee appointed to study the Government's 
proposed legislation. In an interview she said, "He went through it with a fine tooth 
comb. He reaUy cared about improving the treatment of the mentaUy iU" (Hacker 
interview 1 Oct. 1997). When the Mental Health Bih was pubhshed, Robinson wrote 
an enthusiastic article in the AW Statesman (10 Jan. 1959) commending it. "The BiU", 
he wrote, "is a tribute both to the Royal Commission and to growing pubhc 
enhghtenment. The Courts are permitted, afl;er hearing medical evidence, to order 
conçulsory care and treatment without first convicting the offender (One detects Mr. 
Butler's hand here)."
So Robinson would have been temperamentaUy disposed to take up the matter of 
moving atternpted suicides from criminal justice to medical jurisdiction. Rose Hacker
185
said he did know Doris Odium, and there is circumstantial evidence of their haison on 
this issue in the questions Robinson put to Butler, particularly his several references to 
the BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee, and the interesting claim about the churches 
(see chapter 5). There is also the minute of the Joint Committee for 27 March 1958, 
which Dr. Odium chaired, which reads:
"Resolved: 1) That copies of the statement be circulated to interested persons, 
including Mr. Kenneth Robinson M.P., who had asked questions on the subject 
in the H of C."
Robinson raised his first question about suicide law reform in February 1958, He 
followed it up with the written Parliamentary Question (PQ) to Butler on 13 March 
referred to earlier. This written question caused the facts about the prosecution of 
attenq)ted suicides to be publicly displayed in the Parhamentary report. It is probable 
that before this it was not widely known that people were being sent to prison for 
trying to kill themselves.
Robinson then set down an Early Day Motion saying:
"That this House is of the opinion that the present law of England relating to 
suicide has no deterrent effect, is capricious in its incidence, and can no longer 
be regarded as reflecting the attitude of society; and considers that suicide and 
attenq)ted suicide should be removed fi*om the category of criminal offences." 
(TIMES 28 February 1958)
Early Day Motions (EDMs) are a Parhamentary mechanism used by backbench M P.s 
to raise issues and gain pubhcity. Other M P.s sign them to demonstrate support for 
the proposal. EDMs are not part of the legislative process save in the marginal sense 
of bringing issues to pubhc attention. Robinson had begun his Parhamentary career in 
the Whip's office, and this would have given him skills usefiil in marshalling support for
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his proposal, and in the end it attracted 150 signatures. This was only a minority of the 
630 Members in the House, but it was not an insignificant number, and more 
in^ortantly for the ultimate success of the idea, the signers came from both sides of 
the House (TIMES 5 March 1958).
In addition to the PQs and the EDM, Robinson wrote an article for the Spectator (14 
March 1958) entitled "Suicide and the Law", setting out the case for changing the law. 
It focused, as did all the debates on this reform, on the issue of attenq)ted suicides and 
their need for treatment, fit was the potential criminal stigma, and even possible 
inq)risonment," Robinson argued, that "leads people to pretend to their doctor that the 
suicide attençt was an accident, thus making medical treatment almost inçossible." 
He went on to say, "Those \\fro commit or try to commit suicide are mainly persons 
who have broken down under sudden emotional stress, who are suffering from an 
acute depression-state or in whom prolonged strain has destroyed the will to live. 
Almost aU can be classified as mentally sick. When a man is driven to the lengths of 
trying to take his life, and fails, what good can it do to anyone to keep him in custody 
awaiting trial, to bring him before the courts and perhaps send him to prison for three 
or six months?"
The tone of Robinson's Parhamentary Questions on the suicide issues was important. 
They were never either aggressive or partisan, but always courteously phrased even 
when a note of exasperation crept in at the length of time being taken to achieve 
change. Having set the stage with his initial oral and written questions, and having 
received (in May and July of 1958) an imphed acceptance of the general principle of 
reform, he simply kept pressing for progress. An important tactic was to cite the 
"weighty opinion" he claimed favoured the change, and refer to churches, doctors, 
magistrates, senior judiciary, whenever possible. It needs to be noted, of course, that 
while they may look substantial when aggregated, the questions and answers on suicide 
law occupied only a minuscule portion of Parhamentary time, and with the exception
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of the first one, received no newspaper coverage at all Butler's answers on this issue 
were sandwiched between far more contentious matters to do with the police, road 
accidents, sex offences, immigration, cruelty to animals, air guns, prison overcrowding, 
and all the myriad alarms and excursions that surface at Home Ofidce question time. 
At no time did the question of suicide law reform appear either inq)ortant or even very 
interesting. It is perfectly possible that almost no one noticed it.
Robinson's personality and style would have been a contributory factor in the calm, 
low profile manner in which this reform of the law proceeded. The former 
Conservative M.P. Sir William van Straubenzee remembers that Robinson "was very 
widely liked. An exceptionally nice man". (Van Straubenzee interview 31 Oct. 1996) 
His former Labour colleague Leo Abse said "a good man with a worthy record" (Abse 
1973:.92). Noel Annan called him "a most deUghtful man. Civilised. The best kind of 
politician" (Annan interview 15 March 1997). Anthony Howard said, "he was "the 
nicest man I knew in pohtics. Absolutely on the side of hght. Outstandingly nice; on 
every hberal issue he was ahead of his party." But Howard added that Robinson was 
"an ineffective pohtician... considered an oddbaU and a loner. After ah," Howard 
e?q)lained, "miners fi*om Durham thought someone who was going to legahse 
homosexuahty was an agent of the devil" (Howard interview 10 Jan. 1997). This 
refers to the fact that at the same time as he was chanq>ioning reform of the mental 
health and suicide laws, Robinson was pressing for implementation of the Wolfenden 
Report recommendations on legahsing homosexuahty, and promoting a Private 
Member's Bih to ahow abortion. This may bear upon Butler's less than enthusiastic 
response when Robinson enquired in a Parhamentary Question in July 1958, whether a 
Private Member's Bih on the suicide law would be supported by the Government (see 
chapter 7).
Robinson was also considered by some conterrq)oraries to be pohticahy naive. Abse 
comments that Robinson was "perplexed and angry with me" at talking out the Suicide
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Bill on its second reading. Abse said that Robinson really believed it meant the Bill 
would fall, but "I knew", Abse said in an interview, "that the Whips would bring it 
back" (Abse interview 21 Nov. 1996).
When the Bill finally reached the floor of the House of Commons in the summer of 
1961, Robinson welcomed it "wholeheartedly", but in a self-denying speech lasting by 
his own reckoning only one-and-a-half minutes" (Official Record, Standing Committee 
E 25 July 1961). This was in anticipation that the Second Reading would go through 
on the day - a hope fiiistrated by Leo Abse (see chapter 7). However, in the 
Committee on the Bill Robinson expanded on the basic premise that "we all agree that 
psychiatric treatment is what most of these unfortunate people need" (ibid.). While 
opposing proposals to maintain the criminahty of attempted suicide so that courts 
could order such treatment, he nevertheless cited the provisions in the Mental Health 
Act that could be used if necessary (see chapter 4) and pressed the minister to ensure 
that hospitals always referred attempted suicides to a psychiatrist. Fletcher-Cooke 
responded,
"The only point to which I should reply in the hon. Member's speech, very 
briefly, is his request that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health should 
see that the hospital arrangements for giving the opportunity for psychiatric 
treatment are put into force as soon as possible, and that there should not be 
automatic discharge of attenopted suicides after the treatment of their physical 
wounds and symptoms. I will certainly bring what he has said to the attention 
of my right hon. Friend and will follow the matter up" (ibid.).
On the 3rd Reading of the Bill, as it safely approached its final Parhamentary moments, 
the Minister, Fletcher-Cooke, referred to Kermeth Robinsons' "pertinacity" which 
"persuaded the Government." Robinson, who had the very last word in the debate, 
did not stop to bask in the tribute, but used the occasion to urge reform of the
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homosexual and abortion laws. This advocacy, according to Hansard, was greeted 
with "noise" (Hansard:Commons; 28 July 1958).
The TIMES obituary on Kenneth Robinson, 20 February 1996, said: "To him the 
credit also belongs for seeing to it, by his work behind the scenes with the Mental 
Health Act of 1959, that suicide was no longer regarded as a Common Law crime." 
While it is perhaps excessive to grant him all the credit, there is no doubt he played a 
very important part. Had he not raised the issue, it is not apparent that anyone else in 
Parliament at that time would have done so. When Roy Jenkins was asked where the 
idea had come for mentioning suicide law reform in his 1959 pre-election book The 
Labour Case he said, "It would have been from Kenneth Robinson", and went on to 
say, "1 would have supported him in that as he supported me in so many things. He 
was a very good friend of mine" (Jenkins interview 6 Nov. 1996). Nevertheless, it did 
not appear in the Labour Manifesto for the 1959 election, and in any case Labour was 
decisively defeated. No other M.P. on either side raised the issue at any time. Had 
Robinson not pursued it so doggedly both before and after the election there is no 
reason to think Butler would have taken the action he did.
Dr, Doris Odium
Dr. Doris Odium, a consultant psychiatrist, was the third individual whose personal 
actions played a key part in the passing of the Suicide Act. In what was either an 
astonishing accident or an even more amazing strategic design. Dr. Odium's name 
appears in five of the six places outside Parhament where events occurred that were 
important to the Suicide Act: the BMA/Magistrates' Association Joint Committee,
the Church of England committee, the National Association of Mental Health, the 
National Council of Women, and the Home Office. (The sixth was the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee). It is not impossible that it was by design. According to Chad 
Varah, founder and head of the Samaritans, Dr. Odium "was the figure in terms of the
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suicide reform. It was totally her crusade - she persuaded people to go along with her" 
.(Varah interview 7 April 1999)
Bom in 1890, Dr. Odium qualified in 1929 and by the 1950s was a distinguished 
figure in the medical world: Senior Physician for Psychological Medicine at the
Elizabeth Garrett Anderson Hospital, President of the British Medical Women's 
Federation, Foundation Fellow of the Royal Society of Psychiatry, President of the 
European League for Mental Hygiene, Vice President of the International Medical 
Women's Association, and - of particular relevance to this research - a Vice President 
of the National Association of Mental Health where Kenneth Robinson was also a Vice 
President and Rab Butler was President. Rose Hacker remembers Doris Odhim as "a 
6t, jolly woman. Very down to earth; very keen on mental health and inq)roving the 
mental hospitals" (Hacker interview 1 Oct. 1997). Chad Varah remembers her as a 
"white haired, dumpy little figure ... but determined. Wonderful speaker. Rowed for 
Lady Margaret" [the Oxford College] (Varah interview 7 April 1999). A Samaritan 
who knew her at her home in Bournemouth said, "A phenomenal lady - formidable. 
One of the icons of my life. Tremendously confident - charmed people... When she 
went for something she got it" (Simestra interview 15 May 1999).
Dr. Odium's most in^portant platform in terms of the change in the suicide law was her 
chairmanship of the BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee (see chapter 4 and Appendix 
B). She was elected to this post on 10 October 1952, and remained the Chair, despite 
several minuted attempts to escape, firom then until the Joint Committee's suspension 
in 1961. During this period she attended every single recorded meeting save one. 
Committee members came and went, including such co-optees as Dr. Herman 
Mannheim, Reader in Criminology fi*om the LSE, who was a member fi'om 1952 to 
1955. None of them had a tenure even approaching the length of Dr. Odium's, and 
attendance at the twice- or thrice- yearly meetings was patchy, with many having no
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more than five people present. So it is not unreasonable to suggest that hers was the 
dominant influence on the afiairs of the committee.
Certainly the Joint Committee's involvement with suicide law appears firom the minutes 
of their meetings, to have been initiated and driven forward almost entirely by Dr. 
Odium, and her role in the passage of the Suicide Act is examined here in the context 
of the activity of the Joint Committee. The guiding brief for this committee was:
"To provide a channel for co-operation between the BMA and the Magistrates' 
Association; to consider all matters of common interest, with special reference 
to observations, prevention and treatment in relation to the medical aspects of 
legal offence; and to make recommendations for the in^rovement and 
extension of existing arrangements and for &cilitating new legislation."
In July of 1955 they had just completed a massive report on the law in regard to 
cruelty to, and neglect o ( children and were casting about for another subject on which 
to focus their attention. The minutes for 22 July 1955 record, "No subject calling for 
consideration by the Committee came immediately to mind and members agreed to 
give thought to the matter."
At the next meeting on 14 October 1955 item 5 on the agenda was to:
"Consider:
1) Report from the Chairman of a recent case in which a woman was 
sentenced to 15 days imprisonment on a charge of attempted suicide. 
{emphasis added)
2) Question whether the previous stated pohcy of the Committee on this 
subject should be reviewed.
The "previous stated pohcy" is quoted in chapter 4 - it was the 1947 recommendation 
that the law be amended "so that attempted suicide...would not be dealt with as an 
iUegal offence" .
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From this point on the minutes paint a picture of dogged determination on the part of 
Dr. Odium to get the Joint Committee to use their influence to end the criminal 
prosecution of attempted suicide. This aim was pursued with unflagging energy 
despite disinterest shading into recalcitrance among other committee members (see 
Appendix B). The core of the resistance was on the grounds that, in the words of the 
Magistrates Association, "attençted suicide should continue to be a criminal offence 
so that where necessary the person concerned can be safeguarded and helped" 
(Magistrates Association 36th Annual Report October 1956:23). This was the premise 
on which most people who initially opposed décriminalisation said their reservations 
were based. Chad Varah describes his own position, and how Dr. Odium overcame it: 
"She approached me. She wanted my support in getting attempted suicide 
decriminalised. She thought if I was against it she would not succeed. At the 
beginning I was doubtful about the wisdom of it. My experience with 
recovered attenq)ted suicides in the City was that the then system served them 
well. Someone who had attempted suicide and not died could be brought 
before a court and be made to consider various forms of help. The magistrate 
would say, "You need psychiatric help. I require you to present yourself to 
hospital and if you refuse I will send you to prison, and I think it would not be 
good for you, but I do have the power to do it.' That is what happened 
throughout the Met area. Doris said, 'If only the rest of England was like 
that. You would not believe what goes on - the stupid magistrates want to 
punish attenq)ted suicides. You in London have no problem, but for that to 
happen everywhere it needs to be decriminalised.' So I did give her my support 
and wrote to various people at her request and confirmed it when people asked 
me if I supported her" (Varah interview 7 April 1997).
The minutes of the Joint Committee show that Dr. Odium did manage, early on, to 
achieve agreement on the definition of attempted suicides as mentally ill and in need of 
treatment. However, as in other venues where the issue was discussed, the stumbling
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block to gaming agreement on décriminalisation was how to ensure the treatment was 
administered. As set out in chapter 4, whenever decriminahsation was mooted, in 
various draft resolutions fi’om the Joint Committee, it was coupled with proposals for 
"suitable alternative legislation [which] could provide for pohce intervention in cases of 
attempted suicide and give power for such cases to be brought to a hospital for 
observation and treatment if necessary" (see Appendix B).
Dr. Odium worked very hard to shift opinion on the Joint Committee on this issue. A 
seven page summary of the Report of the Royal Commission on Mental Illness and 
Mental Deficiency (The Percy Commission) was circulated to ah members foUowing its 
pubhcation in May of 1957. The clauses that addressed the anxiety about attempted 
suicides escaping treatment were pointed out. When opposition persisted Dr. Odium 
invited Professor E. Stengel, the President of the Psychiatric Section of the Royal 
Society of Medicine, to come and speak to the Committee on the issue.
The same month of Professor Stengel's talk to the Joint Committee, the article by Dr. 
Odium urging that both suicide and attenpted suicide should no longer be criminal 
offences was published in the Proceedings o f the Royal Society o f Medicine. A copy 
of it was circulated to ah the members of the Joint Committee.
The most significant moment for the Joint Committee, in terms of influencing the 
Suicide Act was undoubtedly the meeting at the Home Office to which they were 
summoned in the spring of 1959 (see chapters 4 and 7). The Joint Committee minutes 
of 22 January 1959 record receipt of the invitation "for representatives of the 
Committee to attend the Home Office on Friday, 13 March, 1959, to discuss with 
officers of the Department the problem of attenpted suicide." It should be noted that 
here, again, the focus was entirely on "the problem of attempted suicide", not on 
suicide. The minutes show it was the Chair who selected ("invited") the members 
who were to attend. In the end just three (Lady Adrian, Dr. Bodman, and Mrs.
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MacAdam), went to the meeting with Dr. Odium and the Assistant Secretary to the 
Committee, J.DJ. Havard. The only Home Ofldce attendee was Francis Graham 
Harrison, but his rank - Deputy Permanent Secretary - indicates the Department 
considered the matter to be in^ortant. He was outnumbered by two representatives 
from the Ministry of Health, Dr. W.S. Maclay and Mr. P. Benner.
The significance of the Health Ministry representation was made plain by Graham 
Harrison who "opened the discussing by saying that the question of a change in the law 
relating to attenpted suicide had been under discussion in the Home Ofi&ce and that 
the conclusion had been reached that it was undesirable to retain attenq)ted suicide as a 
criminal offence as it was mainly a social and medical problem" (Minute of 13 March 
1959 meeting taken by J.D.J. Havard, in file of Joint Committee at the BMA archives).
This announcement must have been deeply gratifying to Dr. Odium as it was exactly 
what she had been urging since 1955. However, at that point, March of 1959, the 
law remained unchanged; none of the usual machinery for changing the law had been 
engaged; and a general election was imminent. There was therefore the possibility that 
however undesirable the current Home Office occupants thought it, attenq)ted suicide 
might well remain a criminal offence.
Against this background, on 16 April Kenneth Robinson put down a Parhamentary 
Question to the Home Secretary asking about the meeting between Home Office 
Officials and members of the BMA/Magistrates Committee. Butler rephed:
"A helpful meeting between officials of my Department and of the Ministry of 
Health and representatives of the Joint Committee... took place last month. 
The meeting explored the crucial problem of ensuring that persons who attempt 
suicide receive treatment of their condition. The existing law does ensure this 
although I recognise that it has unsatisfactory features and before we change it
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I want to be satisfied that there are workable alternatives" (Hansard: 
Commons: 16 April 1959).
Thi s reply displeased the members of the Joint Committee. The minutes of their next 
meeting on 21 May when - unusually - eleven members were present, recorded the 
disapproval and agreed to let the Home Secretary know about it:
"The Committee was disturbed that the statement to the House of Commons 
did not appear to be in accordance with the trend of the discussion at the Home 
Office in that the Secretary of State for Home Affairs had said that the existing 
law ensured that persons who attempt to commit suicide received treatment. 
The Committee thought it was clear that this was not generally so at present. 
RESOLVED: That a letter be addressed to the Home Office seeking
clarification of the above points. "
This minute shows that the concern was very much not to allow the statement that 
the existing law ensured treatment to go unchallenged. Since a majority of the 
members at this meeting had not been involved in the previous discussions about 
changing the suicide law, the displeasure is likely to have been expressed in the main by 
Dr. Odium, whose entire concern had been to publicise the unsatisfactory nature of the 
existing law.
The letter telling the Home Secretary of the Joint Committee's disapproval was duly 
sent, and an emolhent reply came back from the Home Office dated 22 June, giving 
their version of the discussion in March:
"Mr. Graham-Harrison explained that the provisional view of the Home Office 
on this subject was that attenq)ted suicide was primarily a medical and social 
problem which ought so far as possible to be dealt with outside the criminal 
law. The Home Secretary was, however, anxious to ensure that the
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arrangements for getting people wAo had attenq)ted suicide into the hands of 
appropriate medical and social agencies could operate adequately. He would 
be glad therefore to have the benefit of the views of the members of the Joint 
Committee of the BMA and the Magistrates Association who had studied this 
problem in some detail" (letter dated 22 June 1959 in Joint Committee file in 
BMA archives).
However, "Members [of the Committee] were not satisfied", according to minutes of 
24 September, "with the explanation given of the reply by the Home Secretary to the 
PQ on 16 April and could not agree that the existing law ensured that persons who 
attenq)ted suicide received treatment...
RESOLVED: 1) Home Secretary to be informed of disquiet of Committee 2) 
After the coming General Election a further approach be made to the Home 
Secretary to ascertain the action proposed in regard to amending the legislation 
on atteropted suicide."
At the next meeting on 18 November, after the election, the Committee received 
copies of the Hansard of 5 November in which Butler had responded to yet another 
Kenneth Robinson question about the law on attenq)ted suicide, with an exphcit 
commitment to reform, albeit in perhaps dehberately opaque language: "As the Hon 
Member knows, I have stated that I understand his point of view on this matter" 
(Hansard 5 November 1959).
The Committee then "discussed the various ways in which persons who attercpted 
suicide might best be dealt with and it was generally agreed that it was desirable to 
avoid the stigma which, at present, attached itself to such cases under existing 
arrangements." Seymour Collins, who continued to resist the removal of all court 
power, suggested that atten^ted suicides seemed to do well on Probation - why not 
let Magistrates Courts put them on probation as a 'civil' action?
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The Committee then-
"RESOLVED: That the Home Ofi&ce he informed that the Committee is of the 
opinion that provision Aonld be made in any amending legislation on atten^ted 
suicide for machinery whereby the courts could deal with cases in their civil 
capacity where there is no alternative method of safeguarding the would-be 
suicide or the community."
So Dr. Odium had achieved her long sought goal of having the Joint Committee agree 
that attempted suicide should be removed from the criminal courts, although their 
determination to maintain some judicial involvement, even if only civil, proved 
ineradicable.
Following this no frirther action by the Joint Committee on this issue is recorded. At 
their meeting a year later on 3 November 1960 they "welcomed" the report of the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee (see Chapter 7), and on 21 March 1961 they 
"received" a report of the Suicide Bill, which had its second reading on 2 March, but 
by then the Joint Committee had moved on to discussions on the rehabilitation of 
alcoholics.
It is clear that Dr. Odium used her position as Chair of the Joint Committee as a base 
from which to canvass more widely for support to change the law on suicide, but 
always on an individual basis; she never attempted to set up any kind of can^aigning 
or lobbying organisation. The Joint Committee minutes for the meeting of 5 
November 1958 record, "The Chair reported she had brought the matter [of a change 
in the law on suicide] to the attention of a number of bodies, including the National 
Association for Mental Health, which supported the view of the Committee..."
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These minutes go on to report, "It appeared to the Committee that no further action 
was called for immediately..." However, despite this, a few weeks later, at the end of 
November, Dr. Odium wrote to the Roman Cathohc Archbishop, Cardinal Godfrey 
and to the General Secretary of the Free Church Federal Council seeking endorsement 
- or at least abstention from censure - of the proposal to reform the suicide law (see 
chapter 5). To both she offered the assurance that "there is no suggestion that suicide 
should not continue to be regarded as a sin. Our only object is to remove it from the 
purview of the criminal law," and included with the letter a report suggesting that 
criminahty "actually inq)edes measures of treatment and rehabihtation".
The answers she received to these letters seem to be have been the basis of the claim in 
Parliament that the churches had no objection to the reform. The answer Dr. Odium 
received to her letter to the Free Church Federation (see chapter 5) in fact refused to 
respond to her request for support for décriminalisation, and referred her to their 
Women's Section who "gave their support to the Resolution passed by the National 
Council of Women". With a peculiar circularity, this NCW resolution seems to have 
had at least something - if not everything - to do with Dr. Odium (see chapter 5).
Coincident with her work on the Joint Committee, in the summer of 1958, Dr. Odium 
received the invitation to join the Church of England Committee considering the law 
on suicide (see chapter 5). The proposal to ask her came only after several failed 
atten^ts to fill the 'psychiatric slot' and was greeted without excessive enthusiasm by 
the Chairman, John Christie, Principle of Jesus College Oxford. "It is rather a shot in 
the dark..." Christie said, "but I think it would be good to have a woman member."
There is no indication in the records that anyone involved with the C of E committee 
knew of Dr. Odium's committed stance in regard to suicide law reform (see chapter 5) 
This would accord with Chad Varah's comment that she wanted to keep the issue very 
low profile because she suspected if the general public knew of it there would be an
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outcry against décriminalisation. Varah remembers her saying, "Look how they are 
about capital punishment" (Varah interview 7 April 1999).
As described in chapter 5, Dr. Odium found herself at odds with the other members of 
the Church of England committee over the issue of the moral (and by inq)hcation 
criminal) culpability of some kinds of suicide. After months of wrangling the chairman 
of this committee, John Christie, made his exasperated comment that he wondered 
"whether the real trouble is that she does not emotionally beheve in what we should 
call responsibihty or guilt at all." It is in fact highly probable that she did not; that her 
position on attempted suicide was that it was a medical matter having nothing at all to 
do with responsibihty or guilt.
In considering Dr. Odium's remarkable capacity to appear in a variety of different 
places, it should be noted that in the file on the booklet in the Church of England 
archives in Bermondsey there is a note to the effect that the British Medical Women's 
Federation in 1957 called for a change in the law on attenq)ted suicide. Dr. Odium 
was the immediate past President of the British Medical Women's Federation.
In ah the places she appeared. Dr. Odium remained consistently focused on the 
practical objective of removing atterrq)ted suicides from criminal justice jurisdiction. 
She had no wish to chaUenge cultural values about self killing in general, and this was 
made exphcit in her letter to the Roman Cathohc Archbishop where she said: "I feel I 
should assure Your Grace that there is no suggestion that suicide should not continue 
to be regarded as a sin. Our only object is to remove it from the purview of the 
criminal law" (see chapter 5). It is also apparent in her ultimate acquiescence (not 
without complaint) in the Church of England booklet recommendation for an 
alternative burial service for suicides who were "morahy guilty". Dr. Odium did not 
want to make a judgement of any kind about self killing. Moral judgements in these
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matters were to her not relevant to the issue of how the state should best deal with the 
people who tried to kill themselves and foiled.
In this way Dr. Odium defined limits for the debate on the décriminalisation of suicide 
\\èich were never breached. Once the difficult Church of England committee was 
negotiated and its booklet recommending décriminalisation of attempted suicide was 
safely published, matters to do with morahty, firee will, and rational choice never again 
surfoced in the debate. The question was entirely one of ensuring the appropriate state 
agency took charge of this kind of deviant behaviour. Not really because the existing 
situation was unkind or cruel, but because it was ineffective. "A better way to treat 
these unfortunate people" - the Government's phrase in describing the reform - was 
exactly how Dr. Odium had conceived the solution to the problem, and this was the 
basis on which the Suicide Bill was passed.
Conclusion
There is an ongoing debate about the relative weight to be given to structure and 
agency in explaining social change (Althusser 1971, Giddens 1979, James 1997), 
although "most of those who have participated have continued to insist that both 
categories remain indispensable" (Skinner 1997:18). The evidence firom enq)irical case 
studies of social reform legislation, including this one, supports the idea that both are 
necessary but neither by itself sufficient. Perhaps because statute law is so obviously a 
human construct, the role of human agency in making it is especially clear, and a fiiUy 
causal explanation less than satisfoctory. In the case of the Suicide Act, the presence 
of powerful factors seemingly ranged against its passage throws into sharp rehef the 
inportance of the actions of its advocates. This chapter has described the three most 
significant of these, and in particular how Kenneth Robinson and Doris Odhim put the 
issue on the pohtical agenda. The next chapter sets out in detail how the most 
influential agent - Rah Butler - actually put the measure through Parliament.
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Notes to Chapter 6
^The reason for the curious lack of mention of the Suicide Act in the memoirs of the main 
protagonists can only be conjectured. One possibility is that the complete lack of controversy meant 
that once passed it was genuinely forgotten. Another is that Butler's determinaton to forestall 
controversy on the issue extended even to the writing of his memoirs.
^Butler was made Under Secretary of State for India in 1932, moved to the Foreign OfiBce in 1938, 
and to Education in 1941. From 1944 to 1945 he was Minister for education. Following the 
Conservatives return of office in 1951 he became Chancellor of the Exchequer; 1955 Lord Privy Seal 
and Leader of the house of Commons; 1957 Home Secretary; 1963 Foreign Secretary; 1965 he was 
made a life Peer
^This aspect of Butler's personality was mentioned by virtually everyone who had worked with him or 
knew him. It also features regularly in comments about him in memoirs and biographies. The 
TIMES obituary (10 March 1982) referred to his "public ambiguity of expression". At the service of 
Thanksgiving for his life in Westminster Abbey 5 April 1982, the Rev. H.A. Williams spoke of his 
"immense subtlety of mind and manoeuvre" and how "he accepted the stark realism of Christ's 
command: 'Be ye therefore as wise as serpents ' (Address reprinted in^  Rabanthology edited by 
Mollie Butler 1995)
^Radzinowicz was delighted with the project and describes it: "The programme consisted of two 
thrusts: penal reform and criminological research. Its significance consisted in the fact that, for the 
first time, their interdependence was laid bare." (1999 p. 169) He goes on to say, apropos of penal 
reform, but with applicability to the suicide law: "That in such unfavourable circumstances a 
reforming zeal should still be endorsed, and for that matter by a Conservative administration, was 
very unusual indeed. Nor should it be forgotten that it would not have happened but for Mr. Butler. 1 
do not like to indulge in gratuitous generalisations, yet 1 firmly believe that it would have been found 
virtually impossible to seek out another prominent political figure of the ruling party who at that time 
would have evinced the desire and the courage to be the captain of such a hazardous enterprise."
(p. 169)
^Butler's written answer of 13 February 1958 to Kenneth Robinson's PQ about the sentences on 
people convicted of attempted suicide showed the following table of disposals from 1952-1956:
Sentence or Order Number Percent
Imprisonment
Up to one month 31 1.1
Over one month, up to three months 76 2.6
Over three months, up to six months 84 2.9
Over six months 3 0.1
Probation order 1,842 63.0
Conditional or Absolute Discharge, Bind-Over 819 28.0
Fine 21 0.7
Otherwise disposed of 46 1.6
TOTAL 2,922 100.0
^Anthony Sampson described the House of Lords in 1961: "There is an aura of contented old age - 
older than the oldest men's club. The rooms are full of half-remembered faces of famous men, or 
politicians who had dropped suddenly out of public life twenty years ago, who - how shall one put it - 
one had forgotten were still around... Sitting on the red-leather sofas, facing each other, leaning back, 
whispering, putting their feet up, fumbling with papers, making notes, putting a deaf-aid (supplied by 
the attendant) to their ear, or simply sleeping, are the peers... More often there is only a handful of 
peers in the room and a pleasant somnolence descends while one of them is speaking." (Sampson 
1962 pp.22-23)
^This information appears in the official Howard biography (p.44); in interview Howard said he had 
gained it from Butler's sister Iris Portal.
^ h e  exchange of letters is in the E ll Miscellaneous correspondence file in the Butler papers. The 
reporter was a Barbara Vereker who sent her article dated 29 July 1959. Butler's response is dated 19 
August 1959.
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Chapter 7: The Parliamentary Passage
The Suicide Bill was a government measure that became law in the summer of 1961. 
On its final 3rd Reading in the House of Commons on 28 July, one of the very few 
speakers, Eric Fletcher M.P., made a revealing comment: "Although this is an
in^ortant bill," he said, "which makes a significant change in the law, it appears to 
have passed through Parhament practically unnoticed" (Hansard: Commons: 28 July 
1961).
Detailed study of the Act's passage supports this observation, and shows that its most 
salient feature was an excessively low profile. For a start, it did not arrive on the 
government's legislative agenda through the approved channels (see below): it did not 
appear on any departmental list; it was not discussed, or even mentioned, in the Future 
Legislation Committee, and it was not considered at the formal Cabinet meeting that 
agreed bills for the coming session. When it did arrive in Parliament, it came in via 
the House of Lords, traditionally the starting point for worthy but dull, non- 
contentious matters, whose sessions receive scant attention compared to the 
Commons. Once into the Commons it was handled by a very junior minister only just 
appointed to the Home Office, and its 2nd and 3rd Readings were scheduled on 
Fridays, when attendance was normally extremely thin. Moreover (a factor probably 
fortuitous), nearly all its appearances coincided with hugely newsworthy other events. 
The result was, as Mr. Fletcher said, that the entire passage was "practically 
unnoticed". Examining the data, it is hard to escape the impression that this is exactly 
what Rab Butler wanted.
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This chapter looks at the actual passage of the Act, using documents in the Public 
Record Office, the Butler papers, Parhamentary Hansards, and interviews with people 
who were present.
The first point to be considered is why the Suicide Bill was a government measure at 
all Reform of this kind - non-pohtical issues involving 'matters of conscience' - is 
typically enacted through Private Members' Bills. Not only is it difficult, and possibly 
damaging, for a government to try and force - "whip" - its M P.s to vote a certain way 
on a "matter of conscience", it is ofi;en hard to gain agreement even among Ministers 
on such issues. Roy (now Lord) Jenkins, the Labour Home Secretary m 1965-67 
when much reforming legislation was passed, said he regretted that the criminal law 
reforms of his years had had to be by way of Private Member's Bills. This was 
necessary, he said, because although he personally supported the reforms he would 
"never have been able to get them through the Cabinet" (Jenkins interview 6 November 
1996).
When his party was in opposition, before 1964, Roy Jenkins had changed the law on 
censorship by piloting the controversial Obscene Publications Act through Parliament 
as a Private Members Bill. It became law m July 1959. In the October 1959 issue of 
Encounter Jenkins reported on his "five year struggle to get this Act on the Statute 
Book" ("Obscenity, Censorship & the Law: The Story of a Bill"). In this he asked, 
"What conclusions can be drawn" about reform legislation? Among his answers was 
the view that "Libertarian reform..is undoubtedly a long and wearisome job for a 
private member. A determinedly hberal Home Secretary could do it much more 
quickly and much more surely" {Encounter October 1959:62).
This is a conclusion that would be drawn by anyone knowledgeable in the ways of 
Parhament. In the twenty-five years firom 1950 to 1975, it has been calculated that 
only 26 percent of ah the Private Members' biUs introduced became law, conq)ared
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with 93 per cent of government bills (Zander 1994:71). Jenkins also listed in his 
article the requirements he believed necessary for a Private Member's Bdl to succeed. 
These included: "some well organised and determined alhes both inside and outside the 
House of Commons, and ... an articulate and inq)ressive body of extra-parliamentary 
support." Neither of these were present, nor were they hkely to emerge, on behalf of 
deciiminaUsing suicide at the time Kenneth Robinson brought the issue to Butler's 
attention. If Butler wanted the reform to happen, and there are reasons to suppose he 
did (see chapter 6), he might well have determined it would be quicker and more 
effective if he, as Home Secretary, did it himself In any case, the fact is that the 
Suicide Act was a government measure, although it did not follow the track usually 
taken to become one. In order to demonstrate the oddity of the path it did take, it is 
necessary to chart the usual route.
Michael Zander in The Law Making Process (1994) says, "Very httle has been written 
about the process of preparing legislation from Whitehall's perspective" (p.4). He then 
quotes at length from a lecture on the subject given by Sir Granville Ram in 1951, 
when Sir Granville was First Parliamentary Counsel. Zander, writing in 1994, indicates 
this account continues to be an authoritative source, and, of course, with reference to 
this research. Sir Granville describes the process at a time near to the passage of the 
Suicide Act (Zander 1994:10-13). Moreover, his account tallies with the information 
gained in interviews with people who were, and are, actual participants in the process. 
In particular it talhes with the comments of Lord Renton, who as David Renton M.P. 
was a member of the Future Legislation Committee (see below) in 1959-61, chaired 
the Committee on the Preparation of Legislation (1973-75) and at the time this thesis 
was written was President of the Statute Law Society (Renton interview 8 May 1996). 
It also talhes with the recollections of Sir Charles Cunningham, who was Permanent 
Secretary to the Home Office from 1957 to 1966 (Cunningham interview 30 
September 1996).
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The "official", and usual, way government bills proceed is as follows:
At the opening of each new session of Parliament, at the end of October or early 
November, the Cabinet Office asks all government departments to submit lists of bills 
they wish to have enacted, to be introduced not in the current session, but in the next 
Parliamentary session twelve months hence.
The Usts are collected and given to a Cabinet Committee known as the Future 
Legislation Committee (FLC). Membership of the FLC includes the Leaders of the 
Commons and the Lords, the Chief Whip and several senior Ministers. After the 
Christmas break, in the early months of the new year, the FLC examines all the 
proposals in detail and decides wftich ones are to be put forward for the laborious and 
expensive process of Parliamentary drafting. David Renton's membership of the FLC 
coincided in part with his time as a Minister at the Home Office (1958 - 1962). He 
recalled that he "loved" the work of the Committee. "We pulled everything apart," 
he said, "went through all the bills with a fine-tooth comb" (Renton interview 8 May
1996).
A provisional hst of possible government bills is agreed and circulated to Ministers in 
the various government departments. At this point a power struggle takes place, 
according to people who have taken part, in which Ministers battle to have their bills 
included if they have been left out, or given a higher priority if they are low on the list. 
Senior Ministers often actually appear in front of the FLC to argue their case, as there 
is never sufficient legislative space to include all the bills believed to be inq)ortant.
The hst that results from this struggle is then submitted to the Cabinet, usually in early 
June. Following Cabinet discussion, the - sometimes amended - hst goes back to the 
FLC which then in^lements the final laborious process of formal drafting of the chosen
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bills by Parliamentary Counsel. After the summer recess, FLC presents the Cabinet 
with the programme of government biUs to be introduced in the coming session.
This is the usual process. It is not what happened with the Suicide bill Reform of the 
law on suicide made its first appearance in the legislative arena on 6 February 1958, 
when Kenneth Robinson, put an oral question about it to the Home Secretary, Rab 
Butler. Previous to this the only reference to suicide law in Parliament had been in 
respect of suicide pacts during debates on the Homicide Act 1957. Outside Parliament 
the only recorded interest in the issue appeared in the BMA/Magistrates Joint 
Committee, whose deliberations were private (see chapters 4 and 6), and in the work 
of Professor E. Stengel of Sheffield University, who had been researching suicide and 
attempted suicide for some years. These small instances could not be said to meet the 
Jenkins' criterion of "an articulate and impressive body of extra-parhamentary 
support."
The question Robinson put was: "Would the Home Secretary introduce legislation to 
amend the law relating to suicide?" (This exchange is from Hansard:Commons:6 Feb. 
1958)
"I am not satisfied," Butler answered, "that any change in the law is desirable." 
Robinson pressed him with a supplementary question, and Butler responded: "There is 
no evidence in my possession that the alteration of the basic concept would be 
universally acceptable to pubhc opinion."
This answer is interesting in the light of Butler's subsequent actions because there was 
never any evidence throughout the passage of the bill - nor any attempt to gain any - 
that the concept would be universally acceptable to public opinion. What did emerge 
during the next three years were indications that a small, but not necessarily 
representative, section of the Estabhshment were willing to accept a change in the law 
on suicide (see chapters 4,5 and 6).
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Robinson followed his oral question with the written one on 13 March (see chapter 4) 
and his Early Day Motion advocating that suicide and attenq)ted suicide be 
decriminalised (see chapter 6). He put another oral question on the subject to Butler 
on 22 May 1958 and elicited an answer that demonstrated the connection - in Butler's 
mind - between suicide law and mental health legislation. Robinson's question was 
"Does not the rt. hon. Gentleman agree that other provisions of the law in regard to 
breach of the peace and mental health are quite sufficient to deal with the cases he has 
in mind?" (Hansard: Commons: 22 May 1958). To which Butler replied: "The 
Government's approach to mental health, as the House knows, is at present actual 
[sic], and does bring all this subject to the fore. It is against that background that I am 
examining it."
There was no further recorded movement on the issue until the beginning of the 
following year when in January 1959, Doris Odium's Joint BMA/Magistrates 
Committee was invited to come to a meeting at the Home Office in March to discuss 
the law relating to attempted suicide (see chapter 4). The Committee minutes record 
receipt of this invitation in January, and Butler confirmed it in answer to another 
Robinson Parliamentary Question on 26 February. The minutes of this meeting (see 
Appendix B) show quite clearly that by March of 1959 the decision had already been 
made that attempted suicide - and thus suicide itself - should be decriminalised. 
However a number of steps needed to be taken before the objective could be realised.
Criminal Law Revision Committee
One of the most inçortant of these steps involved the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee (CLRC), which was set up by Butler on 2 February 1959. Until this 
point, despite years of legal lobbying, there had been no formal, continuing body 
charged with reviewing the criminal law and recommending reform The Lord 
Chancellor had for some years had his own Law Reform Committee to review the civil 
law, but Butler's Committee was the first with a remit to review the criminal law.
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(Zander 1994; and Cnmd 2573 1965 on proposals for a Law Commission) The fifteen 
legally distinguished members,^ presumably chosen by Butler (he makes no mention of 
it in his autobiography, nor does Howard in his biography of Butler), represented a 
remarkably wide range of opinion. There was, for exarrçle, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions Sir Theobald Mathew, a Roman Catholic said by Noel Annan to be "one 
of the most reactionary men ever to hold that office" (Annan interview 15 March
1997). Mathew brought the charge of obscenity against Lady Chatterley's Lover in 
October 1961. Mervyn Griffith Jones, another member of the CLRC, was chief 
prosecution counsel on the case. It was Griffith Jones who put to the jury the famous 
question as to whether Lady Chatterley was "the kind of book you would even wish 
your wife or your servants to read?" (TIMES 21 October 1960) However, 
membership of the CLRC also included Glanville Williams, Professor of Law at 
Cambridge, and a noted canq)aigner for libertarian reform (he became life President of 
the Abortion Law Reform Association in 1962 and was a Vice Preseident of the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society). Williams book The Sanctity o f Life and the Criminal 
Law had been published not long before his appointment to the CLRC in February 
1959. He had also written one of the two letters to the TIMES in February 1958 
supporting Kenneth Robinson's proposal to decriminalise suicide (see chapter 3).
The remit of the CLRC was extremely limited. The members, who in addition to the 
above included two Lord Justices, two High Court Judges, a QC and a Brigadier, were 
expected to serve voluntarily, meet only occasionally, and confine their deliberations to 
matters referred to them by the Home Secretary. While an important precedent, this 
Committee was not an actual precursor of the Law Commission, which the Labour 
government set up by statute m 1965. The Law Commission is empowered to review 
the criminal law on its own initiative, and has an independent existence guaranteed by 
statute (Law Commissions Act 1965).
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The inq)ortaiice of Butler's Criminal Law Revision Committee to this research is the 
fact that the second matter Butler referred to them was a subsidiary aspect of the 
suicide law issue. (The referral letter is reproduced at Appendix C) Their subsequent 
report was tactically deployed by him to help gain acceptance for the Suicide Bill. The 
referral was in the autumn of 1959, but in advance of that an event of rather larger 
importance took place: a general election. The suicide issue did not appear in any of 
the three party manifestos for the 1959 election. Indeed the only place in any election 
literature where mention of it is found is in the Penguin Special The Case for Labour 
(1959) by Roy Jenkins M.P., then an opposition spokesman on Home Affairs. At the 
end of The Case Jenkins presented an agenda for an in-coming Labour Home 
Secretary and "reform of the suicide law" appeared as one item on the list. In 
interview Jenkins credited Kenneth Robinson with pressing him to include this (see 
chapter 6), but he also said there was no ground swell of feeling on the issue, and it did 
not subsequently appear in the Labour manifesto (Jenkins interview 6 November 
1996).
On the 18th September 1959 Parliament was dissolved, and the election took place on 
8 October. The result was an overwhelming Conservative win. The Tories received 
49.6% of the vote and 365 seats to Labour's 258 and the Liberals' 6 (Butler and Rose
1960). The BBC Parliamentary correspondent, Roland Fox, commented, "The 
majority means that the electorate have given the Conservatives a decisive mandate to 
continue their administration for another five years." Such a prominent member of 
the administration as Butler must have seen the result as an endorsement of his own 
Ministerial performance and confirmation that he could pursue his programme as 
planned.
The new Parliament assembled on the 20th of October 1959, the day after publication 
of the Church of England booklet "Ought Suicide to be a Crime?" (see chapter 5). It 
would have been surprising if Butler had paid much attention to either the booklet or
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indeed to the opening of Parliament, as on 21 October he was married for the second 
time. His first wife, Sydney Courtauld, had died a lingering and painful death fi:om 
cancer in 1954. This second marriage was to a Courtauld cousin, Molly, whose own 
husband had also suffered a long agonising illness that only ended in death in March of 
1959. The Butlers spent a five day honeymoon in Rome, and returned as the new 
Parliament was getting underway (Butler 1971, Howard 1987). It is difficult to 
conceive how Butler sustained the burden of work he carried at this period. He was 
Home Secretary, Leader of the House of Commons, and afl;er the '59 election was 
made Chairman of the Conservative Party as well. His biographer, Anthony Howard, 
says, "Rab's workload was certainly exceptionally heavy: in addition to trying to run 
possibly the most mine-strewn of all Departments of State, he was responsible for the 
Government's entire legislative programme - on top of which ... he was now expected 
to give at least two mornings a week to the task of keeping the Party outside 
Parliament happy" (Howard 1987:274).
Yet despite this, only days after returning from his honeymoon and less than a month 
after the election, on 4 November 1959, he referred part of the suicide issue to his new 
Criminal Law Revision Committee. Appendix C shows this referral letter, from Butler's 
Permanent Secretary Sir Charles Cunningham to the Chairman of the CLRC, Lord 
Justice Sellers. The letter makes clear that the terms of this reference to the CLRC 
were strictly limited. They were not asked to consider the substantive issue of the 
actual de-ciiminalisation of suicide and attempted suicide; that matter was firmly 
reserved for the Home Secretary to decide. The Committee were only asked to 
consider what amendments in the criminal law might be required, consequential to 
décriminalisation, in order to retain the criminahty of assisting a suicide. Given the 
intellectually prestigious nature of the CLRC members it is not unreasonable to wonder 
why Butler did not refer the substantive issue to them And if not the substantive 
issue, why bother to refer the subsidiary matter?
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A possible answer to the first question is suggested by the minutes of the CLRC, which 
are now available in the Pubhc Record ofhce (LCO 2/7040). These point to the 
possibihty that had the CLRC been asked to consider whether suicide should be 
decriminahsed, they might not have been able to agree. Given the diametrically 
opposed views of some of the members, such disagreement seems highly likely. It is 
possible that Butler, who after all had appointed the CLRC members, anticipated such 
an outcome, and wished to forestall it. But then, why refer the subsidiary issue?
A possible answer to this second question is suggested by Butler's subsequent use of 
the CLRC report, which he represented to the Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor 
as if the CLRC had considered the substantive issue and had recommended 
decriminahsation. Appendix F shows his letter to the Prime Minister in which he refers 
to the "4 judges and other notables" giving "weighty backing" to the Suicide Bilk
It is also the case that there was a tricky legal point involved in the subsidiary issue; 
one which was spotted by Lord Denning in the Lords' debate on the Suicide Bill.  ^ This 
was the anomaly involved in making it a crime to aid and abet something which was 
itself not a crime. Butler may have thought to scotch possible legal quibbling on this 
point by giving it a prestigious provenance.
The referral to the CLRC took place on 4 November. The next day, 5 November, was 
the day the new Parhament put its first Questions to the Home Secretary. During 
these, Kenneth Robinson asked Butler "if he will introduce, during the present Session, 
legislation to amend the law relating to suicide and atten^ted suicide" (Hansard: 
Commons: 5 Nov. 1960). Butler's answer was obhque, but positive: "As the hon. 
Member knows, I have stated that I understand his point of view on this matter..." But 
went on to say, "We should however get the views of the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee before taking the matter further" (ibid.).
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At this same first Question time, Butler was subjected to a sustained attack from his 
own Conservative backbenchers on the issues of discipline, crime, and capital 
punishment (Hansard 5 November 1959). According to the GUARDIAN the next 
day, 6 Nov., the "flogging lobby would not be content to play it mild". The episode 
could have lefl; the Home Secretary in no doubt about his Parliamentary party's views 
on libertarian reform It was during this same month, November 1959, as per the 
standard procedure, that planning began for legislation in the next Parliamentary 
session. Butler, as Leader of the House, was Chairman of the Future Legislation 
Committee. The first draft list of suggested Bills for the 1960-61 session is available at 
the Public Record Office, and is dated November 1959 (CAB 21 4472). There is no 
mention of anything to do with suicide or with criminal law reform
The legislative proposals followed their usual route to the FLC, which exammed them 
through the winter months. Lord Renton and Sir Charles Cunningham confirmed in 
interview that to the best of their recollection the usual procedure was followed.
The provisional list of Bills, as agreed by the FLC, was presented to the Cabinet in 
June of 1960. The file in the Public Record Office has, along with this list, copies of 
memos from Michael Reed, secretary to the FLC, and from Sir Norman Brook, the 
Cabinet Secretary. Both memos said:
"Even these lists, which have already been drastically pruned, will, on the Chief
Whip's estimate, take up considerably more Parliamentary time than will be
available." (CAB 21 4471)
The list was circulated to Cabinet Ministers on 9 June 1960, together with a covering 
memorandum from the Home Secretary. Copies of the lists, together with Butler's 
covering memo appear at Appendices D and E.. As can be seen by Butler's covering 
memo, the Bills are divided into categories in descending order of priority:
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"A. 1 Essential Bills, which depend on some inescapable time-table.
A.2 Contingent Bills, the need for which depends on some factor at present 
unknown
B.l Main programme Bills 
B.2 Other programme Bills
C Other Bdls, for which it is unlikely that time can be found 
P. BiUs for handing to Private Members successfiil in the baUot. "
Then the Home Secretary repeated the warning from Michael Reed and Norman 
Brook:
"The 'programme' BiUs in Usts B.l and B.2 together constitute a programme 
much heavier than we can comfortably - perhaps even possibly - undertake ..." 
[and went on to recommend that the Cabinet agree -
"That no BUls should at this stage be added to Usts B. 1 and B.2 except on the 
basis that particular, identified BiUs are relegated to a later Session to make 
room for them
Then, rather nearer the time, we can consider what further reductions must be 
made."
As can be seen from the Usts (Appendix E), suicide does not appear on any of the Usts 
of proposed Government BiUs; not even on the "unlikely" C. Ust. It does appear, 
however, mid-way down the 23-item P. Ust of BUls "for handing to private members 
successful in the baUot." "The baUot" refers to the procedure in which backbench 
M P.s draw, lottery-fashion, for chances to introduce a Private Member's BiU. It is a 
feet of Parhamentary time-tabUng that only the first three or possibly four places in the 
baUot stand much chance of having their bills become law. The few M P.s who win 
these places are courted by great numbers of organisations who wish to see particular 
laws enacted. The organisations are ready with professionaUy drafted biUs, and offer
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substantial back-up and support to any Member prepared to take them forward. Low 
level government measures such as appeared on the 1960 P hst - (Agriculture 
(Miscellaneous), Home Safety Propaganda and the Citing of Crematoria share the hst 
with Suicide) - would have to con^ete for private members' fevour against fer more 
popular and pubhcity-worthy issues.^
Kenneth Robinson had broached the possibihty of a Private Member's Bih on suicide 
law back in July of 1958, in an oral question to Butler. "If the government are not 
prepared to take the initiative in this introduction," Robinson said, "can he say what 
would be their attitude towards the initiative being taken by a private Member?" 
(Hansard 24 July 1958) Butler’s answer at that time seemed designed to offer 
sufficient hope of government action to forestaU such a move: "I cannot state what 
my attitude would be towards the initiative of a private Member," he said, "until I 
know the nature of that introduction. I do not know whether the hon. Member is 
aware that the Joint Committee of the BMA and the Magistrates Association has 
commended the law and practice in Scotland in this matter. The reason I am not going 
any further in answer to the hon. Gentleman is that we are at present careftilly 
considering that with a view to seeing what we might do about it" (ibid.).
This answer, given back in the summer of 1958, clearly showed that Butler was 
sympathetic to the idea of suicide law reform, and there is evidence that around this 
time his officials did investigate the situation in Scotland. The minute of the meeting 
between Home Office officials and members of the BMA/Magistrates Association Joint 
Committee on 13 March 1959 (see chapters 4 and 6) records the Deputy Permanent 
Secretary, Francis Graham Harrison, saying that consideration had been given to the 
position in Scotland, wkiere "cases of attenq)ted suicide could be dealt with as a breach 
of the peace" but "it appeared that it was not altogether satisfectory because in some 
areas a charge of breach of the peace was made in nearly every case, with the result
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that of the cases known to the poHce a higher proportion was brought before the 
courts than happened at the present time in England and Wales."
So Butler had been quietly exploring the issue of suicide law reform for some time; 
and, of course, he had submitted the subsidiary matter about assisting suicide to his 
Criminal Law Revision Committee in the autumn of 1959. Nevertheless, in June of 
1960, such a reform did not appear on any of the lists of government bdls proposed to 
Cabinet, not even on the low level "C" hst. It did appear - so that technically it might 
be said to have been "approved" - but it was buried way down in the middle of the 
httle-regarded hst of "possible Private Members' bdls", and titled sinq)ly "Suicide". 
Then, quite suddenly in October 1960, this obscure measure leapt without preamble 
from its lowly place to nearly the top of the government's legislative programme, into 
a schedule which was already seriously overcrowded.
This seems to have happened in the space of nine days in October. The sequence of 
events as recorded in documents in the Pubhc Record OfiBce, was as foUows: (CAB 
128/34)
On the 17th of October 1960 a letter went from the Home Secretary's Private OfiBce to 
the Lord ChanceUor, which said:
"The Home Secretary recommends that legislation be introduced early next 
session along the lines of the report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee."
The report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee on "Suicide" was not formady 
published untd the 20th of October, but Butler would naturahy have seen it in advance. 
The CLRC had kept strictly to their remit and offered advice only on the question of 
the continued criminahty of assisting suicide, not on the matter of decriminahsing 
suicide itself. The report said:
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"We have not concerned ourselves with the main question of poHcy, whether 
suicide and attempted suicide should cease to be offences. The terms of 
reference require us to assume that they should do so..." (Cmnd. 1187 1959- 
60)
The report then went on to recommend what became the actual Clause 2 of the Bill, 
concerning criminal liability for comphcity in another's suicide. For reasons not made 
clear in the papers, the CLRC had actually commissioned Parliamentary drafting of this 
clause - a most unusual move, as this expensive step had ordinarily to be sanctioned by 
the Chairman of the FLC. Of course the Chairman of the FLC was Rab Butler.
The letter to the Lord Chancellor announcing Butler's intention to introduce the Bill, 
was sent on 17 October. On the same day the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee met, 
which Butler chaired. On 18 October he sent a letter to the Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan. A copy of this letter appears at Appendix F. Its contents, and the hand­
written additions are of particular interest. The letter reads:
"PRIME MINISTER
You will have seen from the minutes of the Home Affairs Committee meeting 
yesterday ... that the Committee agreed that the Government should introduce 
a Bill early in the new Session on lines recommended by the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee to provide that suicide and attençted suicide shall cease 
to be offences and that conq)Hcity in another person's suicide or attempted 
suicide shall be punishable by a maximum of fourteen years' imprisonment. The 
Committee also agreed that I should take an early opportunity of announcing 
our intentions.
It is proposed that the ["5/7/" is crossed out here and "Report” written in] 
should be pubhshed on 20th October. It is not likely to be controversial - the
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Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility has published a Report which 
is broadly in line with what we propose.
Then in the handwriting o f the signatory, "RAB", the letter goes on:
The above Criminal Law Revision Cmtee [sic] has no less than 4 Judges and 
other notables, so the backing is weighty. "
The manner in which this letter represents the Criminal Law Revision Committee and 
their report is of particular interest, as is the reference to the Church Assembly Board 
for Social Responsibility. The aim was clearly to create an impression of sohd support 
from the higher reaches of Law and Church.
Of possibly even greater interest is the hand-written note in the right hand comer, 
which is from the Prime Minister, "HM". There can be no doubt of this, as in the 
Pubhc Record Office file this hand-written note is typed out on an attached page and 
identified as bemg written by the Prime Minister, in a letter dated 19 October 1960, 
signed A.J. Phelps from Admiralty House, Whitehall to AW. Glanville at the Home 
Office.
The note says:
"There will be alot of talk about this, but I suppose it had better go on. Ought 
Cabinet to know? HM"
On the 20th of October the report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee was 
formally pubhshed. There was a httle press coverage, but not much, perhaps because 
on this same day the trial of Lady Chatterley's Lover opened, in a prosecution brought 
by the DPP, Theobald Mathew. The prosecution was under the new (1959) law on 
censorship, which had been enacted through Roy Jenkins' Private Member's bih. Press 
and pohtical interest was intense as the outcome would define how the new law was 
actuaUy to be used.
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Also on the 20th of October the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook wrote a memo 
to the Prime Minister about the proposed bill on suicide. This memo is reproduced at 
Appendix G: a model of the cool succinct style that would be expected of the country's 
top civil servant. It makes clear the issue is not suicide, but attempts at suicide, and 
that the measure is intended as a transfer, not an abdication, of responsibility: "it seems 
to be the general opinion," Sir Norman says, "that these people would be better dealt 
with outside the criminal law - as the majority already are". He then supphes the 
standard answer to the social control issue: "The Mental Health Act of last session 
makes it possible to detain for 28 days' observation a person who appears to be 
suffering from mental disorder and ought to be detained for his own health or safety."
On 25 October the Cabinet met. Item four out of five on the agenda was the Suicide 
BiU, immediately after a very controversial item on increasing National Health Service 
charges. The minutes of this Cabinet show a long and heated discussion of the NHS 
matter, which ended without a decision. Butler then introduced the suicide item with 
the comment that the proposed measure "has widespread support" (CAB 128/34).
From Butler's letter to the Prime Minister, and from his rephes to Kenneth Robinson's 
Parhamentary Questions over the preceding two years, it can be inferred that Butler 
based this claim of "widespread support" on the BMA/Magistrates Joint Committee 
recommendations and the Church of England booklet, both of which offered evidence 
o^ at best, only narrow, not "widespread" support (see chapters 4, 5 and 6). If pressed 
Butler would doubtless have added that the CLRC supported the bill, as he had 
claimed in his letter to the Prime Minister, although the CLRC had never actuaUy 
considered the main issue. By this reckoning it could be made to seem as if the 
medical estabhshment, the Church of England, and the judiciary, were aU sohdly in 
favour of the proposal to decriminahse suicide. This is certainly the ingression 
conveyed by Ministers when the bUl entered Parhament.
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The Cabinet minutes for 25 October record that the Home Secretary's submission on a 
suicide bill was "noted with approval". There was no discussion.
On 15 February 1961 the Suicide Bill was published and placed in the House of Lords; 
the move known as "1st Reading". Not a single change was made to the Bill in is 
passage through Parliament, and the final Act (see appendix A) was the same as this 
Bill at 1st Reading.
On the 28th of February the Home Office sent the complete speech for the 2nd 
Reading of the Bill to the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, which he delivered 
virtually word for word to the House of Lords on 2 March 1961. Viscount Kilmuir 
was the former M.P. David Maxwell-Fyfe, who as Home Secretary fi*om 1951-54, had 
supported Theobald Mathew's fierce prosecution of homosexuals,^ and refused to 
allow the royal prerogative to save Bentley despite a huge public outcry urging mercy. 
His reputation was not of a reformer, and moreover, according to Heuston in Lives o f 
the Lord Chancellors, "The abiding ingression is that of a Judge who was simply 
uninterested in the development of legal concepts by analytical reasoning. This is not 
unusual amongst trial judges, but it is not only unusual but also inappropriate in a Lord 
Chancellor."
However, Viscount Kilmuir was also one of Rab Butler's oldest political friends. In his 
autobiography Butler says of him, "He had been with me aU my political life and had 
helped me to reform the Conservative party" (Butler 1971:234). It is reasonable to 
assume that if Butler had asked Kilmuir to introduce the Suicide Bill in the Lords, he 
would have agreed without demur. Moreover, Kilmuir had been present at the Cabinet 
meeting on 25 October, and heard the assertion of "widespread support". It certainly 
added to the aura of authority surrounding the Bill that it was introduced to Parhament 
by the Lord ChanceUor, who was not only head of the entire judicial hierarchy, but also 
Leader of the House of Lords.
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Li the Lord Chancellor's file on the Suicide Bill at the Public Record Office is a copy of 
the speech introducing it. It is on Home Office, not Lord Chancellor, paper, and is 
carefully underlined throughout. Paul Channon, in interview, recalled that Kilmuir was 
notorious among his colleagues for his painstaking underlining of all the myriad papers 
that passed through his hands. The copy of the speech m the Pubhc Record Office file 
matches exactly the Hansard record of the speech Kilmuir gave.
Kilmuir began at 4.04 p.m by stating the provenance of the measure, and setting it in a 
context difficult to dispute: "My rt. hon. friend the Home Secretary," he said, "has 
been much concerned to bring our criminal law up to date. This Bill is part of that 
programme of reform" (These extracts are fi'om Hansard: Lords: 2 March 1961).
He went on to point out the futihty of the present law, in terms of deterring actual 
suicides, and the additional pain and distress criminahty inflicted on the fiiends and 
famihes of suicides. Moving swffily to the matter of attenq)ted suicides, he cited 
Professor Stengel's point that they "are often making an appeal for help..." and went on 
to say that "the only justification for retaining the offence has been that it has provided 
a means of bringing before the courts and perhaps helping, those who have made 
suicidal attempts." He then put forward the central rational of the proposed change, 
i.e.- to move attempted suicide firom criminal justice to medical jurisdiction: "Nor is it 
right to make use of criminal proceedings when the object is primarily medical or 
therapeutic... The only problem has been the practical one of whether alternative and 
more appropriate methods are available for providing help where it is needed or has 
been rejected. I think I can assure your Lordships that this will be the case. 
Arrangements have been made by my rt. hon. Friend the Minister of Health to ensure 
that persons who are brought to hospital having attenq)ted suicide are examined by a 
physician who can consider whether treatment or supervision is needed. Under the 
provisions of Part IV of the Mental Health Act 1959, it is possible to detain for 28
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days' observation a person who appears to be suffering from mental disorder and who 
ought to be detained for his own health or safety."
Twice in the short speech Kilmuir referred to the support of "religious opinion, the 
medical profession and magistrates" for the Bill. In presenting Clause II, which 
created an entirely new crime (and one without precedent) of "aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring the suicide of another or an attempt by another to commit 
suicide", he cited the Criminal Law Revision Committee. "Their Report," he said, was 
published as a White Paper in October last and it is upon that Report that the present 
Bill is based."
The debate that followed did not last long. Five people spoke; none of them opposed 
the Bill: Lord Silkin, Baroness Summerskill, and Baroness Wootton were Labour 
Peers; Silkin was the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Summerskill a shadow Minister of 
Health. No Conservative Peer spoke, other than Kilmuir. Lord Denning, a Law Lord, 
and the Bishop of Carhsle were the other two speakers. Baroness (Barbara) Wootton's 
speech was notable for its explicit reference both to the "Wolfenden strategy" (see 
chapter 3) - "in a more sophisticated age," she said, "we are more disposed to 
discriminate between crime and sins", and to the determinist paradigm - "we must 
appreciate that suicide is in some measure socially caused".
The Bishop of Carlisle diflddently raised the age old question of suicide and natural 
law: "I know it is a difficult subject," he said, "and I have only an amateurish
knowledge of natural law, but I cannot help but think that natural law would determine 
the taking of one's life as unlawfid." However this issue, which had fuelled so much 
controversy over so many centuries, was at this juncture conq)letely ignored. The 
Bishop did not pursue it, and neither did he oppose the Bill, because, he said, he 
beheved it was "motivated by compassion." Nevertheless, he argued, "compassion is 
not enough. Society has a basic duty to protect life, and many of our laws are
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designed for that one purpose ...society must take account of suicide in terms of law as 
well as in terms of compassion - compassion and law."
In responding to this point, Kilmuir said that it "has given us the greatest difficulty" 
but contended that the Bishop's concerns were met by Section 25 of the Mental Health 
Act.
The Bishop, having dropped the issue of natural law, then pursued the matter of social 
control, suggesting there might be a new summary-only offence of'attenq)ting suicide' 
for people who resisted medical help. Kilmuir said it had been considered but 
rejected. He then was unequivocal abut the reason the measure was before Parhament 
at all: "The principle object of the Bill," he said, "is to remove from attempted
suicides the stigma which attaches to their being subject to criminal proceedings." 
None of these matters detained their Lordships for very long; the 2nd Reading debate 
was over before 6 PM, having lasted less than two hours.
The Committee Stage on 9 March was taken, as is usual in the Lords, by the whole 
House (Extracts are from Hansard: Lords: 9 March 1961). Lord Silkin again raised 
the problem of attempted suicides who refiised help: "Suicide is no longer a crime," he 
said, "but it is still a social problem... I do not think we ought to be content to rest on 
the fact that it is no longer to be an offence. It is our duty to help these unfortunate 
people..." Silkin wanted something in the Bill that would ensure that every person who 
attempted suicide was seen by a professional of some sort: "One would like to have 
some means by which such a person can really be helped, even against his own 
wishes."
The Lord Chancellor's reply to Silkin revealed that the Home Office, presumably with 
Butler's involvement, had considered the civil Hberty implications of conq)ulsory 
treatment following an attempted suicide. Most of them would receive treatment.
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Kilmuir said, "either voluntary or under the Mental Health Act." But, he admitted, "a 
small number will not. The Home Office and I have considered [making treatment 
conçulsory] but beheve it would be open to serious objection... some are not mentally 
i ll ..." This is the only point in the Parliamentary debate, both Lords and Commons, 
when the government allowed that some people who attenq)ted to take their own lives 
might not be mentally ill.
Clause n  of the Bill caused some debate at the Committee stage in the Lords, as it did 
in the Commons. What actions would actually constitute the new offence of "aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide or attenopted suicide of another", and how 
harshly should it be punished? Silkin wanted to reduce the maximum penalty from 
fourteen to seven years. The Lord Chancellor refused, citing the Draft Criminal Code 
of 1879 wliich had recommended this offence be made statutory and punishable by life 
inprisonment. Moreover, Kilmuir pointed out, the more recent report of the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment (Cmd. 8932 1952-53) had also recommended life 
inprisonment for this offence.
The Committee stage. Report (16 March) and 3rd Reading (21 March) were all 
conpleted without difficulty and the Bill emerged from the Lords unchanged. There 
had been some concern at Report and 3rd Reading, and a small flurry of letters to the 
TIMES (March 10 and 14), about insurance companies refusing to honour the life 
pohcies of suicides, but this was overcome without any amendment to the Bill Havmg 
conpleted its progress through the Lords, the Bill was then sent to the House of 
Commons, where it did not surface until July. There was no public discussion at all 
during this interim period on the issue of suicide law reform, but then, there was much 
else to claim the world's attention: the Soviet Union put a man mto pace in April 
Also that pring there was the Cuban Bay of Pigs crisis; tension was rising in the 
Middle East and in Germany - (British troops were sent to Kuwait in July and the 
Berlin wall went up in August). George Blake was convicted of pying and sentenced
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to 42 years. South Africa declared itself a republic, and Rudolf Nureyev dramatically 
defected at Le Bourget airport. The House of Commons was diverted throughout 
the spring and summer of 1961 by the continuing saga of whether Viscount Stansgate 
(Anthony Wedgwood-Benn) could - as a Peer - take the Commons' seat to which he 
had been elected.
Meanwhile, in the Home OflSce, far from any pubhc scrutiny or even interest, two 
significant exchanges took place concerning reform of the law on suicide. The 
following report of them is based on interviews with the participants. In June David 
(now Lord) Renton, who had been Parhamentary Under Secretary of State in the 
Home Office since 1958, was offered a promotion by Butler to the position of Minister 
of State. In the interview in which this promotion was offered. Lord Renton recalled 
that Butler talked about the tremendous amount of work on hand and the quantity of 
legislation to be moved on. He mentioned, rather in passing, the Suicide Bill, and 
asked Renton what he thought of it. Until that moment Renton had not been aware of 
any discussion about this Bill at all, indeed he beheves he was unaware of the existence 
of the Bill.
In response to Butler's question Renton said he was against the decriminahsation of 
suicide. He beheved then (and continues to beheve) that suicide and attempted suicide 
should be against the law. His recommendation for reform would have been to have 
them codified as crimes in statute law rather than simply in common law. Having 
given the Home Secretary his views, Renton heard no more about the matter. (Renton 
interview 8 May 1996)
Also in June Charles Fletcher-Cooke M.P. arrived in the Home Office as the new 
Parhamentary Under Secretary of State. He had been in the House since 1951, a 
lawyer by trade, and this was his first Ministerial post. Shortly after he arrived:
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"Rab came to me and said, 'Here's a small bill I would be grateful if you would 
carry through.'
I said I would be glad to, and then Rab said, 'You will not find it as easy as you 
think...'
I said. Do you mean the people in Torquay and the Bishops?' Rab said. You 
will find a great hornet's nest about the sacredness of human life.'
Sir Charles described the context in which this exchange took place:
"...there was all this funk - and it was funk - by the Cabinet... this is why I was 
given the job. If things had gone wrong and just a junior Minister was doing 
the Bill they could abandon it.
Rab had this letter fi'om Macmillan... Macmillan wrote saying Don't pursue 
this Bill'. It was a ridiculous letter really, all about aristocrats pulling his leg 
about how were they going to fill the femily mausoleum Rab showed me the 
letter. I saw it. Rab said, 'fm not going to answer this... let's go on with it in a 
minor key and see how we go.' (Fletcher-Cooke interview 6 March 1996)
On 14 July the Suicide Bill had its 2nd Reading in the House of Commons It was a 
Friday, and the Suicide debate began at 3.27 p.m In those days the House always 
adjourned at 4 PM sharp on Fridays. Fridays in Parliament were rarely considered 
newsworthy by the media, and on 14 July 1961 attention was very much elsewhere as 
it was the day when the astronaut Yuri Gagarin lunched with the Queen and paraded 
through London. Huge crowds thronged the streets and the press conference was 
attended by nearly 1000 journalists.
The recollections of Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke and Lord Renton confirm Butler's 
continued involvement in and supervision of the progress of the Suicide Bill. But there 
is no documentary evidence of his involvement after the Cabinet papers in October
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other than a hand-written note in the Butler papers at Trinity College Cambridge from 
Joan Vickers M.P. dated 7 July 1961. Joan Vickers was a Conservative M.P. whose 
name appears regularly in records of debates on social issues. Her note to Butler 
asked if the Suicide Bill could come on "next Friday", and added, "I think we could get 
the debate on this very inçortant biU over in one hour..." (Butler papers: E l 5/416)
The Bill did come on for its 2nd Reading the following Friday, 14 July, introduced with 
a very short opening speech by the new junior Minister, Charles Fletcher-Cooke. It 
was his first time at the dispatch box, and he remembers it was a very thin House. The 
speech was crisp and lucid, as might be expected from a QC, and kept strictly to the 
brief estabhshed by Kilmuir in the Lords (Extracts are from Hansard: Commons 14 July 
1961). "The Bill," Fletcher-Cooke said, "represents a further stage in our endeavour 
to bring the provisions of the criminal law into conformity with the needs and outlook 
of the present day. Its purpose is single. It is to provide that it shall no longer be a 
criminal act and subject to the machinery and sanctions of the criminal law to commit 
suicide, or to attempt to commit suicide." Although he spoke for a bare eight minutes, 
the Minister managed to outline the Bill, explain the background, cover the issue of 
treatment by reference to the Mental Health Act, and credit Clause 2 to the Crimmal 
Law Revision Committee. At the end, Fletcher-Cooke pointed out that "I have been 
short, and I feel - so far as it is suitable for me to say so - that other hon. Members may 
be equally short, because this is a matter which we all want to see on the Statute Book, 
and if we all want to achieve that aim, cannot we co-operate to that end?"
Five of the following six speakers did co-operate; most spoke for under three minutes. 
All supported the Bill, but their support was clearly linked to the commitment that 
control would continue despite being re-labelled 'treatment' and made the responsibihty 
of doctors and not the pohce.
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Eric Fletcher (Lab., Islington East) made the most rehgiously oriented speech of the 
whole Parhamentary debate, and pointed out the irrq)ortance of what was being done: 
"... we are being invited," he said, "to make a change in what has been the law of 
England ... for nearly 1,000 years; indeed, since the time of King Edgar ... suicide has 
been regarded as the most heinous of felonies - the felony of self-murder. It has been 
said that no man has a right to destroy his own life, because life is a gift from God, to 
be preserved with a sense of responsibihty. Suicide, like murder, is a violation of the 
Sixth Commandment, and in some ways it is more grievous than murder because it 
precludes the opportunity for repentance." Nevertheless, Eric Fletcher, in common 
with others wfro had reservations, had been persuaded that "The real basis of the 
Measure is that in the humane outlook of today it is recognised that those who attempt 
suicide unsuccessftdly are in need of compassion and assistance, and not punishment", 
and so he did "entirely agree that the time has come when the law should be changed." 
He did, however, "wish to add ... two important qualifications to my support of the 
Bill." These qualifications, which were echoed in various forms by other speakers, 
demonstrate that without the repeated assurance that the State would continue to be 
responsible for dealing with attenq)ted suicides - albeit under a different department - 
the Suicide Bill could have encountered serious resistance.
"The first [qualification]," Fletcher said, "is this. Suicide today is unlawful, forbidden 
and regarded as wrong. When this Bill becomes an Act suicide will cease to be 
unlawful. In some quarters there is felt to be a danger that some people will take the 
view that what is law is permissible and free from objection. It would be most 
unfortunate if that idea obtained currency as a result of what we are proposing in this 
Measure. It cannot be too clearly emphasised that nothing in the BUI is intended to 
undermine the sanctity of human life or the general view of society that suicide, even 
though when this Bill is passed it will be legally permissible, is regarded by the majority 
of people as a dreadfiil offence against nature.
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"... The second qualification I wish to make - in some ways it is the more important - is 
this ... There is a fear in some quarters that if we remove the existing responsibilities 
and duties of the police in this regard some of those who in the past have attenq)ted 
suicide and who because of police intervention have had the appropriate treatment, will 
not get it ... What is the machinery to ensure that those people get appropriate 
treatment in the future?" As was the case at every point wfien this concern was 
raised, it was answered by reference to the powers made available by the Mental 
Health Act to ensure attempted suicides received treatment.
John Hobson QC (Conservative, Warwick & Leamington), a Recorder and Chairman 
of the Rutland Quarter Sessions, supported the Bill on the grounds that the differential 
enforcement of the law as it stood brought the law itself into disrepute. But he wanted 
it "generally and publicly realised that suicide nevertheless remains a mortal sin."
Kenneth Robinson, in a modest speech lasting less than two minutes, did refer to his 
own role, and also managed to imqply a large and prestigious support structure: "It is
two-and-a-half years since I first pressed this reform on the Home Secretary. On that 
occasion he was extremely resistant to my persuasion. He thought that reform of this 
kind was not generally required and that it would lead to controversy. I set about 
persuading him that there was a general desire for such a reform. I was powerfully 
assisted by a number of committees of the Church, the medical profession and 
magistrates..."
Peter Kirk (Conservative, Gravesend) welcomed the Bill but with some concerns 
(which he said he would expand on in Committee) about the new offence in Clause 2, 
and about suicide pacts. He spoke for only two minutes, and at 3.58 H. Hynd (Labour, 
Accrington) rose and spoke for only one. It looked at if the Bill would sail through its 
second reading in under 35 minutes. But then, at 3.59 Leo Abse, Labour MP for
229
Pontypool, rose, and began to speak, and was in mid-sentence when the hour struck. 
The Hansard reads: It being Four o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.
The position of the BiU was therefore, that in the closing weeks of a long Parliament, 
with the summer recess looming and much legislation stUl to be processed, a further 
time slot on the floor of the House would have to be found to conq)lete the 2nd 
Reading, not to mention Committee stage and 3rd Reading. The Prime Minister's 
note shows he was not enthusiastic about the measure, and there was no committed 
lobby supporting it, as was later to be the case with reform measures such as the 
abohtion of capital punishment and abortion. In these circumstances it was a distinct 
possibihty the BiU would lapse, having been "talked out".
Leo Abse was in favour of reforming the law on suicide. Before becoming an M.P. he 
had been a soUcitor in Wales and had actuaUy defended a number of people charged 
with attempted suicide. Why, then, did he inq)eril the passage of the BiU by blocking 
the 2nd Reading vote on 14 July?
When this question was put to him he said, "To be candid, I cannot reaUy remember 
now why I did it... I do remember Kenneth Robinson was very upset, but I knew they 
would bring it back..." (Abse interview 21 Nov. 1996)
How did he know? It was, after all, a matter for the Conservative whips, and he was 
a Labour M.P. "I just knew," Abse repUed. "The Whips were under orders."
In his book Private Member, Abse records the incident more ftiUy:
"Kenneth Robinson, understandably anxious to see the BiU through, was ready 
to coUude with the government and was perplexed and angry with me when he 
reaUsed that on the fateful Friday afternoon I was bent upon taking the risk of 
talking the BUI out, caUing the government's blufl  ^ and so, if successful gaining
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a fiül-scale debate to conq)lete the Bill. I did not then seek to explain to him 
what he would have regarded as an absurdly 01ynq)ian view that I would rather 
lose the Bill than corroborate in the morbid stealth of the government" (Abse 
1973:91).
But the Bill was not lost. A time slot was found, not on the Monday or Tuesday 
following, but on Wednesday 19 July at 11.54 p.m., just before midnight, the BiU 
returned to the floor of the House and Abse continued his speech. He spoke for 23 
minutes, in support of the reform, but used the opportunity to make wide ranging 
criticisms of government pohcies on child care, psychiatric social workers, geriatric 
services, old age pensions, and the funding of the University of Wales. He particularly 
urged an amendment to curtaU newspaper reports of suicides and inquests on suicides, 
claiming they encouraged imitation. Two other Labour M.P.s spoke, David Weitzman 
QC (Stoke Newington & Hackney North) and B T. Parkin (Paddington North). Both 
supported the Bill, but endorsed Abse's criticisms of the government. Parkin made 
the interesting point that people who voted for Clause 1 (to decriminahse suicide) 
could be held guilty of the new crime created in Clause 2 of aiding and abetting 
another's suicide "unless conq)ensating inq)rovements are made in our welfare services 
to counteract the inq)ression that the Bill could give." (Hansard: Commons: 19 July
1961)
Fletcher-Cooke, winding up, re-stated the government's continuing commitment to 
control, using a concept which he said had been "echoed by other speakers tonight, 
that it is not enough simply to say that suicide and attempted suicide shall no longer be 
a crime, we agree that not only must we have, as it were, the negative provisions which 
the Bill provides, but that there is a responsibihty upon society and upon the State to 
see that the provision is made to help those people, to prevent them committing suicide 
if we can and to prevent them repeating attempts at suicide, and, at any rate, to see 
that they get such treatment as they should have." He went on to make clear who was
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going to be responsible for this: "My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the
Ministry of Health, upon whom the prime responsibility rests in spite of what was said 
about the Home Office, has listened to this debate and, I am sure, will have paid a 
great deal of attention to it. What has troubled a great many hon. Members, I think, 
including the hon. Member for Paddington North (Mr. Parkin), is this question of the 
gap that there may be as a result of this legislation - namely that there may be a number 
of people attenq)ting suicide who, in future, will not appear to be reached in the sense 
that the police, who in the past used to look after them, will no longer do so, or, at 
least, will not do so in the same way because attenq)ted suicide will be no offence in 
the future." (ibid.)
Fletcher-Cooke went on to try and soothe these fears about a possible threat to social 
order: "There is another way in which the gap is somewhat narrowed," he said, 
"because where the nature of the atten^t has an element of nuisance," he said, "and 
entails the possibility of injury or danger to others, as, for example, where the person 
making the attenq)t has to be rescued at the risk of another's life, it may be possible to 
bring the person before the justices, either under their inherent powers or under the 
Act of 1361, to bind him over to keep the peace. In that case the normal provisions 
would apply" (ibid.).
The Question was put at 12.47 a m , and agreed without a division. Since there was 
no division there is no record of how many M P.s were in attendance. Given the hour 
and the lack of controversy surrounding the measure, there were unlikely to have been 
many.
The Bill had its Committee stage on Tuesday, 25 July with Dr. Horace King (Labour 
MP for Itchen who became Speaker of the House in 1965) in the Chair. Twenty 
members were appointed to the Committee, fifteen attended, and seven spoke 
(including the Minister, Fletcher-Cooke). The Committee began its' deliberations at
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10:30 am, rose at 11:50 am and reported the BiU without amendment. (The foUowing 
extracts from Official Report: Standing Committee E: 25 July 1961) During the 
deliberations, only one speech was made on Clause 1, the part of the BiU which 
decriminaUsed suicide. Appropriately, it was by Kenneth Robinson, wfro ran through 
suicide statistics in general and put on record the facts about the prosecution of 
attempted suicide which clearly motivated his own advocacy of the measure, and 
which had served to persuade Butler of the necessity for change. "Of those cases of 
suicide attenq)ts known to the poUce," Robinson said, "about one in ten have been 
brought to the courts, making about 600 charges a year. Most of those were 
discharged or put on probation, but an average of about 40 per annum have been sent 
to prison for attem^ited suicide. The average length of sentence is rather more than 
three months, and in some cases it has been six months or even longer." He then went 
on to re-en^hasise the central feature of the measure: "I think that we aU agree that 
psychiatric treatment is \\frat most of these unfortunate people need ... Of course there 
wiU be some who wiU resist, but most of those will be suffering from some kind of 
mental disorder and in many cases it will be a mental disorder of a type or degree 
which would justify conçulsory treatment under Section 26, or compulsory 
observation in a mental hospital under Section 25, of the Mental Health Act, 1959." 
(Official Report Standing Committee E 25 July 1961)
Robinson rejected the proposal made by some participants in the debate for machinery 
to be put in place to enforce treatment. "There is a limit," he said, "to the amount of 
conq)ulsion which society can inq)ose on individuals in a matter as personal and as 
intimate as the desire to take one's own life." But he did want to ensure treatment 
wherever possible: "I should like to know," he said, about the arrangements which the 
Minister of Health conten^lates. Exactly how does he propose to do this? It is very 
inq)ortant that it should be done ... " The Minister responded that he would bring 
Robinson's remarks to the attention of the Minister for Health. David Weitzman then 
made a brief comment that he had "personal experience of a case of attempted suicide
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within the last month or so" and commended the psychiatric treatment the person was 
given.
That was the fidl extent of the Committee consideration of the décriminalisation of 
suicide. The remainder of the hour and twenty minutes was taken up primarily with 
discussion as to whether the word "counselling" should be left out of Clause 2, so that 
the new crime being created would only occur if someone "aids, abets and procures" 
another's suicide or atten^ted suicide. Baroness Wootton had attenq)ted a similar 
amendment at Committee stage in the Lords, but had been persuaded by the Lord 
Chancellor to drop it.
The response Fletcher-Cooke made to the proposal in the Commons Committee, and 
the debate that ensued, was revealing. It showed that while there was general 
agreement about transferring attenq)ted suicide fi*om judicial to medical jurisdiction, 
and notwithstanding the lack of debate on Clause 1, feelings about decriminalising 
suicide itself were in fact ambivalent. Fletcher-Cooke said, "We must look at the 
Amendment [to remove the word 'counsels'] in the light of the warnings given on 
Second Reading that self-destruction must still be regarded as a very grave matter and 
that the Bill must not be taken in any way as countenancing self-destruction. If we 
regard the Amendment against that background, the in^ortance of seeing that people 
who are minded to destroy themselves are not encouraged to do so becomes very 
evident. I have to resist the Amendment partly on those grounds ... Counsel, in the 
sense of advice, can be extremely potent, and it would be most dangerous to omit this 
word."
Eric Fletcher agreed, saying that if the Amendment was carried, 'We should then lay 
down the law that it was quite right and proper, and not subject to any criticism, to go 
about counselling persons to commit suicide ... I do not think it right to leave the law 
in such a state that it could be said hereafter that a person is able to give that advice ...
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Although we all want to put an end to the present state of the law ,... on the other hand 
we do not want to do anything to reduce the sanctity of human life or the responsibihty 
of the State to see that a person neither aids, abets, advises nor procures the suicide of 
another."
Kenneth Robinson, who had proposed it, then withdrew the amendment, but proposed 
another - to lower die maximum penalty for the new offence from fourteen to seven 
years. This too was resisted by the Minister, who said, "There is no reason to think 
that a high maximum penalty will result in the courts awarding excessive punishment in 
certain cases. In 1959 there were over 500 cases in which proceedings were taken for 
attenq)ted suicide under the old law, under which there is no maximum penalty, and in 
no case did the court award a sentence in excess of six months inçrisonment. 
Therefore I do not think that there is a danger that courts wUl award heavier sentences 
when the crime is of a lesser value than it has been m the past." Robmson then 
withdrew this amendment too. After a brief fiirther discussion on the inq)lications of 
the new offence on suicide pacts, and whether it should be officially a "felony" or a 
"misdemeanour" (it was confirmed as a "misdemeanour"). Clause 2 was agreed, and 
the entire Bill was reported without Amendment.
Five members of the House Committee on the Suicide Bill were still alive at the time of 
this research, four of them were interviewed for this research.^ Their memories of the 
issue were exceedingly faint, but there was agreement that no controversy attended 
the discussion, nor any opposition to the substantive measure. No media coverage of 
the Committee proceedings has been discovered. Reporting of Parliamentary affairs at 
the time was dominated by a mini-budget announced on 25 July which put 4p on 
cigarettes and 3p on a gallon of petrol
The 3rd Reading of the Suicide Bill took place on 28 July, another Friday. As the 
Committee had proposed no amendments, and the Bill was unchanged from its 2nd
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reading, this final stage was very short, almost perfunctory. Fletcher-Cooke again 
stated the core of the reform: "Because we have taken the view, as Parliament and
the Government have taken, that the treatment of people who attenq)t suicide should 
no longer be through the criminal courts, it in no way lessens the respect for the 
sanctity of human life which we all have. It must not be thought that because we are 
changing the method of treatment for these unfortunate people that we seek to 
depreciate the gravity of the action of anyone who tries to commit suicide" (Hansard: 
Commons: 28 July 1961). Kenneth Robinson had the last word, at 1.17 PM and the 
Bill then passed without a division. As there was no vote, it is not possible to tell how 
many Members participated in this final stage of the décriminalisation. Again, the 
attention of Parliamentary reporters was elsewhere. 28 July was the day the Ifigh 
Court quashed Viscount Stansgate's (Anthony Wedgwood Benn) election victory and 
appointed his defeated opponent as M.P. in his place. The Royal Assent to the Bill 
was given at 6.31 PM on 3 August, 1961. Immediately a Circular (see Appendix H) 
went out fi’om the Home Office to all Chief Constables signed by Francis Graham- 
Harrison, Deputy Permanent Secretary, alerting them to the fact that "it follows from 
this [the passage of the Act] that it will no longer be an offence to attenq)t to commit 
suicide."
Conclusion
The most prominent feature of the Suicide Act was its lack of prominence - a factor 
that undoubtedly assisted its passage. Parliamentary exposure of the issue preceding 
its sudden appearance as a Government sponsored bill was limited to brief exchanges 
between the Labour M.P. Kenneth Robinson and the Home Secretary Rab Butler at 
Parliamentary Question Time and to Robinson's Early Day Motion in March 1958. As 
introducer of the issue to Parliament, Robinson's style was crucial to its acceptance. 
The persistent, low-key, non-partisan nature of his Questions ultimately persuaded 
Butler to take action, but at the same time avoided rousing backbenchers on Butler's 
side who were always deeply suspicious of liberal moves coming fi*om the leâ. Once
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persuaded, Butler took action that stands as a remarkable demonstration of political 
skill wielded by a consummate operator unconstrained by scruple. He used the 
powerfiil positivist paradigm prevailing at the time and focused Parliament's attention 
firmly on the treatment of attempted suicide. He refused to engage with the 
profoundly difhcult issue of suicide itself allowing its moral status as a sin to remain 
unchallenged as long as it could be officially deemed not a crime. The success of the 
strategy is visible throughout the Parliamentary debate, where the only threat to 
decriminahsation arose fi'om its being too successfid - i.e. when pressure mounted to 
make treatment of attençted suicide conq)ulsory through a court order following 
criminal conviction. This threat was overcome, as was the very real danger at the end 
that the BiU would faU through lack of Parhamentary time. At these points, and 
throughout the passage, although Butler was pubhcly invisible, his presence is palpable 
in the unmistakable signs of a pohticaUy sophisticated guiding hand. Without this, 
there is good reason to think suicide would have continued to be a crime.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
This thesis asks the question, Why was suicide decriminalised in England and Wales in 
1961? Because the Suicide Act often features in lists of other reforms of the period, 
the research began by assuming the familiar trajectory of most social reform legislation, 
which is: a group of people determined on change begin working to make it happen; 
books and articles appear, test cases go to court, learned arguments are deployed, and 
all are wrapped in rhetoric about "progress", "humanity" and "steps to a more civilised 
society". After a long time the issue may achieve a place on the pohtical agenda, 
become the subject of a Committee of Enquiry and/or Royal Commission, and may 
finally become law, nearly always - if there is a moral dimension - by means of a 
Private Member's Bill.  ^ In most histories of this kind of legislation, this agency- 
oriented interpretation is alhed to a greater or lesser extent to structural considerations. 
In the period in question the structural elements are well rehearsed: the upheavals of 
war leading to class mobihty, weakened authority structures, relativism in matters of 
morahty, which, when joined by the unprecedented aflduence of the 1950s created a 
climate conducive to social change. Since the decriminahsation of suicide shared the 
same time firame as the other, more high profile reforms, it was originally assumed to 
have foUowed the same path to the statute book. However it soon became clear that 
the facts of the passage of the Suicide Act would not fit into this famihar social reform 
pattern: there was no group pressing for this change, there was no pubhc debate, 
there was no Committee of Enquiry or Royal Commission, there were no issues 
causing immediate concern - such as a sudden rise in suicides, and moreover, the 
Suicide Act was a Government-si^omoxQà. BiU.
As these facts emerged they had the effect of transforming the research question from 
a frame in which to organise material, into a genuinely puzzling question: Why was
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suicide decriminalised in 1961? As the research got properly underway this question 
became even more puzzling, because evidence from Cabinet papers in the Pubhc 
Record Office and interviews with surviving participants were painting a picture that 
stretched creduhty: it looked as if the Home Secretary Rab Butler had engineered the 
passage of the Suicide Act virtually single-handed, in a manner that forestalled 
opposition and rendered the Bill practically invisible. In terms of the actual, technical 
passage of the Bill through Parliament, this is indeed what happened, as the data in 
chapters 6 and 7 makes clear. But the empirical evidence also shows that Butler's 
moves were precipitated by two other agents, Kenneth Robinson M.P. and Dr. Doris 
Odium, and more inportantly, that none of their actions would have been successfid 
without certain long term structural trends that created the necessary - though not 
sufficient - conditions for the decriminahsation to take place.
Three long term structural trends were crucial to the passage of the Suicide Act. The 
first was the growing separation of church and state, a process begun long before, 
which by the mid twentieth century had reached a point where it was possible for 
people to conceive a difference between "sin" and "crime"; something which was not 
conceptually possible - hterally "inconceivable"- formerly when the two words were 
completely interchangeable. This conceptual separation, articulated by the 
Wolfenden Committee in 1957 and endorsed by no less a figure than the Archbishop of 
Canterbury in 1959, made it possible in turn for people to conceive of "crime" as a 
human construct, something different from "sin", which was divinely ordained. This 
made crime, a human construction, subject to human definition, and if necessary (or 
expedient), subject to redefinition. This was a key factor in the circumstances 
surrounding passage of the Suicide Act. It allowed suicide itself to be defined as a 
"sin", and thus a matter for divine, not earthly, authority. And it allowed attempted 
suicide to be re-defined from "crime" to "mental illness", thus putting it under medical, 
not criminal justice, authority.
239
The second long term trend that contributed to the decriminahsation of suicide was the 
positivist tradition, which had been seeking for so long to medicahse deviance, that is, 
to persuade people that deviant behaviour was not chosen, it was caused - the product 
of a pathology. Therefore deviancy was not a moral matter, it was a medical matter, 
and concepts of guilt and moral culpabihty were not just irrelevant, they were actually 
obstacles in the path of rational scientific solutions to the problem This set the scene 
for the arguments that attenq)ted suicide was in and by itself evidence of mental illness, 
so the response should be treatment, not punishment.
The third structural factor was the estabhshed tendency of modem states to disperse 
control and maintain order through a variety of different agencies and techniques. ^  
Max Weber forecast that discretionary regulation would graduaUy replace the rule of 
law; a concept Dixon apphed to his analysis of betting and gaming (1991), and 
McHugh to prostitution (1980). Foucault of course famously described the dispersal 
of discipline and power through all aspects of the body pohtic, and in particular the 
capacity and use of medicine as an instrument of social control. This was the role quite 
exphcitly given to medicine by the passage of the mental health legislation in 1959, 
which gave statutory powers to pohce and doctors to detain and coercively treat 
anyone deemed mentaUy ill. This created the mechanism whereby atterq)ted suicides 
could be transferred from criminal justice to medical jurisdiction without loss of 
control, and thus made it possible to pass the Suicide Act.
These stmctural trends created a context which, when alhed with others discussed in 
chapter 3, made the passage of the Suicide Act possible. But it was by no means 
inevitable. The presence of these trends did not preclude the existence of other, often 
opposing ones. Rehgion, for exanq)le, may have been in retreat before secularisation, 
but it had not been routed. Its continuing power to obstmct or at least limit legislative 
changes it opposed is plainly visible in the debates on censorship, abortion, Sunday 
trading, and gambling, among others. Also, the exculpatory positivist approach to
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deviancy was not accepted by mainstream criminal justice practitioners, who for the 
most part continued to operate using concepts of free will and moral choice, which 
held individuals responsible for their actions.
Equally inq)ortant, in terms of structural fectors working against decriminahsation, was 
the ever present concern for order, which sociologists since Durkheim and political 
philosophers since Hobbes have put forward as the main motive force of law. Even in 
the more tolerant atmosphere of late modernity, this concern is still manifest in the 
references to "opening the floodgate", "thin end of the wedge", "shppery slope" and 
"sending the wrong message" which feature in all debates about loosening control. In 
the celebrated Hart/Devlin debate on law and morahty, which was actuahy 
coterminous with the passage of the Suicide Act, Hart is considered to have been an 
advocate of loosened legal control. Yet in discussing how individuals in a modem 
state make choices he said, "Laws function in their lives ... as accepted legal 
standards of behaviour. That is, they not only do with tolerable regularity what the law 
requires of them, but they look upon it as a legal standard of conduct...." (Hart, 
1961:134) This idea, that people beheve that what the law ahows is ah right to do, 
inspires concern about what "message" might be sent if something is decriminahsed. It 
is a concern that surfaced several times in the debate about the Suicide Bill, coupled 
with anxiety about its consequences for social order.
So, although there were inçortant stmctural forces tending towards the 
decriminahsation of suicide, there were equaUy inq)ortant ones resisting it. In such 
situations inertia can usuahy maintain the status quo: As Roshier and Teflf remarked, 
"It is easier to persuade Governments to do nothing than to convince them of the need 
to introduce new laws." (1980: 43). Therefore it is at this point that the intervention 
of human agency was critical to the passage of the Act.
241
The three agents of the decriminahsation were not confederates; indeed they knew 
each other only in the formal world of pubhc afi&irs. The only place where it can be 
shown that they actuahy met together is - appropriately - the National Association of 
Mental Health, where Rab Butler was President and Doris Odium and Kenneth 
Robinson were Vice Presidents. This venue is appropriate because the primary 
mechanism, both conceptuaUy and practicahy, by means of which the decriminahsation 
was acconq)hshed was the 1959 Mental Health Act. Whether suicide would have been 
decriminahsed without the existence of this Act is a moot point, but on the evidence 
available it looks unlikely. Conceptually, the Mental Health Act had put in place 
official agreement that if a criminal offence was attributable to mental illness, the 
offender was automaticahy removed from criminal justice to medical jurisdiction. This 
preenq)ted potential resistance to decrimmahsation from the mainstream criminal 
justice constituency. Practically, the Mental Health Act gave coercive power to 
pohce and doctors to control and contain attenq)ted suicides, which directly addressed 
the anxieties of the social order constituency. FinaUy, the overtones of care and 
compassion that accon^anied the repeated mention of "treatment" these deviants 
would receive, disarmed potential rehgious opposition. With the most likely sources 
of resistance thus neutrahsed, the way was open for decriminahsation of suicide to be 
presented as a logical footnote to the widely acclaimed Act that had so 
comprehensively changed the approach to mental health. The number of times the 
Mental Health Act was mentioned in the course of the passage of the Suicide Act 
demonstrates that this indeed was the assun^tion generahy made.
Given the terms of the Mental Health Act, the protagonists of the decriminahsation of 
suicide then had only to gain official acceptance that attenq)ted suicide was prima 
facie proof of mental illness, and their purpose was virtuahy acconq)hshed. The actual 
passage of the Suicide Act could then be depicted as a mere formahty, a tidying-up of 
a loose end. It is unlikely, however, that this interpretation of the decriminahsation 
would have survived an open pubhc debate, which is probably why Butler used his
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considerable political skills to prevent one. In considering how he did this one cannot 
but be struck by the breathtaking lack of scruple displayed. From a position of unique 
power and privilege Butler deliberately by-passed the procedures developed to ensure 
democratic scrutiny of proposed laws. He manipulated the mechanisms of government 
at his disposal and he was economical with the truth to his colleagues and to the Prime 
Minister. Achieving the outcome he desired appeared to be his sole consideration. 
What the desired outcome was, as is made clear by Butler's answers to Robinson's 
Parliamentary Questions, was not to decriminalise suicide and attenq)ted suicide in the 
sense of sinq)ly removing state control; it was to change the agency responsible for 
dealing with this form of deviancy in the interests of more eflScient and effective 
control.
The summary answer, then, to the basic question of this thesis is: suicide was
decriminalised in England and Wales in 1961 because: A  person with very special
political skills, \\&o held the principal ofhce of state charged with maintaining order 
and dealing with deviancy, became persuaded that a particular form of deviancy - 
attenq)ted suicide - would be better dealt with by medical, not criminal justice, 
agencies. He took both conscious and unconscious advantage of certain necessary, but 
not sufficient, structural trends, and very conscious advantage of the recently passed 
Mental Health Act, to statutorily effect a transfer of responsibihty between the two 
agencies with the minimum of fuss and disturbance.
The Larger Debates
For a law concerning an issue of profound significance to reach the statute book in 
such a way is very unusual. This thesis argues that it happened only because of a 
particular conjunction of structure and agency at a time when a deferential Parliament 
and unsceptical media gave government ministers a remarkably free rein. Such a 
conjunction of circumstances is rare and unlikely to recur, so this record of the passage 
of the Suicide Act can stand as a curious case history. However, because there are so
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few theoretically oriented studies of the Parliamentary passage of social reform 
legislation, the enq)irical evidence collected here can also make a contribution to at 
least two on-going theoretical debates: (1) the question of the true nature of the so- 
called "permissive" social reforms of the 1950s and '60s, and (2) the larger debate 
about the emergence and change of the criminal law. Moreover, because the issue of 
suicide law remains controversial, the story of its decriminahsation can also make a 
contribution to the contenq)orary, passionately argued question of whether to legalise 
assisted suicide.
Permissive^* legislation?
As regards the first debate, about the true nature of mid-century social reform, the 
evidence about the Suicide Act supports arguments advanced by Stuart Hall (1980), 
Greenwood and Young (1980) and by Tim Newbum (1992), that what has been 
commonly called "permissive" legislation was in fact a highly conq>lex phenomenon 
that reflected attençts to re-structure control in areas where conventional morahty was 
losing its abihty to influence behaviour. The widespread acceptance of the concept 
articulated by the Wolfenden Committee that there was a clear distinction between 
"sin" and "crime" had revealed the diminished power of traditional morahty to either 
control behaviour directly or to effectively buttress the criminal law. In these 
circumstances the choice was to try to re-invigorate traditional morahty in sensitive 
areas involving life, death and sexuahty; abandon attenq)ts at control altogether; or 
attenq)t to find alternative mechanisms of exercising control The authors cited above, 
who have examined changes in the law on abortion, prostitution, and homosexuahty, 
suggest that the changes were attenq)ts to impose alternative mechanisms.
With regard to homosexuahty, Newbum, quoting Bland, points out: "Wolfenden's 
recommendations on homosexuahty, while they opened up a privatised space in which 
adult male homosexuals could now operate without the threat of criminal sanction, in 
no sense advocated the abandonment of 'control' fi'om that space... the Report...
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e?q)licitly marked out a 'course for treatment' for the homosexual which is distinct from 
that of the criminal model - henceforward medicine, therapy, psychiatry and social 
research are to form alternative strategies for the exercise of power." (1992:180)
With regard to prostitution, the dehate accon^anying the Street Offences Act of 1959 
made clear that while prostitution would continue to be legal, it was to take place 
entirely out of sight. The objective of the Act was to remove the nuisance of 
prostitutes soliciting on pubhc streets,^ and towards that end fines for sohciting were 
substantially increased, and so was the maximum prison sentence for a third offence. 
The arguments in favour of abortion law reform made much of the widespread evil of 
back street abortions, which they said would he controlled if terminations of pregnancy 
were brou^t within the remit of the official medical estabhshment. (Hindell & Simms 
1971) In any case, it was argued, the revolution in contraception heralded by the Pill 
would mean that unwanted pregnancies would soon virtually disappear. The Select 
Committee Report that preceded the Obscene Pubhcations Act easing censorship 
argued that the proposed changes would facihtate the suppression of the growing trade 
in pornography."  ^ Advocates of divorce law reform said its purpose was to clear out 
the backlog of "dead" marriages, after which - given the avaüabihty of marital 
counselling - family life would be strengthened and divorce would actually decrease.^ 
As the preceding chapters of this thesis set out, the arguments in support of the Suicide 
Bill, which repeatedly referred to the need to "treat" attempted suicides and invoked 
the compulsory detention provisions of the Mental Health Act, also conform to this 
pattern of seeking to re-structure control of deviancy.
So, the history of the Suicide Act adds weight to claims that mid-century changes to 
laws about personal behaviour cannot be credibly lumped together under the label 
"permissive", with the simphstic imphcation that deviant behaviour formerly forbidden 
was thenceforth to be allowed. Although many beheved then (and now) that this is 
what happened,^ an examination of the evidence shows that most of the advocates of
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change were themselves committed to controlling and reducing deviant behaviour by 
supposedly more effective, scientific means. Optimistic faith in the power of science 
to solve social ills was a defining characteristic of the age, and advocates of social 
reform legislation genuinely beheved that drugs and psychotherapy would successfully 
deal with social problems as diverse as crime, homosexuality, atten^ted suicide, 
marriage breakdown and unwanted pregnancy. So the "permissive" label is not helpful 
in the attençt to understand what really informed, motivated and precipitated the 
social reforms of the 1950s and '60s. Such understanding is worth pursuing not only 
for its straightforward epistemological value, but also because the issues involved 
remain live and continue to be the targets of legislative initiatives. In particular the 
contemporary debates about fiirther extending medical jurisdiction in areas of drug 
abuse, sex offending and euthanasia could benefit fi^ om the insights offered by previous 
studies of the médicalisation of deviance.
Emersence and change in the criminal law
Issues about emergence and change in the criminal law are inextricably linked to larger 
debates about whether the processes of social change can be explained by an over­
arching unitary theory and understood in terms of general laws, or whether change is a 
more conq)lex phenomenon, arising jfrom the interaction of a multitude of fectors, 
many of them specific to the time, place and historical circumstances in which they 
happen, and contingent upon individual human action. The evidence in respect of the 
Suicide Act offers more support for the latter than the former view.
It is possible to impose a unitary consensus-style interpretation on the facts of suicide 
law - a model of the sort favoured by Maine, Durkheim, Weber, and indeed the 
majority of historians of social reform legislation. Such a model would point to the 
undeniable evidence of changing attitudes toward suicide over centuries and would 
claim a rational consensus had emerged that medical treatment was more appropriate 
than penal sanctions. But such a claim would have to ignore or discount many
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awkward facts, such as a clear absence of consensus both about the moral status of 
suicide and the responsibibty of the law in matters to do with morality. The 
evolutionary model would also be unable to explain why, if there was widespread 
agreement on the issue, Butler went to such lengths to shield the proposed 
décriminalisation from pubhc and Parhamentary scrutiny. Moreover, this kind of 
model, in atten^ting to describe the decriminahsation in terms of a calm, enhghtened 
rationahty, cannot explain the intensely controversial contenq)orary debate over 
assisted suicide; a debate which is being conducted primarily in terms of metaphysics 
and rehgion and regularly invokes concepts about the "sanctity of life" (Dworkin 
1995).
It is also possible to inq)ose a 'conflict' interpretation on the facts of suicide law. 
Augustine's edict, which made suicide a mortal sin at a time when - if presented as 
martyrdom - it was admired and even venerated by his fellow Christians, seems to fit 
the Austinian model of law as an arbitrary in^osition by a sovereign power for its own 
ends. Glanvdle-Wilhams' (1958) claim that suicide only became a secular crime 
because under forfeiture rules the Crown could then seize the deceased's goods, would 
fit a ruling class/conflict model of law. So too would the circumstances in which 
attempted suicide came to be prosecuted and punished. The fact that both these 
changes inq)acted disproportionately on the lower classes gives fiirther credibihty to a 
conflict model. However, conflict models by their nature are more suited to explaimng 
laws that criminalise behaviour, not the far less frequent ones that ûfecriminahse it. 
And although the history of the Suicide Act shows its promoters were seeking to re­
structure, not remove, control, nevertheless, the Act itself did unequivocally remove 
crimmal status and thus formal state control of a deviant behaviour.
So this research into the decriminahsation of suicide shows that a unitary theoretical 
interpretation - whichever one is proposed - is not a satisfactory way to explain 
changes in the law on suicide. It shows instead that a great many different elements
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were involved, some of them attributable to causal forces and explicable in terms of 
general laws, but some of them local and contingent on particular events and individual 
human actions. What the evidence makes clear is that the outcome was not inevitable; 
that what happened did not have to happen, and in doing this it addresses what Isaiah 
Berlin called "the crucial practical issue" of "where the frontier between freedom and 
causal laws is to be determined" (1969:74). Case studies that examine the actual 
passage of legislation can add to knowledge about this "crucial issue" as well as to the 
store of knowledge about the origin and development of criminal law. At the moment 
the number of these studies is extremely small, although the number of recently passed 
Acts of social significance is very large. Untangling the constituent elements and 
making visible the multi-faceted reahty of these Acts is an important task, and one 
worthy of more academic attention than it has as yet received.
The question o f assisted suicide
The contenporary debate to which this case history of the Suicide Act can contribute 
is the one about the legal status of assisted suicide, which is at present a matter of 
profound controversy throughout the developed world. The U.S. Supreme Court in 
June 1997 refused to uphold a ruling by lower courts that assisted suicide was a 
fundamental constitutional right.^ In October 1999 the U.S. Congress took steps to 
overturn an Oregon state law legalising doctor-assisted suicide.^ In 1996 the 
Northern Territory of Austraha passed a law legalising assisted suicide, but the 
Australian Federal Parliament overturned it in March 1997.  ^ In Holland, assisted 
suicide has been de facto decriminahsed for many years, and in 1999 the Dutch 
government presented a BiU to Parliament to formally legahse it.^ ® In the United 
Kingdom the issue of euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide has been before the courts 
in several high profile cases in the 1990s^ ,^ and in June 1999 the British Medical 
Association published guidelines to doctors effectively dispensing with the need for 
court orders before food and water were removed from patients in a "persistent
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vegetative state". This move was immediately opposed by a group of doctors calling 
themselves the Medical Ethics Alliance.
The deep and passionate controversy these measures have aroused makes plain that 
suicide is an issue of great in^ortance to many people. But because the debate on the 
Suicide Bill was kept so narrowly focused on attenq)ted suicide, and its promoters 
rigidly defined the act as prima facie evidence of an unsound mind, the profound issues 
that actually are involved in suicide remained undiscussed and unresolved. Only a few 
years afier the Suicide Act was passed, Arthur Koestler^^ in Ghost in the Machine 
launched a sharp attack on the way this kind of determinist thinking avoided difficult 
issues. "Regardless of the verbal acrobatics of the Behaviourists and their allies," 
Koestler wrote, "the fundamental problem of mind and matter, of firee will vs. 
determinism, are still very much with us and have acquired a new urgency - not as a 
subject of philosophical debate, but because of their direct bearing on political ethics, 
and private morals, on criminal justice, psychiatry and our whole outlook on life." 
(1967:202)
These fimdamental problems, as well as all the fi'aught issues of personal autonomy, 
public order, and the enforcement of morals, were not touched on at aU during the 
passage of the Suicide Bill Although it formally decriminalised the act of self-killing, 
the Parliamentary debates dealt only marginally with the difficult issue of suicide itself 
and then only to confirm its status as utterly, irredeemably wrong. However, 
according to the advocates of assisted suicide,^ "^  the logic of the law that was passed 
then is inescapable: that is, it is not possible to continue to criminalise the assistance of 
an act that is not itself a crime. This means, the advocates say, that since suicide has 
been decriminalised, assisted suicide must be decriminalised as well
These wider inq)lications of the Suicide Act, unexamined at its passage, were 
dramatically spelled out a decade afterwards in Brian Clark's acclaimed play Whose
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Life is it Anyway? This was first produced for television in 1972, and became a 
successful stage play in 1978 with Tom Conti in the lead role. In 1982 it was made 
into a film, and in the 1990s became a set text for GCSE students. In the play Ken 
Harrison, a talented and intelligent young sculptor is conq)letely paralysed in a road 
accident. He can think and speak but do nothing else. Afl;er months of serious 
thought, lying in hospital and dependent in every intimate respect, he decides he does 
not wish to continue such a life and asks for the support systems to be withdrawn. The 
doctor in charge of the hospital, convinced of his duty to preserve life, refiises. 
Harrison then insists that he be discharged and so Dr. Emerson invokes Section 26 of 
the Mental Health Act to compulsorily detain and treat him. Another doctor objects, 
saying, "But surely a wish to die is not necessarily a synq)tom of insanity? A man 
might want to die for perfectly sane reasons." But Dr. Emerson rejects this, and so 
Harrison has a writ served demanding to be released under the Habeas Corpus rule 
forbidding unlawfiil detention. The ensuing hearing before a judge, held in Harrison's 
hospital room, allows an intensely dramatic examination of the central issue involved: 
Is a person who chooses to die necessarily insane? At the end of the hearing the Judge 
announces, "I am satisfied that Mr. Harrison is a brave and cool man wJio is in 
conq)lete control of his Acuities and I shall therefore make an order for him to be set 
firee." According to the author, Brian Clark, he has watched the film of his play on 
pubhc tours in countries around the world and "a great cheer always goes up wlien the 
judge gives the hero permission to choose to die." (Davies 1997:48)
The advocates of decriminahsing assisted suicide may or may not be right about the 
inescapable logic of the Suicide Act, but the facts of its passage offer insights into why 
decriminahsation is itself such a rare phenomenon. Moreover, they show that even a 
seemingly overt manifestation of it may be other than it seems. For students of the 
criminal law it is a reminder of the enduring tension between the individual's desire for 
autonomy and the pohtical authority's need to maintain order; between what can be 
tolerated as "private" behaviour and what is perceived as inq)ingmg on the pubhc
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domain and thus requiring regulation. Research in the still-small discipline of the 
sociology of law (to which this study belongs) indicates that the balance between these 
con^eting demands shifts in response to larger changes in pohtical and economic 
conditions, but only very occasionally does the balance - in its visible manifestation in 
criminal law - shift so as to reduce overall the pubhc and increase the private spheres. 
The areas where Authority extends its controlling reach may change - proscriptions on 
sex discrimination replace proscriptions on sexual preference; clinical judgements are 
substituted for court decisions - but abandonment of control altogether is extremely 
rare. As the potential for control expands beyond anything previously imagined, the 
need for research into its true nature and extent becomes more urgent. The question 
of how and why some human acts and not others become its targets remains 
inadequately understood. Since control comes in a variety of shifting guises and is 
often covert - an unexamined fist inside a glove of benevolent intent - the task of 
uncovering and examining it is an ever-present chaUenge. It is one to which the 
academic community is particularly weft suited to respond, and its significance makes it 
of great importance that they do.
Notes to the Conclusion:
^This was the path followed by reforms to the laws on censorship, abortion, homosexuality and 
divorce.
^Shifting conceptions of order make the nature and extent of this tendency a matter of continuing 
debate; see Reiner 1999
^See Butler's comments on this, quoted in chapter 3 
4gee excerpt from Select Committee Report, chapter 3
sgee Leo Abse Private Member 1973. pp. 159-88 for attitudes of divorce reform advocates 
^It is true that after the passage of most of the legislation in question the incidence and/or the visibility 
of abortion, divorce and homosexuality markedly increased. Social Trends 29,1999 shov^ the 
abortion rate rising from just over 2 per 1000 women in 1968 to 13 per 1000 in 1997. Norman Stone 
in Road to Divorce (1990) says "In the twenty seven years between 1960 and 1987 the number of 
divorces per annum in England and Wales has multiplied sixfold... the rate of divorce per annum per 
1000 married couples has also risen sixfold, from 2.0 to 12.6" (Stone 1990:409) The role played in 
the increase by the Acts themselves - as opposed to the influence of changed social mores - may be 
debatable, but there is a widespread belief that the easing of legal restrictions was itself an important 
factor in changing social norms. Hence the continued and rarely-challenged use of the label 
"permissive" (see Newburn 1992, chapter 1) In the case of suicide, the numbers actually dropped in 
the years following the Suicide Act, but this was widely attributed to the introduction of North Sea gas 
which removed one of the most popular methods of self-killing, which was to use the household gas.
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either the oven or the lounge fire, (see Atkinson 1978). By the 1980s the number of suicides officially 
recorded as such had returned to a level of between 3-4000 per year.
^The Supreme Court ruled (June 1997) that there was no Constitutional protection for "the right to 
die", which is to say that the Constitution does not provide a right to assisted suicide, but this left the 
states free to pursue "the earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality and practicality" of 
the issue. (International Herald Tribune 29 Oct. 1997)
^ h e  Oregon law, titled "Death with Dignity" was passed in 1994 and confirmed by referendum in 
1997. The "Pain Relief Promotion Act" was passed by the House of Representatives by 271 to 156 in 
October 1999; Senate leaders said they were certain of a majority for the passage in the Senate. 
(International Herald Tribune 29 Oct. 1999). However, the Act remained unpassed by the spring of 
2000.
^Financial Times 25 March 1997 
^^Sunday Telegraph 14 November 1999
^^Notable: the decision that life support could be removed from the Hillsborough victim Tony 
Bland, confirmed by the House of Lords in 1993; the case brought by Annie Lindsell, suffering from 
motor neurone disease, in October 1997, that her doctor should be allowed to help her die.
^^Times 12 August 1999
^^ It should be noted that Koestler wrote the introduction to the Voluntary Euthanasia Society booklet 
Guide to Self-deliverance, and he himself committed suicide with an overdose of barbiturates in 1983 
at the age of 77. He left a note ensuring there would be no doubt that the self-killing was deliberate. 
"^*The literature of The Voluntary Euthanasia Society of England and Wales makes this point, as did 
Sidney Rosoff  ^former Chairman of the U.S. Society for the Right to Die and President of the Hemlock 
Society USA, in an interview in September 1999.
Whose Life is it Anyway? published by Heinemann Educational 1989 with introduction by Ray 
Speakman, includes questions, "explorations" and suggested essay questions to examine the larger 
issues posed by the law as it stands on suicide and assisted suicide.
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Appendix A
Suicide Act 1961
An Act to amend the law of England and Wales relating to 
suicide, and for purposes connected therewith.
[3rd August 1961]
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual 
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as 
follows:
1. The rule of law whereby it is a crime for a person to commit suicide is hereby abrogated.
2. - (1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to 
commit suicide shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen 
years.
(2) If on the trial of an indictment for murder or manslaughter it is proved that the accused aided, betted, 
counselled or procured the suicide of the person in question, the jury may find him guilty of that offence.
(3) The enactments mentioned in the first column of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect suigect 
to the amendments provided for in the second column (which preserve in relation to offences under this section 
the previous operation of those enactments in relation to murder or manslaughter).
(4) An indictment for an offence under this section shall not be triable by a court of quarter sessions; and 
(subject to section thirteen and forty of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, as applied by subsection (3) 
above) no proceedings shall be instituted for an offence under this section except by or with the consent of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions.
3. - (1) This Act may be cited as the Suicide Act 1961
(2) The enactments mentioned in the Second Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent 
specified in the third column of the Schedule.
(3) This Act shall extend to England and Wales only, except as regards the amendments made by Part 11 of 
the First Schedule and except that the Interments (felo de se) Act, 1882, shall be repealed also for the Channel 
Islands.
SCHEDULES 
FIRST SCHEDULE 
Adaptation of Enactments Relating to 
Murder or Manslaughter 
PARTI
Amendments Limited to England and Wales
Enactment and subject matter 
The Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926
Section twenty (Effect on coroners' 
duties of prosecution for murder, etc.)
Amendment
The references to murder, manslaughter 
or infanticide shall apply also to aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide.
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The Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
First Schedule (Offences to which 
special provisions of the Act apply).
to
The reference to the murder or manslaughter of 
a child or young person shall apply also
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring 
the suicide of a child or young person.
PARTE
Amendments Not Limited to England and Wales
The Extradition Act 1870-
First Schedule (list of extradition crimes).
The Visiting forces Act, 1952-
Section seven (Effect on coroners' duties 
in En^and, Wales and Northern Ireland 
of certain proceedings for homicide.)
Paragraph 1 of the Schedule (Offences not triable 
by courts of England, Wales or Northern 
Ireland in the cases provided for by section 
three of the Act).
The Army Act, 1955-
Subsections (4) and (5) of section 
seventy (Exclusion of court-martial 
jurisdiction over certain offences 
committed in the United Kingdom.
The Air Force Act, 1955-
Subsections (4) and (5) of section 
seventy (Exclusion of court-martial 
jurisdiction over certain offences 
committed in the United Kingdom.
The Naval Discipline Act, 1957-
Subsections (4) and (5) of section forty- 
eight (Exclusion of court-martial 
jurisdiction over certain offences 
committed in the United Kingdom.
The list of crimes shall include aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide.
The definition of "homicide" in subsection (6) 
shall have effect as if after the references to 
murder, manslaughter and infanticide there were 
inserted a reference to aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring suicide.
In sub-paragraph (a) (which provides that 
murder and certain other offences are to be com­
prised in the expression "Offences against the 
person") after the word "assault" there shall be 
inserted the words "and any offence of aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide or an 
attempt to commit suicide".
At the end of subsection (4) there shall be added 
the words-
"In this and the following subsection the 
references to murder shall apply also to aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide."
At the end of subsection (4) there shall be added 
the words-
"In this and the following subsection the 
references to murder shall apply also to aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide."
At the end of subsection (4) there shall be added 
the words-
"In this and the following subsection the 
references to murder shall apply also to aiding, 
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide."
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SECOND SCHEDULE 
REPEALS
Session and Chapter Short Title Extent of Repeal
33 & 34 Viet. C.23 The Forfeiture Act 1870 In section one, the words "of felo de se"
45 & 46 Viet. c. 19 The Interments (felo de se)
Act 1882 The whole Act
15 & 16 Geo.6 and 1 Eliz. 2 c.55 The Magistrates' Courts
Act, 1952 Paragraph 15 of the First Schedule (except
as respects proceedings commenced 
before the commencement of this Act)
5 & 6 Ehz. 2c. 11 The Homicide Act, 1957 In section four, in subsection (1) and in
subsection (2), the words "killing himself or"
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Appendix B
Joint Committee of the British Medical Association and Magistrates* 
Association;
Record of their involvement with the Suicide Act
The part played in the passage of the Suicide Act by the Joint Committee of the 
BMA/Magistrates' Association was very important. Aspects of it appear in the body 
of the thesis in chapters 4, 5 and 6, but because the data exists only in the minutes of 
the Joint Committee, and these are only available in the BMA Archives in London, a 
detailed account of the Joint Committee's involvement with the reform of the suicide 
law is included here in the interests of clarity and historical record. The archival 
reference is simply to Minutes of Joint Committee of the BMA and Magistrates 
Association 1952-1961; BMA Archives, BMA House, Tavistock Square, London 
WC1H9JP; Archivist: Emily Naish.
The points of particular relevance to this thesis which arise from this record are: the 
visible resistance from representatives of the criminal justice establishment to the take­
over of this matter by the medical estabhshment, and the crucial importance of the 
Mental Health Act to the Joint Committee's ultimate agreement to recommend 
decriminahsation. Other points to note are the dominance of the Chair, Doris Odium, 
in the initiation and pursuit of the issue; the evidence that links the Joint Committee to 
Kenneth Robinson M.P., and finally, the contrast between the extremely small number 
of people involved and the intact they appeared to have on the passage of the Act.
The Joint Committee of the British Medical Association and the Magistrates 
Association originated shortly after the end of World War H, in 1946. Its genesis 
seems to have been related at least partly to proximity - the Magistrates' Association 
at that time had its oflSces in BMA House on Tavistock Square in London. It is 
interesting to note that the Joint Committee was suspended in 1961 at exactly the time 
when the Magistrates' Association moved to its present premises on Fitzroy Square.
The Committee's Terms of Reference were clearly set out, and repeated each year at 
the time of the re-election of the chair:
"To provide a channel for co-operation between the BMA and the Magistrates' 
Association; to consider all matters of common interest, with special reference 
to observations, prevention and treatment in relation to the medical aspects of
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legal offence; and to make recommendations for the irrq)rovement and 
extension of existing arrangements and for facilitating new legislation."
The Committee's membership was also formally prescribed: 6 members to be
nominated by the BMA, 6 by the Magistrates Association, with power to co-opt not 
more than 4 additional members. Observers could be invited from appropriate 
Government Departments to attend Committee meetings.
The third report of the Committee, in 1947, was on "Attempted Suicide and the Law". 
It said: "There is a strong case for amendment of the law so that attençted suicide 
(excluding suicide pacts or incitement of another person to commit suicide) would not 
be dealt with as an illegal offence." It was made clear at the time that this reflected 
the views of the medical members only, with the explanation that the Magistrate 
members "had participated fiilly in the discussion, but, though they were not in 
disagreement with the conclusion reached, it was agreed that the report should be 
concerned only with the problem from the medical aspect."
Right from the start, at this very early stage, the proposal to de-criminahse attempted 
suicide was coupled with proposals for its regulation in another sphere:
"If the law is to be concerned at all one suggestion received by the Committee 
is that it should be altered in such a way as to remove from the Courts the 
problem of criminahty in this matter and to extend to adults a principle similar 
to that in the Children and Young Person's Act 1933. Then adults 'in need of 
care and protection' would be brought before the magistrates courts to whom 
the necessary psychiatric advice should be available, so that consideration could 
be given to the best treatment for their rehabihtation. A further suggestion was 
made that powers be granted to
magistrates to extend the present 28 day limit under an observation order."
Nothing further happened to or about this proposal for eight years, until in the middle 
of 1955 Doris Odium resurrected it. Dr. Doris Maude Odium, bom in 1890, was a 
consultant psychiatrist and Senior Physician for Psychological Medicine at the 
Elizabeth Garrett Anderson Hospital in London. On 10 October 1952, she was 
elected to the Chair of the Joint BMA-Magistrates Committee. She remained the 
Chair - despite several minuted atten^ts to relinquish the post - from then until the 
Committee's suspension in 1961, attending every single recorded meeting save one. 
Committee members came and went, including such co-optees as Dr. Herman 
Mannheim, Reader in Criminology from the LSE, who was a member from 1952 to 
1955. None of them had a tenure even approaching the length of Dr. Odium's, and
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attendance at the twice- or thrice-yearly meetings was patchy; with many having no 
more than five people present.
From 1952 to 1955 the Committee was engaged in preparing an enormous report on 
the law in regard to cruelty to, and neglect of children. This was completed by July 
1955, and the minutes of the meeting on 22 July (at which only five members were 
present) state:
"Considered: Future Work of the Committee. No subject calling for
consideration by the Committee came immediately to mind and members 
agreed to give thought to the matter."
The agenda for the next meeting, which took place on 14 October 1955 contained the 
following at Item 5:
"Consider:
1) Report fiom the Chairman of a recent case in which a woman was sentenced 
to 15 days imprisonment on a charge of attempted suicide.
2) Question whether the previous stated policy of the Committee on this 
subject should be reviewed.
The minutes of the 14 October meeting (where again only five were present) record 
that the Chairman pointed out that "in its statement on attempted suicide (1947), the 
Connnittee suggested that attenpted suicide should no longer be a criminal offence, 
but because of the assurance that the law was only used as a means of helping patients 
by giving police some power to see that they were put into good hands and that no 
case of inprisonment had occurred for a great many years, the suggestion was not 
pressed."
The minutes further record: "After some discussion the Chairman suggested that
consideration should be given particularly to the question of whether attempted suicide 
should continue to be regarded as an offence, and it was agreed that before the next 
meeting of the Committee each member should receive a copy of the Committee's 
Report pubhshed in 1947."
It should be noted that the Committee did not at this point agree to make any effort to 
change the law in regard to suicide and attempted suicide, and in fact, a proposal to 
make this a Committee objective was never formally put. It seems to have been 
sinply the inertia of committee proceedings, coupled with the evident interest of the 
Chair, which kept the matter re-appearing on Committee agendas.
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On 2 February 1956 the Committee met again (with only five present). The 1947 
Report had been circulated and was discussed. The minutes record:
"Some were of the opinion that it was advantageous for attenq>ted suicide to be 
regarded as an offence because cases were brought to the notice of the 
authorities who could decide on appropriate action...
On the other hand, the Chairman pointed out that during the last year there had 
been a number of cases of mq)risomnent for attençted suicide which seemed to 
be a highly undesirable course of action. She was supported in her view. It 
was realised that in many cases, however, appropriate action was taken as a 
result of police investigation... In general the Committee endorsed the views 
previously expressed in its statement issued in 1947. Dr. Carroll suggested that 
the most likely way of achieving an amendment to the law would be through a 
Member of Parhament introducing a Private Members Bill on the subject. It 
was realised, however, that before such a step could be taken it would be 
advisable to obtain the views of the medical profession.
Resolved: That it be Recommended to the Council of the B.M.A. that through 
the Divisions and Boards of the Association the question be put to the 
profession whether or not attempted suicide should continue to be regarded as 
a criminal offence.
The representatives of the Magistrates Association were also agreeable to 
bringing the question before their association."
The matter of possible future work for the Committee was also discussed at this, 
February 1956 meeting. Alcoholism and Medical Reports to Courts were suggested as 
possibilities. No proposal was made that the attempted suicide issue should be an 
object of work for the Committee.
The next meeting was on 19 July 1956, at which the Committee received a report of a 
Resolution that had been passed by the Representative Body of the British Medical 
Association on 9 July. The Resolution was:
"(i) That this Meeting notes with concern the fact that in recent years a 
considerable number of people have been imprisoned for attempting suicide. It 
supports the statement of the Joint Committee of the B.M.A. and the 
Magistrates' Association in their report on Attempted Suicide and the Law 
(1947) that "There is a strong case for amendment of the law so that attenq)ted 
suicide (excluding suicide pacts or incitement of another person to commit 
suicide) would not be dealt with as an illegal offence", and expresses its 
satisfaction that the Committee is giving further consideration to the matter.
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(ii) That as a matter of urgency Council should consider the need for further 
discussion with the Magistrates' Association of the treatment of attempted 
suicide, particularly as the majority of these cases are in need of psychiatric 
treatment."
The records do not show the source of this Resolution. However, its wording, and in 
particular the references to the Joint Committee, together with the feet that there are 
no records of any other section of the BMA mvolving itself with this issue, suggest 
Dr. Odium.
At the 19 July meeting (five attending), faced with this Resolution fi*om its parent 
body, the Committee
"discussed the best way of reviewing the question of attenq)ted suicide and of 
bringing to notice any unsatisfactory provisions in the present law. It was 
agreed that information should be sought on the present methods of dealing 
with attempted suicide, and that if this information showed that the views 
expressed in the Committee's 1947 report on the subject calling for amendment 
of the law were stül vahd, an appropriate memorandum should he addressed to 
the Secretary of State for the Home Office.
The next meeting, on 16 November 1956, received statistics for the years 1946-55 
showing the number of cases of attenq)ted suicide known to the pohce, the numbers 
brought before the courts, and the results of the proceedings. They also considered 
reports fi"om 22 consultants as to the various practices followed in regard to attempted 
suicides, and noted that no clear pattern emerged.
More startlingly, the November meeting received a report fi*om Mrs. MacAdam J.P. 
that
"the Legal Committee of the Magistrates' Association had considered the 
present position regarding cases of attempted suicide and had reported to the 
Council of the Magistrates Association that, in their view, there was no 
necessity for a change in the law. They beheved that cases were being dealt 
with satisfactorily, and had asked to be informed of any evidence showing that 
the discretion whether or not to bring a person before the courts was not being 
used wisely.
It was made clear, however, that this was not the view of ah members of the 
Magistrates' Association some of whom upheld the recommendation contained 
in the Committee's 1947 report...
The experience of members of the Committee, and the information received 
fi*om hospital staffs in various parts of the country, indicated that on the whole.
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persons who had atteropted suicide were being dealt with satisfectorily and a 
very small percentage were brought before the courts...
The view was expressed that a concurrent term of inprisonment on a charge of 
attempted suicide following another charge would act as a deterrent against 
further attenpts and against attenpts at suicide by other persons. All members 
of the Committee would not, however, share this view. After discussion it was 
agreed that the present position was not sufficiently altered firom that in 1947 
to warrant further enquiries, but it was suggested that attention should again be 
drawn to the Committee's 1947 report on the subject, together with statistics 
for recent years and the additional information obtained regarding insurance 
pohcies involving persons who have attenpted suicide.
RESOLVED: That a statement incorporating the above points be submitted 
for pubhcation in the British Medical Journal and The Magistrate."
[The refusal of the Magistrates Association to support a proposal to change the law on 
attenpted suicide is also recorded in the 36th Annual Report of the Magistrates 
Association, October 1956:
"The [Legal] Committee has considered whether there is need for some 
alteration in the law relating to attempted suicide, and in particular whether it 
should remain a criminal offence.
In view of the general practice of only bringing a case of attenpted suicide in 
exceptional circumstances, the Committee is not in favour of the law being 
amended, but considers that attenpted suicide should continue to be a criminal 
offence so that where necessary the person concerned can be safeguarded and 
helped." ]
Regardless of the Magistrates Association's clear position against a change in the law, 
the Joint Committee under Dr. Odium pressed on, and at the meeting on 25 April 
1957, following the resolution of 16 November 1956, a draft of the statement to be 
sent to the British Medical Journal and The Magistrate on attenpted suicide was 
considered. Mr. Seymour Collins J.P., who is shown in previous minutes as being 
unenthusiastic about proposals to decriminahse, had submitted a statement in advance 
of the meeting, which had been circulated. It read:
"With regard to the proposed Statement on Attenpted Suicide I am rather 
reserved and very sceptical about the wisdom of all the recommendations.
The pohce officer's powers of arrest where there had merely been a breach of 
the peace merely continues if some action on his part becomes necessary to 
prevent in the immediate future a further breach of the peace. I am very 
doubtful whether, apart from his power of arrest for the common law offence 
of attenpted suicide a poHceman could intervene even if he saw a man in the 
street eating large quantities of apirin and obviously trying to do away with
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himself and a fortiori he would have no powers whatsoever if this or any of the 
other recognised methods of terminating life were being exercised on himself 
by a man in a private dwelling. In any event I doubt whether attempted suicide 
is at the present time any breach of the peace.
I am in fiill agreement with the view that attenpted suicide cases usually 
require some treatment or supervision and I am never very happy about the 
idea of patients being regarded as voluntary patients in a mental hospital when 
they have been sent there under Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 as a 
condition of residence for a period not exceeding 12 months which can only be 
enforced as a breach of a probation order. It seems to me that these provisions 
and their enforcement are so roundabout that they exceed the British genius for 
conq>romise.
All I hope is that the Joint Committee will not tie themselves down to 
recommendations which will leave the police powerless and I venture to 
suggest that in the comparatively rare cases which come before the Courts the 
present system works pretty well. There still is httle to choose between the 
stigma of having been before the Court and having been in a mental hospital in 
the eyes of most families and where the only chance of psychiatric treatment is 
through the medium of a Court I feel the present system has much to 
recommend it..."
Having received these comments from Mr. Collins, the Committee felt unable to deal 
with the proposed formal statement and so -
"RESOLVED: That consideration of the draft statement on attenq)ted suicide 
be deferred until the Committee has had an opportunity of studying the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, expected to 
be pubhshed in May."
The Committee minutes for 1957-58 show that the draft statement went through five 
separate revisions before it was jSnaUy approved. The final approved version makes 
the clear recommendation that attempted suicides should no longer be brought before 
the courts, unless "the incident takes place in pubhc and/or in circumstances which 
cause annoyance and alarm". However to reach agreement even on this rather 
grudging recommendation, many different ways of maintaining control over attempted 
suicides had been canvassed. Take, for example, the draft of the statement considered 
at the meeting of 25 July 1957:
"In view of the fact that suicide is at present a felony, the pohce have power to 
intervene where a person is found attenq)ting suicide, and it is desirable for 
power of this kind to be retained in certain circumstances. It is suggested that 
suitable alternative legislation could provide for pohce intervention in cases of 
attempted suicide and give power for such cases to be brought to a hospital for 
observation and treatment if necessary."
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After Mr. Collins statement in April, a summary of the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on Mental Illness - seven pages long - was duly circulated, and Dr. Odium 
invited Professor E. Stengel of Sheffield University, President of the Psychiatric 
Section of the Royal Society of Medicine, to come and address the January 22, 1958 
meeting. Any question about Professor Stengel's position on the suicide issue was 
resolved in advance by circulating a copy of an address he had recently given to the 
Howard League: "Reactions of Society to Attenq)ted Suicide" (reprinted in the
Howard Journal 199 1956), in which he said: "The fear that a suicide attenq)t may 
lead to prosecution tends to make some people lie to the doctor about it and maintain 
that it was an accident, thus making psychiatric treatment inçossible and a repetition 
more likely..." His address to the Joint Committee on 22 January 1958 was minuted 
as follows:
"Professor Stengel said that during his thirty years as a psychiatrist he had 
practised in countries where legislation concerning attempted suicide was 
different from that in England. It was not a legal offence in any of these 
countries. He told of cases in England where persons who had attempted 
suicide were brou^t to hospital and pohce oflScers waited to take a statement 
from them even though the case was not subsequently brought to court. This 
was very unsatisfactory from the point of view of treatment of the patient and 
also unsatisfactory in that it only happened where cases were known to the 
pohce. In other instances the law was ignored and it was undesirable to have a 
law that was capriciously apphed.
Professor Stengel had practised in Scotland wfrere atterrq)ted suicide was not 
per se a legal offence and had recently discussed the question with Scottish 
coUeagues. They found no difficulty in dealing with such cases and if there 
seemed a real danger of a person repeating an attempt at suicide they were 
dealt with like other patients in need of psychiatric care and treatment.
With regard to the future of persons who had attenq)ted suicide, Professor 
Stengel had fohowed up several groups of persons who had made attempts 5 or 
10 years previously. He found that only a very smah minority had committed 
suicide during that period; and no advantage appeared to be gained in those 
cases where the pohce had intervened.
Professor Stengel reminded the Committee that the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Mental Health expressed the view that the less the judiciary 
had to do with the treatment of patients the better and he thought that this 
principle should be apphed in relation to attenpted suicide.
Mr. Seymour Collins felt there was a necessity for some power to be given to 
the pohce to intervene where a person was found attenq)ting suicide. If the 
present law was amended so that attenq>ted suicide was not regarded as an
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offence the police would have no power to intervene and to take a person to 
hospital and would be Hable to action for unlawful arrest if they so acted.
It was thought that there would be no difficulty in making suitable 
arrangements to cover that point; it was essential that the police or any other 
person discovering an attenq)ted suicide should take action to save the person 
and take him to hospital or a medical practitioner.
In reply to questions whether a person had a right to take his life and whether a 
person who had attenq)ted suicide would resist being saved, Professor Stengel 
was of the opinion that a person had a right to take his life but he was sure that 
persons making an unsuccessful attençt at suicide wanted to be saved."
Following this report of Professor Stengel's talk the minutes record:
"It was the general feeling of the Committee that the present law was obsolete 
and should therefore be amended to ensure that all persons atterrq)ting suicide 
received appropriate care. It was suggested that as a first step towards 
obtaining amendment of the law the matter should be raised in connection with 
new legislation arising out of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Law 
Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency.
RESOLVED: (i) That the draft statement on attempted suicide be accepted in 
principle; that a paragraph be added proposing that with amendment of the law 
the pohce should have power to intervene in the interest of the person's safety 
where an individual is found attempting suicide; and that the statement be 
submitted to the Committee at its next meeting for final approval.
(ii) That the Connnittee on the Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency be informed of 
this Committee's views on the subject of attempted suicide, and be asked to 
support them and to propose the inclusion of a special clause relating to 
attempted suicide in any new legislation concerning mental health."
A special sub-committee was then formed to progress the statement, and this sub­
committee met on 4 March 1958. Lady Adrian J.P. was in the Chair, with Dr. Odium 
and two others present, not including Seymour Collins. Lady Adrian, a Magistrate 
member of the Joint Committee, had been a member of the Royal Commission on the 
Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, and was the Chair of the 
Cambridge Mental Welfare Association. The 4 March minutes record that Kenneth 
Robinson's Parhamentary Question of 13 February about the suicide law was 
discussed, and a further revision of the proposed statement to the journals took place. 
In the absence of Seymour Collins, the meeting removed the recommendation to
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preserve police powers to intervene in attempted suicides, and proposed an extension 
of facilities for psychiatric treatment and after care.
These revisions did not find favour with Mr. Collins, who at the next meeting of the 
full Committee on 27 March tried to re-insert a recommendation that attenpted 
suicides be put on probation by magistrates, and/or give police the power to have them 
detained in hospital. Dr. Odium in the Chair, resisted him, and for the most part 
prevailed. Recommendation 2 of the statement as finally issued read:
"So far as possible, no case of attenpted suicide should be brought before any 
court on any form of charge except, for example, where the incident takes 
place in public, and/or in circumstances which cause annoyance and alarm"
The meeting of 27 March 1958 RESOLVED:
"That copies of the statement be circulated to interested persons, including Mr. 
Kenneth Robinson M.P., who had asked a question on the subject in the House 
of Commons."
On 22 May 1958, Kenneth Robinson duly brought it to the attention of the Home 
Secretary by means of a P.Q.
"Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, since the last Question I put to him on 
this subject, a joint committee, set up by the British Medical Association and 
the Magistrates' Association to examine this subject, has reported in favour of a 
change in the law in the direction which I am suggesting, and that this report is 
unanimously accepted by the Council of the Magistrates Association? In view 
of this weighty opinion, will not the Home Secretary make an early decision in 
this matter?"
Some six weeks later, in July 1958, Rev. Dunstan invited Dr. Odium to join the 
Church working group considering the law on suicide, (see chapter 5) She accepted 
with alacrity, and attended the first meeting of that group on 2 October. On 5 
November 1958 the B.M.A /Magistrates Joint Committee met again and it is minuted 
that "The Chair reported she had brought the matter [of a change in the law on suicide] 
to the attention of a number of bodies, including the National Association for Mental 
Health, which supported the view of the Committee....
It appeared to the Committee that no further action was called for immediately..."
Despite this view of the Committee that no fiirther action was called for. Dr. Odium 
proceeded to write to the Lord Archbishop of Westminster (Cardinal Godfi'ey) on 29 
November, 1958, and to the General Secretary of the Free Church Federal Council,
265
sending them copies of the statement the Committee had approved. The letters and 
the rephes to them are produced in chapter 5.
Early in 1959 the BMA/MA Joint Committee received an invitation "for 
representatives of the Committee to attend the Home Office on Friday, 13 March, 
1959, to discuss with officers of the Department the problem of attempted suicide." 
The Chair invited Lady Adrian, Dr. Bodman, Mr. Seymour Collins and Mrs. MacAdam 
to join her at this meeting. A meeting of this group to prepare was planned for 6 
February, but had to be postponed until 12 March, barely 24 hours before the 
scheduled meeting at the Home Office on Friday the 13th.
A note was circulated with the agenda for 12 March, "as a basis for discussion on 
representations to be made to the Home Office." On the proposal that attercpted 
suicide should no longer be chargeable as a criminal offence it said;
"It would not...be practicable to do this unless legislation is forthcoming at the 
same time to provide that cases of attempted suicide shall be protected against 
subsequent attenq)ts while any disorder of the mind continues. In practice, 
nearly every case of attempted suicide is, subject to police intervention, seen by 
his own medical attendant, who is able to make the necessary arrangements for 
the subsequent management of the case. But it is important that in other cases 
legislation should be forthcoming so that the person is removed immediately to 
a place of safety. It will be necessary that the pohce shall be empowered to 
enter premises and to make the necessary arrangements, upon receipt of 
information which gives them a reasonable cause to beheve that a person has 
made a serious attenq)t upon his own life."
At the preliminary meeting on the 12th, Seymour Collins again attempted to gain 
agreement that courts should have the power to impose care and protection provisions 
on attempted suicides. It was resisted, and the minutes record:
"There was some objection to the proposal on the grounds that it would mean 
that the person had to be brought before a court. It was also felt that, whilst 
such a procedure might be useful in a few cases, the proposals in the present 
Mental Health Bill were such that if accepted, they would provide for action, 
where necessary, m many cases of attempted suicide and it would be 
unnecessary to ring in additional legislation to cover a very small number of 
instances of attempted suicide."
The following points were agreed by the group, to be presented to Home Office 
officials:
"a) Attempted suicide per se should not be a criminal offence
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b) Clause 133 of Mental Health Act could be applied if attenq)ted suicide is in a 
public place, to enable the person to be removed to a place of safety.
c) If the attenpts suicide is not in a pubhc place, the pohce should have power 
to take that person to a place of safety on the presumption they are m need of 
treatment.
d) The smah proportion of attempted suicide who create a pubhc disturbance 
could be charges with breach of the peach.
e) Fohowing discharge from hospital, it is suggested that after care and fohow 
up be undertaken by a social worker, not a probation officer
f) It is not possible to protect people against themselves completely, but if they 
are kept in a place of safety and have the opportunity of care and treatment, 
they are less likely to make a second atten^t at suicide than if they have been 
inq)risoned
g) A change in the law would not make it more difficult for a person to receive 
treatment.
h) The recommendations do not refer to suicide pacts."
The 12 of March minutes also record:
"The Chairman stated that she had written personally to enquire the view of the 
Churches on a possible amendment in the law re attenq)ted suicide and she was 
pleased to report that there appeared to be no opposition to the proposal"
The meeting at the Home Office on 13 March was, in the end, attended by Dr. Odium, 
Lady Adrian, Dr. Bodman, Mrs. MacAdam, and the Assistant Secretary to the 
Committee, J.D.J. Havard. Seymour Collins was not there. The only Home Office 
attendee was Francis Graham Harrison, but his rank - Deputy Permanent Secretary - 
indicates the Department considered the matter to be inq)ortant. It is significant - 
given the theory of a transference of control - that two people from the Ministry of 
Health, Dr. W.S. Maclay and Mr. P. Benner, were also present.
Minutes of the meeting taken by Dr. Havard show that the decision to de-criminahse 
had already been taken, but only because of the existence of the Mental Health Bill:
"Mr. Graham Harrison opened the discussion by saying that the question of a 
change in the law relating to attenq)ted suicide had been under discussion in the 
Home Office and that the conclusion had been reached that it was undesirable 
to retain attenq)ted suicide as a criminal ofrence as it was mainly a social and 
medical problem
Consideration had been given to the recommendation that those cases of 
attempted suicide which it was necessary to bring before a court could be dealt 
with as a breach of the peace. Enquiries had been made about the position in 
Scotland where this procedure was aheady followed. It appeared that it was 
not altogether satisfactory because in some areas a charge of breach of the 
peace was made in nearly every case, with the result that of the cases known to
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the police a higher proportion was brought before the courts than happened at 
the present time in En^and and Wales.
It was pointed out that when the Joint Committee of the B.M.A. and the 
Magistrates' Association had recommended provision for bringing in a charge 
of breach of the peace it was intended to cover those cases where the 
attenq)ted suicide had caused a disturbance to the public. It was now realised 
that if the Mental Health Bill at present before Parliament was passed, the 
provisions contained therein would cover most of the cases of attenpted 
suicide in which it was considered necessary to remove the victim
Word of the meeting at the Home Office with members of the BMA/Magistrates 
Committee reached Kenneth Robinson and on 16 April he put down another PQ to the 
Home Secretary asking about it. Butler repHed:
'A  helpful meeting between officials of my Department and of the Ministry of 
Health and representatives of the Joint Committee... took place last month. 
The meeting explored the crucial problem of ensuring that persons who attempt 
suicide receive treatment of their condition. The existing law does ensure this 
although I recognise that it has unsatisfactory features and before we change it 
I want to be satisfied that there are workable alternatives." (Hansard 16 April 
1959)
Unfortunately this reply displeased members of the Committee, who at their next 
meeting on
21 May - when, unusually eleven members were present - recorded disapproval:
"The Committee was disturbed that the statement to the House of Commons 
did not appear to be in accordance with the trend of the discussion at the Home 
Office in that the Secretary of State for Home Affairs had said that the existing 
law ensured that persons who attempt to commit suicide received treatment. 
The Committee thought it was clear that this was not generally so at present. 
RESOLVED: That a letter be addressed to the Home Office seeking
clarification of the above points.
The letter duly went, and an emollient reply came back from the Home Office dated 22 
June, saying the Home Office minute of the discussion recorded:
"Mr. Graham-Harrison explained that the provisional view of the Home Office 
on this subject was that attecqpted suicide was primarily a medical and social 
problem which ought so far as possible to be dealt with outside the criminal 
law. The Home Secretary was, however, anxious to ensure that the 
arrangements for getting people who had attempted suicide into the hands of 
appropriate medical and social agencies could operate adequately. He would 
be glad therefore to have the benefit of the views of the members of the Joint 
Committee of the BMA and the Magistrates Association who had studied this 
problem in some detail."
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However, "Members [of the Committee] were not satisfied", according to minutes of 
24 September, "with the explanation given of the reply by the Home Secretary to the 
PQ on 16 April and could not agree that the existing law ensured that persons who 
attempted suicide received treatment...
RESOLVED: 1) Home Secretary to be informed of disquiet of Committee 2) After 
the coming General Election a further approach be made to the Home Secretary to 
ascertain the action proposed in regard to amending the legislation on attenq»ted 
suicide."
At the meeting on 18 November 1959 the Committee received copies of the Hansard 
of 5 November in which Butler had responded to yet another Kenneth Robinson 
question about the law on attenq)ted suicide, and confirmed a coming change - albeit in 
the obfiiscating language of Government Ministers: "As the Hon Member knows, I 
have stated that I understand his point of view on this matter." (Hansard 5 November 
1959)
The Committee "discussed the various ways in which persons who attenq)ted suicide 
might best be dealt with and it was generally agreed that it was desirable to avoid the 
stigma which, at present, attached itself to such cases under existing arrangements." 
Seymour Collins, who continued to resist the removal of all court power, suggested 
that attempted suicides seemed to do well on Probation - why not let Magistrates 
Courts put them on probation as a 'civil' action?
The Committee then-
"RESOLVED: That the Home Office be informed that the Committee is of the opinion 
that provision should be made in any amending legislation on attenq)ted suicide for 
machinery whereby the courts could deal with cases in their civil capacity where there 
is no alternative method of safeguarding the would-be suicide or the community."
Following this no further action by the Committee on this issue is recorded. At their 
meeting on 3 November 1960 they "welcomed" the report of the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee (see Chapter 7), and on 21 March 1961 they "received" a report 
of the Suicide Bill, which had its second reading on 2 March, but by then the 
Committee had moved on to discussions on the rehabihtation of alcohohcs.
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Appendix C:
Letter referring suicide issue to Criminal Law Revision Committee
APPENDIX 1
LETTER C O N TA IN IN G  TERM S O F  R EFER EN C E
Home Office,
Whitehall,
London, S .W .l.
Ath November, 1959.
My Lord,
I have the honour, by direction o f the Secretary of State, to inform  you 
that he is considering whether legislation should be introduced to provide that 
suicide and attem pted suicide should no longer be criminal offences.
The abolition o f the offence of suicide would involve consequential am end­
ments of the criminal law to deal with offences which would cease to be m urder 
if suicide ceased to be self-murder. The actions o f one who encourages or 
assists suicide may range widely in moral culpability, and it seems proper that 
any such consequential amendments should be framed in such a way as to 
enable the courts, in assessing the penalty, to take account of these distinctions.
In order to assist the Government in examining the possibility of legislation, 
the Secretary o f State would be obliged if the Crim inal Law Revision Com m ittee 
would be good enough to consider, on the assum ption that it should continue 
to be an offence for a person (v.'Jiether he is acting in pursuance o f a genuine 
suicide pact or not) to incite or assist another to kill or attem pt to kill himself, 
what consequential amendments in the criminal law would be required in 
consequence o f a provision that suicide and attem pted suicide should no longer 
be criminal offences.
I have the honour to be. 
My Lord,
Your Lordship’s m ost obedient Servant,
(Sgd.) C. C. C U N N IN G H A M .
The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Seller;, M.C.
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Printed jor the Cabinet, June I960
Appendix D: Memo from Butler to Cabinet concerning 
Legislative programme for 1960-61 Parliamentary session
TOP SECRET Copy No. 5 4
C, (60) 93 
9 th June, 1960
CABINET
LEG ISLA TIV E PR O G R A M M E : 1960-61 AND L A T E R  SESSIONS
M e m o r a n d u m  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a f e  f o r  t h e  H o m e  D e p a r t m e n t
The Fu tu re  Legislation Committee are now ready to  subm it to the Cabinet 
a provisional program m e of Bills for next Session, together with a conspectus of 
the m ajor legislation we think should be undertaken in the two following Sessions.
The Forw ard Plan
2. We have draw n up this forw ard plan, the main features of which are 
set out in Annex A, in order to put the next Session in perspective and to secure 
for the greater part of the Parliam ent a programme which will be politically 
coherent and, from  the point of view of drafting and the business of the House, 
reasonably m anageable. In addition to a num ber of major-Bills on various subjects, 
the pattern  has certain  recognisable themes running right through it—social or 
moral reform, im provem ent of our financial institutions and commercial practice, 
a progressive attack  on the problems of transport and a steady improvement, on 
a wide front, of the criminal and civil law and its adm inistration. Reorganisation 
of the nationalised industries, not all all of which require le ^ la t io n , will probably 
be proceeding. A nd constitutional and other development in the Commonwealth 
and the Colonies will be a recurrent subject of legislation as and when the occasion 
arises. The pattern  of Scottish legislation will, as appropriate, be adjusted to 
accord with decisions on the English Bills.
3. The p icture sketched in Annex A  is not, and does not aim at being, 
complete. But if the Cabinet felt able to give it general approval, as a solid (if 
rather unexciting) legislative achievement at which to aim in our present term  
of office, the necessary planning and preparation could proceed.
Detailed Program m e for 1960-61
4. For the next Session we must go, without delay, into much more detail. 
A fter discussion with all M inisters concerned, the Committee have allocated the 
material pu t forw ard into the following categories: •
A .I.—Essential Bills, which depend on some inescapable time-table.
A.2.—C ontingent Bills, the need for which depends on some factor at present 
unknown.
B .l.— M ain program m e Bills.
B.2.—O ther program m e Bills.
C.—O ther Bills, for which it is unlikely that time can be found.
P.—Bills for handing to Private Members successful in the ballot.
TOP SECRET
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5. The unavoidable and possibly unavoidable Bills in lists A.l and A.2 call 
for little comment except that» while some of the latter may prove not to be required 
until a later Session, there may be others not in the list which, though on present 
information unlikely, we may later find that we have to include.
6. The “ programme ” Bills in lists B:1 and B.2 together constitute a 
programme much heavier than we can comfortably—perhaps even possibly— 
undertake. Some of them—for example, Housing Subsidies, Rating and Valuation, 
and Overseas Resources Development—are expressions of important political 
decisions which have yet to be considered by the Cabinet and which it may be 
decided to defer to a later Session. But to many of them we are already committed 
and the Committee recommend the Cabinet to agrée—
(u) That for all the Bills in lists B.l and B.2 the Ministers concerned should be 
invited to seek the necessary policy decisions as soon as possible. •
(b) That progress should be made with the drafting of all these Bills. (I should
mention that substantial progress has already been made.)
(c) That no Bills should at this stage be added to lists B.l and B.2 except on the
basis that particular, identified Bills are relegated to a later Session to 
make room for them.
Then, rather nearer the time, we can consider what further reductions must be made.
7. In conclusion I should like to draw the Cabinet’s attention to List P, the 
Bills which the Committee consider might be prepared for handing to Private 
Members successful in the ballot. This arrangement has the double advantage of 
increasing the amount of legislation desired by the Government without adding to 
the pressure on Government time and of obstructing at least some of the unwelcome 
legislation devised by Private Members for themselves.
R. A. B.
Home Office, S.IV. 1, 
8th June, I960.
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Appendix E:
Bills proposed to Cabinet for 1960-61 Parliamentary session
SESSION M m s t
Air Force 
Army
Finance 
Expiring Laws
List A.l—Essential Billâ
List A 2 —Contingent Bflk
Fisheries 
Eurocontrol 
Sierra Leone 
West Indies 
British Cameroons 
Ceylon
Southern RJhodcsia 
European Communities (Privileges) 
•Nuclear Tests 
Foreign Compensation 
Overseas Loans
List B.l- -Main Programme Bills
Covent Garden (Hybrid)
Land Drainage
Trustee Investment and Colonial Stock
Criminal Justice
Licensing
Housing
Rating and Valuation 
National Insurance 
Status of Post Office 
Succession (Scotland)
Criminal Justice (Scotland)
Transport (Railways)
Road Safety
List B.2—Other Programme Bills
Overseas Resources Development 
Commonwealth Ministers’ Immunities 
Scholarships, &c.
Public Health (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Supreme Court of Judicature 
Electricity (Isotopes)
Agricultural Research Council Superannuation 
Sheriffs Pensions (Scotland)
Trusts (Scotland)
Preservation of Countryside (Scotland)
Weights and léleâsures 
Trunk Roads ILand)
The “ Queena;”
Protection of Depositors
Reserve Forces
Hyde Park Garage (Hybrid)
Parliamentary Secretaries
National Health Service (Financial Structure or Contribution) 
TOP SECRET
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Appendix E continued
List C—Other BQk
Naval Enlistm ent 
Aerodromes
Perim and K uria M uria 
Public Libraries 
Overseas Education 
School Leaving D ates 
Continental Shelf 
Research H ospital 
Radiological f to to c tio n  Service 
Registration (Fees)
International H eadquarters 
N orthern Ireland  (Miscellaneous) 
W ater
Employment and  Training 
Judicial Officers* Pensions 
National Insurance (Amendment) I 
Convention on H igh Seas 
Nuclear Risks 
Licensing (Scotland)
Patents (Amendment)
Bankruptcy, &c. (Fees)
A nti-Trust Activities 
“ Savannah ”
M erchant Shipping (Safety)
British M useum 
Financial Institutions 
Decimal C urrency 
Corn Rents 
Crown Estate 
Land Powers (Defence)
List P—Private Members’ Bills
Agriculture (Miscellaneous)
Forestry 
Carriage by A ir 
Services for Old People 
Nursing
Local H ealth and W elfare Committee 
Grafting of H um an Tissues 
Social W orkers 
Fluoridation
Levy on Betting (Peppiatt)
Suicide
Summer T im e 
Employment Agencies 
Oaths
Home Safety Propaganda
Old M etal D ealers
Trade Effluents
Siting of C rem atoria
Local A uthorities (Publicity) (Scotland)
Litter Bins (Scotland)
Divorce (Scotland)
Local A uthorities (Contributions to Charities) (Scotland) 
Hall-marking
TOP SEC R ET
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Appendix F: Memo from  Butler to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
About the Suicide Bill, Handwritten note at bottom right is from Macmillan
y < f  2 '  OCT 1960
PRIME MINISTER
'  /
/ ^ You w i l l  have seen from th e  m inutes of  th e  Home A f fa i r s
Committee meeting y es te rd ay  2 0 th  m eeting, m inute 8)
t h a t  the  Committee agreed th a t  th e  Government shou ld  i n t r o ­
duce a B i l l  e a r ly  i n  the  new S ess io n  on l in e s  recommended by 
,, th e  Criminal Law R ev ision  Committee to  p rov ide  t h a t  su ic id e
I'I \
I apd^^at^e^ t e d  s u i c i de s h a l l  ceaa* to  he o ffen ces  and th a t  
co m p lic ity  i n  a n o th e r  p e rso n ’s s u ic id e  or a t tem p ted  su ic id e  
j s h a l l  he p u n ish ab le  by a maximum o f  fo u r te e n  years*  im prison­
ment, The Committee a lso  agreed t h a t  I  should ta k e  an e a r ly  
o p p o r tu n ity  o f  announcing our i n t e n t io n s .
I t  i s  proposed th a t  th e  B l l-l* should  be p u b l is h e d  on 
20 th  October. I t  i s  j io t  l i k e l y  to  be c o n t ro v e r s i a l  -  the  
Church Assembly Board fo r  S oc ia l R e s p o n s ib i l i ty  has p u b lish ed  
a R eport which i s  b ro ad ly  in  l i n e  w ith  what we p ro p o se .
y u .
,  .)o  c U .  i r * c A < ^
18 th  October. I960
■ Y ^ y -  '  p
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Appendix G
Memorandum from Cabinet Secretary 
(Norman Brook) to Prime Minister 
(Harold Macmillan) about the 
proposed Suicide Bill
FRBIF, MHasiBB
Y  0 ; 0071960
ET '
s s m
Tho Hone Sooamtaxgr #111 vi«h to report orally  to  tlm Oabinat 
on tho oontont o f h is  proposod B i l l  on Sulold*» Thin might oonvnsdnn^  
fo llo v  tho Iten on h is Lioenslng B ill#  Tho auioido B i l l  doe# two 
things* i t  provldos that sulolde and attaqptod nutoide mo longor
bo orimlnal offOnoes; and I t  oroato# a nov ofPanoo # end abottihg
someone e lse  to  oomoit or attengpt to oomoalt suicide -  #1% a fiMwrf—«m 
penalty of 14 years* loprisonsmxt#
2# Thoro seems to bo a fa ir ly  wide oonsonsua o f Infom ed opinioo
that attempted suieldo should no longer bo a criminal offhnoa# Thtc# 
are thought to  bo to 30,000 oases a year, of ahioh only about 5#000 
ocaxe to the notice of the polloe* In a rooant year tiboù t €00 sera  
proGoouted and found guilty o f attonptod suioida and %xe^  than h a lf of 
these aero sent to  prison# But i t  mes» to  bo the gsnoral opinion^ both 
in  the nedioal profession and in  the courts^ that th sie  poopXo mould bo 
b etter dealt rr ith  outside the oriednal Xaor « a# the xoajority alroady afo$ 
The Mental Health Act of la st session  mrnkos i t  ppsflblo to  datalA for  
26 days* observation a person mho sppears to  bo suffering fJPom ■ontal 
disorder and ought to  be detained for h is  osn health nr safoty#
3$ Tho proposal to  meke the change i s  not deritad tram %e
Criminal Lss Revision Cossdttos* admee report has ju st boon p A lisbsds 
I t  mas made by the Heme A ffairs Oonnlttse on tbs prppnssl df lAo Horn» 
Secretary, and tho Criniasl Ism fisr isio s Ocismittss' W # ' th a t
oonsoqoontial changes in  the Issr mould bo requirsd* tb s o a f ttffsnct 
o f aiding and sbettl%s( eonss frcn  them*
4; The orig in al Idea mas that th is  should be a Rcirats Mes&s** # 
B ill in  the oosdng session* but th is  mas la ter  f a i t  to  b# hardly 
appropriate and the B ill beosns looW sd  In the % #####$
The Hone Ssoxmtssy i s  odroridsring Introduotioo io' th e Bhu»# .of ,
24m ooyggR# I9d0
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S u ic id e  1$S1
1 * I  am d i r e c t e d  by th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  to  r e f e r  to  
th e  S u ic id e  Act, I 96 I ,  %hich rece iv ed  the  Royal Assent 
and cams i n t o  o p e ra t io n  on 3rd August, 196I ,
2 , TiiC p r in c i p a l  chance in  the law cade by th e  Act i s  
e f f e c t e d  by s e c t io n  1, which ab ro g a tes  the  r u l e  of law 
whereby i t  i s  a crime f o r  a person to  commit s u i c i d e ,  
f o l lo i r s  from t h i s  t h a t  i t  w i l l  no lo n g e r  be an o ffence  
a t te m p t  t o  commit s u ic i d e .
I t
to
3« I t  has  long been the  p r a c t i c e  of the  p o l i c e ,  in  
acco rdance  w ith the adv ice  con ta ined  in  parag raph  32 of 
s e c t i o n  XX of the Home O ffice  C onso lida ted  C ir c u la r  of 
May, 195s ,  on Crime and h indred  l e t t e r s ,  no t to  r ro s e c u te  
a p e rso n  who has a t tem p ted  to  commit s u ic id e  i f  he i s  
found to  have r e l a t i v e s  or f r ie n d s  who are  w i l l i n g  and 
ready  to  ta k e  care  o f  him and to  accep t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
and i f  th e re  appear to  be no o th e r  s p e c ia l  r ea so n s  to  
j u s t i f y  b r in g in g  him b e fo re  a c o u r t .  I t  w i l l  n e t  in  
f u t u r s  be open to  the  p o l ic e  to  p ro secu te  f o r  an a t tem p t 
to  commit s u ic id e  in  o rd e r  to  ensure th a t  the  person 
concerned  i s  p laced  under r e s t r a i n t  or r e c e iv e s  any 
n e c e s s a ry  t re a tm e n t .  The S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  i s  su re  
t h a t  th e  p o l ic e  w i l l  n e v e r th e le s s  wish to  co n t in u e  to  
g ive  w hatever help  they  can in  any case  of a t tem p ted  
« u ic id o  which cornea t o  t h e i r  n o t i c e .
Tho C hief  C onstab le . A *
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if* In r « r j cases r e la t iv e s  or fr ien d s  of - k# person
ooDoamed w ill  be ab le to  give the help and advt$# needed. 
In other oases the nature of the attempt w i l l  make i t  
necessazy fo r  him to  be admitted to  h o sp ita l for medical 
treatm ent, and arrangements are being made whereby in a l l  
suph oases p syob ia tric  in v estig a tio n  w i l l  be carried out 
so th a t the need fo r  treatment or supervision  can be a sse s ­
sed . Vi'here r e la t iv e s  or fr ien d s are not ava ilab le  to give  
him help and h o sp ita l treatment i s  not necessary, the b est  
e o ir se  mtj be, w ith h is  consent, to  ask h is  doctor to  
atten d  him. I f  he i s  relu ctan t to see h is  doctor he 
should b# advised that th is  i s  desirab le in  h is  own 
in te r e s t s . In appropriate oases the powers contained in  
Part IV of the Mental Health Act, 1959, w i l l  be exercised  
to  provide fo r  h is  compulsory detention in  hosp ita l;  
a p p lica tio n  fo r  adm ission to  hosp ital under these  
prow isioiia has to  be sm.de by the nearest r e la t iv e  or by 
a m ental w elfare o f f ic e r  and must be founded on two 
m édical recosa ends t ie n s , though in an emergency one 
raoommendation w i l l  s u f f ic e  in i t i a l l y .
5* There may remain a few cases in  which a person who 
has attempted su io id e  w i l l  not need h o sp ita l treatment 
fo r  h is  in ju r ie s , w i l l  r e j e c t  help and w i l l  not be found 
to  be su ffer in g  from a mental disorder which would ju s t i fy  
the use o f ccmpulsozy powers. There w i l l  generally  
be no means o f ensuring th at such a person i s  supervised  
or placed under any form o f  r e s tr a in t . Where, however, 
the nature of the attempt has an element o f nuisance and 
e n ta ils  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f injury to others -  as, for  
example, where the person making the attempt has to  be 
rescued a t the r isk  o f another's l i f e  -  i t  may be p o ssib le  
to  bring him before the J u s tic e s , so that they may bind 
him over and order him to  fin d  su reties  to  keep the 
peace or to  be o f good behaviour.
/ 6.
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6 , Subeeotion (1 ) of s ec tio n  2 o f the Act provides  
th a t i t  sh a ll  be an offen ce  fo r  any person to  a id , abet, 
counsel or procure the su ic id e  of another or an attempt 
by another to  commit s u ic id e . The offence w i l l  be tr ia b le  
on Indictm ent and w i l l  ca r iy  a maximum p en a lty  of fourteen  
years* imprisonment. The crea tion  of th is  o ffen ce  
preserves the e x is t in g  law su b sta n tia lly  unchanged in  
r e la t io n  to  a ccesso r ie s  to  su ic id e  or attem pted suicide#
7* Subsection (2 ) of se c t io n  2 enables the jury to  fin d  
a person g u ilty  o f the new offen ce i f  on the t r i a l  of an 
indictm ent fo r  murder or manslaughter the evidence shews 
th a t such a fin d in g  would be appropriate#
8# Subsection (3 ) of sec tio n  2 provides fo r  the adaptation  
of cer ta in  enactments, s e t  out in  the F ir s t  Schedule, 
which make various p rov ision s in  respect o f such matters 
as in q u e sts , ex tra d itio n , v i s i t in g  fo rces  and courts-  
m a rtia l, extending th e ir  a p p lica tio n  to cover the new  ^
offence#
9* Subsection (4) of s ec tio n  2 deals w ith the procedure 
in  resp ec t o f prosecutions fo r  the new o ffe n c e . I ts  
e f f e c t  i s  as fo llo w s ;-
( i )  T ria l by Quarter Sessions i s  excluded. The
offence w i l l  n ot, however, rank as hcmiicide and 
summary t r i a l  fo r  children and young persons, 
in  accordance w ith the p rovision s o f sec tio n s  
20 and 21 o f the M agistrates* Courts Act, 1952, 
w il l  th erefore not be excluded#
( i i )  IVoceedings may be in s t itu te d  only by or with
the consent o f the D irector o f P u blic  Prosecutions. 
V/here, however, the v ic tim  i s  a c h ild  or young
/perrf^-.
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sperson  i t  w i l l  be p o s s ib le  b e fo ie  th e  
D ire c to r  has been c o n su l ted  to  e x e r c i s e  the 
powers c o n fe r re d  by s e c t io n s  13 wid 40 of the  
C h ild ren  and Young Persons Act, 193), to  
a r r e s t  the  o f fe n d e r  and to  remove the  v ic t im  
to  a p la ce  o f  s a f e ty ,
1 0 .  Subsec tion  ( 2 )  of s e c t io n  3 p ro v id es  f o r  the  
r e p e a l  of the  enac tm en ts  l i s t e d  in  th e  Second Schedule 
to  th e  e x te n t  s p e c i f i e d .  Your a t t e n t i o n  i s  drawn 
p a r t i o u l a r l y  to  the  r e p e a l  of the  words " k i l l i n g  
h im s e l f  or" in  s u b s e c t io n s  (1} and (2 )  o f  s e c t i o n  4 of 
th e  Homicide Act, 1957. That s e c t io n  p ro v id es  t h a t  i t  
s h a l l  be m anslaugh ter  f o r  a person a c t i n g  in  pursuance  
o f  a s u ic id e  p a c t  between him and an o th e r  t o  k i l l  th e  
o th e r  o r  be a p a r ty  t o  the  o the r  k i l l i n g  h im se lf  or b e in g  
k i l l e d  by a t h i r d  p e rso n .  Cases in  which the  deceased  
d ie s  by h i s  own hand w i l l  now be covered  by th e  new 
o f fe n c e  c re a te d  in  s e c t i o n  2 of the  S u ic id e  Act, and 
th e  r e p e a l  of the words in  the Homicide Act has  the  effect 
t h a t  th e  o ffence  of m anslaughter  w i l l  no t be committed 
in  th e s e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s .
I am, Sir ,
Your obedient Servant,
CHI. 775A /1
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Appendix I
List of people interviewed 
(in alphabetical order)
Leo Abse: Former M.P., long time campaigner for reform of the law on social issues 
(divorce, homosexuahty, capital punishment); speaker in House debates on Suicide 
Bill
Lord (Noel) Annan; Provost of Kings College Cambridge 1956-66; Vice-Chancellor 
University of London 1978-81; author oîThe Intellectual Aristocracy (1956) and Our 
Age, Portrait o f a Generation 1990
Lord (Kenneth) Baker: Former M.P.; Government Minister 1981-92 (Cabinet 1985- 
92)
Lady (Moliie) Butler: Widow of Lord Butler (RAB Butler)
Lord (Paul) Channon: Former M.P.; Government Minister 1979-89 (Cabinet 1986- 
89); Parliamentary Private Secretary to RAB Butler as Home Secretary 1960-62
John Croft: Former Head of Home Office Research Unit
Sir Charles Cunningham: Permanent Under Secretary of State, Home Office, 1957- 
66
Lord (William) Deedes: Former M.P., member of the House Committee on the 
Suicide Bill; Parhamentary Under Secretary, Home Office 1955-57
Rev. Prof. G.R.Dunstan: Secretary to Church of England Board for Social 
Responsibility 1955-63; Convened committee to consider suicide law; Professor of 
Moral and Social Theology Kings College London 1967-82; Vice President Institute of 
Medical Ethics 1985-;
Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke QC: Former M.P.; Joint Parhamentary Under Secretary 
of State Home Office 1961-63; the Minister who put the Suicide BiU through the 
House of Commons
Francis Graham-Harrison: Assistant Under Secretary of State, Home Office 1957- 
63
Rose Hacker: Social activist; pohtical volunteer for Kenneth Robinson M.P. in his 
north London constituency (St. Paneras North); knew Dr, Doris Odhim
Anthony Howard: Official biographer of RAB Butler; at the time of the Suicide Bill 
he was on the editorial staff of MANCHESTER GUARDIAN (1959-61) and then 
pohtical correspondent of The New Statesman (1961-64)
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Lord (Peter) Lnbert: started as policeman on the beat in London in 1954, ultimately 
became Commissioner of the Metropohtan Police 1987-93
Lord (Roy) Jenkins: Former M R, Government Minister 1964-70, 1974-76 (Cabinet 
1965-70, 1974-76)
Sir Ivan Lawrence QC: Former M.P; Chairman Commons Home ASairs Committee 
1992-97
Lord (Christopher) Mayhew: Former M.P., member of the House Committee on the 
Suicide Bill
Colette Maitland-Warne: Probation Of&cer in Yorkshire and London in 1950s and 
1960s
Lord (John) Moore: Former M.P., Government Minister 1979-89 (Cabinet 1986-89)
Lord (David) Renton: Former M.P., Joint Parhamentary Under Secretary of State 
Home Office 1958-61; Minister of State Home Office 1961-62; President, Statute Law 
Society 1980-
Sidney Rosoff: Former Chairman of the U.S. Society for the Right to Die, and 
President of the Hemlock Society U.S.A.
Margaret Simestra: Samaritan in Bournemouth who knew Dr. Doris Odium
Jeanette Stockell: Former casualty nurse at Charing Cross Hospital in 1950s
Roy Thomas; Started as pohceman on the beat in London in 1956, ultimately became 
Chief Inspector with the Metropohtan Pohce and head of the Vice Squad in Lambeth 
in 1980s
Mary Tuck: Former Head of Home Office Research Unit
Sir William van Straubenzee: Former M.P., member of the House Committee on 
the Suicide Bih
Rev. Chad Varah: Founder of the Samaritans, the voluntary organisation to befiiend 
the suicidal and despairing; long term fiiend of Dr. Doris Odium
Doreen Yardley: Probation Officer in London's East End in 1950s and 1960s
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